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During a parliamentary speech in November, 1981, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
said that to her, “Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom; as much as my 
constituency is”. This statement is commonly paraphrased and quoted as ‘Northern 
Ireland is a British as Finchley.’ The quote is often used as evidence of Thatcher’s 
dedication to maintaining the union with Northern Ireland. It is surprising then that in 
1990 Peter Brooke, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, said in a public speech 
that the Thatcher Government had “no selfish economic or strategic interest” in Northern 
Ireland and that should the majority vote for unification, they would consent. 
 
The principal aim of this project is to discover why the Thatcher Government’s 
attitude towards Northern Ireland changed. It will be dominated by an exploration of how 
both governments addressed the issue of the perpetual Northern Irish crisis. This study 
will delve into the personal relationships between the key Anglo-Irish political figures of 
the decade, namely Thatcher, Charles J. Haughey and Garret FitzGerald. Public interest 
in Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister was heightened following her death in 2013, the 
aftermath of which saw re-runs of television documentaries and interviews with her 
colleagues. Scholarly interest in the period has also grown due to the release of 
governmental records under the twenty-year and thirty-year rule in London, Dublin and 
Belfast. Overall, this is a timely study that aims to extract key information from the newly 
released records in order to explore Anglo-Irish relations between 1979-1990. Existing 
literature on Thatcher’s premiership is comprehensive. However, a specific study of the 
attitude of the Thatcher Government towards Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations 
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An Unrequited Love Affair? Unionism and Conservatism, 1885-
1979 
Northern Ireland always tended, sooner or later, to bring out in mainland leaders an 
opposite set of emotions: of indifference, boredom or the kind of despair which makes all 
action seem futile.1 
 
The question of Ireland, and its relationship with the United Kingdom (UK), was from the 
first Home Rule Bill of 1885 one of the great dividing lines of British politics.2 The 
Conservative party’s political dominance in Britain between 1886 and 1906 was inaugurated 
and arguably entrenched by its stand of defending the 1801 Act of Union. To be a British 
Conservative was to be Unionist. It was intimately bound up with perceptions of national and 
strategic interest, popular imperialism and mistrust of the largely catholic electorate of 
Ireland. Yet, following the creation of the Northern Ireland state in 1921, the sting went out 
of the Irish question in British domestic politics. The Irish Free State, which was created in 
1922, would become almost Hibernia incognito while Northern Ireland and its polarized 
politics was overlooked. Throughout the twentieth century, Conservative policy on the Irish 
question fluctuated due to the political, social and economic climate in the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland.3  
 
Research Questions, Contribution to Knowledge, Research Methods, Methodology 
and Structure of Thesis 
This thesis examines the changing nature of British government policy in Northern Ireland 
during Margaret Thatcher’s long term in office. When Thatcher became leader of the 
Conservative Party she indicated that she would repair relations between the Conservatives 
                                                
1 Hugo Young, One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher (London: Pan, 1993), p. 465. 
2 Two of the best studies on the history of the Irish issue in British politics are D. George Boyce, The Irish Question and 
British Politics, 1868-1996 (London: Macmillan, 1996) and Peter Catterall and Sean McDougall (eds.,), The Northern 
Ireland Question in British Politics (London: Macmillan, 1996). See also Alvin Jackson, The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists 
in the House of Commons, 1884-1911 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). For more on the successive Home Rule crises please see 
especially Alvin Jackson, Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800-2000 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003). 
3 For an overview of the social, economic and political climate in Ireland see D. George Boyce, Nineteenth Century Ireland 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2005) and Alvin Jackson, Ireland: 1798-1998 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). 
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and Unionists. Thatcher claimed to be ‘profoundly Unionist’ yet by the end of her tenure 
Peter Brooke, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, stated that the British Government 
had ‘no selfish economic or strategic interest’ in Northern Ireland.4 This thesis will consider 
whether the apparent shift in attitude was reflective of Thatcher’s own views towards the 
situation in Northern Ireland.    
 
 The second theme revolves around wider Anglo-Irish relations. The 1980s proved to 
be a tumultuous time period. The violence in Northern Ireland increased and spread to 
mainland UK; politics in the Republic of Ireland proved to be unstable as Fine Gael and 
Fianna Fáil vied for the Taoiseach’s Office, with Haughey serving as Taoiseach thrice 
between 1979 and 1992 and FitzGerald twice between 1981 and 1987. How did London view 
the two Taoiseachs, and did their policies and personalities have an effect on Thatcher? Did 
they differ in their approach to Anglo-Irish relations, and if so, why? Kilheeney’s work 
focuses on Thatcher’s involvement in shaping Northern Ireland policy during her time as 
Prime Minister.5 Through her research, Kilheeney discovered that Thatcher was not the 
autocratic ‘Iron Lady’ most people, and indeed some historians, assume her to be. In regards 
to Northern Ireland policy, she could be pragmatic. But looking at how policy was discussed 
and meetings were prepared for by Dublin is pivotal to understanding how Anglo-Irish 
relations in the 1980s developed. To leave out Dublin completely is to miss half of the story, 
especially when we arrive at the AIA. Contrariwise, to focus primarily on Dublin, as Kelly 
did, is to disregard the nuances between Dublin and London.6 Part of the analysis of this 
thesis involves identifying the subtle differences in approach and evaluation between meeting 
agendas and summations of each government. In doing this, this study offers another layer 
of analysis which has not been appreciated before. Moore also attempted this in his 
biographies of Thatcher, but due to the time scale and different issues he covers, he is only 
                                                
4 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 2012), p. 385, Karen Johnston Miller, Duncan 
McTavish, Making and Managing Public Policy (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 169. Peter Brooke, Baron Brooke of 
Sutton Mandeville, Conservative. MP 1977-2001. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 1989-1992. Brooke resigned after 
Gay Byrne, host of RTÉ programme ‘The Late Late Show’ convinced him to sing ‘Oh My Darling, Clementine’ the same 
day the PIRA had killed seven protestant construction workers. This was deemed highly disrespectful and outraged the 
Ulster Unionists. 
5 Kilheeney, ‘Ministers Advise, Prime Minister’s Decide?’ 
6 Stephen Kelly, ‘A Failed Political Entity’: Charles Haughey and the Northern Ireland Question, 1945-1992 (Kildare: 
Merrion Press, 2016), 
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able to dedicate one chapter to Northern Ireland in his works.7 This means we miss out on 
key details which better explain how Anglo-Irish relations developed during the 1980s. It is 
this gap that this thesis attempts to bridge.  
 
 Although this thesis focuses primarily on the UK and the Republic of Ireland, the 
third theme involves looking at other influences on Anglo-Irish relations. This includes a 
brief look into how the international political arena could shape Thatcher’s Irish policy 
(chapters three and five) and how political scandals could affect relations between Dublin 
and London (chapters three, six and seven). Throughout the 1980s there were a string of 
paramilitary attacks on members of the security forces, government officials and the general 
public (see chapters one, four and seven) which also affected Anglo-Irish relations. In order 
to understand how key policies were shaped and discussed, this thesis offers a study of the 
stresses and strains that were placed on the key negotiating figures. 
 
There is also a study of how Anglo-Irish relations continued after the AIA, something 
previous works have only been able to briefly refer to due to the lack of available 
documentation. This thesis covers from 1979 to 1990, meaning that this work delves further 
into Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy than has hitherto been possible. Some political 
studies, including the works of McGarry and O’Leary, have covered this time period.8 
However, again for the years preceding the AIA most offer a brief overview of key events 
without being able to explain what happened behind the scenes. This thesis offers a dedicated 
study into a contemporary subject, looking in particular at how policy was shaped by the 
Anglo-Irish political elite. 
 
 As this thesis focuses on the Anglo-Irish political elite, it is open to criticism from 
historians of the ‘history from below’ tradition.9 Although the effects of the decisions of the 
political elite on the general population in Northern Ireland is discussed at various points 
                                                
7 Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorised Biography, Volume One: Not for Turning (London: Allen Lane, 2013) 
and Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography: Volume Two: Everything She Wants (London: Penguin, 2016). 
8 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (London: Athlone 
Press, 1992), Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995),  
9 The lead historian from this movement is Maurice Cowling. See especially Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics 
and British Policy, 1933-1940 (Chicago and London” The University of Chicago Press, 1977). 
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throughout this thesis, the focus will remain on Thatcher, Haughey, FitzGerald and their 
teams. This is simply because of the release of the respective government files from the time 
period. For the first time, we as historians can closely examine what happened behind the 
scenes between the British and Irish governments. This therefore contextualises the major 
events of the 1980s and fully explains how key policies and decisions were reached.  
 
Some may argue that given that this study looks into the events of 30 years ago, it 
cannot technically be classified as ‘history.’ Barraclough wrote that contemporary history 
was merely the study of a process, and ‘does not constitute a separate period with distinctive 
characteristics of its own.’10 To exclude the 1980s from the wider story of the Northern 
Ireland peace process would take away one of the founding blocks of Anglo-Irish relations. 
Although fall-outs between Thatcher and either Haughey or FitzGerald were numerous, it 
cannot be denied that significant progress was made between Dublin and London in the 
eleven years that Thatcher was Prime Minister. Aside from this, understanding more about 
how Anglo-Irish relations developed in the 1980s gives us the opportunity to discover how 
diplomacy between two countries with opposing views can develop, a useful lesson in any 
era. 
 
The main inspiration behind this project stems from the 2013 ruling that documents 
held within the National Archives in London from the 1980s were to be released under a new 
twenty-year rule. For the first time, the Thatcher government papers, also known as the Prime 
Minister’s Office Files (PREM) were available to study. Thatcher also passed away in 2013 
which sparked interest in her time as Prime Minister from both members of the public, via 
media interviews with her colleagues and television documentaries. Those who contributed 
to Jackson and Saunders’ edited essay collection as well as Kelly, Kilheeney and Moore, 
were able to make some use of these files releases and those published online by The 
Margaret Thatcher Foundation.11 As aforementioned, these works are focused on either 
Dublin or London politics, and were unable to go in to detail about Anglo-Irish relations post 
1985. Because this work was completed in 2018, I was able to access PREM files dating 
                                                
10 Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History (Middlesex: Penguin, 1967). See also Eric Hobsbawm, 
On History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997) for more on the limitations of studying the political elite. 
11 Robert Saunders and Ben Jackson (eds.,), Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
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from 1979 to 1990. I was also able to collect files from the Cabinet Office (CAB), the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Northern Ireland Office (CJ4), however due to the 
limited time allowed to complete this PhD, I decided to focus on the PREM files as these 
contained the most information on the inner-workings of Thatcher and her team.  
 
The government of the Republic of Ireland did not adopt a twenty-year rule, but there 
were still documents released from 1979 to 1987 under the thirty-year rule. I therefore 
collected files from both the Department of the Taoiseach (TAOIS) and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs (DFA). I also collected some files from the Public Records Office of 
Northern Ireland, however I found these to be largely in line with what I had found within 
the CJ4 files. The documents I studied from each repository varied from telegrams, 
memorandums, briefings, official letters and summaries.  
 
One of the more fascinating aspects of the PREM files was that Thatcher was a 
detailed note taker. A lot of the unique findings contained within this thesis are taken from 
these handwritten notes. Thatcher used different lines to express her appreciation of a memo. 
According to Charles Powell, who deciphered the meanings behind the different styles during 
an interview for the 1993 documentary series, ‘The Downing Street Years’; A wavy 
underline meant ‘this is absolute rubbish’; A single underline meant that Thatcher would 
commit that fact/statement to memory; A double underline meant ‘I agree’; Finally, a rare 
triple underline, which was often accompanied by a short notation in the margin and extra 
ticks, meant ‘Bulls eye!’ I will indicate if the underlines contained within this thesis are 
present on the original document. 
 
 While I was collecting files from Belfast, Dublin and London I noted that entire files, 
particularly from the 1986-1989 period, had been withheld from release. There were also 
some documents from within the released files which had been entirely or partially redacted. 
This is due to international security concerns as some of the information must have been 
sensitive. It is also partly due to the fact that some of the figures from the time period, for 
example John Hume, are still alive. I therefore decided to complete several freedom of 
information (FOI) requests from the Cabinet Office to try to access some of the withheld 
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information from 1986-1990. Before I submitted the requests, I sought advice from Chris 
Collins, the Director of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, on how best to word these 
requests. Chris had experience with submitting FOIs and was able to guide me. In the end, I 
only succeeded in one request; to access documents that covered meetings between the 
British and Irish Foreign Secretaries regarding Anglo-Irish relations, and I had to cease my 
requests because the Cabinet Office informed me that they had become ‘vexatious’ But I was 
able to use FOI 0231-17 in the later chapters of this work.  
 
I also wanted to further understand how Thatcher behaved after the AIA. In order to 
achieve this, I decided to try to contact Tom King and Peter Brooke, Secretaries of State for 
Northern Ireland from 1985-1989 and 1989-1992 respectively. I was only able to contact Mr. 
King as Mr. Brooke had retired from the House of Lords in 2015. Mr. King was happy to 
correspond with me via email, and his responses to several of my questions are contained 
within this thesis. 
 
The following chapters will follow a chronological narrative. The reason for this is to 
ensure that the vast collection of primary resources are used to their full advantage. 
Government files are grouped together by subject, for example the Prime Minister’s Office 
Files which are used here were contained within the ‘Ireland’ series. The individual 
documents are then kept in chronological order. Using this method also emphasises how 
issues between Dublin and London escalated over time. For example, we can see how 
Thatcher’s reservation towards the Anglo-Irish talks culminated in the ‘out out out’ burst of 
1984 (chapter four). There are slight overlaps between the time periods covered in chapters 
one and six, but this is due to the major events these chapters cover. This thesis covers three 
stages in Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy; from engagement between 1979-1984; 
estrangement between 1985-1986; and finally, disengagement between 1987-1990. Such a 
comprehensive study of Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy has not been undertaken before. 




In order to better understand the Thatcher Government’s attitude to Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland, the remainder of this introduction will outline the history of the 
Conservative-Unionist dynamic from 1885 to 1979.12 Due to the long time-scale covered, 
and to fully understand how relations developed over time, the introduction will follow a 
chronological narrative style. Key incidents will be analyzed alongside the actions of 
important political figures of the period. This will begin with the Home Rule crises of the 
late nineteenth century.  
 
The 1880s were a period of tremendous agrarian unrest in Ireland. William Ewart 
Gladstone, Liberal Prime Minister, in the face of the Land War and the electoral success of 
Charles Stewart Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party, by 1885 came to the conclusion that the 
only solution to the Irish problem was Home Rule.13 The First Home Rule Bill of 1886 was 
defeated in the House of Commons. Gladstone tried to introduce a Second Bill in 1893 and 
this did pass the vote in the Commons. However, it was defeated by the Conservative 
majority in the House of Lords. In spite of this, and in retaliation to suspicions that the 
Conservative party had started to reconsider Home Rule, the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) 
was formed in 1905.14 The UUC brought together and officiated local Unionist organisations 
throughout Ulster.  
 
After Edward Carson became leader of the Irish Unionist Party in 1910, he fought a 
sustained campaign against Home Rule.15 The threat of Home Rule persisted as the Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP), led by John Redmond, held the key to a majority. The British 
General Election of January 1910 left the Liberal party with a two seat majority over the 
                                                
12 For a background to the Conservative party in Ireland and their attitude to the Union pre-1886, please see Andrew Shields, 
The Irish Conservative Party, 1852-1868: Land, Politics and Religion (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007). 
13 William Ewart Gladstone, Liberal. Prime Minister 1868-1874, 1880-1885, 1886 and 1892-1894. See especially David 
George Boyce and Alan O’Day (eds), Gladstone and Ireland: Politics, Religion and Nationality in the Victorian Age 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and Jeremy Smith, The Tories and Ireland: Conservative Party Politics and the 
Home Rule Crisis, 1910-1914 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2000). For a biography of Gladstone see John Morley, The 
Life of William Ewart Gladstone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). The Irish Parliamentary Party is also 
referred to as the Home Rule Party. It was founded by Isaac Butt in 1874 and was dissolved in 1922. 
14 For more on the UUC, please see Graham Walker, A History of the Ulster Unionist Party; Protest, Pragmatism and 
Pessimism (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2004). 
15 Baron Edward Carson, Leader of the Irish Unionist Parliamentary Party and the Ulster Unionist Party, 1910-1921. Two 
of the best biographies in Carson are Ian Colvin and Edward Marjoribanks, The Life of Lord Carson, Vol. 1 (London: 
Gollancz, 1932) The Life of Lord Carson, Vol. 2 (London: Gollancz, 1934) and The Life of Lord Carson, Vol. 3 (London: 
Gollancz, 1936) and Alvin Jackson, Sir Edward Carson (Dundalk: Morgan Press, 1993). 
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Conservatives. An alliance with the IPP, who were the largest minority party with 82 returned 
Members of Parliament (MPs), would leave the Liberals with a comfortable hold over the 
Commons.16 When the Third Home Rule Bill passed in April 1912, Unionists became more 
determined than ever to stop the initiative. Carson led the people of North-East Ireland on 
Ulster Day in September.17 During the same time, the Ulster Volunteers began to emerge as 
the fighting force against Home Rule. The Third Home Rule Bill also saw Conservative 
leaders use language that was tantamount to provocation, such was their vociferous attempts 
to disrupt the passage of the Bill. But Ulster Unionists continued to turn to militant action. 
The UUC organised the Larne gun-running, a major smuggling operation to equip the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF) with arms sent from Germany. WW1 saw the Third Home Rule Bill 
delayed for 6 years.  
 
In the interim, the Easter Rising of 1916 by the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) 
significantly altered support for independence in Ireland and saw the rise of Sinn Féin, an 
Irish nationalist party.18 Eventually in 1920 the Fourth Home Rule Bill, officially the 
Government of Ireland Act, was enacted. This oversaw the formation of Northern Ireland 
and the Irish Free State. Yet the Irish problem remained unsolved. The Anglo-Irish War, or 
the Irish War of Independence, which had begun in 1919, continued until the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty of 1921 was signed.19 The Treaty caused outrage amongst Unionists due to the 
establishment of Irish independence. Northern Ireland opted out of the Free State and a 
Boundary Commission was set up to draw up a border.20 Following partition, evidence 
suggests that, for the most part, British politics disengaged from the Irish question.  
 
                                                
16 Neal Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People: The General Elections of 1910 (London: MacMillan, 1972), p. 377. 
17 See Ronald McNeill, Ulster’s Stand for Union (London: tradition, 2012), A.T.Q. Stewart, Ulster Crisis: Resistance to 
Home Rule, 1912-1914 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1997) and Walker, A History of the Ulster Unionist Party for more on 
the Ulster Covenant. 
18 For more on the Easter Rising see especially Fearghal McGarry, The Rising: Ireland, Easter 1916 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 
19 There is an extensive selection of historiographies covering the Anglo-Irish War. Two of the best are Michael Hopkinson, 
The Irish War of Independence, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2002) and Charles Townsend, The Republic: The Fight for 
Irish Independence, 1918-1923 (London: Penguin, 2014). For more on the Anglo-Irish Treaty see especially Jason Knirck, 
Imagining Ireland’s Independence: The Debates Over the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2005) and Frank Longford, Peace by Ordeal: An Account, from First Hand Sources, of the Negotiation and 
Signature of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1921 (London: New English Library, 1967).  
20 See especially Paul Murray, The Irish Boundary Commission and its Origins, 1886-1925 (Dublin: University College 
Dublin Press, 2011). 
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Between 1932 and 1938, Britain and the Irish Free State were engaged in a Trade 
War.21 The dispute stemmed from the Free State’s refusal to pay Britain land annuities. The 
Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement, signed by Éamon de Valera, leader of Fianna Fáil and 
Taoiseach, and Neville Chamberlain, Conservative Prime Minister, ended the war.22 The 
terms of the settlement, however, caused an argument amongst the Conservatives in the 
Commons when it was revealed that Chamberlain had surrendered Irish Treaty Ports. The 
Republic of Ireland’s neutrality during WW2 led Winston Churchill, Conservative Prime 
Minister, to state that he was ‘sick’ of Ireland.23 Following the Republic of Ireland Act of 
1948, in which Ireland declared itself an independent Republic, the UK government passed 
the Ireland Act in 1949. 
 
Aside from recognising the Republic of Ireland as an independent country, the Ireland 
Act also stated that Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK as long as the majority of 
its citizens wanted to. During the 1950s and up until 1969, relations between the 
Conservatives and the Ulster Unionists disintegrated into a series of spats as Jeremy Smith 
outlined in his article ‘Ever Reliable Friends.’24 Unionist paranoia increased as paramilitary 
violence, particularly during the PIRA’s border campaign between 1956 and 1962, escalated. 
Meanwhile, the Conservative party tried to reinvent itself as a modern party. Its link with the 
Unionists proved an embarrassment as sectarianism continued. Therefore, the Conservative 
party slipped into a ‘certain coolness’ towards their colleagues across the Irish Sea.25 
                                                
21 See Alvin Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998: War, Peace and Beyond (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) for more on the Trade 
War and its consequences. 
22 Éamon de Valera, co-founder of Fianna Fáil. Leader of Fianna Fáil 1926-1959. Taoiseach 1937-1948, 1951-1956 and 
1957-1959. President of Ireland 1959-1973. For biographies of de Valera please see Tim Pat Coogan, De Valera: Long 
Fellow, Long Shadow (London: Arrow, 1995) and Ronan Fanning, Éamon de Valera: A Will to Power (London: Faber and 
Faber, 2016). Neville Chamberlain, Conservative. Leader of the Party 1937-1940. Prime Minister 1937-1940. See Ian 
Chambers, The Chamberlains, the Churchill’s and Ireland, 1874-1922 (New York: Cambria Press, 2006) for more on 
Chamberlain’s efforts in resisting Home Rule in Ireland. 
23 Bew, Churchill and Ireland, p. 141. Sir Winston Churchill, Conservative. Leader of the Conservative Party 1940-1955. 
Prime Minister 1940-1945 and 1951-1955. For more on Churchill and Ireland please see Kevin Matthews, ‘Churchill and 
Ulster Unionists: 1918-1925’ in The Churchill’s in Ireland, 1660-1965: Connections and Controversies, ed., by Robert 
McNamara (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2012) and Richard Toye ‘“Phrases Make History Here”: Churchill, Ireland and 
the Rhetoric of Empire,’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 38, no. 4 (2010). Ireland’s reasons for 
adopting neutrality, and the consequences of Churchill’s anger, can be found in Bryce Evans, Ireland During the Second 
World War: Farewell to Plato’s Cave (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014). For a view into how the Irish were 
treated in England during the interwar period, including during the Irish Civil War, please see Mo Moulton, Ireland and the 
Irish in Interwar England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
24 Jeremy Smith, ‘Ever Reliable Friends’? The Conservative Party and Ulster Unionism in the Twentieth Century,’ The  
English Historical Review, vol. 491, no 490 (2006). 
25 iBid., 
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However, they were forced to engage with Northern Ireland with the onset of The Troubles 
in 1969.26 The emergence of Thatcher as Conservative party leader, and her New Right 
ideology, signified to the Unionists that a change was on the horizon.27 
 
When Thatcher became leader of the Conservative party in 1975, interest in 
maintaining the Union was at an all time low. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) had broken 
ties with the Conservatives in 1972.28 For Unionists, Thatcher’s instalment as leader of the 
Conservative party signified a new age. On the surface she appeared more invested in 
Northern Ireland than many of her predecessors. At various times she referred to the 
province. In Belfast in 1978 she had said that the Conservative and Unionist parties were 
united by one ‘common purpose: the maintenance and strengthening of the Union.’29 The 
final section of this introduction will outline the central research question this thesis seeks to 
answer. It will also delve into the existing historiography, indicating the contribution to 
knowledge this work offers. Further to this a discussion of the methodology will be outlined 
in order to understand where the information used has come from. 
 
Playing the Orange Card: Westminster and the Home Rule Crises, 1885-1921 
From 1885, Gladstone began to lobby for Home Rule in Ireland.30 His Home Rule bills 
stressed the insignificance of Unionists in the Irish question. For Loughlin, this revealed 
Gladstone’s ignorance of ‘the northern Protestant community and the seriousness of the 
threat it posed.’31 Gladstone failed to realise the emotional impact Home Rule would have 
on Unionists. ‘The intensity of emotion associated with it had been steadily building up in 
                                                
26 For more on the impact of The Troubles on Britain, please refer to Graham Dawson, Jo Dover and Stephen Hopkins 
(eds.,), The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain: Impacts, Engagements, Legacies and Memories (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2017). 
27 Thatcher wrote two books about her life before and during her time as Prime Minister. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing 
Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993) and The Path to Power (London: HarperCollins, 1995). There is also a 
collection of selected speeches and interviews in Margaret Thatcher and Iain Dale, Margaret Thatcher: In Her Own Words 
(London Biteback, 2010). For more on Thatcher and Thatcherism please see Jonathan Aitken, Margaret Thatcher: Power 
and Personality (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), E.H.H. Green, Thatcher (London: Hodder Arnold, 2006), Charles Moore, 
Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography: Vol. One: Not for Turning (London: Allen Lane, 2013) and Margaret 
Thatcher: The Authorized Biography: Vol. Two: Everything She Wants (London: Penguin, 2016) and Stanislao G. Pugliese, 
The Political Legacy of Margaret Thatcher (London: Politico’s, 2003). 
28 Smith, ‘Ever Reliable Friends.’ 
29 MTF, ‘Margaret Thatcher, Speech to Ulster Unionist Council (business lunch),’ 19 June 1978, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103715.  
30 Loughlin, Ulster Question Since 1945, p. 7. 
31 Loughlin, Gladstone, Home Rule and the Ulster Question, 1882-1893 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1986), p. 132, p. 123. 
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previous years.’ Unionists believed they had colonised Ulster on Britain’s behalf, therefore 
Britain was bound by honour not to abandon them there and ‘(hand) them over to their 
enemies.’32 For Ulster Unionists, Home Rule was the ultimate betrayal by the British 
Government.33 Yet, even within the Conservative party, there was support for Home Rule. 
 
Lord Henry Carnarvon, then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, invited Parnell to London to 
discuss Home Rule, and revealed in private that he was in favour of it.34 Lord Randolph 
Churchill, a charismatic Conservative politician who later denounced Home Rule, also met 
with Parnell. Even the Tory Whip at the time, Rowland Winn, met with Richard Power, Whip 
for the Irish Parliamentary Party, to talk about the Irish problem. Jackson surmised that in 
1885, the Conservatives were ‘playing the political field.’35 When some Conservative figures 
rejected Home Rule, Unionists believed they had support at Westminster.  
 
The aforementioned Churchill was the first such champion. His true attitude to Home 
Rule was ambiguous, and remains so in historiography.36 But in 1886, Ulster Unionists had 
reason to believe that Churchill was on their side. He had grown up in ‘an atmosphere 
favourable to Ulster Unionism’ and was aware of his personal links to the province.37 
Churchill’s trip to Belfast in 1886 swiftly entered Unionist folklore and has been described 
as the high point of Home Rule fever. ‘Its effect was to bring the Ulster Unionist case to the 
                                                
32 Loughlin, Gladstone, pp. 157-161. Catholics and protestants had experienced social and economic segregation since the 
Ulster Plantation in the seventeenth century. In northern industries, including ship building and textiles, managerial posts 
were strictly reserved for protestant applicants. Such was the level of segregation between catholic and protestant that ‘for 
the most part, they only knew each other through the public pronouncements of political leaders.’ The ‘them and us’ culture 
that had evolved between the Protestants and Catholics of Ireland create a unique minefield for successive British 
Governments to negotiate. To fully understand the ongoing political issues of the twentieth century, the situation needs to 
be understood as a multi-faceted set of problems. For the role of religion, see Marianne Elliott, When God Took Sides: 
Religion and Identity in Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). To understand the influence political ideology 
played, please see Richard Bourke, Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas (London: Pimlico, 2003). See Jon Calame, Esthher 
Charlesworth, Lebbeus Woods, Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania, 2012), 
33 Loughlin, Ulster Question, p. 7. 
34 Grenfell Morton, Home Rule and the Irish Question (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 30. Henry Herbert, Earl of Carnarvon. 
Conservative. Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1885-1886. 
35 Jackson, Home Rule, pp. 49-50. See also Allen Warren, ‘Lord Salisbury and Ireland, 1859-1887: Principles, Ambition 
and Strategies,’ Parliamentary History, vol. 26, no. 2 (2007), pp. 203-224. 
36 See Alistair B. Cooke, Ulster: The Origins of the Problem (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1988) and Jeremy 
Smith, The Tories and Ireland: Conservative Party Politics and the Home Rule Crisis, 1910-1914 (Dublin: Irish Academic 
Press, 2000). Quinault believed that Churchill’s concerns for Ulster were genuine, and stemmed from his familial links to 
the area, R.E. Quinault, ‘Lord Randolph Churchill and Home Rule,’ Irish Historical Studies, vol. 22, no. 84 (1979), pp. 
377-403. 
37 Quinault, ‘Lord Randolph Churchill and Home Rule,’ pp. 377-403. 
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forefront of political attention.’38 Churchill assured the crowd that England would support 
the fight against Home Rule and would take up arms if necessary. ‘Ulster will fight and Ulster 
will be right’ became the battle cry against Home Rule. He used the Irish issue to his 
advantage by establishing himself as an expert on Irish affairs at Westminster.39 Churchill 
flashed the orange card and admitted that he hoped it was the right one to play before the 
General Election of July 1886. Foster argues that his actions were tactical, ‘founded on short-
term goals’ and that he ‘detached himself from Unionism as swiftly as was decent.’40 
Churchill’s front-bench career ended in September 1886. Churchill tried to call Lord 
Salisbury’s bluff over his unpopular budget cuts by threatening to resign.41 Salisbury 
accepted Churchill’s resignation unconditionally, his ‘meteoric political career’ was over.42 
The First Home Rule Bill had also failed. It was defeated by 30 votes in the Commons and 
until the Second Home Rule Bill in 1893, ‘Ulsteria’ within the Conservative party waned.43 
 
In the interim between the First and Second Home Rule Bills, while Salisbury was 
Prime Minister, Conservative rhetoric on Home Rule and Ireland was almost non-existent. 
This gives credence to Jackson’s hypothesis that anti-Home Rule statements by the 
Conservatives only occurred when they were in opposition and needed ‘to rally support 
around a popular cause.’ Jackson also points out that Irish Unionists had not yet agreed ‘what 
they were defending, or how it should be defended.’ Therefore, ‘complete harmony’ with the 
Conservative party could not be achieved.44 The thing that held the alliance together was the 
belief that ‘Parnellite Nationalism did not represent the true feeling of the Irish people.’45 
The split in the Home Rule party in 1890, caused by the scandal of Katharine O’Shea naming 
Parnell as her lover in her divorce papers, weakened the Home Rule movement 
                                                
38 Walker, A History of the Ulster Unionist Party, pp. 10-11 and Foster, Lord Randolph Churchill, p. 257. 
39 Foster, Lord Randolph Churchill, p. 41. 
40 R.F. Foster, Paddy and Mr. Punch, Connections in Irish and English History (London: Faber, 2011), p. 250. 
41 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, known as Lord Salisbury until 1865, the Viscount Cranborne from 1866-1868, and thereafter the 
Marquess of Salisbury. Conservative Prime Minister 1885-1886, 1886-1892 and 1895-1902.  
42 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher (London: Heinemann, 1997), pp. 158-159 and Norman 
McCord and Bill Purdue, British History 1815-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 411. 
43 Jackson, The Ulster Party, p. 117. 
44 iBid., pp. 116-117, p. 119. 
45 Peter Davis, ‘The Liberal Unionist Party and the Irish Policy of Lord Salisbury’s Government,’ The Historical Journal, 
vol. 18, no. 1 (1975), pp. 85-104. 
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considerably.46 When a General Election was called in 1892, Home Rule was treated as a 
side line to other issues. 
 
 The 1892 campaign was tame in comparison with the language adopted by Churchill 
in 1886. This was partly because ‘the Irish issue no longer dominated British politics as 
exclusively as hitherto; social reforms, as the concoction of the Newcastly [sic] programme 
testified, increasingly pre-occupied the attention of the electorate.’47 The fact that another 
Home Rule Bill seemed unlikely given the split in the Parnellites also explains the absence 
of Home Rule in the 1892 campaign. When the Conservative party failed to gain a majority 
in the General Election Gladstone, thanks to the support of the Irish Nationalist Party, 
returned as Prime Minister.48 And so, Home Rule loomed large once again.  
 
 When the Second Home Rule Bill appeared in 1893, more effort was made by the 
Conservatives to reach out to Ulster. Both Arthur Balfour and Salisbury visited Ulster.49  
‘From an English perspective, these visits also offered Conservative leaders sentimental 
capital – the opportunity to identify themselves with an isolated and embattled community, 
and to pose as their champions against the threat of Home Rule.’50 Part of the appeal of Ulster 
for the Tories was the idea of the Empire. Ireland was British territory and the cluster of 
Unionists in the North East could not be abandoned.51 Gladstone’s second attempt passed the 
Commons but was vetoed by the House of Lords, which had an overwhelming Conservative 
majority. Gladstone then retired from politics in 1894.52 This coupled with the fall from 
grace, and death, of Parnell meant that for the time being, Home Rule was off the agenda.53 
 
                                                
46 Alan O’Day, Irish Home Rule, 1867-1921 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp. 180-81. For more on 
the O’Shea scandal, and its repercussions, please see Frank Callanan, the Parnell Split, 1890-91 (Cork: Cork University 
Press, 1992). 
47 Davis, ‘The Liberal Unionist Party,’ pp. 85-104. Davis here was referring to The Newcastle Programme, a programme 
adopted by the National Liberal federation in 1891 to try to attract the working class voter. Home Rule was still on the 
agenda, but housing and land reform were now on the agenda as well.  
48 Jackson, Home Rule, pp. 79-80.  
49 Arthur Balfour, Conservative. Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1887-1891, Prime Minister 1902-1905. For more on Balfour 
see Max Egremont, Balfour, A Life of Arthur James Balfour (London: Phoenix, 1998) and Kenneth Young, Arthur James 
Balfour: The Happy Life of the Politician, Prime Minister, Statesman and Philosopher, 1848-1930 (London: Bell, 1963). 
50 Jackson, The Ulster Party, pp. 118-119. 
51 Loughlin, Gladstone, Home Rule and the Ulster Question, pp. 157-161. 
52 Jackson, Home Rule, p. 85. 
53 Parnell died in 1891. 
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 How did relations between the Conservatives and Unionists fare between the Second 
and Third Home Rule Bills? Although the formal connection remained, without the 
immediate risk to the Empire that Home Rule threatened, once again the Conservatives 
turned their attention to other matters. Ulster Unionists, in response to the devolution crisis 
in 1904-05, decided to reorganize themselves into the UUC in 1905.54 The Council was 
formed ‘to cast off the antique forms of political organization which had been forged under 
their landed predecessors.’55 After the Irish Nationalist Party agreed to support the Liberals 
in Parliament in 1910 following the January General Election, Home Rule returned as a focal 
point in British politics.56 In February, Unionists elected a new leader in the form of Carson. 
The following year, Herbert Asquith, Liberal Prime Minister, introduced the Third Home 
Rule Bill.57 Now that the Lords power of veto had been removed, Home Rule for Ireland was 
within the Liberal majority’s grasp.  
 
Andrew Bonar Law, the future leader of the Conservative Party, made a brief tour of 
Ulster in April 1912.58 In front of a crowd of 100,000 he stood under the world’s largest 
Union Flag and proclaimed the ‘wedding of Protestant Ulster with the Conservative Unionist 
Party.’59 In July, he made an impassioned speech during a Unionist rally at Blenheim Palace. 
He professed that Ulster had a ‘right to resist (Home Rule) by force’ and that, if they did so, 
‘they would have the Unionist Party in England wholeheartedly behind them.’60 Bonar Law 
‘threw himself heart and soul into the support of the Ulster cause.’ Blake argues that he 
sympathised with the Unionist minority in what would become the Irish Free State. In a 
contribution to a book entitled Against Home Rule, Bonar Law concluded ‘Ireland is not a 
nation; it is two nations.’61 In Bonar Law, Ulster Unionists believed they had found the ‘son 
                                                
54 Walker, A History of the Ulster Unionist Party, p. 17. 
55 Jackson, The Ulster Party, p. 236. 
56 For more on the deal struck between the Liberals and the Irish Parliamentary Party please see Conor Mulvagh, The Irish 
Parliamentary Party at Westminster, 1900-18 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), chpt. 4. 
57 Herbert Asquith, The Earl of Oxford and Asquith. Liberal. Leader of the party 1908-1926. Prime Minister 1908-1916. 
58 Andrew Bonar Law, Conservative. Leader of the party 1916-1921 and 1922-1923. Prime Minister 1922-1923. As the son 
of a proud Ulsterman, Bonar Law was well versed in the culture and divisions of the province. For more on Bonar Law, see 
R.J.Q. Adams, Bonar Law (London: John Murray, 1999), Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times 
of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1923 (London: Faber and Faber, 2010) and H.A. Taylor, The Strange Case of Andrew Bonar 
Law (London: Stanley and Paul, 1932), 
59 Taylor, The Strange Case of Andrew Bonar Law, pp. 177-178. 
60 Adams, Bonar Law, pp. 109-110. 
61 Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, p. 180. 
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of an Ulsterman,’ an ally at Westminster.62 Yet, as Smith notes, it is important to remember 
that Bonar Law’s support also came from a desire to take power from the Liberals. Aside 
from Home Rule, ‘the Conservatives had few other policies or issues upon which effectively 
to challenge the Liberals.’63 Bonar Law was ‘as concerned to keep his party together and to 
maintain his own precarious position as he was anxious to give real support to Ulster.’64 
Ulster Unionists felt increasingly ‘sidelined [sic], talked over, overruled.’65 Their solution to 
this was Ulster Day. 
 
On 28 September, Carson was the first person to sign the Ulster Covenant. The 
message, and the use of the word Covenant, was carefully planned. ‘Thiers was an ancient 
struggle, the courage and will of people long dead called the living representatives of that 
lineage to defend their heritage with vigour.’66 The suspicion that the final decision on Home 
Rule would be decided without consultation with the Ulster Unionists ‘fuelled the fervour 
and the determination around the Covenant in 1912.’67 The Covenant was dismissed by some 
as a publicity stunt, but Unionists had also started to threaten physical violence against a 
united Ireland. By 1913, around 90,000 volunteers from the unionist community joined 
together to form the UVF, a private army committed to defending Ulster against Home 
Rule.68 In 1914, the group was armed with rifles and ammunition thanks to a smuggling 
operation from Germany and Austria.69 Between 1912 and 1914 the Conservatives supported 
the UVF.70 For a time, 
 
                                                
62 Jeremy Smith, ‘Bluff, Bluster and Brinkmanship: Andrew Bonar Law and the Third Home Rule Bill,’ The Historical 
Journal, vol. 36, no. 1 (1993), pp. 161-178. For a general overview of the importance of the Irish question at Westminster, 
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63 Jeremy Smith, ‘Bluff, Bluster and Brinkmanship: Andrew Bonar Law and the Third Home Rule Bill,’ The Historical 
Journal, vol. 36, no. 1 (1993), pp. 161-178. 
64 Richard Murphy, ‘Faction in the Conservative Party and the Home Rule Crisis, 1912-14,’ History, vol. 71, no. 232 (1986), 
pp. 222-234. 
65 Graham Walker, ‘The Ulster Covenant and the pulse of Protestant Ulster,’ National Identities (2015), pp. 1-13. 
66 John Brewer and Gareth Higgins, Anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland, 1600-1998: The Mote and the Beam (London: 
Macmillan, 1998), p. 83. 
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(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). 
69 James W. McAuley, Very British Rebels? The Culture and Politics of Ulster Loyalism (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), p. 
22. 
70 Robert Saunders, ‘Tory Rebels and Tory Democracy: The Ulster Crisis, 1900-14,’ in The Foundations of the Conservative 
Party: Essays on Conservatism from Lord Salisbury to David Cameron, ed., by Bradley W. Hart and Richard Carr (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 66. 
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 Ulster Unionists and Conservatives became allies in a defensive ‘Tory’ crusade in 
British politics, with the Act of Union a counter-revolutionary symbol for a 
‘revolutionary’ age, and with the Ulstermen cast as a sort of Praetorian Guard in 
defence of a wider Conservative vision of society.71  
 
The Third Home Rule Bill, known formally as the Government of Ireland Act, was passed 
in 1914. Due to the outbreak of WW1, it was postponed. During those six years, events were 
to have an impact on the British Government’s attitude towards Ireland.  
 
The Easter Rising of 1916 hardened British attitudes and although Hunt argues that 
‘war-time cooperation … left all post-war Tory Prime ministers and several leading Ministers 
… with a more obviously pro-Unionist outlook,’ the end of WW1 also ‘witnessed (the) 
established Conservative discourse on the Union lose its relevance and appeal.’72 With 
extended enfranchisement, the Conservative party needed to appeal to a working class 
electorate with concerns other than the age old Irish problem. The disparity between the 
Conservative’s anti-Home Rule campaign and the militant Unionist movement meant that 
the two groups were political allies, but simultaneously independent partners.73 
 
When the British Government decided to introduce conscription in Ireland in 1918, 
the Irish Parliamentary Party lost its ‘last shred of credibility.’ At the General Election in 
December 1918, the Irish Parliamentary Party was superseded by Sinn Féin who won 73 of 
Ireland’s 105 seats.74 The Home Rule party was overshadowed by a revolutionary republican 
party that went on to declare itself head of the Irish Republic in January 1919.75 A cabinet 
committee, dedicated to finding a solution to Ireland, was formed the same year and, in 1920, 
the Government of Ireland Act was introduced to Parliament. Ireland was partitioned and 
Northern Ireland was created in 1920. Northern Ireland was headed by a devolved 
government with local powers to deal with local affairs. ‘“We want to remain with you,” 
                                                
71 Smith, ‘Ever Reliable Friends,’ pp. 70-103. 
72 Jocelyn Hunt, Britain: 1846-1919 (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2013), p. 223 and Smith, ‘Ever Reliable Friends,’ pp. 
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Carson told the House of Commons at the time. “Do not turn us out”.’76 Thousands of 
Unionists in Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan now found themselves citizens of the Free State, 
‘any representation of the Union as a guardian of British rights (was) difficult to justify.’77  
 
The Irish War of Independence, which had started in 1919, meant that Home Rule for 
Southern Ireland could not be implemented. Therefore in 1921, the Anglo-Irish Treaty was 
signed.78 This ended the War and established Southern Ireland as the Irish Free State, a self 
governing Republic completely separate from the United Kingdom. Birkenhead asserted that 
Ulster had nothing to fear from the establishment of the Irish Free State.79 But the Treaty 
heightened insecurity within Unionist circles. Now, nationalism was on their doorstep and 
the border ‘made for a highly conflicting set of social and political relations and created a 
civic arena dominated by the border and the reinforcement of opposing social and political 
identities.’80 In response to this, Carson denounced Austen Chamberlain, a Conservative who 
had been fervently against Home Rule before the start of WW1, and F.E. Smith, the Lord 
Chancellor who had also been a prominent Unionist, and declared that the friendship they 
shared was over. He continued, ‘I was only a puppet and so was Ulster and so was Ireland, 
in the political game that was to get the Conservative party into power.’ In response, Smith 
commented that Carson’s speech ‘would have been immature on the lips of a hysterical 
schoolgirl.’81  
 
Before the 1921 Treaty, the Irish question held the spotlight in British politics. After 
1921, the Ulster Unionists became ‘faintly ridiculous’ to Conservatives.82 The problem had 
been ‘solved’ with partition, but tension continued to bubble under the surface, 
 
Sectarian conflict ravaged Belfast in 1920-2; Irish nationalism within the six counties 
refused to recognize the new state’s legitimacy; the Provisional Government of the 
                                                
76 H. Montgomery Hyde, Carson: The Life of Sir Edward Carson, Lord Carson of Duncairn (London: William 
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Irish Free State sponsored republican raids across the border and launched an 
economic boycott; and the threat of territorial loss through a Boundary Commission 
loomed ominously.83 
 
‘After the 1920s the governing class in England gave up on Ireland, which it saw as doing its 
own thing.’84 Of course there were a few exceptions to this rule, but by and large 
Conservative politicians of the inter-war period showed little interest in Northern Ireland. 
 
The Realm of ‘old unhappy far-off things and battles long ago’: Ulster Unionists at 
Westminster after 1921 
The tenure of Stanley Baldwin, Conservative leader from 1923 to 1937, marks the beginning 
of a drift between Unionists and the Conservatives.85 Baldwin wanted ‘to maintain the treaty 
settlement of 1921 and, at the same time, reunite his party.’86 The Irish issue was no longer 
pivotal to Westminster, so much so that in 1923 the Speaker of the House of Commons 
banned any discussion of Northern Ireland and the Free State in the chamber.87 During 
Baldwin’s first two terms as Prime Minister, the British Government’s Irish policy was 
handed over to civil servants. Therefore, ‘there could be no initiatives, for only politicians 
could accept the political risks attendant upon these.’88 
 
Even in 1924 with the establishment of the Boundary Commission, Baldwin and his 
colleagues said little about Ireland. In an effort to stop speeches on Ireland by his colleagues, 
Baldwin travelled to Belfast to convene with the Northern Ireland Cabinet. The one-day trip 
involved extended talks with James Craig, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, during 
which Baldwin made clear that there was little enthusiasm amongst Conservatives to support 
the boundary question.89 Belfast had refused to appoint a boundary commissioner. The Privy 
Council ruled that the British government would need to implement new legislation if they 
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wanted to appoint a Commissioner themselves. This would risk splitting the party; the die-
hards would support the Ulster Unionists and vote against the bill. ‘ … if the House of Lords 
blocked the bill, an election in which the rallying call would be, like 1910, peers versus the 
people.’90 When he returned to London, Craig sent word to Baldwin that the Ulster Unionists 
felt ‘bound to take every possible step to prevent the passage of the bill’ unless it was 
amended ‘to apply merely to an adjustment of the boundary.’ In spite of Baldwin’s best 
efforts, the Conservative party could not avoid the issue.91 Craig’s decision to fight Labour’s 
boundary bill meant that the Conservatives were back to square one. This was a major 
problem for the party.  
 
They had hoped to defeat the Liberals but the Irish question could jeopardise their 
goal. Ireland could ‘create just the sort of uproar that David Lloyd George, Liberal Prime 
Minister, thrived on, and which both Labour and the Conservatives were determined to avoid 
at all costs.’92 Baldwin decided to form an alliance with the Ulster Unionists. In the end the 
success of the Conservative party was due more to Baldwin’s playing the red over the orange 
card. With Labour confirmed as the socialist representative, the Conservatives easily 
defeated the Liberals at a time when their leadership was weak. ‘Without the diversion of the 
communist scare used so effectively by Baldwin’s lieutenants, it would have been impossible 
to extricate us from the cul-de-sac of Ireland.’93  
 
Anglo-Irish relations became strained during the tenures of Chamberlain and Éamon 
de Valera, leader of Fianna Fáil.94 The Great Depression, 
 
contributed greatly to the deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations from 1929-1931 … In 
Ireland, economic nationalism … was beginning to gain wider appeal. In Britain, 
                                                
90 Neil C. Fleming, The Marquess of Londonderry: Aristocracy, Power and Politics in Britain and Ireland (New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2005), pp. 102-103. For more on the internal debate between the Ulster Unionists and the Conservatives over the 
Boundary Commission, see also Kevin Matthews, Fatal Influence: The Impact of Ireland on British Politics, 1920-1925 
(Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2003). 
91 Matthews, ‘Stanley Baldwin’s Irish Question,’ pp. 1027-1049. 
92 iBid., pp. 1027-1049. David Lloyd George, Liberal. Leader of the party 1926-1931. Prime Minister 1916-1922. 
93 Matthews, ‘Stanley Baldwin’s Irish Question,’ pp. 1027-1049. 
94 Éamon de Valera, founder of Fianna Fáil. President of Dáil Éireann 1919-1921, President of the Irish Republic 1921-
1922, Leader of Fianna Fáil 1926-1959, Taoiseach 1937-1948, 1951-1954, 1957-1959, President of Ireland 1959-1973. 
 20 
higher unemployment … put added pressure on the Government to restrict Irish 
immigration.95 
 
This tension eventually disintegrated into an economic war in 1932.96 The cause of this war 
was ‘Fianna Fáil’s dream of an Ireland untrammelled by what it perceived as degrading 
linkages with the former imperial power.’97 The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1938 ended those 
hostilities and gave de Valera enough concessions from the UK to satisfy Fianna Fáil. 
Chamberlain retained control of three treaty ports and agreed to drop his £26 million land 
annuities price to £10 million.98 This provoked a row on his own backbenches. War with 
Germany was now expected. Winston Churchill, future Prime Minister, predicted that 
Chamberlain’s decision to surrender the Treaty would prevent Britain from protecting 
themselves from ‘German submarines in Atlantic shipping lanes.’99 Chamberlain then turned 
his attention to Hitler and Europe before resigning as Prime Minister at the beginning of the 
war.100 His successor’s continued to disengage from Northern Ireland. 
 
 WW2 was a catastrophic global conflict that changed British popular attitude towards 
the Irish question. Aughey argues that Churchill is the personification of this shift, while Bew 
concludes that from the outset his ‘tone towards Ulster Unionism was cold and 
contemptuous.’ Unionists ‘paraded their loyalty, using it to extort concessions and privilege 
from the British government; when any man attempted to do even-handed justice in the 
King’s name, they complained they were being betrayed.’101 Churchill was infuriated by Irish 
neutrality during WW2. He described their stance as ‘odious.’102 When Harold Wilson, future 
Labour Prime Minister, drew up a report that criticised Northern Ireland’s contribution to the 
war effort in 1940, it was accepted by Churchill.103 Northern Ireland was exempt from 
conscription during WW2. This ‘reflected badly on the Unionist government that Northern 
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Ireland had to be treated differently from the rest of the UK, and the absence of conscription 
fuelled the notion that the Province was only ‘half involved’ in the war.’104 The end of WW2 
also highlighted lifestyle differences between the people of Northern Ireland and mainland 
Britain. 
 
 After WW2, it seemed as though Britain moved on while Northern Ireland remained 
stagnant. International migration to mainland Britain saw an explosion of multi-culturalism 
that had unforeseen effects on British culture. Church attendance declined and more families 
took the chance of a fresh start in countries like Australia.105 ‘… so too decreased the 
sentimental affinity of British public life within the concerns of loyal Ulster with the very 
notable exception of the common sacrifices of (WW2). Life was now elsewhere.’106 
Modernity and culture swept the country and would prove key to the survival of the political 
elite. The Free State was also looking to make a big change. 
 
 In 1948, Taoiseach John Costello announced that the Irish Free State was a 
Republic.107 The Free State then passed the Republic of Ireland Act which abolished the last 
remaining functions of the King. The Free State became the Republic of Ireland.108 In 
response to this, and following the Free State’s policy of neutrality during WW2, in 1949 the 
British Government passed the Ireland Act. The Ireland Act broke the remaining ties between 
the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and decreed that Northern Ireland would remain part of 
the UK so long as the majority wanted to. The British Government left Northern Ireland ‘… 
with complete autonomy over law and order, and considerable independence in domestic 
public policy.’109 The Conservative party manifesto in the 1950 UK general election repeated 
this, enforcing the message that it was up to ‘the Northern Irish Parliament to decide its future, 
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while the Tory Party held what appeared to be an impartial public stance on the future of the 
Union.’110 
 
‘For God's sake bring me a large Scotch. What a bloody awful country’111: 1950-1974 
Although relations between the Conservative party and the Ulster Unionists remained 
friendly throughout the 1950s, there were instances of ‘friction or disappointment’ between 
the two parties. As Ulster Unionism developed a more radical flavour, particularly when Ian 
Paisley, founder of the Democratic Unionist Party emerged, Conservatives became 
increasingly ‘offended by the sectarian dimension to Ulster Unionism.’112 Paisley was part 
of a long tradition of Protestant Evangelism in Northern Ireland and of Ulster Unionists who 
became alternative figureheads from the mainstream Ulster Unionist Party (UUP).113 Part of 
Paisley’s appeal was a continuation of the link between God and Ulster. Just as Carson had 
signed the Covenant, the Reverend Paisley persisted that the Protestant struggle against 
Catholicism was ‘divinely inspired and directed.’114 A cult of rumour was central to Paisley’s 
campaigns where the story of an imminent Catholic uprising (to avenge lands lost during the 
Ulster plantation) was ingrained on the psyche. ‘Such rumours were simply a part of the 
folklore of Ulster Protestantism that was likely to be widely publicised in a period of political 
crisis.’ He encouraged Loyalists to oppose the emerging civil rights movement. This resulted 
in frequent affrays throughout the 1960s.115 Paisley’s extremism served to isolate Unionism 
further from the Conservative leadership. 
 
From the early 1950s, there was ‘a growing and mutual incomprehension’ between 
the UUP and the Conservative Party. The Ulster Unionists felt that the ‘Conservative Party 
was ignoring them and their concerns,’ and this is partly because the Conservatives were not 
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reliant upon the UUP, with the exception of the 1951 general election (see Table 1).116 It 
appears that British Conservatives did not feel the need to cement the link either because they 
were relatively uninterested in Northern Ireland and/or because they could take Unionist 
support at Westminster for granted.117 Unionists took the Conservative Whip to help the 
Tories at Westminster. However, the impact of Unionist support after 1945 is 
underwhelming.118 
 









July 1945 188 8 393 
February 1950 210 36 315 
October 1951 293* 9 295 
May 1955 335 10 277 
October 1959 353 12 258 
October 1964 292* 12 317 
March 1966 242* 11 364 
June 1970 321 9 298 
February 1974 297 7 301 
October 1974 277 6 319 
Blue indicates an overall Conservative victory, red a Labour. 
*Including seats from the National Liberal Party. 
 
Further to this, the Conservative party wanted to reinvent itself. Many considered its 
traditional views on the British Empire sentimental. ‘For Ulster Unionists, however, the dead 
hand of the past, territorial integrity and borders were the very core of their existence.’119 As 
Prime Minister, Churchill continued to support the unification of Ireland, ‘if she were wooed 
and won of her own free will and consent I, personally, would regard such an event as a 
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blessing for the whole of the British Empire and also for the civilised world.’120 The Irish 
question was at the bottom of Churchill’s priority list. It only needed to be promoted when 
he sought popular support. ‘… (Churchill was) a political actor who had to navigate ever-
changing waters where, several times, he ran aground.’121 His arguments on Ireland ‘fitted 
rather suspiciously all too neatly with his contemporary political ambitions’ and by the end 
of his political career, ‘… he had almost … run through the gamut of positions on Ireland 
that it was possible for a mainstream Westminster politician to hold.’122 When he left office 
in 1955, elite Conservative disinterest in the province was cemented. During the 1960s, 
Westminster tried to ‘maintain a moderate Protestant unionist leadership, and (tried) to 
deliver enough civil rights reform to nurture a new and equally moderate Catholic nationalist 
leadership.’123 The divide between the Ulster Unionists and the Conservatives was further 
exacerbated by the emergence of The Troubles in the late 1960s.  
 
Inspired by the civil rights movement headed by Dr. Martin Luther King Junior in the 
United States, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement (NICRM) and the Campaign for 
Social Justice (CSJ) emerged. These organisations sought to challenge the discrimination the 
catholic community faced from housing allocation, employment opportunities and media 
censorship. Catholics had also faced fifty years of targeted police attention under the Special 
Powers Act.124 Instances of violence and death within the community increased tension while 
the use of the Special Powers Act to ban parades or to prevent the carrying of the Tricolour 
‘was a potent symbol of the abnormality of the situation in Northern Ireland for its critics.’125 
Images of the police using batons and water cannons against seemingly innocent members 
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of the public shocked the world.126 Hostilities smouldered until 1968 when a civil rights 
march in Londonderry ended in chaos as children, Saturday shoppers and other bystanders 
were caught up in the violence. The protestors had intended to act peacefully on the day, but 
they marched up to police lines and threw items in a way that was seen as antagonistic. 
Tensions were set to worsen. 
 
In 1972, it became clear to the British government that Northern Ireland could not 
govern itself. Bloody Sunday was the day Nationalist resentment towards the British Army 
and government was cemented. Although many pinpoint the Londonderry civil rights march 
of 1968 as the day The Troubles began, Bloody Sunday was the event that saw an increase 
in popular support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).127 Britain’s policy of 
shoring up the centre had failed, and ‘it seemed temporarily at a loss as to what to do next.’128 
The emergence of the PIRA, and the violence that ensued, led to the abolition of the Northern 
Ireland government in 1973. A deal between Northern Ireland’s leading political parties, the 
UUP and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (the SDLP), the British and Irish 
governments, known as Sunningdale, saw the introduction of a new Northern Ireland 
Assembly. The Assembly would be elected by proportional representation and governed by 
an informal power-sharing executive. A group of politicians with limited powers would sit 
in Stormont.129 A link with the government in Dublin was created through the Council of 
Ireland. But the council was a sore point for Unionists. Within five months the Ulster 
Workers Council staged strikes across Northern Ireland that saw the collapse of Sunningdale 
and Stormont. The Ulster Unionist and Conservative parties split again in 1973 and at the 
1974 UK General Election, the Ulster Unionists refused to support the Conservative party. 
This reflected their fury with Heath’s decision to prorogue Stormont, a devastating rejection 
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by a traditional ally. After the Conservative defeat, the party started to look for a new 
leader.130  
 
Thatcher on the Road to Number Ten, 1975-1979 
After her election as party leader in 1975, Thatcher was invited to attend a meeting with 
Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan and Merlyn Rees, Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland.131 Thatcher accepted and brought along Airey Neave, her friend and Shadow 
Northern Ireland advisor.132 Neave wanted to implement full integration with the UK and 
aligned himself with hard-line unionism, although there is evidence that before his death, 
‘while an integrationist posture in opposition was acceptable, the responsibilities and 
constraints of government meant that it was unlikely to be implemented.’133 Thatcher seems 
to have initially followed Neave’s theory of integration as her meeting with the Labour Prime 
Minister shows. 
 
The discussion saw Thatcher and Neave quiz Callaghan on key Northern Ireland 
issues that would resonate throughout her time as Conservative leader. Thatcher began by 
asking ‘… how much longer could the situation drag on?’134 Callaghan and Rees set out to 
brief Thatcher on the full extent of the problem. Beginning with the politics of the region, 
Rees assured Thatcher that although Sinn Féin had attempted to open a secret channel with 
the Government they had refused to respond. Thatcher would find herself in a similar position 
during the 1980-1981 Hunger Strikes, although on that occasion she negotiated with the 
PIRA leadership (see chapter three). Thatcher then asked about intelligence, a key theme of 
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future meetings between her, Haughey and FitzGerald, particularly in the run up to the 1985 
AIA (see chapter five). She thought that if intelligence improved, the violence would stop,  
 
Mrs. Thatcher said that her impression was that the Army were not now getting the 
intelligence which they had previously received. The Secretary of State 
acknowledged that this was so in terms of necessary intelligence for waging an urban 
guerrilla campaign, but many of the murders now being committed could be traced 
back to one gun. Mrs. Thatcher commented that if our intelligence was good, no doubt 
that one gun could be picked up. 
 
Thatcher concluded by discussing the letters she, and other members of the government, 
regularly received from the British public asking for a withdrawal from Northern Ireland. 
Tellingly, Thatcher remarked, ‘People unfortunately did not realise that the result of a pull 
out would be much greater carnage … The Conservative Party understood the need to protect 
innocent people in all parts of the United Kingdom.’135 Thatcher also displayed her personal 
commitment to Northern Ireland. 
 
During her time as Leader of the Opposition, Thatcher visited Northern Ireland every 
year (except for 1976, when confidential details of her visit were stolen). Her trips were 
meticulously organised, and were intended to reassure Unionists of her commitment to the 
province. Her three-day visit in 1978 was aimed at winning back support following their 
alliance with Labour before the general election of 1979. She was not afraid to visit the inner 
cities or border areas and in 1979, following the Mountbatten/Warrenpoint attacks, she made 
a point of visiting the army barracks at Crossmaglen (see chapter one). Her message was 
clear; I care, I am not afraid, I will help. It is apparent that in the early stages of her leadership, 
Thatcher displayed a dedication to the province that is stark when compared with her 
predecessors. However, from the outset her commitment to the region saw her and her 
advisors become a primary target. 
 
 Neave died in April 1979 when the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) planted a 
bomb under his car. The fact that the bomb was detonated in the Palace of Westminster shook 
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the political establishment to its core.136 It was a violent death for the decorated war hero, 
and it took its toll on his protégé. Thatcher wrote that she ‘… felt only stunned. The full grief 
would come later. With it came also anger that this man- my friend- who had shrugged off 
so much danger in his life should be murdered by someone worse than a common 
criminal.’137 Neave was primed to become Secretary of State on Thatcher’s election.138 
Neave was dedicated to the defeat of terrorism and Thatcher had confidence in him, ‘his 
intelligence contacts, proven physical courage and shrewdness amply qualified him for this 
testing and largely thankless task.’139 Thatcher commented that the Ulster Unionists knew 
they had strong support in both her and Neave. She made similar promises about Southern 
Rhodesia, but as it turned out this was only to please the right-wing enthusiasts within the 
party. In reality, she adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach when it came to the Lancaster House 
agreement, and throughout her premiership, as this thesis will show, she was also comfortable 
to hand over Northern Ireland policy to a team of appointed advisors.140 Thatcher was 
‘temperamentally a unionist of the Powell stripe. She shared his desire for military victory, 
and even for integration,’ but by the time she became Prime Minister in 1979, ‘The new 
Conservative government abandoned the notion of ‘integration’.141 Neave’s death would 




Ireland has been subject to British political and military intervention since the twelfth 
century.143 Violent opposition to British rule was often met with military action, ‘interspersed 
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with phases involving the importance of people from England and Wales.’144 Although 
tensions between catholics and protestants had been present for centuries beforehand, a 
policy of disengagement from Northern Ireland by successive British administrations from 
the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century meant left the Conservative political elite 
with a attitude towards the region.145 The 1921 Treaty, and the policy of partition that 
followed, effectively cut Northern Ireland off from mainland Britain. Relations broke down 
after 1922, and continued to steadily decline until Heath was forced to intervene due to the 
outbreak of The Troubles. Perhaps most telling is the fact that no Unionist MP held a 
government or cabinet position after 1921.146 Northern Ireland issues were also banned from 
discussion in the Commons from 1923 onwards. Still, Unionist MP’s could claim to have 
some sway over election results. The Conservatives were returned in 1951 with Winston 
Churchill as Prime Minister thanks in part to the nine Unionist MP’s who claimed half of the 
government majority.147 In February 1974, still reeling from Sunningdale, the Unionists 
turned Heath’s election ‘into a … plebiscite which they won resoundingly.’148  
 
From 1885, the Conservative party were spurred to action in Northern Ireland due to 
an immediate crisis. ‘British people do not think much about Ireland,’ and it is clear that more 
often than not, Northern Ireland has been treated as a place apart.149 Unionist identity began 
when a perceived link with mainland Britain was forged. This was strengthened by an ability 
to exclude Irish nationalism.150 But relations between the Conservatives and the Ulster 
Unionists declined after partition. Thereafter, the Conservatives became ‘… conditional 
rather than emotive defenders of the Union.’151  
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Jack Lynch, Charles J. Haughey and Margaret Thatcher, 1979-
1981 
 
I think he is a tough, clever, wily man, no friend of ours, but not, perhaps, actively, hostile. 
He is conscious of his shady past (and present!). Perhaps there is something in what one 
columnist wrote recently- that he is “Ireland’s answer to JR”.1 
 
It was a sunny August Bank Holiday in County Sligo when Lord Louis Mountbatten set out 
on his leisure boat to go fishing. Accompanying him were members of his family and a local 
boy who had been hired to assist on the boat. The police had warned Mountbatten about the 
threat the PIRA posed but he had ignored them. As Mountbatten and his guests set sail, the 
PIRA detonated the bomb they had stowed in the hold the night before. Mountbatten, his 
grandson and the local boy died in the blast and Baroness Brabourne died a few days later. 
The PIRA had just killed the patriarch of the Royal family.2 
 
 News of Mountbatten’s assassination reached the Parachute Regiment at Bessbrook 
near Newry where operations continued as normal. ‘A’ Company were on their way to relieve 
Support Company and had been ordered to travel by a particularly dangerous road. Narrow 
Water marked the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Irish 
side of the Clanrye River was covered in thick woodland that provided perfect cover for an 
ambush. As the first lorry passed the gate lodge of the castle, a bomb hidden in straw bales 
was detonated. The surviving soldiers opened fire and killed a tourist across the river. A 
medical team arrived at the site by helicopter, but it landed directly beside the second bomb. 
‘B’ Company were sent to Narrow Water thirty minutes after the second explosion. It was a 
horrifying scene. The bombs had killed 18 soldiers, their body parts were strewn over the 
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road, in the trees and in the water.3 The British public reacted with ‘anger, sadness and 
bewilderment.’4 If the INLA assassination of Airey Neave just before the general election in 
May 1979 had demonstrated forcefully to Thatcher that Northern Ireland would provide an 
enormous challenge, the events of August 1979 reinforced this. The PIRA had carried out 
two major operations in one day. The attackers at Warrenpoint were able to disappear into 
the Republic of Ireland, which was to provoke an immediate problem for Anglo- Irish 
relations. 
 
This chapter will focus on the first years of Thatcher’s term in office in relation to 
Northern Ireland and Ireland. This chapter will focus primarily on Haughey and the Dublin 
as opposed to Thatcher and the London government. Thatcher’s outlook is not entirely 
ignored, however in order to set the scene and fully explain how relations between Haughey 
and Thatcher deteriorated, both personally and professionally, it is vital to understand how 
Haughey’s Northern Ireland policy developed during his first term. The significance of this 
chapter lies in the in-depth background information it offers. By delving into the files from 
the archives in Dublin and London, this thesis offers a greater understanding of the Atkins 
Talks and how its results were received by the governments in Dublin and London. This 
chapter also details the nerves both Haughey and Thatcher felt before they first met each 
other. Both Haughey and Thatcher were meticulously briefed before their Anglo-Irish 
meetings, as the rest of this thesis will show. However, for their first summit, the preparation 
was particularly thorough. Both sides outlined basic information about their counterpart, 
including their education. What is surprising is the personal detail that was offered about 
each leader. This chapter will also detail the increasing media interest surrounding the 
Haughey-Thatcher meetings. These reports could prove surprisingly influential over Anglo-
Irish relations. Although both Dublin and London wanted to move away from mega-phone 
diplomacy, this chapter details how media reports could still sour Anglo-Irish relations. 
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On entering office, Thatcher met the Irish Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, twice before he 
was replaced by Charles J. Haughey.5 Lynch had not made a good impression on Thatcher. 
As well as being shy by nature, Lynch was tired. He had had a long career in the Dáil having 
first been elected as a TD in 1948.6 He had started to pass responsibility for day-to-day 
government business to unelected civil servants. The events of August 1979 were to prove 
important catalysts for Haughey’s leadership bid. Relations between Lynch and Thatcher 
were rocked by the Mountbatten/Warrenpoint attacks. Notable backbench TDs, Síle de 
Valera and Bill Loughnane, railed against rumours of increased rights of overflight of the 
Irish border by the British security forces in Northern Ireland. In the November Cork by-
election Fianna Fáil’s seat was taken by Fine Gael, a humiliating defeat in Lynch’s home 
county.7 Lynch had had enough. The timing of his resignation though appeared to be strongly 
motivated by a determination to give George Colley, his preferred successor the best chance.8 
It was not to be. 
 
Haughey became leader of Fianna Fáil and Taoiseach. He tried to launch an Anglo-
Irish conference to formalize and regulate contact between the Republic of Ireland and the 
UK. But Haughey continually alluded to a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and 
unity by consent. Therefore, his idea was out of the question. The similar ‘Atkins talks’ 
(officially the ‘Constitutional Conference’) comprising the DUP, Alliance and the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), went ahead under the chairmanship of the Secretary 
of State, Humphrey Atkins.9 The Conference failed to produce any proposals; but the talks 
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6 See John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975) for a damning verdict. 
7 Síle de Valera, granddaughter of Éamon de Valera. Fianna Fáil TD 1977-2007. William ‘Bill’ Loughnane, Fianna Fáil TD 
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8 George Colley, Fianna Fáil TD 1961-1983. Tánaiste 1977-1981. 
9 Humphrey Atkins, Lord Colnbrook, Conservative. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 1979-1981. 
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gave Thatcher’s Government an idea of where the main parties, with the exception of the 
UUP, stood and how they could proceed.10 Haughey and Thatcher met throughout 1980 and 
1981 with varying degrees of success. The post-summit press conferences and communiqués 
proved to be Haughey’s downfall. Added to this his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brian 
Lenihan, called for the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland.11 Thatcher had previously 
defended Haughey but she realised he had ‘hoodwinked’ her. Before he could regain her 
trust, he was voted out of the Taoiseach’s office. His first term was as dramatic as it was 
short.  
 
‘Rise and follow Charlie’: Haughey’s Journey from the Backbenches to the Taoiseach’s 
Office 
When Thatcher became Prime Minister in May 1979, Jack Lynch was two years into his 
second stint as Taoiseach. A modest, demure man, he had served longer as Taoiseach than 
anyone apart from Éamon de Valera. He had been very popular and his election victory in 
1977 was a personal triumph. He had continued the economic modernisation of Ireland and 
presided over the single most important event in Irish governance since independence - the 
accession, along with Britain, to the European Economic Community (EEC). While his 
policies on Northern Ireland had been confused, he had increasingly cracked down on the 
PIRA and sought solutions with London.  
 
Lynch had first met Thatcher on 10 May 1979. The discussion about Northern Ireland 
was brief though Lynch emphasised that Dublin had taken strong measures against terrorism, 
including introducing special courts.12 Lynch had also decried the views of Jim Molyneaux, 
leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, that the Republic of Ireland was a ‘haven for terrorists.’ 
Lynch advised Thatcher to exercise caution when making public statements on security. 
Lynch felt that some of the statements Roy Mason, former Northern Ireland Secretary, had 
                                                
10 The UUP, sometimes referred to as the Official Unionist Party (OUP), is the oldest of the unionist parties. Founded in 
1905, the UUP is a centre-right wing party, more liberal than the DUP but still against the unification of Ireland. Unlike the 
DUP, the UUP were against militant action in the late 1980s but were forced to go along with the DUP as a member of the 
un-official unionist alliance (see chpt. 6). 
11 Brian Lenihan Senior, Fianna Fáil. Minister for Foreign Affairs 1973, 1979-1981, 1987-1989, Minister for Defence 1989-
1990, Tánaiste 1987-1990. 
12 NAI, TAOIS 2009/135/704, Lynch meeting with MT, 10 May 1979. A summary of this meeting is also stored in NAI, 
TAOIS 2009/135/703. London’s record can be found in TNA UK, PREM 19/79. 
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made had provoked violence.13 Lynch had hoped to invite Thatcher to Dublin for talks in 
October 1979 but the events of late August changed matters and Lynch proposed to go to 
London to represent the government at Lord Mountbatten’s funeral.14  
 
The meetings on 5 September, which included a tête-à-tête between Lynch and 
Thatcher, were dominated by security.15 Thatcher used the opportunity provided by the recent 
events to pressure Lynch into more cooperation against terrorism. During their private 
meeting, where only their appointed note takers were present, Thatcher told Lynch she was 
anxious to ‘stamp out terrorism’ which posed a threat to democracy. Lynch expanded that 
terrorism could also have repercussions for the economy. Thatcher told Lynch that existing 
security co-operation ‘had to be improved.’16 Lynch emphasised that such cooperation was 
already there and Dublin had ‘enacted a code of legislation in Ireland against terrorism which 
was stronger, so far as he was aware, than that of any other European country.’ Thatcher 
conceded there was cooperation but she wanted enhanced cooperation. She drew Lynch’s 
attention to the inadequacies of the current prosecution system. She wanted increased and 
permanent liaison between the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Garda. She 
concluded with a suggestion that would cause Lynch no end of trouble. Thatcher wanted 
overflight rights without specific permission 10 to 15 km over the border so that British 
helicopters could continue to track suspects and guide the Republic’s security forces to them. 
Lynch, surprisingly, was most receptive to the overflights and was more robust on defending 
existing co-operation between the Garda and the RUC.17 The election of Charles Haughey to 
the office of Taoiseach in December 1979 was partly down to rumours that Lynch had gone 
too far with Thatcher in security cooperation.  
 
The Fianna Fáil leadership election of 1979 gave Haughey an unexpected opportunity 
towards his long-held goals of becoming party leader and Taoiseach.18 It was a remarkable 
                                                
13 iBid., Roy Mason, Lord Mason of Barnsley, Labour. Secretary for Defence 1974-1976, Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland 1976-1979, Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 1979. 
14 NAI, TAOIS 2009/135/704, Lynch meeting with MT, 30 Aug. 1979  
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16 TNA UK, PREM 19/79, MT tête-à-tête with Lynch, 5 Sept. 1979. 
17 NAI, TAOIS 2009/135/704, Lynch meeting with MT, 5 Sept. 1979. 
18 Haughey never wrote an autobiography, nor did he appoint an official biographer, but there is an extensive collection of 
biographies. Bruce Arnold, Haughey: His Life and Unlucky Deeds (London: HarperCollins, 1993), Stephen Collins, The 
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recovery of a once promising career that had unraveled due to the Arms crisis of 1970, when 
the discovery of an attempt to import arms to nationalists in Northern Ireland by leading 
Fianna Fáil Ministers provoked the worst governmental crisis since WW2. Haughey was first 
elected to the Dáil in 1957 and rose rapidly through the ranks thanks to an advantageous 
marriage. He was the son-in-law of Sean Lemass, Taoiseach from 1959-1966.19 Haughey 
embodied a new breed of modern Irish politician that characterized Fianna Fáil politics in the 
1950s. Haughey was committed to a new open Ireland that saw foreign investment as 
necessary in order to modernize and grow the Irish economy. Fianna Fáil’s traditional policy 
of protectionism was abandoned in the late 1950s. Haughey was a highly regarded Minister 
for Justice, then Agriculture and from 1966, a dynamic Minister for Finance. He had been 
joint favourite with George Colley, a more traditional Fianna Fáil figure for the succession 
to Lemass in 1966. But while admired he was also seen as venal and greedy. Most of the 
Fianna Fáil party breathed a sigh of relief when a compromise candidate, the safe Lynch, 
emerged. Many in Fianna Fáil, particularly the more austere traditionalists, watched Haughey 
with a jaundiced eye.  
 
Along with a successful Ministerial career, Haughey had apparently enriched himself 
through unclear means from the most modest of beginnings.20 He was the son of a retired 
Irish Army officer from Londonderry. This link to Northern Ireland, according to one recent 
study, greatly influenced his views on The Troubles.21 This assessment must be balanced by 
the fact that Haughey had had little hesitation as Minister for Justice in using internment and 
the draconian Offenses against the State Act to make the PIRA’s Border campaign 1956-
1962 unsustainable.22 It is hard to see in the record that Haughey paid much attention to 
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Northern Ireland.23 Indeed, the economic strategy of the Northern Irish government of 
Terence O’Neill seemed to demonstrate a conjunction of two modernizing governments that 
wished to leave the past behind.24 Economic prosperity was more important than old 
struggles over partition. However, what the modernisers on both sides of the border could 
not foresee was that the continued unfairness which the minority community in Northern 
Ireland experienced was a ticking time bomb. 
 
The economic balance of Northern Ireland remained firmly skewed to the protestant 
eastern counties. Little effort was made to deal with Catholic grievances about the economy 
and infrastructure, the police or, and perhaps most importantly, gerrymandering and the 
restricted franchise in local government.25 Nonetheless, the riots of August 1969 in Derry 
and Belfast caught Lynch’s government by surprise. What rapidly emerged was a split in the 
Cabinet between those who wanted intervention - there was a lot of ballad singing apparently 
- and those who were concerned that such a move would cause a wider conflagration that 
would spiral out of control. Nonetheless, the views of Haughey, Kevin Boland and Neil 
Blaney almost certainly hardened, at least rhetorically, the Irish government’s policy in the 
autumn of 1969.26 What happened next remains the subject of much speculation. 
 
In May 1970, Haughey, then Minister of Finance, was fired by Lynch after being 
charged with conspiring to import guns into Ireland for potential use by Citizen Defense 
Committees’ in Northern Ireland. A leading PIRA member, John Kelly, was one of those 
involved.27 How much Lynch and other members of the government knew about the arms 
import remains unclear. Indeed, it was the Garda and Secretary of the Department of Justice, 
Peter Berry, who on discovery of the plan forced Lynch’s hand. Three members of his 
Cabinet, Haughey, Neil Blaney and Michael O’ Morain, the incapable Minister for Justice, 
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were fired while a fourth Kevin Boland, resigned. Two trials - the first was a mistrial - saw 
Haughey acquitted.28 What the trial indicated was that the level of knowledge in the 
government about the arms import went much further than Haughey. The testimony of Jim 
Gibbons, the Minister for Defence, was particularly problematic.29 In the short term, it did 
little for Haughey as the Fianna Fáil party rallied around Lynch. Haughey, unlike Blaney and 
Boland who left Fianna Fáil, voted confidence in Lynch. Haughey’s reputation was tarnished 
but he had survived. In 1973, Lynch allowed him to remain a Fianna Fáil candidate in the 
election and a slow and remarkable recovery began. Blaney and Boland, on the other hand, 
would never return to the fold. Their careers as senior politicians were finished.  
 
Haughey loitered around the back benches of the Dáil and worked tirelessly to fulfill 
his ambition of becoming Taoiseach. He worked the ‘chicken and chips’ circuit at Fianna 
Fáil meetings using his infamous charm to get people on his side. This experience would 
have been humiliating for Haughey. Frank Dunlop, government press secretary during 
Haughey’s first term in office, wrote how the meetings usually had a small turn out, ‘the 
discussion was stilted and the food, if any, diabolical.’30 But this was what Haughey was 
good at. He was a charismatic man who had a way of ‘getting people on his side.’31 
Remarkably, he was restored to the front bench of the party in the mid 1970s as it languished 
in opposition. It was widely expected that the Fine Gael-Labour coalition would win the next 
election in 1977. As it happened Lynch won in a landslide. This triumph disguised a number 
of problems. It created a pool of backbenchers in the Fianna Fáil party who held vulnerable 
seats and who were open to the blandishments and populism of Haughey, who also used his 
position as Minister for Social Welfare to become the go-to-guy for Ministers with enquiries 
from their constituents. He carried around a little black book of problems which, once solved, 
he took credit for. All this was in stark contrast with Lynch’s hand’s off approach. Moreover, 
the 1977 Fianna Fáil manifesto called for massive tax cuts to stimulate the economy. After a 
brief burst of growth in 1978, world conditions savagely changed in 1979 and the Irish 
government began to run increasingly unsustainable deficits. Meanwhile, the violence in 
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Northern Ireland continued, albeit at a lower level than in the early and mid-1970s. Economic 
and political stagnation led to calls for change from the back benches. Following Colley’s 
decision to increase taxes on agricultural produce, support for Fianna Fáil at the polls fell to 
its lowest ebb in the party’s history. The June 1979 European Elections saw Fianna Fáil 
narrowly beat Fine Gael to take five of a possible fifteen seats. Haughey’s leadership 
campaign was launched quietly by the so-called ‘gang of five’ (made up by Albert Reynolds, 
Jackie Fahey, Seán Doherty, Tom McEllistrim and Mark Killilea) with Lynch’s Northern 
Ireland policy, or lack thereof, as the basis of attack.32 Lynch underestimated Haughey’s 
ambition and the dedication of his supporters.33 
 
The leadership election took place on 7 December 1979 and was contested by 
Haughey and Colley. Writing years later, Fine Gael leader Garret FitzGerald described the 
bullying tactics the Haughey camp adopted during the ballot.34 According to FitzGerald, 
several Fine Gael TD’s complained that Haughey’s men intimidated party members. 
Although FitzGerald was told that privacy booths were used, during the walk to the ballot 
box Haughey’s supporters demanded confirmation of a vote in favour of their leader, 
otherwise you ‘would be assumed to have voted for Colley and would subsequently be treated 
accordingly.’35 Haughey won the leadership contest by 44 votes to Colley’s 38. Haughey 
became Taoiseach.36 
 
RTÉ’s political correspondent Sean Dunigan labelled Haughey’s victory as ‘the 
greatest comeback since Lazarus.’37 Other journalists focused on the new Taoiseach’s 
Northern Ireland policy. He had avoided outlining his aims, due largely to the Arms Crisis, 
but this had not gone unnoticed. Haughey’s response was brief, ‘this is the first time I have 
been asked in this position, and up to now the responsibility for making Fianna Fáil party 
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statements in these matters belonged to others.’38 His election as Taoiseach meant that he 
needed to expand on his policy. He soon voiced his aspiration for a united Ireland.39  
 
The Atkins Talks 
In November 1979 Westminster published a White Paper that proposed the introduction of a 
consultative conference involving all the Northern Ireland parties.40 It was hoped that this 
approach would begin a dialogue which would provide a basic policy framework.41 The 
Conference was chaired by Atkins and ran from January to March 1980.42 The Conference 
was a step-away from the Conservative’s 1979 election manifesto, which had promised a 
strict policy of integration, and was therefore warmly received by politicians in Ireland.43 
 
FitzGerald told Robin Haydon, the British Ambassador to Ireland, how pleased he 
was to see the Conference go ahead.44 ‘He was very happy to see some movement on the 
North at last. He also thought that it was encouraging and remarkable that Ian Paisley and 
John Hume, future leader of the SDLP, were ‘establishing a good relationship …’45 Haughey 
also praised the Conference and added, ‘…pending the withdrawal or disengagement of 
Britain from Irish affairs … we should pursue the peaceful coming together of the 
communities by means of interim institutions. Any such interim institution would be 
welcome.’46 Haughey’s speech aggravated the unionist camp. Paisley asked to meet 
Thatcher. Gerry Fitt, leader of the SDLP, forewarned Thatcher that Paisley would use the 
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meeting ‘purely as a publicity stunt.’47 The conversation would be crucial. Paisley was the 
representative of ‘grass roots Protestant opinion’ so the current atmosphere on the ground 
could be ascertained. He could also give Thatcher insight into how politics in Northern 
Ireland worked.48 However, his emotive language irritated Thatcher.  
 
 Paisley claimed that he ‘represented the most slandered, most abused, most betrayed 
people in the United Kingdom: The Protestants of Northern Ireland.’ Thatcher replied that 
her visit to Northern Ireland that August represented her ‘own personal commitment’ to the 
province. She hoped Paisley ‘would say nothing that might put co-operation between Britain 
and the Republic in jeopardy.’49 Paisley was a powerful figure but he was a liability. He 
wanted ‘to build himself up as “leader of the people of Northern Ireland”.’50 His success at 
the European Elections in 1979 bolstered his confidence.51 Thatcher was warned that his 
ambitions had ‘changed sharply.’ The Government found that he changed from ‘a wrecker’ 
to an ambitious power seeker. ‘His immediate ambition is to supplant the UUP as the main 
voice of the Unionist tradition …’52 Paisley faced an obstacle to this aim. 
 
There was no concrete unionist plan on how to govern Northern Ireland, particularly 
so given the UUP’s absence from the initial Atkins talks. The only thing the unionist parties 
agreed on was ‘their aversion to incorporation into a united Ireland.’53 There was also 
suspicion towards the Conservative party. As discussed in the introduction, time and again 
British Conservatives had used the Irish issue to their political advantage. Within recent 
memory, a Conservative Government had dissolved Stormont and ‘brought out the hated 
Sunningdale agreement.’54 It was essential for Thatcher to reassure unionists that there was 
no sell-out, ‘Reassuring Protestant Unionists is not, however, a one-off job, nor has it been 
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at any time this century.’55 Advice on how she could achieve this was sent from the Northern 
Ireland Office (NIO). 
 
When Thatcher became Prime Minister, she appointed Maurice Oldfield, former 
director of MI6, with overseeing security and intelligence-gathering operations in Northern 
Ireland.56 In October 1979 (after only a week in his post) Oldfield wrote an advisory paper 
titled ‘But me no Buts.’ After reading through the official summaries and notes, Oldfield 
noticed a pattern in the language adopted. Officials continually used the word ‘but,’ “Our 
personal relations are very good but …”; “We have no difficulty in agreeing at the operational 
level but there are questions of higher policy”; “Of course the task is clear but …” Oldfield 
suggested using ‘and’ instead of ‘but’ as the latter had negative connotations. This would 
change the tone of these meetings. T.E. Utley, a respected Tory journalist and advisor, agreed 
with this assessment.57 Based on his experiences with the unionists (Utley stood as a UUP 
candidate in North Antrim in the general election of February 1974 but was defeated by 
Paisley), he reported that there was ‘total disillusionment with British policy … According 
to their interpretation of events, negotiations had been started with Dublin in order to provoke 
a fierce reaction in Northern Ireland which would prove that the province was ungovernable 
and thus prepare the way for independence.’58 The Atkins Talks also faced opposition from 
Westminster. 
 
Enoch Powell, UUP MP for South Down, asked to meet Thatcher to discuss the new 
Conference.59 He felt that talks contradicted an agreement between the UUP and Atkins 
predecessor as Secretary of State, Neave. Powell gave specific details of the time and date 
this agreement was reached. He said the UUP had promised to support the Conservatives at 
Westminster to bring down Labour. He did not divulge Neave’s specific plans but insinuated 
that Thatcher was aware of them.60 Powell believed that the talks were a search for a 
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“glittering prize” in Northern Ireland. He advised it was safer to maintain distance, and allow 
‘passions to subside and events to take their course.’ For Roy Harrington (private secretary 
in the NIO) the implication from Powell was clear; ‘… the Government’s policy towards 
Northern Ireland would be a Unionist policy leading towards integration rather than 
devolution.’ Harrington’s superior, the Under Secretary of State, Kenneth Stowe, agreed and 
told Powell that ‘Ministers judged that it was timely to make a move,’ an argument that did 
‘not make much impact on Mr. Powell.’61 During a meeting with Thatcher and her 
parliamentary private secretary, Ian Gow, in May 1980, Powell made two further arguments 
against the talks.62 First, movement on a constitutional change in Northern Ireland did not 
need to happen immediately. Although the Government wanted to make a significant move, 
Direct Rule would cause ‘no outcry in Ulster.’ Second, Powell argued that an Assembly could 
function without an Executive. Gow disagreed with this, 
  
If there was to be an Assembly, without an Executive, that Assembly would act 
irresponsibly, because it would have no responsibility. It would discuss any and all 
matters. It would be hostile and critical. Its criticism would be destructive. It would 
diminish the role of Ulster MPs at Westminster.63  
 
Powell could not dissuade Thatcher from disbanding the talks. The participants had so far 
worked well together, and by the third session some progress had been made. 
 
Conference delegates were reported to have ‘reached the heart of the matter: the role 
to be assigned to the minority community in a devolved administration.’ Alliance favoured a 
committee-style system made up of equal numbers of each community. The SDLP preferred 
a power-sharing arrangement, similar to Sunningdale. The DUP was willing to introduce 
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some safeguards for the minority in their majority rule model, but did not set out what these 
safeguards would be. Harrington reported that although the main parties were still ‘a long 
way apart,’ they wanted to continue talking.64 By the sixth week, Michael Hopkins of the 
NIO told Michael Alexander ( Thatcher’s Private Secretary on Overseas Affairs) that the 
position of each party had become clear, but there was still no ‘sense of readiness to explore 
middle ground (if indeed there is middle ground to explore).’65 At the final session it was 
apparent that until a formal paper was produced, any further suggestions would be 
hypothetical. The delegates had put forward their ideas, now it was up to London to outline 
its position. Atkins suggested to Thatcher, who agreed, that a next steps paper should be 
prepared.66 
 
While speaking privately to an un-named member of staff from the British Embassy, 
who had been sent by Haydon, FitzGerald emphasised the need for swift action following 
the adjournment of the talks, 
 
Once the parties’ informal views had been ascertained the British Government should 
then impose a solution with great firmness. His view was that a reiteration of the 
principles of Sunningdale or something like it might enable the SDLP to acquiesce in 
a solution which involved weighted majority voting.67  
 
Westminster published the White Paper in July.68 Two options were outlined, power-sharing 
between elected parties, or majority rule. Unionists, concerned that their majority would be 
threatened by power-sharing, rejected it. The UUP was hopeful of a majority rule model with 
no concessions to the minority. It realised that this option was impossible so it began to look 
at an integrated model, 
 
They hope to proceed down this path via the failure of the Government’s initiative to 
restore devolved government, followed by implementation of the Government’s 
                                                
64 TNA UK, PREM 19/279, letter from Harrington to Alexander, 31 Jan. 1980. 
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68 The Government of Northern Ireland: Proposals for Future Discussion, July 1980, 
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manifesto commitment to strengthen local government which they would hope to 
dominate as they did before 1970.69 
 
Non-Unionists disagreed with majority rule. They preferred the current system that 
guaranteed the status quo unionist majority. The impact of the Atkins talks, therefore, was 
limited.70 In November Atkins told the Commons that no agreement existed between the 
Northern Ireland parties.71 London remained committed to finding a solution.  
 
The Queen’s speech, which is written by Ministers from the majority party on her 
behalf, pledged that the government would continue to seek arrangements for “Northern 
Ireland that will better meet the needs of all its people”.72 In a briefing paper for Haughey’s 
upcoming meeting with Thatcher in December, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
advised Haughey that it was ‘apparent from recent contacts at official level with the British 
that they are now pessimistic on the prospects for setting up a devolved administration or 
local assembly and that further attempts in this direction have been postponed until next 
year.’73 Now was Haughey’s chance to discuss his idea with Thatcher. 
 
Haughey’s Search for the ‘glittering prize’ 
Although Haughey had reiterated Fianna Fáil’s traditional stance on a united Ireland, there 
had been a shift in tactic. Whereas traditionally nationalists had demanded the British to 
withdraw from Northern Ireland, Haughey wanted to pursue intergovernmental talks. Dublin 
and London would come together to discuss a solution to Northern Ireland.74 In early 1980, 
Haughey discussed his intention to work with London to ‘find a formula that will lift the 
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situation to a new plane.’75 It was a bold scheme and Haughey needed to be assertive. After 
a meeting with Brian Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in April, Atkins reported that 
Haughey was personally in control of Northern Ireland policy and that the DFA was 
‘somewhat frozen out.’76 Stowe later commented that Haughey’s officials seemed ‘hard put 
to it to express a clear view.77 The lack of DFA briefing began to show in Haughey’s 
speeches.  
 
During some speeches, Haughey called for Westminster to consent to Irish unity, but 
then he talked of the benefits of an Anglo-Irish initiative.78 In April, in his first interview 
with The Irish Times as Taoiseach, Haughey said that he was ‘hopeful’ of a united Ireland in 
his lifetime. He went on to say, ‘What is needed is a coherent, mature political approach and 
an abundance of patience, understanding and generosity.’79 In June, the day after the 
incredibly successful Teapot Summit where Haughey gifted Thatcher with a silver Georgian 
Teapot and strainer, Haughey started to backtrack. Keen to keep Thatcher on side, and aware 
that the interview would probably be sent to her, he told RTÉ News that he wanted to reach 
out to all the people of Northern Ireland, 
 
What I’d like to do is to invite them to discuss with us some new developments. 
There’s been too many failures, too many initiatives have been brought forward, too 
many proposals, too many conferences, all of which have ended up in the same bitter 
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frustrating failure. Now what I’d like to say to them is, can you not visualise some 
new beginning?80  
 
In August a Fianna Fáil policy review conference took place. Haughey’s Joint Studies 
initiative was dissected. It was decided that the purpose of the studies was ‘to provide a 
framework in which they could obtain adequate assurance that security interests would not 
be prejudiced by progress towards Irish unity.’ An integral part of the Joint Studies would be 
the establishment of an Anglo-Irish Council. The Council would officialise meetings between 
government leaders and their ministers. It would work to ‘make fundamental changes of 
attitude on the part of those involved.’ Haughey set out what he hoped these changes would 
include, 
 
- more effective security throughout Ireland … 
- action on an All-Ireland basis directed to the reconstruction of the devastated 
Northern Ireland economy … 
- working out an acceptable constitution for an All-Ireland political entity, and 
- promoting closer relations between Ireland and Britain.81 
 
Haughey also wanted to include the unionists in the Conference. He ordered that ‘Contact 
should be initiated with the unionist parties of Northern Ireland and that ‘ways of awakening 
Unionist interest in closer relations with this state should be researched.’82 Haughey ordered 
that senior unionists should be invited to any official dinners or receptions.83 Basically, 
Haughey wanted to run with the fox and hunt with the hounds. He wanted to work closely 
with the people who vehemently opposed his aspirations of unity. Thatcher’s team continued 
to try to figure out Haughey’s character and aims.  
 
London thought that Haughey’s plans were tantamount to an unsustainable fantasy, 
‘We also had in mind that if- as may happen- the Republic wish the Taoiseach’s flight of 
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82 iBid.,  
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fancy about an international initiative on Irish unity to glide slowly into something less 
significant, it would be in our interests to allow this to happen.’84 The Times described 
Haughey as a ‘deeply committed republican, with political aspirations that (strayed) little 
from the original concepts of Fianna Fáil.’85 Aitken describes Thatcher’s early attitude to 
Haughey as ‘wary,’ the arms trial casted a long shadow.86 FitzGerald’s ‘flawed pedigree’ 
speech during the debates that followed Haughey’s nomination for Taoiseach, hardly aided 
Haughey’s image.87 Memos from within Thatcher’s cabinet show that they were attempting 
to decipher the man professionally and personally. Haydon described Haughey as fostering,  
 
A calculating and ruthless ambition ... (he) surround(s) himself with a close-knit and 
faithful coterie of associates whom he dominates by force of character and some of 
whom, it is said, he has bought ... He has become pretty sophisticated, and would like 
to be more so ... He is said to have been at least unscrupulous in his business dealings 
... He has acquired a taste for the good things in life.88 
 
Memos from the NIO to Ten Downing Street (No. 10) detail Haughey’s leadership style as 
‘near Presidential’ and label his Northern Ireland policy as fostering ‘a large element of 
sleight of hand.’89 Yet Thatcher and Haughey were quite similar; both possessed personalities 
that overwhelmed people; both were resolute in their aim to bring peace to Northern Ireland 
(albeit for differing ultimatums); both could be flirtatious; and they were suspicious of their 
respective Foreign and Commonwealth Offices (FCO).90 Northern Ireland was a ‘glittering 
prize.’ Unity would secure Haughey’s place in history as the great Taoiseach. The Arms Trial 
would be recorded as a minor blip.91 But London refused to entertain Haughey’s calls for 
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unity. It needed to maintain a good working relationship with him so that cross-border 
security could be improved. William Whitelaw, Conservative Deputy Leader and Home 
Secretary, commented that Haughey ‘could not flout international opinion by blatantly 
withdrawing (cooperation), but only one telephone call is needed to cripple its 
effectiveness.’92 Haughey used Northern Ireland to advance his own political career, but he 
also used it to establish a relationship with Thatcher, and vice versa.93 
 
 Thatcher was ‘an emotional unionist,’ and when she had said that ‘Northern Ireland 
was as British as Finchley she meant it.’94 She was outraged by paramilitary atrocities, but 
was unsure what to do about it. Her official biographer revealed that in private Thatcher 
surmised that she was a unionist because ‘they (the Northern Ireland unionists) had been jolly 
loyal to us.’95 But she found unionists themselves ‘up-hill work.’96 When asked how Thatcher 
viewed the unionist leaders, her Press Secretary Bernard Ingham sniggered ‘well I suppose 
they were sent to try us, weren’t they!’97 The Atkins talks had proved that an internal solution 
was not forthcoming. It was left to the Anglo-Irish political elite to move into diplomacy.98  
 
The Haughey-Thatcher Meetings 
At the very beginning, Thatcher was cautious of meeting Haughey on her own. She noted on 
an FCO letter that she did not want to meet him before the EEC in April, ‘NO- the point 
about choosing the European council is that I will have met him in company with several 
others first.’99 Thatcher usually revelled in male attention and liked to be ‘made a fuss of by 
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a lot of chaps.’100 When they did meet, there was an element of physical attraction on 
Thatcher’s part. Charles Powell, Thatcher’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
commented that ‘there was a glint in (Haughey’s) eye that she found actually quite 
attractive.’101 Thatcher initially fell for Haughey’s charisma, ‘He set out to charm her, and I 
suppose at the beginning she was slightly susceptible to the charm, relations developed 
reasonably well.’102 Haughey projected a suave exterior, but he had thoroughly prepared for 
their meeting. 
 
 Representatives from the Departments of the Taoiseach, DFA and Finance were 
asked to have briefing papers ready for Haughey by 8 May 1980.103 Haughey was given 
briefs with a nationalist colour which described Northern Ireland as a desperate idea with an 
unstable foundation. The brief emphasised the role Haughey had to play in convincing 
Thatcher that an internal solution to Northern Ireland would fail. Dublin needed to be 
involved. Haughey was also warned that the meeting would set the tone for future Anglo-
Irish relations, and attract intense media interest.104 Eamonn Kennedy, the Irish Ambassador 
to Britain, sent Haughey a personality report on Thatcher,105 
 
Thatcher comes across as a sharp, bossy, down-to-earth and at times abrasive Prime 
Minister … She has a tidy, efficient, hard-working mind and while she impresses by 
her crisp grasp of detail, and her down-to-business, time-is-valuable approach she 
sometimes gives offence to her Cabinet by treating them as if she were an aggressive 
school-mistress, handing out marks to the hawks and criticising the wets. Thatcher 
takes great care to impress as the well-groomed, well-tailored lady who wants to be 
graciously treated as such but not, as it were, referred to specifically as a woman.106 
 
Kennedy warned that the death of Neave and Mountbatten had left a ‘deep psychological 
scar’ on Thatcher and her opinion on Ireland was thus affected. Haughey was advised that 
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she would not immediately reject a bold new approach but he would have to bide his time.107 
Haughey adopted a slowly slowly approach and met with members of her team to discuss his 
views on Northern Ireland. During a meeting with Stowe, Haughey reiterated that any attempt 
to solve the Northern Ireland problem without the Irish Government would fail. Knowing 
that the meeting would be reported back to Thatcher, Haughey tried to flatter her. He told her 
team that she had .’..the opportunity of achieving what no other Prime Minister had ever 
achieved …’108 
 
Haughey’s advisors had to tread carefully. Haughey was advised to present any 
proposals orally, initially through Kennedy, as a paper text could look too final. This would 
result in an unfavourable reaction from her that would ‘colour her attitude’ to the meeting. 
After Kennedy had laid out the basic premise, Haughey could fill in the gaps. Although this 
would not provide Dublin with an immediate answer, this plan carried less risk of an outright 
rejection.109  
 
Memos kept in the Prime Minister’s files reveal Haughey’s personal concerns with 
the first meeting. He was, ‘… at pains to see that nothing is said beforehand which might 
sour the atmosphere.’110 Thatcher’s notation on a memo a few days prior to the meeting 
reveal her concerns about Haughey’s expectations. Haughey had indicated that he believed 
he could solve the Irish problem by December of that year, Thatcher noted ‘this is exactly 
what I feared - and he can only be disappointed.’111 Thatcher was also advised to ‘pour cold 
water on some of his more far-reaching ideas, without rebuffing his desire to contribute to 
the resolution of the Northern Ireland problem …’112 She was given five key points to make 
to Haughey, 
 
1. Guarantee: there can be no question of change … 
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2. Declaration of interest by HMG in eventual Irish unity: not on … 
3. Dublin’s role: recognise that they have a natural interest … 
4. Wider relationships: what does Hume mean exactly? 
5. Long-term future: HMG accepts and will defend the choice of the Northern Ireland 
people.113 
 
London was unsure of what Haughey would seek at the meeting, but it knew that ‘he would 
certainly aim at extracting the maximum political advantage ...’114 Thatcher’s main priority 
was security, Haughey’s was to ‘(convince) the Prime Minister of the seriousness of Irish 
intentions.’115 Thatcher’s cabinet attempted to guess what other policies Haughey would 
focus on, 
 
Taoiseach aims- to establish, and be seen to establish, a relationship of trust and 
confidence with the Prime Minister- partly perhaps by demonstrating a robust line 
over terrorism. Possibly also by showing that he has constructive ideas on Ireland’s 
role in Europe, including perhaps a readiness to question Ireland’s traditional 
neutrality; and more generally that he is a man to be taken seriously.116 
 
 Thatcher was advised by Whitelaw to ‘keep him sweet’ to save the cross-border security 
initiative.117 Thatcher was also warned that a poor meeting would cause Anglo-Irish relations 
to deteriorate. Conceding a negotiating role for Haughey could be risky, but would have long-
term benefits for security.118 Thatcher remained defiant. Beside a point that suggested an 
arrangement between Dublin and London, she noted ‘NO.’119 Unaware of Thatcher’s refusal 
to comprehend his main idea, after the Luxemburg EEC in April Haughey announced that he 
would meet her in London.120  
 
Far from welcoming the new Taoiseach, the day before Haughey arrived Thatcher 
told the Commons, ‘the future of the constitutional affairs of Northern Ireland is a matter for 
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the people of Northern Ireland, the Government and this Parliament, and no one else.’121 This 
would have made any other world leader anxious about meeting Thatcher, but not Haughey. 
The Times described his handling of the meeting as ‘a bold performance,’ and perhaps that 
is what the occasion called for.122 A touch of Irish charm to put her at ease.  
 
No note taker was present during the private conversation between Haughey and 
Thatcher, but existing records outline events from the rest of the day.123 Thatcher agreed to 
regular meetings with Haughey to discuss Northern Ireland, but also steered the conversation 
to international matters including the EEC and the Middle East.124 Thatcher was still wary of 
Haughey and therefore avoided discussing Northern Ireland. In her autobiography, Thatcher 
recounted with fondness her first impression of Haughey describing him as ‘easy to get on 
with ... tough, able and politically astute with few illusions.’125 Meanwhile, Haughey raved 
about the meeting to the press stating that ‘new and closer cooperation’ had been agreed.126 
A memo from the NIO complemented Haughey on how prepared he was.127 So in spite of 
Haughey’s inauspicious past, he impressed Thatcher and her team and ‘good rapport’ was 
struck.128 Haughey also gave Thatcher a silver Georgian teapot. Haughey told Dunlop ‘She 
likes silver … That will knock her back a bit.’129  
 
The ‘Teapot summit’ marked the beginning of a new era in Anglo-Irish relations. In 
the post-summit communiqué, the phrase “unique” was used to describe relations between 
the UK and Ireland. Thatcher herself suggested the word in place of “special”, which she 
argued was widely used to describe Anglo-American relations, ‘“Our relationship is unique 
so let’s use the word - it is stronger”.’130 This decision would come back to haunt her. 
 
                                                
121 ‘Prime Minister (Engagements),’ Commons sitting of 20 May 1980, Hansard HC [225-474] cc. 247-251. 
122 The Times, 22 May 1980. 
123 It was unusual for leaders to meet without a note taker but as this was Haughey and MT’s first official meeting, both 
sides wanted to keep things casual. Dublin’s record of the meeting is kept in NAI, DFA 2010/20/6 and NAI, TAOIS 
2010/53/928. London’s record is in TNA UK, PREM 19/280. 
124 NAI, TAOIS 2010/53/928, Haughey meeting with MT, 21 May 1980. 
125 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 388. 
126 The Times, 22 May 1980. 
127 TNA UK, PREM 19/280, note of a meeting held in the NIO, 30 May 1980. 
128 Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, p. 415 
129 Dunlop, Yes, Taoiseach, p. 209. 
130 NAI, TAOIS 2010/53/928, notes on discussion between the Haughey and MT, 23 May 1980. MT perhaps decided to use 
“unique” because Britain’s “special relationship” was with the USA. 
 54 
Robert Armstrong, Thatcher’s Cabinet Secretary, recalled that immediately after the 
meeting Thatcher said that ‘we had all been making a great mistake about Charles Haughey, 
and that he was a romantic idealist.’131 Now both sides needed to maintain their relationship 
as a note from the Taoiseach office indicated, ‘the Taoiseach had made a very favourable 
impression in Britain generally as a result of the Summit. It was important to build on this 
climate.’132 Privately, the success of the meeting was echoed. In a letter to Thatcher Kennedy 
told her that ‘we (the Irish representatives) all felt that new and encouraging vistas of co-
operation in friendship had been opened between us and that the two islands were coming 
closer together.’133 The staunchly pro-Tory The Daily Mail reported that a new friendship 
had been struck between the pair. Thatcher had also ‘pledged to work with him for 
reconciliation over The Troubles.134 Back in Ireland, the papers were hungry for concrete 
information on the Taoiseach’s first discussion with the Prime Minister.  
 
The Cork Examiner reported that there had been ‘no nettles grasped’ and that 
Haughey had failed to gain any concessions or to initiate any of his new ideas. ‘Any moves 
towards real and lasting solutions to the Northern problem are as far away as ever.’135 The 
Irish Independent wanted to know what had actually happened at the meeting. They felt 
Haughey ‘Either … had a lot to conceal or there was nothing of substance from the meeting 
that could be reported.’136 In truth aside from the teapot, there was nothing juicy for the 
papers to publish. Haughey and Thatcher were pleased with how the meeting went. Haughey 
told Haydon ‘he had, “to be honest”, been surprised that everything had gone so well in 
London … “But,” he added, “we must keep up the impetus”.’137 The day after the meeting, 
Thatcher called Haughey to thank him for the gift and for an enjoyable discussion.138 The 
relative harmony between the two leaders did not last. 
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In June 1980, Haughey was given the opportunity to present himself to the British 
public via an interview on the BBC current affairs programme, Panorama. This was the first 
time the new Taoiseach had the opportunity to speak on his own terms. It was a chance to 
reaffirm the relationship he was building with Thatcher, and to set the record straight 
regarding his past. Whether the programme was heavily edited or Haughey forgot himself in 
the heat of the moment, we may never know. Haughey placed the blame on the BBC for 
omitting several key discussions and projecting him in a negative light.139 Either way, during 
the interview Haughey said that in order for Ireland to successfully work alongside Britain, 
it would be necessary for Britain to withdraw completely from Northern Ireland.140 This was 
nothing new. As previously discussed he had told the Irish electorate and his party the same 
thing. Haughey’s call for unity after meeting with Thatcher was ill timed. 
  
Following the broadcast, Haughey had some groveling to do in London. He was 
aware of the damage his interview had caused, ‘the Irish Ambassador rang the Department 
this afternoon to say that the Taoiseach had just telephoned him to say that he was disturbed 
by reports that his Panorama interview had occasioned some dissatisfaction in London.’141 
Although there is little evidence of Thatcher’s personal reaction to the Panorama interview, 
her team reminded her of the possible benefits of Anglo-Irish relations, 
 
… if the present political initiative in Northern Ireland shows any signs of success, it 
could only be helpful if it is reinforced by regular meetings between the Prime 
Minister and Mr. Haughey. If on the other hand the political initiative looks like its 
losing its momentum, a regular series of meetings with Mr. Haughey will provide 
something on which to fall back on.142 
  
A letter from NIO highlighted the fragility of relations at this early stage. The memo includes 
several hand-written comments by Thatcher revealing her dismay at Haughey’s 
misunderstanding of their recent discussion at the EEC at Venice in June. Haughey told John 
Hume, SDLP leader, that Thatcher had said she ‘did not expect the Governments initiative 
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to get anywhere.’ She placed three exclamation points beside this sentence, further 
expressing her irritation in a note, ‘I am sure I said no such thing. I told him the white paper 
would be out within a few weeks and then we would have to discuss it.’ Thatcher also penned 
a lengthy analysis of the situation, saying that she did say she would ‘spend some time on 
going over the history of the Irish problem to see how we could best go ahead and to get a 
better feel for the nature of the problem.’143 Thatcher also highlighted Haughey’s 
expectations, ‘in his heart of hearts (he is) expecting far more than we are and (he) is looking 
forward to the next bilateral as if it will result in positive and considerable steps forward to a 
very much closer relationship ... I see he will be disappointed - very disappointed.’144 
Meanwhile, officials from Dublin and London met to make arrangements for future Thatcher-
Haughey meetings.  
 
Hugh Swift of the Irish Embassy met with David Chesterton, a British Official, to 
exchange views on a December summit. Chesterton remarked that although the Atkins talks 
had failed, it had been a useful exercise. ‘… no real dialogue had developed between the 
political parties but, conversely, they were extremely pleased at the improved understanding 
between individual political parties and the Government as regards their respective 
positions.’ Chesterton also pointed out that the government’s position was a precarious one. 
Supporters had to be kept happy in order for Thatcher to stay in power, and many back-
benchers were staunch traditional unionists. Chesterton assured Swift that the NIO would 
continue working “to keep the ball in the air” in Northern Ireland.145 After some back and 
forth suggestions with Dublin, 8 December was set as the next summit.146 
 
 Haughey sent Lenihan to meet with Atkins in October to prepare for the upcoming 
December meeting. Lenihan recognised the efforts London had made to bring the northern 
parties together, but again emphasized the need to include Dublin in future. Lenihan told 
Atkins, ‘… it would be wrong to divorce the two Northern Ireland communities from the rest 
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of Ireland.’147 Lenihan argued that by including Dublin, the minority community would feel 
they were represented in any new deal and would be more likely to accept it. Dublin was 
pushing an open door. British Ministers had realised that an Irish dimension was necessary.148 
It was Thatcher they needed to convince. She was pleased with Haughey’s efforts on security, 
indeed Atkins pointed out that ‘it had not gone unnoticed that the Irish Government was 
devoting more and more of its resources to border security. London was well aware of what 
Dublin was doing …’ However, more could be done. The feeling on the ground in Northern 
Ireland was that terrorists could still cross the border. Atkins reported that ‘Twice recently, 
in his contacts with ‘ordinary people,’ he was left in no doubt that ‘things were boiling up 
beneath the surface.’ He had been told of the possibility that ‘a whole lot of Protestants would 
murder a whole lot of Catholics.’149  
 
Reports on the atmosphere in Northern Ireland were requested for Haughey’s 
consideration. These briefings provided the background to current thinking in Northern 
Ireland, allowing the reader to form a line of argument during official meetings. However, 
Stowe warned Andrew O’Rourke, Secretary of the DFA, that information requests were 
sometimes misunderstood.150 ‘If one asks for information about a particular idea … this does 
not mean that one is either in favour of, or hostile to the idea or that one is asking for it to be 
promoted. It is a question of knowing how minds are working.’ Stowe warned that Hume 
was privy to Irish information requests and was passing on his own assumptions of what they 
meant to the NIO. With this information, the Irish could tacitly request briefings. Thatcher, 
through the NIO, would potentially be made aware of a similar line of thought in Dublin. 
This would instil confidence in Haughey and the Anglo-Irish process. O’Rourke asked Stowe 
if Thatcher was still interested in Northern Ireland. Stowe assured him that Thatcher was still 
determined to find a solution. Her team was involved in a process which was at stage four or 
five. Stage six would be a decision on how to move forward. ‘It was important to “get things 
right”.’ Stowe continued, ‘For Thatcher … there is a real interest in reaching a solution, the 
time scale being about 3 years … for the Irish Government the time scale is shorter.’151  
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In November 1980, Robert Armstrong briefed her on Haughey’s outlook. Armstrong 
felt that Haughey ‘would like to be the Taoiseach who unlocked the door to the solution to 
the Northern Ireland problem.’ His calls for unity were a way of testing Thatcher’s 
‘vulnerable’ and ‘sticking’ points. Haughey’s minor concessions were intended to place him 
in a good place with his supporters, then ‘he (would) be in a position with his own electorate 
to blame us for failure.’152 Tory grandee and Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, also wrote to 
Thatcher to offer his advice.153 He warned that a ‘final solution’ was not possible ‘within our 
lifetime.’ He said that Northern Ireland was made up of ‘two, mutually hostile, tribes’ and 
that there was ‘no such thing as the Irish people.’ Hailsham concluded that Thatcher’s task 
was to ‘find a means within our span of life in office in which effect is given to the 
requirements …’154 Before the December summit, Thatcher and Haughey entered into their 
final preparations.  
 
 During one of the last meetings before the summit, Haughey briefed his delegation 
on how they should proceed.155 He wanted it to be made clear to London that Dublin was 
displeased with the border. He recalled that a ‘Member of the government travelling to 
Donegal recently through the six counties had noticed that there was no military or police 
presence immediately north of the border. The British would have to do better than that and 
they should be told so.’156 This was contrary to how London viewed the situation. In October, 
the Department of the Taoiseach reported that London was so pleased with current security 
that it wanted to move away from discussing it, and instead focus on criminal law reform.157 
Haughey also wanted to push the inter-Governmental conference. When asked what kind of 
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conference they should present, Haughey told his team ‘we should tell the British that we 
wanted a constitutional conference but we did not care how they might decide to dress it up.’ 
Haughey still wanted to ‘sell the case for Irish unity to Thatcher, to the British Government 
and to the great British public … we were attempting to help to find a solution and that we 
wished to take Northern Ireland off the backs of the British.’ Haughey felt that Thatcher 
would probably refuse to discuss unity, ‘mentioning as objections … her own unionism (“I 
was not elected to preside over the dismemberment of the United Kingdom”) and her 
Government’s fear of a loyalist backlash.’158 
 
At a meeting between Thatcher and Haughey’s Ministers, London responded strongly 
to Haughey’s ideas.159 In regards the conference, the Dublin papers reported that London’s 
reaction was ‘personal … and not receptive.’ Thatcher would have to be sold on this idea.160 
London said that it had not been told ‘from on high’ what to discuss. This is contrary to what 
Stowe had reported earlier. If Thatcher was taking a keen interest in Northern Ireland surely 
she would have wanted to brief her delegation before their meeting? Dublin assured them 
that this was an exploratory. Thatcher’s team took the opportunity to discuss the language 
used by Dublin. They warned that phrases including the “totality of relationships within 
Ireland” and “these islands” were unacceptable, as they sailed too close to unity.161 The 
meeting concluded when Stowe assured Haughey’s team that Thatcher ‘would come to the 
meeting informed and purposely applied to the problem of Northern Ireland.’162 
 
In the midst of this a challenge to both London and Dublin emerged. When London 
ended special category status in March 1976 for convicted republican prisoners in the Maze 
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prison a chain of protests began. The protests escalated from a blanket protest, which began 
with PIRA prisoner, Kieran Nugent in September 1976, to a Hunger Strike, the first in March 
1980, followed by a second in January 1981.163 Thatcher was determined not to yield to the 
prisoners, and so a stalemate ensued. Haughey and the Irish Government were ever anxious 
to make a political breakthrough in Northern Ireland but it was considered bad timing for an 
Anglo-Irish summit, ‘a generally unfavourable atmosphere’ was apparent. With all the 
arrangements made, it was decided to go ahead.164 
 
London and Dublin’s records of the meeting vary. Dublin’s record focuses overly on 
Haughey’s joint studies, whereas the London papers detail a long discussion about the 
Hunger Strikes. This is indicative of each sides priority going in to the meeting. Haughey 
needed to get tangible results from Thatcher, and Thatcher wanted to steer the conversation 
away from Haughey’s joint studies idea.165 Dublin’s papers also reflect their frustration with 
being left to run after London. Another interesting aspect of the record points to Thatcher’s 
relationship with Lynch and whether the exchanges between them ‘affected the attitude of 
the British Prime Minister to the studies process.’166 In spite of these problems, Haughey’s 
team felt that the two sides worked well together, ‘the discussions were regarded by both 
sides as extremely constructive and significant.’167 Haughey was also flattered by the high-
profile British delegation.168 In spite of Thatcher’s attempts to steer the conversation away 
from Haughey’s idea, he pushed his idea for an Anglo-Irish Conference forward. Thatcher 
told him that ‘it was a bit soon to talk of a conference,’ and changed the subject to cross-
border security. She felt it was important to work on more ‘practical’ issues including gas 
supplies and tourism before they could move on to the bigger issues. Haughey argued that 
the small problems would continue to grow due to nationalist resistance. Government to 
Government contacts were crucial. Haughey’s perserverance appeared to work, Thatcher 
replied that ‘she would like to try to give the studies a practical format. She added “I think 
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we need to look at joint studies” and appeared to agree with the Taoiseach’s proposition.’169 
Thatcher then returned to security.  
 
Border areas were difficult to patrol.170 As well as suspects crossing the border, as 
they had after the Warrenpoint Ambush, it was evident that border residents were 
uncomfortable with the Army presence there. Deaths in the area were actually increasing.171 
In spite of this, Thatcher was pleased with the work between the RUC and Garda. Haughey, 
in an argument that would be echoed throughout Thatcher’s premiership, explained that 
although security was important, ‘it was not the whole picture.’ The two leaders clashed over 
the origin of the violence, ‘We are concerned with the spill-over effects of Northern violence 
(in Ireland). The Prime Minister said that she thought that much of the violence came from 
(Ireland). Haughey explained that many of the perpetrators of violence had been ‘locked up,’ 
so the next task would be to isolate their comrades in Northern Ireland. This, Haughey 
argued, could only be done if a new political initiative were launched, 
 
If we could get these studies going we might be able to move forward, on a basis 
which would enable the people in Northern Ireland to live at peace with one another 
on the understanding that the two Governments are co-operating. What was involved 
was a great historic move. If the situation was handled right the two Governments 
could, perhaps, between them solve the problem. They knew the British had certain 
concerns with Defence. We would fully accept these in any new arrangements. He 
would like them to be assured that Ireland would never be used as a base for an attack 
on Britain.172 
 
 Thatcher partially agreed with Haughey. She wanted to end the violence but emphasized 
again that she could not agitate the unionists by involving Dublin in the solution. They would 
need to be persuaded and this was a job for London. Haughey asked Thatcher to take more 
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personal interest in this and cross-border studies.173 Thatcher again fell back on security 
before the meeting concluded.  
 
Post meeting, Haughey was jubilant. One memo, passed between the recently-
appointed British Ambassador to Ireland, Leonard Figg and Alexander, gives a glimpse of 
the triumphant mood Haughey was in, 
 
You may remember just before lunch yesterday that when Mr. Haughey was showing 
the Prime Minister the throne in the main central Throne Room he invited her to sit 
on it. She firmly disclaimed any intention of doing so but suggested he should do so 
if he wished. They both laughed and went off to lunch ... Haughey returned to the 
Throne Room, where a lot of his officials were still milling around and drinking. He 
then ascended the throne and sat on it, his feet not quite touching the floor, and told 
the company they should now all kneel. He has a good sense of fun, and we might as 
well take comfort from the fact that he clearly thought the day had gone well.174 
 
Progress had been made. A note sent from Thatcher to Haughey discussed how they had 
‘carried the development of relations … a stage further.’175 The meeting also saw the first 
use of the phrase ‘totality of relationships.’ If a relationship between Dublin and London was 
developed, the tense situation in Northern Ireland could be neutralised. The meeting caused 
a media frenzy, the result of which would see a harsh lesson in phraseology for both Haughey 
and Thatcher.  
 
The general response to the Dublin summit was that of confusion; mystery 
surrounded what had been discussed, and if anything had been agreed. Haughey told the post-
summit press conference that ‘sufficient for the day is the achievement thereof’ and alluded 
to ‘… historic progress.’176 The Irish press reported that Haughey was deluded, ‘the search 
for the true significance of this week’s Anglo-Irish summit continues but the Taoiseach ... 
remains convinced that it ... would raise the Northern problem to a new plane.’177 In the Dáil, 
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Haughey was asked to clarify what had happened and how significant the meeting had been. 
Patrick Harte, a Fine Gael TD, mocked Haughey.178 He asked him to ‘tell us what 
extraordinary thing happened at this meeting that did not happen before.’ FitzGerald went on 
to sarcastically thank Haughey for ‘(clarifying) what I think to be obscure.’179 Results were 
expected, but not forthcoming. Haughey’s use of the phrase ‘historic progress,’ was 
problematic. 
 
 What did ‘historic progress’ mean? Reporters poured over the post-summit 
communiqué to try to understand what Haughey meant. They failed to reach a conclusion, 
‘From the communiqué issued and from the Taoiseach’s comments afterwards nothing was 
revealed that justifies the description “historic” being applied to the meeting. (Even Thatcher 
was enigmatic at her press conference).’180 Contrasts were made between Haughey’s press 
conference and Thatcher’s ‘lukewarm’ reception, ‘ Thatcher seemed to attach less weight to 
some of the proposals than did Mr. Haughey. Observers found it difficult to assess just how 
much progress has been made on the Northern problem.’181 There were calls for her to ‘come 
clean’ on the summit.182 The Daily Mirror and The Guardian praised Thatcher for breaking 
‘through 59 years of prejudice and hate yesterday to put the issue of closer links between 
Belfast and Dublin back on the political agenda.’183 The Observer, was less than 
complimentary. It accused Thatcher of performing a ‘u-turn’ on Northern Ireland.184 Other 
titles attempted to reassure the unionists that there was nothing to fear of this new venture.185 
The Belfast Telegraph focused on unionist unease.186 Powell fanned the flames within 
unionist circles. He described the summit as a ‘mini-Munich,’ a ‘visible humiliation of the 
Government …’187 At a private lunch with Gow, Powell attacked the terminology used in the 
communiqué. ‘He sees the use of words like “institutional structures” as the beginning of a 
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softening-up of British opinion on the way to disposing of the “problem” of Northern Ireland 
…’188  
 
The meeting continued to dominate headlines for weeks after.189 Thatcher tried to 
downplay Haughey’s over-zealous press conference. She stressed that talks would focus on 
‘“institutional - but not “constitutional” - structures …’190 This was the first blip in the 
Thatcher-Haughey relationship, and it was not the last. In 1981, relations crumbled due to a 
series of interviews given by Lenihan.  
 
Lenihan was well known in Government circles as a ‘delightfully indiscreet’ 
character. ‘He found it too difficult to lie, and when confronted about some misdemeanor or 
other would disarmingly admit to whatever mistake had been made.’191 In essence, he was a 
journalist’s dream interview. During an interview with Geraldine Kennedy, a well-respected 
Irish political journalist, Lenihan claimed that the burgeoning relationship between Britain 
and Ireland meant that a united Ireland was possible within ten years.192 The Lenihan 
interview left Thatcher ‘very, very distressed.’ His tone was ‘wholly different from 
everything which we agreed in our previous communiqué.’193 Thatcher and Haughey were 
due to meet on the margins of the EEC at Maastricht, and Thatcher took the opportunity to 
have a private audience with Haughey. Although no official record of that conversation 
exists, contemporary accounts tell us that Thatcher hand-bagged Haughey, 
 
Thatcher tore into Haughey who remained silent effectively ... for about half an hour 
... you could say that the bilateral relationship that he (Haughey) had been carefully 
building up ... that was the point at which it was shattered.194  
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The media reports from the EEC pick up on this tension and reflect a similar description of 
Thatcher’s conversation with Haughey, ‘Brian Lenihan certainly looked a most unhappy [sic] 
man in Maastricht. There he was walking Charlie into three or four minutes of the shortest 
side of Thatcher’s tongue, and then having to take all the blame for it.’195 James Prior, 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, later recalled that ‘she wanted to throw the teapot 
away.’196 Haughey and Thatcher agreed that they needed to ‘…  pull things back.’ Haughey 
felt the best thing to do was to sleep on it and Thatcher agreed. ‘The two heads of government 
parted with expressions of mutual esteem and regret!’197 This was the last Anglo-Irish summit 
of Haughey’s first term.  
 
Conclusion 
In June, FitzGerald replaced Haughey as Taoiseach. It had been a challenging term in office 
for Haughey; a climactic return to the Dáil front bench and blossoming Anglo-Irish relations 
had been hampered by the Hunger Strikes. This chapter has shown how delicate Anglo-Irish 
relations were at the beginning of the 1980s. Thatcher was initially charmed by Haughey, 
and to a certain extent did not believe the personality reports that were presented to her. 
Haughey, on the other hand, seemed to know exactly how to treat Thatcher. He used his 
humour to disarm her and his own team admired him for this. However, as the rest of this 
thesis will continue to prove, Anglo-Irish relations during the 1980s were almost constantly 
on a knife’s edge. The two high profile Anglo-Irish summit meetings had gone reasonably 
well, but were let down by Haughey’s overzealous presentations to the media and Thatcher’s 
refusal to seriously consider his ideas. The press interest in the Anglo-Irish summit meetings 
added an extra level of stress for both teams. Lenihan’s interview proved to be the final straw 
for Thatcher. By the time Haughey left office, Anglo-Irish relations were in tatters. Thatcher 
had realised that Lynch ‘utterly and totally useless, as wet as a whistle,’ but her 
                                                
195 The Irish Times, 28 Mar. 1981. 
196 Lord Prior interviewed for ‘Margaret Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady,’ RTÉ, 2013. Lord James ‘Jim’ Prior, Baron 
Prior, Conservative. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 1981-1984. Many believed Thatcher moved Prior to the 
‘dustbin’ of Northern Ireland to get him away from central Cabinet. Prior was widely regarded as leader of the ‘wets.’ 
Thatcher had beaten Prior to leadership of the party in 1975.  
197 TNA UK, PREM 19/508, No. 10 record of conversation, 24 Mar. 1981. There is no record of this meeting in the Dublin 
files. 
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disappointment in Haughey was to damage Anglo-Irish relations beyond his first term.198 
Dublin was ‘the enemy.’199 
 







                                                
198 Sir Bernard Ingham interviewed for ‘Margaret Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady,’ RTÉ, 2013. 
199 Lord Powell interviewed for ‘Margaret Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady,’ RTÉ, 2013. 
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Chapter 2 
Crisis in Ireland: The Hunger Strikes, 1980-1981 
There is no question of granting political status.1 
 
Patrick Dillon had been an Officer at Magilligan Prison in County Londonderry for less than 
a year. He had a wife and five children and was hoping to purchase a new home. Dillon was 
about to get into his car just after lunchtime on 8 April 1976 when a van pulled up. Dillon 
was shot four times at close range before the assassins sped off.2 The PIRA later admitted 
responsibility for Dillon’s death. He was the first prison officer to be killed during The 
Troubles.3 Dillon was targeted because Merlyn Rees had announced that special category 
status would be phased out from the Northern Ireland prison system.4 From 1972, convicted 
paramilitary prisoners were treated the same as prisoners of war. They were excused from 
work, allowed to wear their own clothes, permitted one parcel per week, could send one letter 
per week (the cost of which would be covered by the Government) and one thirty-minute 
visit per week.5 Without special category status, the PIRA and INLA lost these privileges 
and the recognition that their crimes were politically motivated.6  
 
 This chapter will focus primarily on the secretive negotiations between Dublin and 
London during the 1980 and 1981 Hunger Strikes. When Margaret Thatcher became Prime 
Minister in 1979, prisoners in the Maze had been protesting against the removal of special 
category status for three years. The first section of this chapter will begin with a brief 
examination of the protests in the Maze prison from 1976-1980.The protests had escalated 
from a blanket protest, initiated by Kieran Nugent in 1976 when he refused to wear a prison 
uniform, to a dirty protest, started after a prisoner was taken to solitary confinement after a 
                                                
1 TNA UK, PREM 19/503, MT press conference at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 21 Apr. 1981. 
2 The Ulster Herald, 17 Apr. 1976. 
3 13 prison officers were killed during The Troubles. See David McKittrick, Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and 
Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles (London: Random House, 2001). 
4 ‘Northern Ireland,’ Commons sitting of 26 Mar. 1976, Hansard HC [603-776] cc. 641-676. 
5 Thomas Hennessey, Hunger Strike: Thatcher’s Battle with the IRA, 1980-81 (Kildare: Irish Academic Press, 2014), p. 20. 
6 It was paramount for paramilitary crimes to be categorized as politically motivated so that suspects could not be extradited 
by the British Government from the Republic of Ireland. See chpt. 7 for more on extradition. 
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fight with a prison officer in 1978.7 The Thatcher Government announced in March 1980 
that special category status had ended for good. In retaliation, seven prisoners began a Hunger 
Strike on 27 October. The second part of this chapter will look at the effects of the 1980 
Hunger Strikes on Anglo-Irish relations. The protestors made five demands; the right to wear 
their own clothing; the right not to do prison work; the right of free association with other 
prisoners; the right to one visit, one letter and one parcel per week; and the restoration of 
remission.8 The 1980 Hunger Strike ended when an offer from London was accepted by 
Brendan Hughes, the PIRA Operational Command in the prison, who wanted to save his 
friend and fellow striker, Sean McKenna, from death.9 Civilian-style clothing and free 
association were offered but the other three demands were not met. Political status would not 
be granted, and the prisoners felt they had been tricked.10 Frustration grew in the Maze and 
rumours of another Hunger Strike reached Thatcher in January.11 More trouble was on the 
horizon. 
 
The final section of this chapter will examine the second Hunger Strike from March 
to October 1981. Although much has been written on the 1981 Hunger Strike, a close 
examination of its impact on Anglo-Irish relations, particularly during Garret FitzGerald’s 
first term, has not yet been undertaken. The second strike, led by Robert Sands, started on 1 
March 1981.12 This Hunger Strike was organised to gain maximum publicity. Protestors 
staggered the start of their Hunger Strike so that when one man died, another would take his 
place. A Westminster by-election in Fermanagh-South Tyrone, and the 1981 Irish General 
                                                
7 Padraig O’Malley, Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 
pp. 20-22. 
8 O’Malley, Biting at the Grave, p. 3. For more on the protests in the Maze prison see David Beresford, Ten Men Dead: The 
Story of the 1981 Hunger Strike (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1997), Tom Collins, The Irish Hunger Strike (Dublin: 
White Island, 1986), Francis Stuart Ross, Smashing H-Block: The Rise and Fall of the Popular Campaign Against 
Criminalization, 1976-1982 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), R.K. Walker, The Hunger Strikes (Belfast: 
Lagan Books, 2006). 
9 Brendan Hughes, PIRA Commander and leader of the 1980 Hunger Strike. Hughes opposed the second Strike of 1981. 
Sean McKenna, PIRA Volunteer and participant in 1980 Hunger Strike. 
10 See works by Richard O’Rawe for more on the offers made to PIRA prisoners in the Maze, O’Rawe, Afterlives: The 
Hunger Strike and the Offer That Changed Irish History (Dublin: Lilliput, 2010) and Blanketmen: An Untold Story of the 
H-Block Hunger Strike (Dublin: New Island, 2005). 
11 TNA UK, PREM 19/503, letter from Hopkins to Alexander, 9 Jan. 1981. 
12 For accounts of the strikes by the strikers see Hunger Strike, Reflections on the 1981 Hunger Strike, ed., by Danny 
Morrison (London and Kerry: Brandon, 2006), Collins, The Irish Hunger Strike, Brian Campbell, Laurence McKeown and 
Felim O’Hagan (eds.,), Nor Meekly Serve My Time, The H-Block Struggle 1976-1981 (Belfast: Beyond the Pale, 2006), 
Bobby Sands, The Diary of Booby Sands (Dublin: Sinn Féin, 1981). Robert ‘Bobby’ Sands, Anti-H-Block MP for 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone, 1981. PIRA Volunteer and leader of the second Hunger Strike of 1981. Died after 66 days 
on Hunger Strike.  
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Election provided the strikers with another opportunity for publicity. Sands won the by-
election while Paddy Agnew and Kieran Doherty won seats in Dáil Éireann.13 Haughey had 
failed to persuade Thatcher to grant all demands bar political status.14 His relations with 
Thatcher were fragile due to the 1980 communiqué (see chapter one) and he struggled to 
balance Anglo-Irish relations with his sympathy for the protestors.15 In the 1981 Dáil 
elections, Agnew and Doherty Dáil won their seats from Fianna Fáil and Haughey lost his 
majority. His first term as Taoiseach was over. 
 
When FitzGerald became Taoiseach in June 1981 he inherited a Government in crisis. 
The death of Sands in May and Doherty in August brought world-wide attention to the anti-
H-Block campaign. FitzGerald feared that political support for the prisoners would wreak 
havoc in Ireland.16 He prioritised the Hunger Strike on entering office but also sought to 
improve Anglo-Irish relations. His announcement of his ‘constitutional crusade,’ an attempt 
to remove certain theocratic laws and articles from the Irish constitution, appealed to 
Thatcher, but the Hunger Strike remained the central issue.17 FitzGerald sought the help of 
the International Commission for Justice and Peace (ICJP) while London secretly negotiated 
with the PIRA.18 London’s negotiations with the PIRA annoyed FitzGerald, but when he met 
Thatcher in November, the two agreed to establish the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental 
Council (AIIGC). The AIIGC would act as an official body for talks between Belfast, Dublin 
and London.19 Thatcher maintained that the Hunger Strike would only end if the PIRA 
Command ordered it. In the end, the families intervened starting with Paddy Quinn on 31 
July, Patrick McGeown on 20 August and Matt Devlin and Lawrence McKeown on 4 
                                                
13 Northern Ireland Elections, Fermanagh and South Tyrone 1973-1982, http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/cfst.htm, Brian 
Farrell, ‘The context of three elections,’ Ireland at the Polls, 1981, 1982 and 1987, ed., by Howard R. Penniman and Brian 
Farrell (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 7. Paddy Agnew, Anti-H-Block TD 1981-1982, PIRA Volunteer and 
participant in second Hunger Strike of 1981. Kieran Doherty, Anti-H-Block TD 1981, PIRA Volunteer and participant in 
second Hunger Strike of 1981. Doherty died after 73 days on Hunger Strike.  
14 Kelly, A Failed Political Entity for an account of Haughey’s role in the Hunger Strikes. Hennessey examined MT and the 
Hunger Strikes in Hunger Strike: Thatcher’s Battle with the IRA, 1980-81. 
15 Dunlop, Yes, Taoiseach, p. 231. 
16 THCR 3/1/15, FitzGerald letter to MT, 10 July 1981. FitzGerald penned a biography, All in a Life, but as of yet there is 
no dedicated analysis of his role in the Hunger Strikes. 
17 The Irish Times, 27 Dec. 2014, David Hill, ‘The Constitutional Issue in Irish politics,’ in The British and Peace in 
Northern Ireland, ed., by Spencer, p. 62. 
18 NAI, DFA 2011/39/1824, notes taken during meeting between Alison and ICJP, undated (could be 3 or 4 July). TNA UK, 
PREM 19/604 contains all documents relating to London’s negotiations with the PIRA in 1981. 
19 NAI, TAOIS 2011/127/1087, summary of conclusions for the joint study on measures to encourage mutual understanding, 
Nov. 1981. 
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September.20 On 24 September, Bernard Fox and Liam McCloskey ended their strikes 
themselves.21 The Hunger Strike ended on 3 October. Ten men had died in the Maze prison. 
They entered ‘… the Irish pantheon of martyrs and heroes.’22 
 
This chapter follows several key themes and topics. It will examine how both Dublin 
and London were tested by the Hunger Strike. As a Taoiseach who had voiced his aspiration 
for a united Ireland, many expected that Haughey would support the Hunger Strikers. 
However, Haughey became more concerned with staying in office. He even told one Hunger 
Striker’s family that he could not give his support because he felt the protest was tantamount 
to blackmail.23 Meanwhile, Thatcher repeatedly denounced the Hunger Strike and refused to 
countenance granting any of the five demands. However, we now know that she was directly 
involved in secret negotiations with representatives of the PIRA.24 After FitzGerald learnt of 
these negotiations, he wrote that he felt he could not trust Thatcher, an interesting 
juxtaposition with the Haughey-Thatcher relationship. FitzGerald’s role in the Hunger Strike 
has not been examined in detail before. The discovery of rare handwritten notes within the 
National Archives of Ireland reveals that his administration was actively seeking solutions to 
the protest. By examining his role, we will be able to gain more insight into how his 
relationship with Thatcher developed in his first term as Taoiseach. 
 
A Brief Background to the 1980 and 1981 Hunger Strikes 
Hunger Strikes in Ireland has roots in pre-Christian Gaelic culture. Grievances could be 
settled by fasting on the doorstep of your enemy. To die there meant that responsibility for 
your death, and the disagreement that led to it, lay with the occupant.25 Hunger Strikes had 
been carried out during the revolutionary period of the early twentieth century by legendary 
                                                
20 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 319, p. 347, O’Malley, Biting at the Grave, p. 84. Paddy Quinn, PIRA volunteer and 
participant in second Hunger Strike of 1981. Patrick McGeown, PIRA volunteer and participant in second Hunger Strike of 
1981. Matt Devlin, PIRA volunteer and participant in second Hunger Strike of 1981. Lawrence McKeown, PIRA volunteer 
and participant in second Hunger Strike of 1981. 
21 iBid., p. 353. Bernard Fox, PIRA volunteer and participant in second Hunger Strike of 1981. Liam McCloskey, PIRA 
volunteer and participant in second Hunger Strike of 1981. 
22 George Sweeney, ‘Self-Immolative Martyrdom: Explaining the Irish Hunger Strike Tradition,’ Studies: An Irish 
Quarterly Review, vol. 93, no. 371 (2014), pp. 337-348. 
23 Paul Graham, ‘The Effects of the Fatal Hunger Strike in the H-Blocks Long Kesh, in 1981, on the Catholic/Nationalist 
Community,’ MSc Thesis, Queens University Belfast, 1986, p. 46. 
24 See especially Hennessey, Hunger Strike. 
25 For more on the history of Hunger Strikes in Ireland see George Sweeney, ‘Irish Hunger Strikes and the Cult of Self-
Sacrifice,’ Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 28 (1993), pp. 421-437.	
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republican figures including Thomas Ashe and Terrence MacSwiney.26 To carry out a 
Hunger Strike until death would initiate the men of the Maze into a hall of martyrs and 
legitimise their campaign for political status.27 A striker used his or her body as the weapon.28 
But a Hunger Strike was not the first option. 
 
When Nugent was taken to the Maze in 1976, he refused to wear a prison uniform. 
He was given a blanket which he donned during exercise, thus began the blanket protest. The 
blanket protest escalated to a dirty protest in 1978. Prisoners refused to wash themselves or 
slop out their cells.29 In March 1980, four of the protestors brought a case to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). They argued that conditions in the prison were inhumane. 
The EHCR rejected the case as the prisoners had brought about the conditions themselves. 
The report also criticised London’s intransigence in refusing to accede to the five demands.30 
The ruling by the EHCR strengthened London’s resolve and moved attention away from 
special category status to conditions within the prison.31 The PIRA leadership realised that 
their campaign was faltering. Another escalation was required.32 
 
The Battle Begins, the First Hunger Strike, October-December 1980 
The first Hunger Strike began on 27 October 1980. It was timed to culminate at Christmas.33 
Although there was support from the public, through protests in Dublin, Britain and Northern 
Ireland, the Hunger Strike did not garner as much support as was hoped.34 The Hunger Strike 
was born out of frustration at a lack of progress and public support. The question was how 
far the strikers would go. This was a dangerous game of cat and mouse which could play into 
the hands of either side, ‘On the assumption that there will be no previous give on either side, 
                                                
26 Sweeney, ‘Self-Immolative Martyrdom,’ pp. 337-348. Thomas Ashe, founder member of the Irish Volunteers who died 
in 1917 after 5 days on Hunger Strike as a consequence of force feeding. Terrence MacSwiney, Sinn Féin TD 1918-1920, 
Lord Mayor of Cork 1920. MacSwiney died on Hunger Strike after 74 days in 1920. 
27 Sweeney, ‘Irish Hunger Strikes,’ pp. 421-437. 
28 Megan A. O’Branski, ‘“The Savage Reduction of the Flesh”: Violence, Gender and Bodily Weaponisation in the 1981 
Irish Republican Hunger Strike Protest,’ Studies on Terrorism, vol. 7, no. 1 (2014), pp. 97-111.  
29 O’Malley, Biting at the Grave, pp. 20-22. 
30 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, pp. 64-65. 
31 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, letter from Hopkins to Alexander, 24 Mar. 1980. 
32 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 65. 
33 TNA UK, PREM 19/503, note for MT, undated. 
34 NAI, DFA 2010/19/1695, An Phoblacht, 13 Dec. 1980, The Ulster Herald, 6 and 13 Dec. 1980.	
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the next catalyst will be death.’35 London recognised the impact the death of a striker could 
have in Northern Ireland and Ireland, 
 
There will be an emotional reaction on the streets to the death or serious deterioration 
in the health of a hunger striker. PIRA have prepared to exploit this, particularly in 
Belfast. Loyalist paramilitaries will be preparing for this disorder, but are unlikely to 
become involved unless the trouble spreads, either deliberately or accidentally, into 
Loyalist areas.36 
 
But the strikers did not anticipate the resolution of Thatcher. In private discussions from 
October to December, Thatcher and her Ministers reaffirmed their position. The Home and 
Social Affair Committee decided that the five demands would not be conceded.37 The 
committee asked for the agreement of Cabinet which Thatcher provided.38 It was also agreed 
to stand by the Government’s policy on force feeding that had been introduced by Roy 
Jenkins, Labour Home Secretary, in 1979.39 Strikers would not be force fed and prison 
doctors would ‘allow the inevitable deterioration - and consequent death - of a Hunger Striker 
to take place unless the prisoner specifically asks for medical intervention.’40  
 
Officially, London would stand aside. To Thatcher, the strikers were criminals. Airey 
Neave had been killed by the INLA and Thatcher knew something of the pain of the victims’ 
families. The INLA and PIRA had also attacked British soldiers, her ‘boys’ as she usually 
referred to them. ‘Compromise was not a word in Thatcher’s vocabulary.’41 The campaign 
for political status was therefore illegitimate.42 Humphrey Atkins recognised that Northern 
Ireland prisoners were a challenge to rehabilitate but felt that reinstating political status was 
                                                
35 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, Stormont assessment on the Hunger Strikers, 7 Nov. 1980. 
36 TNA UK, PREM 19/503, minute from Atkins to MT, 17 Dec. 1980. 
37 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, minute from Whitelaw to MT, 21 Oct. 1980. The Home and Social Affair Committee covered 
domestic issues. ‘H,’ as Whitelaw referred to it in the original document, was one of a number of committees within the 
Government. Committees were made up of Ministers and MPs from all parties in Westminster who met to discuss policy 
issues. Please see Simon James, British Cabinet Government (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) for more on the 
role of committees within the British Government.  
38 iBid.,  
39 Roy Jenkins, Baron Jenkins of Hillhead, Labour MP 1948-1977, Social Democratic Party MP 1982-1987, Home Secretary 
1965-1967, 1974-1976, Leader of the Social Democratic Party 1982-1983.  
40 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, minute from Atkins to MT, 15 Nov. 1979. 
41 Peter Taylor, Provos: The IRA and Sinn Féin (London: Bloomsbury, 1998), p. 232. 
42 Aogán Mulcahy, ‘Claims-Making and the Construction of Legitimacy: Press Coverage of the 1981 Northern Irish Hunger 
Strike,’ Social Problems, vol. 42, no. 4 (1995), pp. 449-467. 
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not in their best interests. The Thatcher Government could not be seen to grant amnesty to 
criminals.43 Brian Lenihan tried to explain to Atkins that the Hunger Strike could act as a 
propaganda coup for the PIRA. ‘There was a real danger that a Hunger Strike could have 
serious consequences in terms of public opinion …’44 Lenihan also asked a FCO official if 
Thatcher could look again at clothing and work concessions. The official continued, ‘Dublin 
shared the same concerns as London. The Hunger Strike could have serious repercussions 
for the burgeoning security initiative. Dublin was ‘quite worried.’45 Haughey warned 
Thatcher via letter, ‘Once a strike starts it will probably be impossible to stop it and people 
will inevitably die.’46 But Thatcher remained adamant. In order for London to understand 
more about the Hunger Strike, Stormont prepared a report. 
 
 The report explained the background to and aims of the strike. It stated that the PIRA 
was in decline, and that the Hunger Strike came ‘from PIRA’s weakness, not its strength.’ 
Evidence suggested that communities had lost interest in paramilitary organisations.47 The 
five demands were introduced to regain popular support. This ‘allowed people to feel they 
were in favour of the prisoners’ right to live without necessarily supporting the PIRA. It was 
a ‘subtle but fundamental change in presentation, liberating support from those who would 
normally have withheld it in fear of appearing pro-IRA.’48 Further public sympathy was 
garnered when conditions within the Maze prison were televised by a BBC World in Action 
documentary. Thatcher was displeased with the programme as some of the prisoners had 
been interviewed, and advised that ‘in future no prisoner in Northern Ireland should be 
permitted to be interviewed by the press or broadcasting organisations …’49 Criminalisation 
came first. Thatcher noted on the memo accompanying the report, ‘We cannot make any 
                                                
43 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, letter from Atkins to Whitelaw, 9 Oct. 1980. 
44 NAI, DFA 2010/19/1728, meeting between Lenihan and Atkins, 13 Oct. 1980. A record of this meeting is also kept in 
TAOIS 2010/53/875. 
45 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, Dublin 271 to FCO, 27 Oct. 1980. 
46 NAI, TAOIS 2010/53/928, message from Haughey to MT, undated here. The letter is in THCR 3/1/10 and is dated 23 
Oct. 1980. 
47 NAI, DFA 2010/19/1728, talks at Stormont, 17 Nov. 1980. 
48 Peter Taylor, Brits: The War Against the IRA (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), p. 231. 
49 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, minute from Harrington to Alexander, 28 Nov. 1980.	
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concessions.’50 Thatcher also reaffirmed this in a response to a letter from Pope John Paul II, 
who had written to urge her to reconsider making concessions to the strikers, 
 
Of the seven Hunger Strikers, six are members of the PIRA; one is a member of the 
INLA. All were convicted in open court of very serious crimes including murder, 
attempted murder, armed robbery and explosives offences. Their Hunger Strike is in 
pursuit of a demand for a political status which would involve their receiving 
privileges greater than those available to other convicted criminals in Northern 
Ireland. I have made it clear that the British Government cannot and will not accede 
to this demand.51 
 
But the Hunger Strike would also affect the Republic of Ireland. 
 
As leader of Fianna Fáil, some nationalists expected Haughey to support the strikers 
in their ‘Five Demands.’  Della McLuckie wrote to Haughey and demanded that he ‘stop 
licking Thatcher’s shoes and tell Britain to get out of Ireland.’52 The Irish Independent 
expected Haughey to tell Thatcher that ‘If even one of the seven H-Block Hunger Strikers 
dies that will be too many.’53 At a rally in Letterkenny, Síle de Valera criticised how Thatcher 
had handled the strike. She was deeply shocked by Thatcher’s ‘lack of compassion.’54 The 
statement came a month before Haughey was due to meet Thatcher, and there was a rush to 
limit the damage the speech had made. Ray MacSharry, then Minister for Agriculture and 
Fianna Fáil director of elections, explained to the press that her speech did not reflect official 
party policy.55 Eamonn Kennedy sent Thatcher a note explaining that Haughey ‘totally and 
without any ambiguity rejects what was said by (de Valera).’56 Back in the Dáil, Haughey’s 
reaction to de Valera’s speech came under harsh criticism. Gerry L’Estrange, Fine Gael TD, 
believed that Haughey was quiet about the H-Block issue because ‘he believes in taking the 
                                                
50 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, memo from Armstrong to MT, 7 Nov. 1980. Underline present on original document. MT also 
asked when the new issue civilian-style clothing would be ready. She would not let prisoners wear their own clothes but 
would supply them with a civilian-style uniform.  
51 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, letter from MT to Pope John Paul II, 13 Nov. 1980. 
52 NAI, DFA 2010/19/1695, letter from Mrs. Della McLuckie to Haughey, 14 Dec. 1980. 
53 NAI, DFA 2010/19/1695, The Evening Herald, 1 Dec. 1980. 
54 BUFVCD, ‘Maze Prison Protest - Síle de Valera view,’ 1980.  
55 Dwight, Haughey’s Forty Years, p. 221. Ray MacSharry, Fianna Fáil TD 1969-1988, Tánaiste 1982. 
56 TNA UK, PREM 19/282, letter from Kennedy to MT, 2 Nov. 1980.  
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two sides of the road. He is running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.’57 The reality 
was that Haughey could not support the strike.  
 
His long-term aim was to get the British to leave Northern Ireland. Although he did 
not know how this would be accomplished, for a Taoiseach to support convicted criminals 
would not endear him to either Thatcher or the unionists in Northern Ireland. Political status 
was unacceptable.58 ‘Charlie knew that he was trapped in a vice, caught between 
sympathizing with the protesting prisoners in the H-Blocks and keeping faith with the process 
that he had agreed with Thatcher.’59 Coupled with this was concern about a rise in militant 
republicanism. ‘… Haughey thought that if they started voting, they might want more and 
more radical change.’60 Haughey offered to send a ‘go-between’ to find a compromise, but 
Thatcher ignored his help.61 
  
 Thatcher and Haughey were due to meet before Christmas 1980. They had had a 
short meeting at the December EEC summit in Luxembourg where Thatcher had promised 
to look again at what was on offer to the prisoners.62 In contradiction to London’s 
aforementioned policy, she had wondered ‘if it could be dressed up differently’ but 
emphasised that the government’s concerns lay with the ‘dignity’ of the prisoners, i.e. the 
conditions they were held in.63 Thatcher also told Haughey that the H-Block issue had been 
a topic of discussion for some months past. London was not taking the situation lightly.64 
According to London’s record of the meeting, Thatcher read out a list of concessions that 
had been available since March 1980, but these had been rejected by the prisoners. She told 
Haughey that she had already taken “a lot of stick” for this and that no new concessions could 
                                                
57 ‘Supplementary Estimates, 1980: Leave to Intro.,’ Dáil Éireann Debate, 4 Nov. 1980, vol. 323, no. 8. Gerry L’Estrange, 
Fine Gael TD 1965-1987. Minister of State at the Department of Finance 1981, Government Chief Whip 1981. 
58 NAI, TAOIS 2010/53/930, meeting between Haughey and MT, Dublin Castle, 8 Dec. 1980. 
59 Dunlop, Yes, Taoiseach, p. 231. 
60 Quote by Bik McFarlane in Walker, Hunger Strikes, p. 103. 
61 NAI, DFA 2010/19/1728, discussion at British Embassy, 5 Nov., 7 Nov. 1980. Haughey’s team were Dermot Nally, 
Secretary to the Government, Andrew O’Rourke, Secretary of the Irish DFA, David Neligan, Assistant Secretary in the 
DFA and Walter Kirwan, Assistant Secretary in the Department of the Taoiseach. A record of the meeting is also kept in 
NAI, DFA 2010/19/1651 and TNA UK, PREM 19/282. 
62 The meeting lasted 35 minutes. CAC, THCR 6/1/2/2, MT engagement diary, entry for 1 Dec. 1980. 
63 NAI, DFA 2010/19/1728, Haughey meeting with MT in Luxembourg, 1 Dec. 1980. London has records of this meeting 
in TNA UK, PREM 19/221 and TNA UK, PREM 19/507. 
64 NAI, DFA 2010/19/1728, Haughey meeting with MT in Luxembourg, 1 Dec. 1980.  
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be made now that a Hunger Strike had begun.65 Before the meeting broke up, it was agreed 
that a re-examination of the concessions available would be undertaken. Thatcher and 
Haughey would also meet at official Anglo-Irish level. 
 
The start of the Hunger Strikes meant that Thatcher’s personal security was now 
paramount. In light of this, it was agreed that Thatcher would fly in and out of Dublin on 8 
December instead of staying the night.66 In the course of the meeting, Haughey told Thatcher 
that even if one of the strikers died, ‘some face saving formula could, no doubt, be found.’ 
Haughey also pressed Thatcher to talk to the prisoners. But she felt that would be a waste of 
time as she was ‘not sure if the prisoners had the authority, themselves, to come off…’ 
Haughey told her that the ‘situation was confused.’ Hughes seemed to be the leader and more 
effort should be made to communicate with him. Haughey warned her that the Hunger Strike 
was already gaining support for ‘the Provos’ in Belfast.67 Interestingly, London’s record of 
the Throne Room Summit makes little mention of the Hunger Strike. According to it, 
Thatcher referred to Éamon de Valera’s view that violence would not work against Northern 
Ireland. It also states that Thatcher hoped to communicate a new rule on civilian-style 
clothing to conforming prisoners, but that there would be ‘no surrender’ to violence. Haughey 
told Thatcher that the only way to undermine violence was to continue to work on politics. 
Thatcher told Haughey that she would stand by the guarantee given to the unionist majority.68 
 
 Following the December Anglo-Irish summit, Paisley demanded to meet Thatcher to 
discuss the Hunger Strike and her plans for working with Dublin. At a time of heightened 
tension, the Paisley meeting rattled Thatcher. Paisley had already told her via telegram in 
October that ‘Any concessions to the IRA H-Block murderers will be a grave insult and 
betrayal … It will be viewed in Northern Ireland as the beginning of an amnesty and final 
capitulation of the IRA objectives.69 ‘During their meeting in December, she rejected his 
summation that the protestant community was being ‘treated as second-class citizens.’70 
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Douglas Hurd, one of Thatcher’s long-serving ministers and future Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, concluded that although she aligned herself with unionism, ‘she found 
discussing Irish matters with the Unionists up-hill work.’71  
 
 Loyalist prisoners also began a Hunger Strike on 11 December, although it was clear 
that their protest was half-hearted. The Newsletter suspected that the loyalist Hunger Strike 
was a tactical move, orchestrated by the NIO, to enable concessions to be granted to the 
republican Hunger Strikers.72 Loyalists abandoned their protest on 17 December. They 
warned that they ‘reserved the right’ to start one up again in future. Michael Alexander noted 
that ‘we need not, I think, take this very seriously.’73 Things came to a head in the Maze 
prison. 
 
 On 16 December 1980, prison doctors reported that the strikers were becoming 
weaker.74 By 18 December, McKenna was hours from death and had been transferred to the 
Royal Victoria Hospital. In a last minute attempt to save his friend, Hughes took advice from 
Father Denis Faul, who assisted the prison chaplain.75 Faul had seen the latest British 
proposal and assured Hughes that it was worth taking. Hughes, too weak to fully comprehend 
what the document actually said, accepted the deal and called off the strike. Hughes saved 
his friend, but soon realised that the new document, which was a statement by Atkins to the 
Commons, was a rehash of what London had said all along.76 The prisoners would be able to 
wear civilian-style clothing during recreation and visiting time. Protestors who gave up their 
fast would be put into clean cells and association between wings would begin. Political status 
would not be granted, and the prisoners felt that they had been hoodwinked.77 London knew 
they had ‘scored a notable victory over the IRA: they know it and the people of Northern 
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Ireland know it. But we have nothing to gain and much to lose from self-congratulation; the 
facts can speak for themselves.’78 Atkins concluded that ‘the seven H-Block Hunger-Strikers 
must have “grasped the fact” that the British Government was not going to give them political 
status.’79 Yet ‘The failure to reach a solution, when one appeared eminently possible, is one 
of the great ‘if only’s [sic] of history. If agreement had been reached there would have been 
no second Hunger Strike …’80 The battle may have been won, but the war was far from over. 
 
‘Crime is crime is crime’: The Second Hunger Strike, March-October 1981 
As Dublin and London breathed a sigh of relief over the end of the 1980 hunger strike, the 
prisoners in the Maze became frustrated. They had gained nothing from their 53 day fast, 
whereas Thatcher had sealed her reputation as the ‘Iron Lady.’ The Thatcher government 
were informed in January that another Hunger Strike was on the cards. Michael Hopkins, an 
official from the NIO, warned that an announcement was imminent.81 To shift focus away 
from the rumours, the Government worked on ending the dirty protest.82 Its initiatives, 
including releasing Pauline McLaughlin, a Republican prisoner, on health grounds, were 
made public in the hope that it would put London in a ‘good position’ should a second Hunger 
Strike be announced.83 The second republican Hunger Strike began on 1 March 1981. 
  
 The second Hunger Strike was organised by Sands, who replaced Hughes as Officer 
Commander of the PIRA prisoners. Sands felt he was,  
 
… but another of those wretched Irishmen born of a risen generation with a deeply 
rooted and unquenchable desire for freedom. I am dying not just to attempt to end the 
barbarity of H-Block, or to gain the rightful recognition of a political prisoner, but 
primarily because what is lost in here is lost for the Republic and those wretched 
oppressed whom I am deeply proud to know as the ‘risen people.’84 
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The timing of the second Hunger Strike was important. The crisis would come at Easter, an 
important date in the nationalist calendar. Easter was ‘traditionally the time for expressions, 
verbal and physical, of Republican sentiment in Ireland north and south.’85 The prisoners 
decided to stagger strikers to maximise publicity. Thatcher would be put under intense 
pressure. Shortly after the start of the strike, she reiterated her position. 
 
 In a show of solidarity with the unionist community, Thatcher visited Northern 
Ireland on 5 March. She told the crowd in Belfast that the prisoner’s demands for political 
status were invalid because, ‘There is only criminal murder, criminal bombing and criminal 
violence. We will not compromise on this. There will be no political status.’86 In the 
Commons, Atkins said that the government would handle this Hunger Strike the same way 
as the first, ‘… we shall not give way on the issue of political status under pressure of further 
protest action …’87 On the same day as Thatcher’s visit, Frank Maguire, the Independent 
Republican MP for Fermanagh-South Tyrone, died suddenly of a heart attack. A seat was 
now vacant, a by-election on the horizon. The strikers hatched a plan. 
 
 Maguire’s death gave the strikers an opportunity to hit the Thatcher government 
where it hurt. What better way to grab their attention than by having a protestor elected to 
the Commons? Thatcher wanted to stop Sands from standing, but an investigation into the 
law around prisoners and elections found that ‘Sands (was) a valid election candidate.’ In the 
run-up to the election, Sands was entitled to receive one postal communication, visits from 
an election agent (permission granted at the discretion of the Governor) and there would be 
no requirement for him to attend Westminster. He would be an MP but would not be entitled 
to wages. In effect, it was not illegal for a prisoner to stand for Parliament.88 Members of the 
House could expel him, but Francis Pym, then serving as Leader of the House of Commons, 
thought they would not.89 ‘The argument is that the present law may well be an ass, but that 
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Mr. Sands was legally entitled to election and that those who voted for him knew that he was 
and (that he) would remain in custody.’90 London was unable to stop Sands, but hoped his 
campaign could falter due to weak support.  
 
 Sands’ election campaign was a powerful one. Nationalists were presented with the 
opportunity to save Sands’ life by voting for him. Surely even Thatcher would not allow an 
MP to die? ‘Lone is your vote … What an appeal!’91 In the prison, inmates moved from the 
dirty to a ‘clean’ protest so as not to detract from the Hunger Strike.92 London understood 
that the ‘handling (of) this Hunger Strike must be different from the last,’ but they continued 
to underestimate support outside the prison.93 London hoped that the majority of nationalist 
voters would abstain.94 They also speculated that Sands’ election would be used as ‘an 
excuse’ to call the strike off.95 Robert Armstrong advised that both communities in Northern 
Ireland would watch carefully to see how Thatcher handled the strike. ‘The catholics will be 
hoping and the protestants will be fearing that the Government will offer some concession as 
a way out of the Hunger Strike.’96 Thatcher could not falter. 
 
Sands was elected on 19 April. He beat the unionist candidate, Harry West, by 1447 
votes.97 Armstrong advised Thatcher to keep her reaction ‘very low key.’98 By mid-April 
there were reports that Sands was deteriorating. London suspected that this was a rumour to 
heighten nationalist emotion before Easter, but prison doctors confirmed that Sands was 
seriously ill.99 News of Sands’ deterioration led to riots in Londonderry. The FCO reported 
that Sands had been transformed into ‘... a folk hero’ after his election to the Commons.100 
 
 Thatcher was unmoved. During a question and answer session in Saudi Arabia, she 
rebuffed a journalist’s question on concessions with ‘There is no question of political status 
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for someone serving a sentence for crime. Crime is crime is crime. It is not political, it is 
crime.’101 Thatcher labelled the strikers as terrorists, murderers and criminals. She felt that 
they belonged on the periphery of society. Publicly, the strikers demands were impossible 
for her to acknowledge.102 The NIO felt that her attitude would lead the strikers’ families to 
turn to Haughey for help.103 
 
On 20 April, three Fianna Fáil TDs, Neil Blaney, Síle de Valera and John O’Connell, 
visited Sands in prison and then requested to meet with Thatcher. They believed that ‘… 
hours can now make a difference’ to the strikers.104 Thatcher was advised that loyalists would 
be ‘infuriated’ if she accepted the request, 
 
(a) it would be seen as treating [sic] with the enemy; 
(b) it would be taken as a sign that the Government’s resolve to withstand terrorism 
was weakening; and 
(c) it would be regarded as confirmation that the visit to Sands was part of a back-
door deal to which the British Government was a party.105  
 
Unionists felt the visit was ‘… something of a damp squib because it has had no outcome of 
substance other than the proposal that the 3 TDs should meet the Prime Minister.’106 Their 
request was denied. During a meeting between Lenihan and the three TD’s, O’Connell 
surmised that ‘ Thatcher’s intransigence is impressive but that there was a formula which 
could get the British off the hook by concessions in the field of work and other areas.’107 
O’Connell wondered if London could trick the strikers by granting the five demands, then 
rescind them. ‘They can if necessary take concessions back.108  
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Towards the end of April, Haughey wanted to touch base with Thatcher. It was not 
possible to arrange a meeting as Thatcher was too busy, and a summit with the Taoiseach at 
such a sensitive time would agitate the public in Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
Instead, the two kept in touch through their ministers. Following a lengthy meeting with 
Haughey, Dermot Nally, Secretary to the Government, contacted Armstrong to ask if 
Thatcher had considered ‘simply (letting) Sands go …’109 In doing so, Sands’ campaign 
would be undermined and street disturbances could be reduced. Haughey was concerned that 
violence in Northern Ireland would spill over to Ireland. He felt pressurised to get some sort 
of movement from Thatcher.110 However, London felt that releasing Sands would inflame 
unionist opinion ‘to the point where we once again saw a resurgence of Protestant 
violence.’111 For the meantime, it was safer to sit back and see what happened. Haughey 
continued to push his Joint Studies idea. 
 
At the end of April, the Joint Studies group produced a report that delved into the 
current state of affairs and how best to carry on. It was suggested that a new Anglo-Irish Co-
operation Council be established and regularly meet. Thatcher rebuffed the idea with a wavy 
underline and a note explaining that ‘The Irish want the word ‘council’ precisely because it 
conveys the very meaning we do not want it to convey. No.’112 The use of the word ‘council’ 
may have confused people into thinking that the delegates had been elected to serve. The aim 
was to create an official body made up by un-elected Civil Servants from Dublin and London. 
Thatcher noted her concerns with Dublin’s idea, 
 
This is the most alarming set of papers in the UK/Irish situation I have read. They 
reveal starkly a total difference of approach. We are trying to achieve … co-operation 
and reconciliation between our two countries, i.e. UK and the Republic: They are 
using every study as a step towards takeover. If these papers go ahead to publication 
even on an agree to differ basis I am not prepared to go on with the studies [sic]. The 
Irish view … would set Anglo-Irish relations back for years and do untold harm to 
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many Unionist people if the Protestant paramilitary groups revived. It is no longer a 
question of changing the wording of a few sentences. We are at the heart of the 
matter.113 
 
 Thatcher ordered her ministers to rewrite the report. In a draft passage entitled ‘mutual 
misconceptions,’ London surmised that a lack of understanding of government policies was 
Dublin’s biggest issue. The misunderstandings were deep rooted, but London felt that the 
remedy lay in increasing contacts and information exchanges.114 There would be no council, 
but they could arrange for regular discussions. Thatcher would have to trust Haughey, and 
Haughey would have to keep quiet.115 Meanwhile, Sands had reached crisis point.  
 
 When Sands died on 5 May, the Hunger Strike entered a new phase. Community 
support was more fervent than London had estimated. Atkins had told Thatcher that his death 
would result in ‘a great deal of flurry.’116 This was an understatement. Sands’ funeral was 
attended by an estimated 30,000 people, and within a week marches of support spread to 
Dublin.117 During one demonstration, which began at the General Post Office on O’Connell 
street, the crowd tried to storm the Chancery, a building symbolic of British law in Ireland. 
The Garda and Irish Army were there to stop them, and only one window was broken, but it 
was clear that supporters of the H-Block campaign wanted the Dáil to take a greater role.118 
‘Weekend World,’ a political programme televised by ITV, predicted that Haughey would 
support the strikes over Thatcher, ‘if this happened Thatcher would be stripped of the one 
element of her policy which holds out any real prospect of a settlement.’119 Thatcher also 
received additional pleas for compassion from Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich, Primate of All 
Ireland.120 But she still felt that it was up to the strikers’ commanders to end the protest. It 
was they who had made the ‘cold-blooded decision that the unfortunate men now fasting in 
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prison are of more use to them dead than alive.’ In the meantime, Thatcher and her colleagues 
would continue to bear the ‘heavy load’ and ride out the storm.121  
 
Both Thatcher and Haughey were under intense pressure as the summer of 1981 
continued. On the last page of a memo on the attitudes of the catholic and protestant 
community, Thatcher scribbled that the catholic community was ‘more supportive’ of the 
Hunger Strike while ‘something should be done’ to allay protestant fears. ‘Intense hatred’ 
was present on both sides.122 Hughes’ died on 12 May. Following a briefing by Haughey, 
Kennedy advised Thatcher that the gap between the death of Hughes and the next striker 
should be exploited and a new political initiative introduced. Dublin knew that special 
category status was out of the question, but they again urged Thatcher to consider movement 
on the other demands. Kennedy added that Haughey wanted to come to London to signal a 
new stage of negotiations, but the point was not taken up by Thatcher or Atkins during the 
meeting.123 Instead, Thatcher went to Northern Ireland on 28 May to meet with Church 
leaders and show support for ‘peace and reconciliation.’124 
 
On the same day as Thatcher’s visit, the ECHR wrote to London to inform the British 
Government that a new case could be brought forward. Sands’ sister, Marcella, had tried to 
launch an investigation into prison conditions. The ECHR had thrown the case out as the 
prisoners had imposed the conditions on themselves. The ECHR invited Britain to send a 
representative to an informal meeting to reach a ‘friendly settlement.’125 Stephen Boys-
Smith, then Principal Private Secretary to Atkins, had previously guessed that Dublin 
believed the ECHR would ‘produce a solution but are vague about that body’s 
involvement.’126 On receiving the news, Thatcher was furious. She had been in Northern 
Ireland the day the ECHR had made its response but had not been informed about it. She felt 
that Boys-Smith implied that if the strikers moved they should move too. She wrote on the 
back, 
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This letter must have been written and the policy decided before we left Belfast to-day. I 
am wholly dismayed and very angry that at no time to-day was it raised with me even 
though S.W. Boys-Smith knew how strongly I felt about it. I propose the following course 
of action: 
 
(1) Find a highly skilled rep. [sic] to Strasbourg who is fully conversed with the law 
(2) Retrieve the legal point on admissibility to be agreed in Court (This point you 
remember was made by the A.G. (Attorney General)). 
(3) In the meantime, as the Commission they have only raised the question of possible 
… security ore [sic] human rights. We are of course prepared to consider a 
friendly settlement with regard to that - i.e. correspondence. We have no further 
proposals to make … 
(4) Should however the Commission wish to have facilities to (word illegible, may 
be fund) the visits they will of course be granted whole heartedly and 
immediately.  
(5) Any proposed changes must apply to all prisoners in Northern Ireland. There can 
be no question of special status for some. MT.127 
 
In response to Boys-Smith’s letter, Alexander surmised that while Thatcher was content for 
the ECHR to carry out its investigation, she did not want to negotiate for a settlement.128  
 
In Dublin, Haughey had hoped to capitalise on his growing popularity by announcing 
a General Election. But this was delayed until June out of respect for the 48 victims of the 
Stardust fire in February. In the interim, the Hunger Strike had serious repercussions for 
Fianna Fáil.129 
 
Two Anti-H-Block candidates, Doherty and Agnew, stood for the Dáil in the 1981 
election. Having seen Sands’ success at the by-election, the DFA investigated what could be 
done to prevent the two from entering the Dáil. An investigation found that only prisoners 
who had been sentenced to hard labour were banned from standing for election. The law gave 
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no advice on what would happen after a prisoner was elected. The only powers Dáil members 
had was to issue a writ to the prisoner on the grounds that he was unable to carry out his 
role.130 
 
The election of Doherty and Agnew to the Dáil gave ‘a national profile to individuals 
in jail in Northern Ireland which they would never have had otherwise.’ A, 
 
‘strong emotional reaction’ could be expected if a sitting TD died. This would give 
the PIRA another opportunity to mount an election campaign to fill the vacant seat. 
The strikes appealed ‘to potential recruits to violence and to the humane sympathies 
of less committed people.’131 
 
The strikes dominated the election campaign. Haughey toured the Republic of Ireland and 
was met with a mixed reception. While vising a hospital in Dun Laoghaire, a member of the 
crowd threw a bag of paint at him. The attacker missed, but the incident was one of many 
during Haughey’s campaign trail.132 The election resulted in a narrow majority for Fianna 
Fáil. The party lost two seats to Doherty and Agnew.133 The election further legitimised the 
Anti-H-Block campaign and proved that support for the strikers existed across the border. 
 
After the election, and with his time in the Taoiseach’s Office coming to an end, 
Haughey sought a meeting with Thatcher. On 16 June, Leonard Figg, British Ambassador to 
Ireland, sent a telegram back to London to advise that ‘in the present emotional state 
generated by the Hunger Strike deaths, we must try and get out of our present difficulty 
whereby Irish men are seen to die in British prisons and the British can’t or don’t want to 
stop them.’134 The next day, Haughey sent Thatcher a message to update her on the 
atmosphere in Dublin. He warned that things were ‘difficult’ and were ‘going downhill.’ He 
asked for a meeting again as he suspected that tensions between relatives of the strikers and 
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the PIRA command structure could be exploited. Kennedy was sent to meet Thatcher on 23 
June with a letter from Haughey. Haughey asked her to rethink the prison regime and to 
exploit the split between the prisoners’ families and the PIRA. Thatcher pointed out that his 
suggestions ‘went along with the salami tactics of the IRA leadership.’ She felt that control 
over the Hunger Strike was in their hands, yet she was expected to find a solution, 
 
It was not clear how, and in any case if HMG did succeed in solving the immediate 
problem, they would simply be presented with another problem to solve which further 
concessions would be sought … It was for others to move.135 
 
Figg received further messages from Haughey in the days before he left the Taoiseach’s 
office. In a detailed minute, Haughey made six points, 
 
(i) There is now a need for a major serious effort to resolve the crisis in Northern 
Ireland … 
(ii) The prisoners alone will have the final voice in deciding whether the crisis is 
resolved 
(iii) Any discussions should be between a nominee of the prisoners and a high level 
representative of Her Majesty’s Government. 
(iv) Though the prisoners are insisting on their five demands, there is in fact room for 
manoeuvre. 
(v) Any settlement need not be implemented immediately, but could be phased in 
over a period of, say, 6 months. 
(vi) There is now a movement in favour of settlement, and a settlement could be of a 
final nature: this is not “salami tactics”. 
 
Armstrong forwarded the message to Kenneth Stowe for assessment. Alarmingly for 
Thatcher, Stowe suspected that ‘the nature of the message suggested a close contact between 
the Taoiseach and elements in the PIRA.’136 Haughey had met with the strikers’ families. 
However, the Doherty’s later told a Queen’s University Masters student that Haughey had 
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refused to step in and help the strikers as he felt they had resorted to blackmail.137 Haughey 
here was alluding to the policy followed by Éamon de Valera.  
 
De Valera felt that a Hunger Strike was a form of blackmail.138 In 1939 the Irish 
Government had released Con Lehane, a prisoner on Hunger Strike in Arbour Hill military 
prison. De Valera told the Dáil that the day after Lehane’s release, half a dozen men went on 
strike. Granting concessions, therefore, endangered the public, 
 
The alternatives we are forced to face are the alternatives of two evils, one to see men 
die that we do not want to see die if we can save them, the other, to permit them to 
bring the State and the community as a whole to disaster … We have had to choose 
the lesser, and the lesser evil is to see men die rather than that the safety of the whole 
community should be endangered.139 
 
Were Haughey’s messages to Thatcher coming from a place of genuine concern? Probably 
not. He spoke about the Hunger Strike in the lead up to the election, asserting that he had 
‘constantly sought by every means open to me to secure a humanitarian solution that would 
avoid loss of life.’140 Yet he never detailed how a humanitarian solution could be found. If 
Thatcher had allowed a meeting to go ahead, he would have been seen as the big wig of 
Anglo-Irish relations in the Dáil. Perhaps he had another idea to present to Thatcher but it 
appears he was desperate to get Thatcher to make a move on the strikes so that he could save 
himself. It was not to be. 
 
On 22 June, FitzGerald told Figg that he expected to form a coalition government 
with the Irish Labour Party by the end of the month. He was prepared to make the Hunger 
Strike a priority, and indicated that he wanted to meet Thatcher urgently. Figg guessed that 
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FitzGerald did not have any new ideas, but the prospect of more deaths would force him into 
thinking of one.141 
 
FitzGerald and the Hunger Strikes 
FitzGerald was able to form a majority, albeit a small one, with Labour and became 
Taoiseach on 30 June 1981. The strikes commanded his attention from the beginning of his 
first term.142 He did not believe the prisoners should be granted political status. He telephoned 
Thatcher on 1 July to outline his position. He felt that the situation was urgent and should be 
prioritised. He advised that the first thing to do was to push ahead with the Joint Studies. By 
focusing on this, he felt sure that a solution to the Hunger Strike could be found.143 Figg 
advised Thatcher to follow FitzGerald’s advice and allow the ICJP to talk to the strikers. 
‘While we may not agree with him about their importance we should not refuse what he asks. 
If we turn down his request we shall get off to a bad start here.’144 During a telephone 
conversation with Father Oliver Crilly, a member of the ICJP, Martin Burke, Private 
Secretary to the Taoiseach, made the following notes; ‘Vanquish, exploit. Speed and 
access.’145 Crilly advised that urgent access to the strikers was paramount to ending their fast. 
The Hunger Strike had caused the Irish public profound frustration.146 Popular feeling was 
that the issue would be solved if Thatcher could soften her position and concede to some of 
the demands. Dublin was convinced that London had failed to comprehend the ‘well-founded 
character’ of Dublin’s concerns.147 Thatcher remained resolute. Instead of persuading her, 
FitzGerald pursued a new tactic: correspondence with the strikers. He was encouraged by a 
report made by the ICJP on 3 June. 
 
The Commission suggested that London should look again at clothing, recreation and 
work.148 In a minute on 2 July, Michael Alexander suggested that they could utilise the ICJP 
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as it was ‘active and on the doorstep.’ Alexander also noted that, as a Catholic body, the ICJP 
would be trusted by the prisoners. Thatcher dismissed the idea of it acting as ‘mediators,’ but 
at a later meeting agreed to allow the Commission to visit the strikers.149 Prior to a prison 
visit, the ICJP met with Michael Alison, Minister of State in the NIO, to go over its 
proposals.150 
 
 The eight-hour meeting was ‘friendly and engaging’ but not ground breaking. Alison 
operated under Thatcher’s instructions and ‘stonewalled’ any suggestion of political status. 
Thatcher observed that the clergy ‘do like talking,’ and commented that lengthy meetings 
‘tries one’s patience, doesn’t it’ but Alison assured her he did not mind. She gushed, ‘I think 
you are marvellous and I am very grateful.’151 Thatcher herself would not have had the 
patience to sit through such a lengthy discussion. Alison advised Thatcher that the ICJP 
would visit the strikers. Dublin also met with the ICJP.  
 
Although the PREM papers tend to have markings and, often, notes from Thatcher, it 
is rare to find such evidence within the Dublin files.152 However, within the DFA documents 
there is a lengthy series of notes, taken by an unknown official, that outline the FitzGerald 
administration’s thoughts on the Hunger Strike. The annotations also recount a meeting with 
the ICJP. The notes deduce that, ‘PIRA in a spot - can’t reject, if prisoners accept, get out of 
way.’ They also refer to Alison’s meeting with the ICJP and how he was acting under 
Thatcher’s instructions, ‘Alison - lady behind veil.’ London was ‘under the microscope’ and, 
according to John Kelly, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was afraid of ‘some new thing of equal 
(propaganda) value to PIRA.’153 The notes go on to detail ‘Operation Santa Claus.’ If the 
strikers agreed to come off, within 15 minutes a package containing their own clothing would 
                                                
149 TNA UK, PREM 19/506, minute from Alexander, 2 July 1981 and letter from Rickett to Boys-Smith, 3 July 1981. MT’s 
wiggly underline means that she thought this point was nonsense.  
150 Michael Alison, Conservative MP 1964-1997. Minister of State at the NIO 1979-1983, Parliamentary Private Secretary 
1983-1987. 
151 TNA UK, PREM 19/506, record of conversation between Alison and MT, 4 July 1981. MT was impatient and liked to 
get to the point. This is why she preferred Haughey to FitzGerald. See chpt. three. 
152 In the case of Haughey, this is due to paper trails. Haughey did not want to leave too much evidence behind beyond 
official memos and minutes. In FitzGerald’s case, it is probable that his analysis on briefings would be done verbally, as he 
was prone to lengthy and in-depth analysis. 
153 John M. Kelly, Fine Gael TD 1973-1989. Minister for Foreign Affairs, June- Oct. 1981. 
 91 
be taken to them. Logue told Kelly that the ICJP would visit the prison. In summation, the 
following was agreed, 
 
See Provisional Sinn Féin tomorrow. Go on Friday to prisoners. Endorse and put 
pressure on T. Get a senior Labour politician to (ask Thatcher about Hunger-Strike 
during) P.Q. (Prime Minister’s question time) - does the govert. [sic] accept the 
outline … ICJP should not give up its effort.154 
 
The ICJP released a statement on 8 July outlining the meetings it had had with Alison and 
with the strikers. The ICJP accused London of delaying the NIO’s visit to the Hunger Strikers 
from 6 to 8 July. By the time the visit occurred early in the morning of 8 July, Joe McDonnell 
had died.155 The ICJP then accused London of sending an unsatisfactory statement to the 
prisoners through the NIO.156 The same day Atkins was instructed to release a statement 
outlining what was on offer if the hunger striker’s gave up their fast.157 FitzGerald then sent 
Thatcher a three page letter on 10 July, urging her to listen to the recommendations of the 
ICJP - he agreed with their viewpoint. FitzGerald warned that London’s refusal to work with 
Dublin would result in a ‘danger of a serious and progressive deterioration in bilateral 
relations.’158 Thatcher’s response on 14 July outlined again her belief that the power to end 
the strikes did not lie with her. Thatcher asked FitzGerald, 
 
… not … (to) be misled into thinking that this problem is susceptible of an easy 
solution, wanting only a little flexibility on Her Majesty’s Government part. It is not 
… in our attitude to these demands we are not seeking to be difficult for the sake of 
saving face.159 
 
FitzGerald had telephoned her to ask for a meeting on 1 July.160 Throughout Haughey’s term 
as Taoiseach, London had emphasised that Anglo-Irish meetings should take place once a 
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year. Dublin had interpreted this to mean once every six months, a move that London 
resisted.161 These meetings caused a media circus and usually resulted in speculation that 
other negotiations were conducted in secret. A compromise was reached. A Ministerial 
meeting was organised on 10 July in London.162 
 
Kelly, James Dooge, leader of Fine Gael in the Seanad and officials from the DFA 
and Department of the Taoiseach, met with Ian Gilmour, the Lord Privy Seal and Atkins.163 
It was again agreed that the key to progress was regular meetings and information sharing. 
The team from Dublin were ‘insistent and frank’ while Atkins was ‘somewhat shaken by the 
intensity as well as the extent of information shown in the Irish presentation.’ FitzGerald 
wanted to know why Thatcher had allowed the ICJP into the prison if no consideration of 
movement was possible. And why had Thatcher delayed contacting the ICJP even though 
FitzGerald had personally asked her to? The delegation from Dublin also asked how the crisis 
would end. As a result of these questions, London was ‘non-commital [sic] and defensive.’ 
Atkins’ response to the final question was described as ‘pat and unoriginal.’ Dooge advised 
that instead of looking at the five demands as a set of principles, London could look at them 
as differences.164 That way, a solution could be achieved without a sense of defeat. Atkins 
said that he understood Dooge’s concerns and that the problem was being treated with 
urgency in London. ‘They had done little since last October but rack their brains to find a 
way forward.’165 
 
 At another meeting on 13 July, Dooge warned Peter Carrington, Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, that the Hunger Strike was acting as a propaganda 
parade for the PIRA.166 ‘Every death … was a victory.’ The Hunger Strike garnered global 
media attention, with support emanating from the US in particular. This had resulted in ‘an 
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internationalism of the problem.’167 The Hunger Strike also caused problems in Dublin. Two 
strikers had been elected to the Dáil, ‘Northern Ireland was having an influence in Ireland, in 
a way and to an extent not seen before. It was leading to a destabilisation of public 
opinion.’168 Figg reported that recruitment into the Irish Army was outnumbered by PIRA 
recruitment.169 Dublin would rather reach a solution and face criticism than allow more 
strikers to die. Meanwhile, London considered permitting the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) into the prison.  
 
 Thatcher allowed the ICRC into the prison on 16 July. On 23 July, it met with Alison 
to discuss its findings. It concluded that there was nothing it could do to break the deadlock, 
so it instead concentrated on prison conditions. It felt the major issues were overcrowding 
and segregation. Alison asked if the ICRC had formed an opinion of the strikers’ attitude 
towards the government. Were their five demands really aimed at getting small changes to 
the prison regime or was it a question of pride? The ICRC pointed out that it had not visited 
the strikers themselves, but it felt that the general atmosphere towards the government’s 
policy was one of ‘we’ve heard it all before.’ The ICRC concluded that the major problems 
in Northern Ireland prisons were psychological ones which resulted in ‘a sense of tension 
and struggle.’170 Following the Red Cross visit, the Press Office in Dublin received a 
telephone call from prominent Republican, Bernadette McAliskey.171 McAliskey accused 
FitzGerald of siding ‘with the British Government when Kieran Doherty is about to die.’ 
Liam Hourican, Irish Government Press Secretary, surmised that FitzGerald had ‘regretted 
the failure of Tuesday morning’s visit which seemed to be attributable to unreasonable pre-
conditions demanded by the prisoners.’172 McAliskey wanted to know how the Government 
knew what had happened when they were not talking ‘to the people who have the 
information.’ Hourican replied that if she wanted to pass on any information, he would 
forward it.173 Little did Hourican know that London was talking to the PIRA. 
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 At the beginning of July, a secret channel between the Thatcher Government and the 
PIRA was opened. Representing London was the Mountain Climber, now known to be MI6 
Officer Michael Oatley.174 Brendan Duddy, a businessman from Londonderry, was 
codenamed ‘Soon,’ and was tasked with transporting secret messages to the PIRA 
leadership.175 Through a series of eight telephone conversations between 4-6 July, Duddy 
updated Oatley on what could be done to end the strike. The PIRA asked for a draft offer so 
that it could be carefully perused and any difficulties highlighted. Duddy also mentioned that 
PIRA was ‘very worried about the time scale now involved. He said that the situation would 
be irreparably damaged if a protestor died and he urged HMG to act with the utmost haste.’176 
Contained within PREM 19/506 is, arguably, one of the most surprising discoveries of the 
Thatcher files.  
 
 On a document entitled ‘Message to be sent through the channel,’ Thatcher’s 
handwriting covers the page.177 Her refusal to talk to terrorists, as she deemed them, was 
temporarily set aside during the Hunger Strikes. The message was sent but was rejected by 
PIRA due to its tone. Thatcher then advised that the original deal should be redrafted, hence 
why her handwriting appears on the document.178 This was a risky line to take. If the Hunger 
Strike was called off, it would be too risky to withdraw concessions. Yet too firm a stance 
would result in further deaths.179 London hoped the redrafted offer would be accepted, going 
as far as outlining what would happen when the Hunger Strike was called off.180 But the 
PREM files confirm that an ‘unsatisfactory’ reply was made by the PIRA.181 ‘… we have a 
clear acknowledgment … that the Hunger Strikers have no power to give up; and we have 
sent an official in to clarify our position to the Hunger Strikers and they have said that they 
do not wish to listen.’182 On 20 July the channel was closed by Atkins.183 What were the 
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consequences of Thatcher’s actions? FitzGerald was made aware of the secret negotiations 
by the ICJP and later wrote that he felt he had ‘one hand tied behind (his) back’ when talking 
to Thatcher, 
 
For I would naturally have liked to confront them with - and would have liked even 
more to be able to make public - my knowledge of the furtive contacts on their behalf 
with the IRA, which seemed to have proved fatal to the resolution of the problem.184 
 
This was compounded by the fact that the Duke of Norfolk had also visited the strikers in 
prison on 22 July. He told one of the protestors, Paddy Quinn, that the Hunger Strike was ‘a 
waste of life’ and asked him to ‘come off it’ before leaving.185 The meeting was conducted 
in secret, much to the annoyance of Dublin who, at the time, was drafting a detailed briefing 
for FitzGerald. FitzGerald had taken charge of Northern Ireland policy so it was crucial that 
all relevant information should be available for him to read.186 Figg apologised for the 
incident and assured Dooge that the visit was inconsequential. He did not know about the 
meeting until he had read about it in the papers. As the visit occurred in the week leading up 
to the Royal Wedding, the media felt that it must have had some significance.187 Why would 
a Duke travel to the Maze prison during a hectic week for the Royal family? FitzGerald’s 
representatives let Thatcher know that they were aware of the channel and the Duke’s visit, 
and they hoped that in future relations ‘could be somewhat franker.’188 It was a case of they 
know we know, and Thatcher was warned that ‘The Taoiseach feels we have let him down 
and I hope we can try and do what we can to show that, whatever the facts of the matter, we 
care about his feelings.’189 
 
During the secret talks, Joe McDonnell died.190 The channel had opened too late and 
another life had been lost. The channel was the last option for the Thatcher Government. It 
had come under increasing pressure to make a move, but they could not end the Hunger 
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Strike. On 28 July, Bishop Cathal Daly, the families of Kevin Lynch and Quinn and Mr. 
Canning, a public representative, met to try to find a way of ending the strike.191 They wanted 
to ‘devise a formula allowing the Hunger Strikers to quit “with honour” …’ Following the 
meeting, a delegation was sent to Belfast to confront Gerry Adams, policy coordinator for 
the Anti-H-Block party and future president of Sinn Féin, who had refused to join the 
meeting, to ‘insist that they attempt to end the Hunger Strike or face public denunciation 
from certain families.’ Adams refused.192 The means to end the Hunger Strike did not lie with 
Dublin or London, or the strikers themselves, and now the prisoners’ superiors refused to act. 
In desperation, FitzGerald turned to US President Ronald Reagan.193 
 
The protest had been followed closely by passionate Irish-Americans, and had 
resulted in some unrest. Philip McKearney, British Consul in Boston, sent Kevin White, the 
Mayor, a picture of his home after slogans including ‘stop the hungers now’ and ‘IRA’ had 
been sprayed across it. McKearney explained that his home had been extensively damaged 
during anti-H-Block demonstrations over the summer of 1981. The protestors painted his 
door step with blood and he had received death threats.194 Thatcher had received resolutions 
from State Senates urging her to end the strikes. These messages were sympathetic to the 
PIRA. They referred to the strikers as ‘Irish Patriots’ and the Hunger Strike as a ‘human 
rights crisis.’195 Where once the strikes had been a minor story in the American press, by 
June interest in the story had peaked.196 Press coverage had ‘dramatically improved the image 
of the PIRA among thirty million Irish-Americans and reversed a five-year trend of declining 
financial support of the PIRA.’197 Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador to the USA, felt 
that American input was pivotal as Irish-American groups, such as the Irish Northern Aid 
Committee (NORAID), provided the PIRA with money and weapons.198 NORAID had 
posted full-page adverts for pro-hunger strike paraphernalia including t-shirts and bumper 
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stickers with the slogan ‘IRA all the way.’199 American investment in Northern Ireland had 
suffered due to the riots in Belfast and Londonderry. Although American interference could 
be ‘ignorant and partisan,’ Reagan had a card to play.200  
 
 Knowing that Reagan held sway with Thatcher, FitzGerald asked him to intervene. 
This move was labelled as ‘bizarre’ by The Daily Express, but the paper did not understand 
the influence Reagan had over Thatcher. The two were great personal friends as well as 
political allies.201 Thatcher reflected that Reagan ‘… instinctively felt and thought as I did.’202 
The request was ultimately ignored.203 Reagan did not want to adopt a position but said he 
would ‘be very pleased if the ICRC were now to find a solution as they would be spared the 
need to take up any solution and would issue an anodyne reply.’204 America continued to 
watch the situation in Northern Ireland closely but did not raise the issue with Thatcher.205 
Henderson met with Ted Kennedy, one of the Four Horsemen, to discuss the situation. 
Kennedy assured Henderson that they were working hard to undermine groups such as 
NORAID.206 The Horsemen had distinguished themselves as the peaceful Irish-American 
group. Kennedy added that the Horsemen did not support the strikers’ demand for political 
status, but they ‘found it increasingly difficult to believe that Britain was showing the 
flexibility necessary to avoid losing the propaganda war.’207 When FitzGerald cancelled a 
Dáil speech on the strikes on 23 July, there were rumours that he was going to give up.208 
FitzGerald then received an invitation to meet with the strikers’ families on 27 July. 
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FitzGerald walked into a taut atmosphere. He had not been fully briefed on the secret 
negotiations between London and the PIRA. The families verbally attacked him. They 
accused him of taking the same position as Thatcher and doing nothing to help. FitzGerald 
reassured them that he was in daily contact with London but that he had little influence over 
Thatcher. His government focused on the humanitarian aspect of the strike. FitzGerald also 
advised the families that the emotional, and violent, protests in support of the strikers would 
not endear their campaign to Thatcher. The protests ‘would destroy the channels of 
communication open to us and weaken our leverage on the British.’ In frustration, the 
relatives walked out of the meeting after forty minutes. They believed that FitzGerald was 
not ‘dealing realistically’ with the problem. The families were desperate for a solution.209  
  
August began with the deaths of Lynch and Doherty. Eight men had now died on 
Hunger Strike and new prisoners were volunteering each week. The consequences of the 
Hunger Strike were now understood to be long lasting, ‘even if the hunger strike were to end 
tomorrow, its consequences will be with us for a long time to come.’210 The PIRA had made 
unprecedented political gains, shattering London’s notion of a lack of local support. 
Sympathy for the Hunger Strike was international. The PIRA had ‘succeeded in the last year 
in setting back the assertion and acceptance everywhere of the cause for a united Ireland on 
a basis of reconciliation and consent.’211 Although Irish public opinion was largely behind 
FitzGerald, it was difficult to gauge the effect the Hunger Strike had had on the Irish 
electorate.212 At the beginning of July, protests in Dublin were relatively small with only 400 
attendees.213 By the end of July, the marches had spread to rural areas and were larger and 
more violent.214 The strikers’ funerals were also problematic. Aside from the large crowds, 
PIRA guards of honour were offensive to the unionist community and troublesome for the 
security forces.215 The crisis had peaked. David Neligan, Assistant Secretary in the DFA, 
suggested to FitzGerald that he should consider asking Thatcher to force feed the Hunger 
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Strikers.216 Figg admitted to Kelly that London did not know how the Hunger Strike was 
going to end. ‘The strikers knew what was on offer. They did not need clarification.’217 But 
Thatcher’s Government still refused to grant political status.218 On 20 August, Michael 
Devine died.219 Ten men had died on Hunger Strike. The situation seemed hopeless.  
 
 On 20 July, Quinn’s family asked for medical intervention to save his life. The 
Quinn’s were followed by the McGeowns on 20 August and the Devlin’s on 4 September.220 
The Hunger Strikes entered a new phase. Newspapers suggested that the Hunger Strike was 
near collapse.221 Dooge surmised that the wedge between the PIRA and the striker’s families 
was ‘welcome’ but he did not hold much hope for it lasting.222 Dooge was wrong in thinking 
so. McCloskey’s mother told John Hume that she would end her son’s Hunger Strike when 
he lost consciousness.223 The PIRA tried to stop families from intervening but they started to 
as well.224 Bernard Fox was taken off because he was ‘dying too quickly.’225 The end was in 
sight. The Hunger Strike was faltering.226 
 
The pressure on London was reduced as the strikers’ families vowed to end their 
protest.227 The Hunger Strike ended on 3 October. To ensure another Hunger Strike would 
not occur, three of the five demands were met by the Thatcher Government. On 6 October 
Jim Prior, who had replaced Atkins as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in September, 
announced that civilian-style clothing, free association and 50% of lost remission would be 
reinstated.228 Anglo-Irish relations were strained but communication between Dublin and 
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London had been maintained throughout the strike. Neither side wanted to overreact to the 
end of the strike. Prior’s official statement was sent to Dublin for assessment by FitzGerald. 
He found it satisfactory as it was ‘conceived in a generous spirit and (represented) a genuine 
attempt to put the whole issue into the past.’ Attention now turned to the PIRA. They had led 
an incredibly successful propaganda campaign throughout the strike. It was expected that 
they would return to violence.229  
 
 The PIRA carried out an attack on British soldiers in London on 10 October. Four 
days later, FitzGerald met with Carrington to discuss security. FitzGerald asked that his 
condolences be passed on to Thatcher. He added that the bomb had been a surprise but was 
not unexpected. PIRA morale was known to be low and intelligence had been unclear about 
what their next move would be. The NIO knew that the PIRA had little capability in Britain 
and lacked popular support, but they were unsure if this attack marked the start of a new 
campaign. The NIO guessed that the bomb had been carried out by peripheral members.230 
Carrington said that attacks on mainland Britain had little effect on Northern Ireland. People 
there ‘tended to believe that they had borne the brunt of violence to date and that incidents in 
Britain simply demonstrated to the British public what they, the population of Northern 
Ireland, had to put up with.’231 In November, Armstrong suggested that Thatcher meet up 
with FitzGerald to discuss his constitutional crusade. Thatcher said she had ‘great respect’ 
for FitzGerald’s initiative, and that she would be pleased to meet with him as long as the 
meeting was low key.232 Armstrong suggested that the two leaders should meet privately, but 
Thatcher wanted a note taker to be present.233 She explained that there was a ‘danger that 
things (that were said in private) could be twisted.’234  
 
In the lead up to the meeting, communications between Dublin and London were 
regular. Prior advised that post-strike, London should view Anglo-Irish relations as ‘a vehicle 
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moving along a road. He hoped it would gain speed with time but if pushed too far it could 
stall.’ FitzGerald wanted to bring unionists and nationalists together, but Prior warned that 
there ‘was a danger of putting the unionists into an intransigent position.’235 FitzGerald was 
aware that London ‘might be getting fed up’ but he believed in Anglo-Irish relations.236 While 
visiting Larne, Atkins had been warned not to meet with ‘the South’ as ‘he would be labelled 
as a traitor.’237 Michael O’Leary, Tánaiste and Leader of the Labour Party, asked Prior what 
influence London wielded over the protestant community.238 Prior said that, 
 
… he had discussions with them but on every occasion they “bang on” about 
security… They would dismiss out of hand the idea that the British guarantee 
maintained the border - as well as resenting deeply any suggestion that the guarantee 
should be changed. They talked a lot of nonsense about loyalty to the Queen.239 
 
Prior warned that Thatcher ‘… would be influenced by what she believed would be the 
attitude of Neave. She was really a Unionist at heart.’240 It had been nearly a year since the 
last Anglo-Irish summit. Thatcher needed to officially meet with FitzGerald.  
 
 As the FitzGerald-Thatcher summit approached, the finer details of their agendas 
were fleshed out. Dublin suggested a joint press conference would present a united front. 
Michael Lillis, Head of the Anglo-Irish section in the DFA, advised FitzGerald to concentrate 
on three points,241  
 
1. Northern Ireland is a tragic situation in which words can kill. I have no interest in 
exploiting it politically … 
2. We should both strongly emphasise our shared humanitarian concern for the suffering 
of the people of Northern Ireland. 
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3. We must at all cost avoid being put into conflicting positions by the press. That would 
be to undermine whatever progress we can make together which, in this situation, is 
the only way in which progress can be made.242 
 
On the day of the meeting, 6 November, an unnamed official from Dublin acted as note taker. 
The notes are brief but give insight into the key topics of conversation, 
 
Common solidarity 
Consent c idea that support even in opposition 
To start 
Security successes 
Publication - build trust and confidence with us 
Council - be called Ministerial 
Security/court 
Gov. in N.I. [sic]. 
Guarantee.243 
 
A detailed briefing shows how the conversation between the two heads of government 
unfolded. Thatcher began by thanking FitzGerald for visiting the wounded Irish guardsmen 
in hospital. FitzGerald told Thatcher that his visit was intended to be a reflection of his 
attitude towards the PIRA and their violent tactics. Thatcher wanted to know if FitzGerald 
had proscribed groups such as the PIRA and INLA. FitzGerald assured her he had, although 
the election of Sinn Féin candidates would prove to be a headache.244 FitzGerald told 
Thatcher about his attitude towards Northern Ireland. He said, 
 
… he felt passionately on the subject. He fully understood the position of Northern 
protestants. He had been full of supressed fury since childhood at some of the attitude 
adopted in the South. He had bided time - but still remained of the attitude described 
in his book of 1972. He had to wait until he was Taoiseach to give voice to his views. 
In fact, he could say that he was in politics today for this purpose largely. People must 
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be willing to take an initiative - and this had been an incidental effect that his 
Government had been strengthened by what he had been doing.245 
 
In Ireland, the November summit was reported positively. FitzGerald was said to have 
launched a ‘two-pronged attack’ and had counteracted Haughey’s ‘mess.’246 FitzGerald 
claimed that the meeting was ‘a great first step along the different road towards reconciliation 
in London’ and also mentioned his support for Co-operation North. ‘… he was anxious to 
encourage the establishment of a network of links between organisations in the North and the 
South.’247 Meanwhile, Thatcher stressed that the meeting was ‘all in a day’s work’ and felt 
the press attention these Anglo-Irish summits attracted was unnecessary.248 Her irritation is 
evident when she remarked that future meetings would be ‘more frequent, more regular so 
that … (they) are more unremarked than at present.’249  
 
The November summit resulted in the establishment of the AIIGC, an official body 
that formalised communications between Dublin and London.250 FitzGerald planned to 
publish the summaries of the Joint Studies a week after the meeting, so communications 
between the two bodies seemed likely to dramatically increase.251 The AIIGC aimed to 
remedy the issues between Dublin, Belfast and London. The group advised that, 
 
… the problem goes deeper and remedial measures would need to be far reaching, 
including consideration of the Constitutional claim and the “guarantee”, Church/State 
relationships, institutional arrangements to reduce suspicion and distrust, and 
measures to make more effective the prosecution of offenders who seek to evade 
justice by crossing from one side of the border to the other.252 
 
Before FitzGerald could start the Joint Studies, he faced a no confidence vote.  
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In January 1982, FitzGerald’s government introduced a new budget. They had 
previously released a budget plan in July 1981 that was as austere as it was unpopular.253 The 
February 1982 budget did not fare better. The main gripe was with the tax on children’s 
shoes. FitzGerald defended the tax by arguing that these could be purchased by women with 
small feet. Fine Gael lost the support of Jim Kemmy, an Independent TD, in the Dáil, and 
the government fell.254 An election was called the following month which Haughey won.255 
The ‘revolving door’ of Irish politics continued to spin.256  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the Hunger Strikes further tested the Anglo-Irish political arena. 
Some of the discoveries are surprising; Haughey was expected to support the protest but 
actually labelled them blackmailers; Thatcher adamantly denounced the Hunger Strike but 
was directly involved with secret negotiations with the PIRA; FitzGerald’s administration 
actively sought a solution, one of which was ‘Operation Santa Claus’, and he felt like he 
could not fully trust Thatcher due to the secret negotiations. Examining each of these 
elements in turn is key to understanding how Dublin and London could be caught up in a 
crisis and work together and autonomously. This chapter has also shown how grass roots 
support in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland could be motivated to the extent that 
both Westminster and the Dáil were directly impacted. Sands became an MP, while 
Haughey’s majority was challenged when Doherty and Agnew took two of Fianna Fáil’s 
seats in the 1981 General Election. Although both Dublin and London had other policy 
matters to attend to during the 1980s, Northern Ireland continually demanded attention. 
 
The 1980 Hunger Strike ultimately ended in failure for the protestors. London offered 
concessions on clothing and association, but the fundamental policy of political status 
remained. During a Cabinet meeting on 4 December, it was noted that ‘The strike was getting 
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less support from outside than the organisers had hoped. The level of public response had not 
increased and the size of marches had not grown.’257 The PIRA prisoners felt that had been 
tricked by London. Thatcher’s victory over the 1980 Hunger Strike was short-lived. Lessons 
were learnt that were applied to the second Hunger Strike in 1981.  
 
The 1981 Hunger Strike caused a crisis in the Dáil and Westminster. Haughey urged 
Thatcher to come up with a solution without outlining what that solution should be. When 
FitzGerald entered the Taoiseach’s office, he was determined to find a solution. He pinned 
his hopes on the ICJP report, and Thatcher permitted the group to go into the prison to study 
conditions. But both the ICJP and ICRC reports reiterated what Haughey had suggested: re-
examine the concessions bar the demand for political status. In July, Thatcher communicated 
directly with the PIRA to find a solution. When London’s proposals were rejected, it seemed 
there was nothing to do but sit back and wait.  
 
The Hunger Strike also marked the beginning of a new PIRA tactic. Members could 
be elected to Westminster and the Dáil. Voters were given the opportunity to save Sands’ life 
by voting for him, but they were voting for the PIRA. Support for the PIRA was strengthened 
by the Hunger Strike and ‘… the hunger strikes of the IRA prisoners can be seen as an 
instrument exerting political pressure that raised the whole Northern Ireland conflict to a 
completely different level.’258 The strikes also led to international condemnation of 
Thatcher’s policy. Irish-American groups, including NORAID, worked to raise funds for the 
PIRA. In spite of this, Reagan refused to step in and make a statement on the strike. In the 
end, interception by the strikers’ families ended the protest on 3 October 1981. Ten men had 
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GUBU1: Irish Neutrality and the Falklands War, 1982 
That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen’s subjects and prevail by 
fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister.2 
 
At 2am on 2 April 1982, the Royal Marines at Moody Brook Camp awoke and moved from 
their garrison in Port Stanley to their defence positions. The FCO had sent Rex Hunt, 
Governor of the Falklands, a telegram the previous day warning that an Argentine invasion 
was imminent. 80 marines were placed around the Island. At 4:30 am, the Argentines landed 
and headed straight for the Marines barracks. Using grenades and sub-machine guns they 
‘shot the place up’ but, realising the Marines had anticipated their attack, moved off to 
Government House, the home of Hunt. If the Argentines wanted to take the Islands, Hunt 
had to surrender. The Marines defended Government House until Hunt asked them to stand 
down at 10:30am. The Argentine flag flew over the Falklands and the national anthem played 
on loop over the local radio station.3 How had this happened? 
 
In 1981, Thatcher cut the defence budget in the South Atlantic. As a consequence, 
HMS Endurance, a patrol vessel, was decommissioned. This left the Falklands without a sea 
patrol. This decision ‘demoralised the islanders and emboldened the Argentines.’4 Thatcher 
later defended this decision in the Commons. She told the House that Argentine interest in 
the Islands was historical, but the cost of defending the Islands and the resources involved 
would precipitate ‘the very action it was intended to deter.’5 In Argentina, General Galtieri 
needed a morale boost. His popularity was low and anti-junta demonstrations, along with 
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protests over the ‘Dirty War’ in which thousands of people disappeared without a trace, 
threatened his position. To solve his problem, Galtieri invaded the Falklands.6 Thatcher 
described being told of the invasion as ‘the worst moment of my life.’7 Trouble was brewing 
in Ireland too. 
 
Anglo-Irish relations deteriorated rapidly during Haughey’s nine-month term in 1982. 
His muddled attempt at foreign policy during the Falklands War deeply angered Thatcher. 
She later described his stance as ‘thoroughly unhelpful …’8 Although Haughey initially 
agreed to support EEC sanctions against Argentina, the publication of a new White Paper on 
Northern Ireland which set out a ‘rolling devolution’ policy left Haughey out in the cold. The 
Falklands presented Haughey with the opportunity to avenge his idea for an inter-
parliamentary tier. When an Irish fishing vessel, the Sharelga, was sunk accidentally by a 
British submarine and an Argentine cruiser, the Belgrano, was sunk by a submarine with 
sanction from Thatcher, Britain proved that it had abandoned diplomacy in favour of military 
action. The final straw for Haughey came when Thatcher delayed a vote on EEC farm price 
increases. Haughey reinstated Irish neutrality. He claimed that this was a return to Ireland’s 
traditional foreign policy, but anti-British statements by Síle de Valera and Neil Blaney 
proved otherwise. Was Haughey using Britain’s difficulty as his opportunity to appeal to his 
Anglophobic support base? The relationship between Haughey and Thatcher became toxic. 
Thatcher described how ‘Anglo-Irish relations cooled to freezing.’9 At home, Haughey’s grip 
on the Taoiseach’s Office started to slip. An over-ride button, the implication of the Irish 
Attorney General, Patrick Connolly, in the MacArthur murders, the Dowra affair, a car-crash 
and Liffeygate led to a low ebb in public confidence in Haughey.10 He left the Taoiseach’s 
office in December 1982 under a cloud of suspicion and with Anglo-Irish relations in ruins. 
His second term was as dramatic as it was short.  
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This chapter will provide further analysis of the Haughey-Thatcher relationship. The 
Falklands War would have lasting consequences for the Anglo-Irish political arena. As 
hibernophobia became increasingly evident in the British press, Thatcher also began to 
understand why her advisors had warned her about Haughey. Further to this, there was 
evidence of corruption within Haughey’s circle, the Garda and the justice system. The GUBU 
period is detailed in this work because it would have been closely watched by London. 1982 
would prove to Thatcher that the Haughey government could not be depended on for support.  
 
Haughey Returns to the Taoiseach’s Office 
Haughey was re-elected Taoiseach in March 1982.11 In an address to the White House during 
the annual St. Patrick’s Day visit, Haughey set the tone for his second administration, 
 
[T]here’s one thing we Irish have not yet achieved and which we are constantly 
reminded … we are seeking to bring to an end the partition of ours. And the obstacles 
to that goal are in part the age-old ones which so nearly sundered the young United 
States - misunderstanding, ignorance, prejudice, suspicion and fear.12  
 
The remark was tantamount to a red flag to London. The speech was ‘unhelpful … 
unwelcome … and unexpected,’ and a ‘hangover from electioneering.’13 By this stage, it was 
common knowledge that the Haughey-Thatcher initiative was dead in the water, and London 
was unsure of how to proceed, ‘there remains the question of what, if anything, you should 
say about these matters to Mr. Haughey, if you see him.’14 Nevertheless, the two governments 
agreed that Haughey and Thatcher should meet at the next EEC summit in March.15  
 
It was a brief meeting of 20 minutes, intended as a casual reintroduction rather than 
an official discussion. Haughey’s pre-meeting briefs reiterated the importance of telling 
Thatcher that a solution to Northern Ireland needed to include Dublin.16 The DFA in Dublin 
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1982.  
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16 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/1055, steering note, 26 Mar. 1982 
 110 
knew London was about to introduce a new scheme for rolling devolution. They had been 
told by Prior himself, and the plans had been leaked to the Irish media.17 Haughey labelled 
rolling devolution as ‘unworkable’ as it was ‘an internal six-county’ idea that was contrary 
to the December 1980 communiqué.18 But, according to London’s record of the meeting, 
Haughey and Thatcher avoided talking about politics and instead focused on economics, the 
Pope’s visit to Britain and the Falkland Islands.19 The tone of the record suggests that 
Haughey attempted to extend an olive branch, but Thatcher gently pushed it away. Before 
the discussion concluded, Haughey asked if Thatcher could ‘tentatively (earmark)’ July for 
a follow up meeting. Thatcher ‘s response, ‘that time might be possible,’ is in stark contrast 
to her enthusiasm during Haughey’s first term.20 Thatcher made it clear that it was up to 
Dublin to pursue London, but the publication of Prior’s plans, the White Paper, on 5 April, 
as well as the invasion of the Falklands, made a meeting impossible for the foreseeable 
future.21 
 
 Immediately after the White Paper was published, the Haughey Government released 
a strongly worded statement. ‘… the Government can only confirm their view as to the 
unworkable nature and the mistaken focus of the proposals.’22 Dublin also kept a close eye 
on reactions to the Prior initiative in Northern Ireland.23 The Department of the Taoiseach 
held a Northern Ireland review meeting on 8 April where it was agreed that opposition to the 
White Paper should be expressed at every opportunity to London. Officials were told to press 
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for the next Anglo-Irish bilateral but MT wanted to wait until Autumn. See TNA UK, PREM 19/1070. 
21 The White Paper, officially ‘Northern Ireland: A framework for devolution’ is available at CAIN, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cmd8541.htm.  
22 Mansergh, Spirit of the Nation, p. 613 and also NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/1092. 
23 See NAI, DFA 2012/59/1580, conversation with General Secretary (UUP), Norman Hutton, 23 Apr. 1982, NAI, TAOIS 
2012/90/1092, report on the unionist reaction to the Prior initiative, 24 Apr. 1982, report from Mansergh on reactions to the 
Prior initiative in the Commons, 12 May 1982. 
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for an Irish dimension.24 When Dermot Nally, David Neligan and Seán Donlon, Secretary 
General of the DFA and head of the Irish Diplomatic Service, met with Leonard Figg, British 
Ambassador to Ireland, and Philip Woodfield, Permanent Secretary of the NIO, to discuss 
Northern Ireland, Donlon asked if July would suit Thatcher for a meeting with Haughey.25 
Thatcher’s team did not give a concrete reply. Events in the South Atlantic overshadowed 
Anglo-Irish relations for the time being.26  
 
The Republic of Ireland During the Falklands War 
On 5 April David Tatham, from the British Embassy, met with Pádraig MacKernan, assistant 
secretary and political director of the DFA.27 Tatham had been sent by the British Embassy 
to ask Ireland for support at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The day after the 
invasion, the UN had tabled resolution 502 calling for an immediate end to hostilities and for 
Argentina to withdraw from the Falklands.28 Tatham then detailed four suggestions for 
Ireland to consider, 
 
(1) condemning the attack to the Argentine Ambassador  
(2) recalling the Irish Ambassador, Patrick Walsh, from Argentina 
(3) imposing an arms embargo on Argentina 
(4) a suspension for export credit guarantees for trade with Argentina.29 
 
These were serious moves. To recall the Irish Ambassador would signal Ireland’s disapproval 
of the invasion. MacKernan reiterated Ireland’s resolve to support a peaceful resolution, but 
did not commit to any of the four points.30 The following day the DFA circulated a report on 
the implications of the four suggestions. The report acknowledged that Dublin’s decision 
would have lasting consequences on Anglo-Irish relations. Either they supported Britain, 
                                                
24 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/1100, Northern Ireland review meeting, 8 Apr. 1982. Present at that meeting were Haughey, Seán 
Doherty, Minister for Justice, Patrick Connolly, Attorney General and unnamed officials from the Departments of the 
Taoiseach, DFA, Justice and the Office of the Attorney General. 
25 Seán Donlon, Irish diplomat. Irish Ambassador to the United States 1978-1981, Secretary General of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Head of the Irish Diplomatic Service, 1981-1987. Pivotal in setting up of Friends of Ireland to rival 
support for more controversial NORAID. Part of the Irish negotiating team for the AIA. Sir Philip Woodfield, British civil 
servant. Permanent Under-Secretary of State of the NIO 1981-1983.  
26 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/1055, meeting between Figg and Woodfield, 22 Apr. 1982.  
27 David Tatham, British diplomat. Counsellor, Embassy, Ireland 1981-1984. Pádraig MacKernan, Irish diplomat. Assistant 
Secretary and political director of the DFA 1980-1985. 
28 Resolution 502 can be found at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/502.  
29 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/866, meeting with Tatham, 5 Apr. 1982. 
30 iBid., 
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which would ‘… build up credit which could be turned to political and economic advantage 
…’ or they could refuse support, which would result in ‘… British ill-will and … a negative 
impact both on our bilateral relations generally and on British willingness to move forward 
on the economic and political questions …’31 What was holding Dublin back then? The report 
alluded to Ireland’s policy of neutrality.32 An arms embargo could signal further disapproval 
with the invasion. Apart from this, Irish exports to Argentina would be impacted by the 
sanctions. On balance the report recommended, 
 
… there is more to be gained, despite the risks and despite our attitudes on the merits 
of the case and the rash judgement which has brought the UK into its present 
predicament from a display of political good-will combined with cautious 
cooperation in the economic field, than from appearing to be negative or unduly 
dilatory.33  
 
Further to this, a brief on the Irish community in Argentina concluded that the Argentine-
Irish were ‘Argentine first, Irish second.’ They were so few in number that their disapproval 
with Irish support for sanctions would have a minimal impact.34 Dublin needed to make a 
decision. On 10 April, Gerard Collins, Haughey’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, released a 
statement affirming the Government’s decision to back resolution 502.35 Tatham reassured 
MacKernan that as it would take the task force three weeks to arrive at the Islands, Thatcher 
would focus on a diplomatic solution to the conflict.36 But events close to home proved 
otherwise.  
 
Two weeks after the invasion, an accident occurred in South-West Ireland. On 18 
April a fishing vessel called Sharelga sank after being dragged backwards at speed for two-
                                                
31 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/866, British request for support in applying sanctions against Argentina, 6 Apr. 1982. 
32 Ireland had adopted neutrality in the 1930s. For more on the history of Irish neutrality see Trevor C. Salmon, ‘Neutrality 
and the Irish republic: Myth or reality?’ The Round Table, vol. 73, no. 290 (1984), pp. 205-215, Raymond J. Raymond, 
‘Irish Neutrality and Anglo-Irish Relations: 1921-1941,’ The International History Review, vol. 9, no. 3 (1987), pp. 456-
464, Eunan O’Halpin, Spying on Ireland: Intelligence and Irish Neutrality During the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
33 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/866, British request for support in applying sanctions against Argentina, 6 Apr. 1982. 
34 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/866, The Irish-Argentine Community and the Falklands Crisis, 7 Apr. 1982. 
35 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/867, statement by Collins, 10 Apr. 1982. Resolution 502 called for Argentina to withdraw from the 
Falklands and for Argentina and the UK to come to a peaceful settlement. Gerard ‘Gerry’ Collins, Fianna Fáil TD 1967-
1997. Minister for Justice 1977-1981, 1987-1989, Minister for Foreign Affairs 1982, 1989-1992. 
36 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/866, meeting with Tatham, 5 Apr. 1982. The Task Force, made up of HMS Hermes, Invincible and 
Fearless, needed at least three days-notice before setting sail and would then be at sea for three weeks.  
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and a-half-miles. None of the crew were injured but the owner, Raymond McEvoy, 
demanded an explanation from the Irish Government. McEvoy told reporters, ‘It must have 
been a sub. It wasn’t jaws or the 1.30pm bus.’37 The Guardian even guessed that the trawler’s 
nets had become entangled with a British submarine.38 At first London denied any 
involvement, but Figg was later sent to apologise for the incident, 
 
He said that it was “some time” before the Commander of the submarine realised that 
he had been involved in an incident and that it took ‘some time’ to establish with a 
reasonable degree of certainty that the British authorities were liable. I pressed him 
to give additional details, particularly about the length of the period between the 
incident and the Commanders realisation that there had been an incident [sic]. He said 
that he had no further information.39 
 
The British Ministry of Defence (MOD) requested that McEvoy send a claim for damages 
which would be given ‘prompt attention.’40 However, the political damage had been done.  
 
 Dublin demanded further explanation for the incident. It concluded that it would not 
become involved in the monetary claim from McEvoy, but requested intelligence on the 
incident from London.41 To cover their tracks, it was advised that ‘Such an approach could 
be made in the context of the anxiety on the part of the fishermen.’42 The Irish Independent 
was more forthright and demanded an answer to three questions, 
 
• An explanation for the delay in admitting responsibility by the British. 
• To hear why no apparent effort was made by the submarine to ensure there had been 
no loss of life after the sinking. 
• To find out if steps were taken to make sure no such incident could occur again.43  
 
                                                
37 The Evening Herald, 5 Sept. 2012. 
38 NAI, DFA 2014/32/1904, The Guardian, 3 May 1982. 
39 NAI, DFA 2014/32/1904, note from Seán to Dermot, 1 May 1982. 
40 NAI, DFA 2014/32/1904, note for Minister’s information, undated. 
41 In 1983 it was reported that the crew were still awaiting compensation. The Irish Government agreed to make further 
enquiries as a complete breakdown in negotiations between the fishermen and the MOD could have serious political 
repercussions. No record of a final settlement figure is present within the DFA files, although recent newspaper articles 
reveal that an interim payment was made in 1984 before a final instalment in 1988. See NAI, DFA 2014/32/1904. 
42 NAI, DFA 2014/32/1904, memo from King to Hennessy, 8 June 1982. 
43 NAI, DFA 2014/32/1904, The Irish Times, The Evening Herald, 3 May 1982, The Guardian, 3 May 1982, The Irish 
Press, 29 Apr. 1982. 
 114 
Little mention of the incident is present in the PREM files aside from a despatch note by 
Figg. He surmised that the impact of the accident should not be overlooked, ‘The news (of 
the sinking of the Sharelga on 18 April) provoked a wave of horror and revulsion, and 
because a British submarine was involved the event was linked in the public mind with the 
sinking of the Belgrano.’ Figg also reported that ‘(Gerard) Collins told me that he felt he 
should not be seen to be shaking my hand in public.’44 Declan O’Donovan, a DFA official, 
reflected ‘… contacts with the British Embassy here have not produced much realisation on 
their part of the implications of the stalemate in this case for Anglo-Irish relations … The 
Sharelga case requires greater political attention on the British side.’45 Negotiations between 
McEvoy’s solicitors and the MOD dragged on and Irish papers kept a close eye on 
proceedings.46 The presence of a nuclear submarine in Irish waters confirmed that Britain 
was prepared for conflict. London’s secrecy over the incident increased distrust in Dublin 
and made it difficult for Haughey to be seen to support Thatcher.  
 
Following the invasion of the Falklands, Thatcher had issued a plea for support of 
EEC sanctions against Argentina. The sanctions were intended to further damage Argentina’s 
fragile economy and to pressurise her into retreat.47 Thatcher invited Haughey to join the 
international community in bringing about a swift and peaceful end to the invasion.48 She 
saw the invasion as a great injustice to the British citizens on the Islands and assumed others 
would feel the same.49 Haughey initially agreed to ‘support Community action and 
demonstrate … solidarity.’50 In doing so, Thatcher could welcome Haughey and Ireland to 
the ‘right’ side of the conflict. Six days after Haughey sent Thatcher that message, Dermot 
Nally told an Official from the British Embassy that Ireland was unsure about the 
effectiveness of sanctions, and that Dublin would like to see ‘some reciprocity on the question 
                                                
44 TNA UK, PREM 19/815, dispatch from Figg, 22 June 1982. 
45 NAI, DFA 2014/32/1904, letter from O’Donovan to Lillis, 24 Jan. 1984. Declan O’Donovan, Irish diplomat. Official at 
the Anglo-Irish section of the DFA. 
46 NAI, DFA 2014/32/1904, The Evening Herald, 7 Feb. 1984. 
47 Please refer to Lisa L. Martin, ‘Institutions and Co-Operation: sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict,’ 
International Security, vol. 16, no. 4 (1992), pp. 143-178 for more on the EEC sanctions against Argentina.  
48 TNA UK, PREM 19/615, message from MT to world leaders, 6 Apr. 1982 and NAI, TAOIS 2013/27/14, message from 
MT to Haughey, undated. 
49 See Stephen Benedict Dyson, ‘Cognitive Style and Foreign Policy: Margaret Thatcher ‘s Black and White Thinking,’ 
International Political Science Review, vol. 30, no. 1 (2009), pp. 33-48 for more on MT ‘s cognitive outlook and its effect 
on the Falklands. 
50 CAC, THCR 3/1/20, message from Haughey to MT, 16 Apr. 1982.  
 115 
of agricultural prices which were a matter of extreme concern to us particularly at this time 
of the year.’51 
 
The EEC had been due to vote on a budgetary increase of 10.5% for farmers, but due 
to the Falklands crisis, the vote was delayed. This impacted Haughey’s main electoral support 
group, Irish dairy farmers, who could potentially lose £250,000 per day until the increase 
was agreed.52 The Irish Economic Division surmised that although no other member state 
had linked the Falklands with the price debate, ‘the possibility exists that progress on either 
issue will affect the outcome of the other.’ The Division also warned that wavering on 
solidarity with sanctions could make Thatcher ‘more intransigent and less likely to accept a 
compromise on the Budget.’53 Thatcher vetoed the vote using the Luxembourg compromise 
at the end of April.54 This was strike one for Haughey. Strike two quickly followed. 
 
On 2 May, the Argentine cruiser Belgrano was sunk by the Royal Navy. News of the 
attack on the Argentine fleet was critically received in Ireland.55 Belgrano was sailing away 
from the exclusion zone when it was torpedoed. It looked as though the Navy had launched 
an unprovoked attack against the ship and its crew. In her autobiography, Thatcher outlined 
the danger of allowing the Belgrano to continue sailing along the exclusion zone, 
 
The Belgrano was escorted by two destroyers. The cruiser itself had substantial fire 
power provided by 6 inch guns with a range of 13 miles and anti-aircraft missiles. We 
were advised that she might have been fitted with Exocet anti-ship missiles, and her 
two destroyer escorts were known to be carrying them. The whole group was sailing 
on the edge of the Exclusion Zone. We had received intelligence about the aggressive 
intentions of the Argentine fleet.56  
                                                
51 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/1055, summary of meeting with Figg and Woodfield, 22 Apr. 1982.  
52 The Irish Times, 3 Apr. 1982. 
53 NAI, DFA 2012/25/87, letter from Economic Division, renewal of sanctions on trade with Argentina, 13 May 1982. 
54 Arthur, Special Relationships, p. 211 and NAI, DFA 2012/25/87, press summary, 30 Apr. 1982. The Luxembourg 
compromise was essentially a gentleman’s agreement between the member states of the EEC that any vote could be delayed 
when it affected a country’s interests. See Anthony L. Teasdale, ‘The Life and Death of the Luxembourg Compromise,’ 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 4 (1993), pp. 567-579. Thatcher explains the problems with EEC 
farm price increases for the UK in Downing Street Years. 
55 Irish Independent, The Irish Press and The Irish Examiner, 4 May 1982, The Irish Press, 5 May 1982. These papers all 
reported on the loss of the sailors on board the Belgrano.  
56 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 214. This report has been confirmed and clarified by several contemporaries. The 
Argentine’s claimed Belgrano was heading back to port, but other evidence suggests she was part of a pincer movement 
and would have attacked the British fleet. See Major David Thorp, The Silent Listener: British Electronic Surveillance, 
Falklands 1982 (Gloucestershire, Spellmount, 2014), Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the 
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Although Belgrano was sailing away, the cruiser could still turn around and launch an attack. 
This was lost on Paddy Power, the Irish Minister for Defence.57 He told a Fianna Fáil meeting 
that following the sinking of the Belgrano, he believed ‘Britain themselves (were) very much 
the aggressors.’ He added that ‘the withdrawal of British forces “from this little island of 
ours” will bring peace.’58 At a time of intense diplomatic tension, Powers statement added to 
the sour atmosphere.59 Worse still he made the statement the same day HMS Sheffield was 
sunk by Argentina. Thatcher reportedly, ‘took this act of aggression “very hard”, and sat 
alone in her Commons room in tears.’60 At first Haughey was against Powers comment and 
demanded a retraction and an apology. Powers statement had serious repercussions for the 
Anglo-Irish bilateral. Media outlets suggested that Dublin’s official line was that the British 
were the aggressors.61 But Power refused to apologise and Haughey did not to seek his 
resignation. Power was not the only Fianna Fáil member to criticise the Falklands War. 
 
 Blaney had been against Ireland’s involvement in sanctions from the beginning and 
deemed it a move in favour of colonial Britain that had damaged essential Irish trade with 
Argentina.62 Síle de Valera argued that Ireland’s traditional stance of neutrality should have 
been of primary importance from the very beginning.63 Two challenges from within his own 
party meant that Haughey had to act quickly to preserve his majority.64 Two days after 
Belgrano sank, Dublin released a statement that called for an end to the sanctions against 
Argentina.65 Haughey told Figg that Power’s comments ‘had been made off the cuff, as a sort 
of an emotional reaction by the Minister who perhaps had associated the sinking of the 
                                                
Falklands Battle Group Commander (London: HarperCollins, 2012) and Martin Middlebrook, The Argentine Fight for the 
Falklands (Yorkshire, Pen and Sword, 2003). Speaking to Portsmouth News on 2 Apr. 2012, Sir Tim McClement also 
confirmed this theory.  
57 Paddy Power, Fianna Fáil TD 1969-1989. Minister for Defence and Minister for Trade, Commerce and Tourism 1982. 
58 The Irish Times, 4 May 1982. 
59 TNA UK, PREM 19/624, UKE Dublin to FCO, 4 May 1982. 
60 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. One, p. 716 and Kelly, Failed Political Entity, p. 265. 
61 NAI, DFA 2012/25/87, press office 3 to head of mission, 6 May 1982. 
62 Dwyer, Haughey’s Forty Years, p. 267 and The Evening Herald, 9 Nov. 1985. 
63 iBid., p. 267. Later in July, Gerry Collins, Haughey’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, attacked the level of commitment 
shown by the British Government towards the burgeoning Anglo-Irish initiative. See TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, UKE 
Dublin 197 to FCO, 16 July 1982. 
64 Haughey told MT in Brussels that ‘governments rarely lasted long.’ TNA UK, PREM 19/749, No. 10 recorded 
conversation, 30 Mar. 1982. 
65 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/868, official Government statement, 4 May 1982 and DFA 2013/27/14, government statement, 4 
May 1982. See also Mansergh, Spirit of the Nation, pp. 629-634. 
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Argentinian warship with the recent sinking of an Irish fishing vessel by a British 
submarine.’66 Haughey then wrote to Thatcher to clarify his position, 
 
You are, I know, already aware of my Government’s attitude to the use of force by 
Argentina, in defiance of the Security Council. We have made our views clear both 
in the Security Council and in our support for the Joint Statements by the Ten on this 
issue … At the same time, however, we have always been doubtful about the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions, particularly in circumstances where they cannot 
be universally applied.67  
 
News of Dublin’s change in stance left Thatcher ‘in a mood of fury.’68 In her autobiography, 
she wrote that ‘the diplomatic scene was … becoming more difficult and complicated.’69 
Figg told Haughey that he was ‘dismayed’ by the Irish Government’s volte face. Given their 
attempts to work together, Figg expected some consultation before Dublin made a public 
announcement. Figg warned that the repercussions would be serious for the war, ‘(sending) 
precisely the wrong political signal to Argentina at a most crucial time.’70 The Irish 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Noel Dorr, emphasised that the decision was based on 
the implementation of military measures.71 Britain’s military action had led the public in 
Ireland to ‘… perceive the sanctions as an extension of military action rather than 
political/diplomatic action.’72 
 
Although Haughey emphasised that neutrality was the basis of his decision, the Irish 
media speculated that this was not the case.73 During a radio interview, RTÉ broadcaster 
Shane Kenny put it to Haughey that ‘Ireland’s neutrality is … simply … anti-British.’ 
Haughey retorted that any anti-British feeling was being matched, even surpassed, by ‘latent 
anti-Irish feeling … which surfaces on occasions like this.’ In effect, his decision had not 
brought about Anglo-Irish tensions, it had simply boiled over due to the circumstances. 
                                                
66 NAI, DFA2012/59/1688, meeting between Haughey and Figg, 6 May 1982. 
67 CAC, THCR 3/1/20, Haughey message to MT, 16 Apr. 1982.  
68 NAI, DFA 2013/27/14, Kennedy 163 to government, 17 May 1982, Norman MacQueen, ‘The Expedience of Tradition: 
Ireland, International Organization and the Falklands Crisis,’ Political Studies (1985), pp. 38-55. 
69 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 216. 
70 NAI, DFA 2012/25/87, message conveyed orally by British Ambassador to Haughey, 6 May 1982.  
71 Noel Dorr, Irish representative to the United Nations Security Council 1981, Irish Ambassador to the United Kingdom 
1983-1987, Secretary-General of the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1987-1995. 
72 NAI, DFA 2012/25/87, Dorr to MacKernan, 5 May 1982. 
73 NAI, DFA 2013/27/14, statement by Haughey to Dáil Éireann on the Falklands Crisis, 11 May 1982. 
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Haughey also said that Ireland could no longer support sanctions once military measures had 
been taken, ‘in the South Atlantic there is what amounts to a state of open war and in that 
situation we must be very careful to preserve our neutral position.’74 
 
Ill-feeling in Britain was monitored closely by the Irish Press Office. They found that 
although interest in Irish holidays actually increased during the crisis, other areas suffered.75 
Aer Lingus reported that revenue from Britain was down 6-7 per cent, and that advance 
bookings were poor.76 Concerns were raised at the potential loss of exports to both Argentina 
and Britain.77 The Sun launched a campaign urging its readers to stop buying Irish butter, 
‘Remember: don’t buy Irish butter. Let them try selling it to their new friends in Argentina. 
Maybe they can make out-of-work Galtieri their chief salesman!’78 Adams Food Ltd., an 
Irish butter and cheese manufacturer, reported that sales representatives in North England 
and Scotland were having a particularly difficult time. They were ‘… operating in a very 
disagreeable atmosphere.’79 In addition to the hostility towards Irish business in Britain, 
Haughey’s Government came under fire from the Commons.  
 
During FCO question time on 5 May, Peter Emery, MP for East Devon, described 
neutrality as a ‘stab in the back’ while Jim Spicer, MP for West Dorset and MEP for Wessex, 
spoke of ‘the “disgraceful way” in which the Irish Government had broken ranks with 
Britain’s partners in the EEC.’ Douglas Hurd concluded that Ireland’s decision was a 
‘mistake’ and would ‘be a hindrance to getting a peaceful settlement to what both we and the 
Irish Government want.’80 Thatcher had to defend the Anglo-Irish initiative as back-bench 
colleagues asked ‘for a “freeze” in diplomatic relations …’81 In spite of this, private meetings 
between Ministers in London and Dublin initially increased in May.82 
                                                
74 NAI, DFA 2012/59/1688, Haughey interviewed for ‘This Week,’ RTÉ Radio, 23 May 1982. Also in NAI, DFA 
2013/27/14. 
75 NAI, DFA 2012/59/1688, The Sunday Press, 27 June 1982.  
76 NAI, DFA 2012/59/1688, London liaison committee, 11 June 1982. 
77 NAI, DFA 2012/59/1688, The Irish Press, 18 June 1982, The Daily Telegraph, 3 June 1982. 
78 NAI, DFA 2012/59/1688, The Sun, 25 June 1982. Sentence appears in italics and bold in original article. 
79 NAI, DFA 2012/59/1688, minute from Foster to Kennedy, 28 May 1982. 
80 NAI, DFA 2012/59/1688, Dempsey 441 to Political Division, 5 May 1982. In his report, Dempsey mistook Emery for 
Julian Amery, MP for Brighton Pavilion. The comments can be found within Commons sitting of 5 May 1982, Hansard HC 
[135-264]. 
81 NAI, DFA 2012/59/1688, The Financial Times, 25 May 1982. 
82 Mansergh, Spirit of the Nation, p. 628. Notes of these meetings are held within NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/827, NAI, TAOIS 
2012/90/1055 and TNA UK, PREM 19/1070.  
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 The importance of Anglo-Irish relations was brought home by the Hyde and Regent’s 
Park PIRA bombs in London in July in which 11 soldiers were killed.83 Thatcher later wrote 
that ‘the carnage was truly terrible’ and visited the surviving soldiers the next day in 
hospital.84 The day after the bomb Thatcher also received a note from Ian Gow about a speech 
that Collins had made in the Dáil on 15 July.85 Gow, ever keen to push the unionist cause 
over wider Anglo-Irish relations, timed the note deliberately. Elements of Collins speech had 
been sent to Thatcher before, but after the bombs parts of it were troubling.86 Collins had 
indicated that security co-operation was conditional and that Dublin had the support of their 
‘European partners’ for a joint Anglo-Irish approach to Northern Ireland.87 The Irish media 
sensationalised the speech. The Irish Press interpreted Collins as meaning that … the political 
development of the North is not our business then the security of the North is not our business 
either.’88 The Irish Independent led with Collins ‘Blistering Attack on Britain’ while The 
Irish Times hinted at a growing ‘Anglo-Irish rift.’89 Following the reaction to Collin’s speech, 
Figg was called to Neligan’s office. Collins did not send an apology but said he was 
concerned that his speech had been misinterpreted by the media. He added that Collin’s was 
‘particularly upset’ given his previous role as Minister of Justice and that ‘He wanted Mr. 
Prior to know that he should have no worries (about security).’90 The message was passed on 
and the matter, seemingly, dropped. The faux pas was made during the worst period for 
Anglo-Irish relations since the Thatcher-Haughey fall out of 1980. But the British media 
continued to examine the impact Haughey had had on the Falklands War. 
 
 The Daily Telegraph surmised that Haughey’s attitude was ‘calculated to endear the 
Irish Government to people in Britain already disenchanted with its stand in refusing to back 
                                                
83 McKittrick, Lost Lives, pp. 908-909. 
84 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 394. 
85 Collins speech can be found here- ‘Adjournment of Dáil: Motion,’ Dáil Éireann debate vol. 337 no. 11, 15 July 1982.  
86 Figg sent MT highlights of Collin’s speech via telegram. Her signature is at the top of the document. TNA UK, PREM 
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89 The Evening Herald and The Irish Times, 16 July 1982. Figg sent these headlines via telegram to the FCO, TNA UK, 
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90 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, Figg 208 to FCO, 23 July 1982. 
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Britain over the Falklands.’ The Tory The Daily Mail published that ‘The Government of the 
Republic is temperamentally and traditionally inclined to make trouble for Britain in any 
international dispute in which we are involved.’ The Daily Express ran a headline story on 
‘Hostile Haughey.’91 The Irish Press Office reported that Haughey’s Government had caused 
more upset than the assassination of Mountbatten in 1979, ‘… We have had more letters and 
more phone calls, almost all of which are against the Government’s policy … the attitudes 
and actions of the Irish Government are being directly labelled as being anti-British.’92 The 
DFA in Dublin forwarded a list of common questions they were receiving from the Irish 
public, 
 
(1) Argentina is the aggressor, not Britain. Why is Ireland allowing itself to be seen to be 
siding with an aggressor? 
(2) Argentina is a dictatorship, with a very poor recent record on human rights. Are we 
now siding with a dictatorship against a democracy? Comparisons are made here with 
World War 2. 
(3) Our stand on the Falklands shows up what we are really like. Contrary to recent 
developments Ireland is not really interested in better Anglo-Irish relations. In 
Britain’s hour of need we are seen to be wanting. Some of the comments made claim 
we are pro-IRA.  
(4) A number have told us that they are cancelling holidays in Ireland.  
(5) Those with business contacts with Ireland have indicated that they would wish to 
reduce such contacts to a minimum both in terms of purchasing Irish goods and in 
terms of employing Irish people.93 
 
Haughey telephoned Thatcher in May to offer his “deepest sympathy” along with the promise 
of trying ‘to be helpful.’94 But Thatcher and her Government’s tolerance level had been 
pushed to capacity. Figg was due to meet Haughey at the end of May and was advised to 
‘leave (him) in no doubt that we regard Anglo-Irish relations as having taken a considerable 
turn for the worse.’95 During that meeting, Haughey laid the blame squarely at London 
because of their failure to consult him before the White Paper. He went on to explain that his 
                                                
91 The Daily Telegraph, 19 July 1982, The Daily Mail, 25 May 1982, The Daily Express, 25 May 1982. Cut outs of these 
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92 NAI, DFA 2012/59/1688, Kennedy 138 to Neligan, 26 May 1982. 
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actions were calculated ‘to prevent a more unwelcome Panamanian resolution’ as well as a 
reflection of Ireland’s traditional state of neutrality.96 He added that Anglo-Irish relations 
were ‘often taking considerable turns for the worse.’ Figg concluded that it would take time 
to restore Anglo-Irish relations at an elite level.97 Other British diplomats reported their 
disappointment. 
 
During a lunch held in his honour, Francis Pym spoke to US Senator, Ted Kennedy, 
about his and Thatcher’s anger with Ireland’s decision, and how ‘relations (were) “getting 
worse every day”.’98 As an avid supporter of the peace process in Ireland, this would have 
concerned Kennedy. Eamonn Kennedy, the Irish Ambassador, said that Thatcher’s tone had 
become ‘… more bellicose …’99 Later in May, Daithi O Ceallaigh, an official at the Irish 
Embassy in London, met Grey Ruthven, Minister of State for Northern Ireland.100 Gowrie 
said that Thatcher was ‘furious’ and that ‘if the Anglo-Irish relationship is to mean anything 
it should mean that in matters of mutual interest one side is aware beforehand of what the 
other is doing.’101 Alan Goodison of the FCO surmised,102 
 
… in the view of the UK Government, Ireland was taking a most unhelpful line at the 
United Nations. The Irish draft resolution was totally unacceptable to the UK. It was 
naieve [sic] to think that the UK … would now agree to halt its military activity before 
Argentina agreed to withdraw its forces from the islands. There was a lack of clear 
thinking in the Irish attitude … The UK Government considered the Irish activity at 
the UN unhelpful and damaging to the UK.103 
 
The FCO compiled a report on the current state of Anglo-Irish relations. 
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 The report analysed the reasons behind Dublin’s u-turn decision. Irish nationalists 
sympathised with Argentina as a ‘fellow victim’ of colonialism, so Haughey’s grass-root 
support base must have had some influence over his policy shift. True, some Irish newspapers 
referred to the Islands as the ‘Malvinas’ in solidarity with the junta, and Power had alluded 
to the similarities with Northern Ireland.104 The report made three concluding remarks, 
 
1) The impact of the Irish Government’s behaviour on Anglo-Irish relations may well 
be long lasting … the Falklands issue touched on raw nerves in Ireland and reminded 
us yet again of the virulence in some quarters of anti-British feeling and of the 
tendency of Irish politicians … to be unwilling to speak out against it.  
2) Irish memories of the Falklands crisis will probably have less long term impact than 
perceptions in Britain.  
3) Irish behaviour over the Falklands has gratuitously damaged our relations and British 
attitudes towards the Republic are likely to remain suspicious for some time. But we 
still need to co-operate closely with our nearest neighbour, just as they need to do so 
with us.105 
 
 Thatcher faced the prospect of meeting Haughey at the June EEC. She was not ready to 
forgive Haughey and ‘… she minded very much indeed that the Irish had tried to impede 
British victory in the Falklands.’106 During Prime Minister’s question time in the Commons 
in May, she expressed her ‘disappointment’ at the Irish Government’s attitude to EEC 
sanctions.107 Then, in June, she stated that she was ‘very concerned’ about some of the 
proposals put forward by the Irish Government in the course of the crisis.108 Sections of the 
British press blamed Haughey for setting relations back by ten years and de-railing the peace 
process.109 Evaluations of the current mood in London differed.  
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Whereas Cabinet member, Cecil Parkinson, Conservative MP, and T.E. Utley warned 
that Anglo-Irish relations would soon recover without any lasting damage, the overwhelming 
opinion was the opposite.110 Utley later penned an article for The Daily Telegraph, explaining 
that the Falklands ‘were sure to kill any Dublin entente.’111 Thatcher was particularly 
disappointed as she felt that she and Haughey had reached an understanding of their “unique 
relationship”. Pym warned Kennedy that Thatcher might not meet with Haughey again.112 
Edward Oakden of the FCO confirmed that such was Thatcher’s current mood that ‘the 
Falklands Issue has ended any possibility of the Prime Minister meeting the Taoiseach in the 
near future and (Oakden) personally doubted if there would be a meeting this year.’113 He 
had heard that Thatcher was angry and disappointed, and warned Dublin that ‘relations have 
suffered severely.’ He explained that part of Thatcher’s disappointment stemmed from her 
uncertainty on the Irish issue. She had relied heavily on Neave to form her policy. After he 
died it was revealed that she had ‘very little direct knowledge of Anglo-Irish relations.’ She 
had trusted Haughey and, in spite of the unionist backlash, she had believed in the steps they 
were taking. The Falklands had shattered her belief in that relationship. It was confirmed to 
her that ‘the Irish Government has no real interest in developing a framework of co-operation 
for the sake of good bilateral relations but views these relations only through the prism of 
events in the North.’114 After attending the Trooping of the Colours ceremony, Kennedy sent 
a report of his brief conversation with Thatcher to the DFA. She was evidently fond of 
Kennedy. She told him that he and his family would ‘always be welcome.’ Just before he left 
the ceremony, Kennedy had another brief chat with Thatcher, 
 
She then said that these were not the easiest times for Anglo-Irish relations and I 
recalled her remarkable phrase before entering No. 10 in May 1979 when she said 
“where there is discord may we bring harmony”. “Yes”, she said, with some 
vehemence, “but it takes two to do it! I cannot do it on my own” and turned away to 
say farewell to other departing guests.115  
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 Thatcher felt let down by Haughey. Various newspapers reported that at the EEC summit in 
June 1982, she did not meet with him. Her engagement diary shows that she did not have a 
one-on-one meeting with anyone at the EEC but the media made the most of Thatcher’s 
apparent snub, with headlines including ‘buzz off,  T tells Haughey.’116 Ireland’s actions 
during the Falklands War were difficult for the British public to forget. The war had, to some 
extent, been glorified by the British media who wanted to cultivate a sense of patriotism. 
‘Whatever its intrinsic flaws, the government’s position remained close to the mood of the 
country.’117 The Argentines invaded a British island where the majority of inhabitants 
identified as, and wanted to remain, British.118 Thanks to the Falklands spirit, Thatcher’s 
popularity rocketed.119 Her determination to get the Islands back, coupled with light 
casualties, appealed to the patriotic spirit within 1980s Britain. Thatcher was ‘a warrior 
queen,’ a national emblem of defiance and British sovereignty.120 Her Government had been 
on the brink of collapse but now she was ‘unstoppable.’121 Within a week support for the 
Conservatives jumped from 36% to 43%.122 Haughey’s mishandling of the crisis meant he 
was now out in the cold, the wettest of the wets. The Irish Times published an article on ‘the 
Falkland Sickness’ which reported that ‘there will be some wry smiles in this country at 
patriotic outbursts in the House of Commons.’123 One reporter for The Irish Times penned a 
gloating article after interviewing two Falkland Islanders, 
 
“We do hope the British won’t do anything foolish”, said Angela worriedly. Angela 
Cairncross and Janet Duncan were two middle-aged ladies who could have walked 
straight out of the vicarage garden party. As prim and wholesome as their sugar-
dusted tea cakes, their English accents clear and precise … And they believe that the 
Falklands Islands rightly belong to Argentina.124  
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This story echoed London’s concerns about the Irish media. As one memo noted, 
 
At a time when national patriotism has been aroused to a high pitch, these stories 
would be seen as a knife in the back and would provoke a storm of opprobrium. The 
effects on Anglo-Irish relations would be incalculable and the progress made in recent 
years in achieving closer co-operation between London and Dublin would be put at 
risk. The Irish community would become the target of fierce hostility and Irish 
exports would be effected. Boycotts could not be ruled out. The allegations by 
Molyneaux and Powell that the situation in the Falkland Islands and Northern Ireland 
are comparable would be given credence.125 
 
Throughout the summer, relations continued to decline. 
 
On 30 July, Thatcher stated that ‘no commitment exists for Her Majesty’s 
Government to consult the Irish Government on matters affecting Northern Ireland.’126 
Haughey played dumb. Four days earlier, Douglas Hurd had told Figg that London ‘did not 
consider that they were obliged to consult with the Irish Government on the future of 
Northern Ireland.’127 Dublin sent an official reply to Thatcher’s statement, 
 
It is difficult to find any justification for recent British claims that there was no 
commitment on the part of HMG to consult with Dublin on matters affecting Northern 
Ireland. The Irish Government regret(s) that Britain has turned away from a course 
which “undoubtedly contained the possibility for a long term solution to the situation 
in the North part of this Island.128 
 
Later in July, a Northern Ireland review meeting in Dublin concluded that there was little 
they could do. There was no possibility of a Thatcher-Haughey summit. Haughey’s Anglo-
Irish Encounter idea would be abandoned and any meetings between officials and British 
Ministers had to be cleared by Haughey himself. Haughey’s team were told not to seek any 
meetings at official level.129 Unofficial contacts reduced and, when they did occur, were 
carefully analysed. 
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During a meeting in September Paul Whiteway, a British diplomat, asked if it was 
true that the Department of the Taoiseach and the DFA were ‘not talking.’ He also asked if 
Padraic O’Hannrachain, Haughey’s political assistant and trusted confidant, and Martin 
Mansergh were influencing Haughey’s Northern Ireland policy or if he was making his own 
way.130 Fitzpatrick, an official from Dublin, said he did not answer these questions, but the 
implication was clear. Haughey was in charge and that was why relations were in their current 
state. In a note in the margin, Mansergh recorded that Dunlop had met an official at the British 
Embassy on 3 September and had ‘set the record straight,’ 
 
Such an impression is of course damaging and I am surprised at such … persisting. I 
have brought it to the T’s (Taoiseach’s) attention, and leave it to your discretion as to 
whether you wish to say anything to Mr. Donlon about it.131 
 
MacKernan also noted at the top of the document that Donlon would ‘mention the cordiality 
of our affairs formally to the British ambassador when he sees this information!’132 
Haughey’s team did not want to miss an opportunity to show that relations were somewhat 
normal. But spats between Thatcher and Haughey’s officials occurred. 
 
On 30 September, Figg called on Neligan to express London’s disappointment with 
Haughey’s Wolfe Tone Commemoration speech at Bodenstown. Haughey had once again 
referred to Northern Ireland as a ‘failure.’133 Figg had been instructed to say that it was 
‘unhelpful’ to use such terms. Figg then quoted part of a speech Prior had made in Belfast on 
20 September on the Northern Ireland Assembly and the guarantee to the minority. Neligan 
rebuffed the point as the Assembly could only work if there was agreement between all the 
Northern Ireland parties. He continued that any speeches made by Fianna Fáil in public were 
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the result of a ‘full analysis of the concepts on which they were based … it was unlikely, to 
say the least, that our convictions in this regard would be modified by his démarche.’134 
 
The final death knell sounded when Haughey offered to enfranchise British citizens 
in Ireland. It had been suggested that both governments would allow British and Irish citizens 
residing in their countries full voting rights. Dublin doubted whether London was sincerely 
interested, while London accused Dublin of delaying their decision.135 Following the 
Falklands, back-bench Conservatives suggested that Irish voting rights should be limited. 
According to an informant, ‘the reason being for this is the stand taken by us on the Falklands 
and on the annual review of agricultural prices within the European community.’136 London 
was out for revenge. The voting move was rebuffed by Thatcher who noted, ‘we do not want 
the Irish Government to give the vote to British citizens. They are pitifully few and it would 
not be a quid pro quo for the vote of the millions of Irish citizens who reside there.’137 A 
meeting was suggested to further discuss the matter but Thatcher adamantly refused. She 
noted, ‘events have changed … Certainly I have no intention of having further bilateral 
meetings with the Taoiseach.’138 Relations between Dublin and London were officially 
‘cool.’139 
 
 Thatcher ended Anglo-Irish relations with Haughey. Haughey blamed Thatcher for 
going ahead with the White Paper without consulting him.140 But Thatcher found Haughey’s 
switch on EEC sanctions unforgivable, a disastrous decision that came at a time when 
relations had already deteriorated. London believed that ‘Irish neutrality (was) useful as a 
cloak for anti-British attitude’ and that the ‘impact on Anglo-Irish relations (were) to be long 
lasting.’141 The Falklands dispute gave Ireland the opportunity to influence international 
affairs, but Haughey’s sudden switch in policy hindered Ireland’s standing in the global 
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political arena and isolated Ireland further from Britain.142 Haughey’s handling of the 
Falklands had gained him some support at home, but an unusual sequence of events 
throughout the latter half of 1982 meant that his time in the Taoiseach’s Office was to be 
short-lived. 
 
GUBU: Irish Scandals, 1982 
The July 1982 Galway-East by-election was key to Haughey’s majority. The constituency 
was a Fianna Fáil strong-hold, but the death of Johnny Callanan put Haughey’s Government 
at risk. Fianna Fáil had been reliant on the vote of the speaker, but a Fine Gael victory in 
Galway-East would tip the balance. Fine Gael were prepared to go to extremes to get the 
seat. On 22 June Jim Mitchell, former Minister for Justice, told the Dáil that when Haughey 
had installed a new telephone system in his first term in 1980, he had included an override 
facility that allowed him to listen in to all telephone calls in Leinster House.143 The story was 
front page news in Ireland the next day.144 The Irish Press maintained that the system was 
nothing more than a ‘sophisticated switchboard’ where the override button only worked if 
the another console also had it. Haughey dismissed the implication that he had installed the 
system to listen in to the calls of his and Fine Gael Ministers. He claimed that he did not 
know the facility existed and that, if he did, he would not have left it there for FitzGerald to 
discover on his entering the Taoiseach’s Office in June 1981. Attention then turned to 
FitzGerald, did he know about the system? Had he used it? FitzGerald denied having any 
knowledge of the system and ordered a technician to remove the facility immediately. The 
fact that the public believed FitzGerald, but continued to suspect Haughey, is indicative of 
the mood towards Haughey in 1982.145  
 
 In July, nurse Bridie Gargan was brutally murdered by a man wielding a fake gun and 
a hammer. The suspect had attacked Gargan with the hammer in the backseat of her car. The 
back window was spattered with blood and a passing ambulance, assuming the suspect was 
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a doctor taking the injured party to hospital due to a medical sticker on the windscreen, 
escorted the car from Phoenix Park to a nearby hospital. On arrival the suspect drove off and 
abandoned the car, and a dying Gargan, nearby. A few days later, farmer Dónal Dunne was 
murdered with his own shotgun in Edenderry. Dunne’s car and gun were both taken by the 
suspect. At first the Garda did not link the two cases but in August Malcolm Mac Arthur, an 
eccentric Dublin socialite, was arrested and charged with the two murders. The real 
controversy came when MacArthur was arrested at the home of Haughey’s Attorney General, 
Connolly. The implication of Haughey’s appointed legal advisor to the Government was 
enough, but as Connolly was a bachelor who lived alone, rumours of a homosexual 
relationship between him and MacArthur added fuel to the media fire. Connolly’s initial 
refusal to give a statement, and his departure to America for a holiday two days after 
MacArthur’s arrest, implied that he had something to hide. Haughey was forced to demand 
his return home and accepted his resignation. That same day Haughey hosted a press 
conference on public sector pay. One reporter baited Haughey, asking him why he had not 
yet congratulated the Garda on their detective work. Haughey, who disliked being interrupted 
by his advisors during press conferences, walked into the trap. ‘It was a very good piece of 
police work, slowly, painstakingly putting the whole thing together and eventually finding 
the right man.’146 Haughey implicated an as-of-yet innocent man in a murder investigation. 
The Irish media were unable to publish the comments but Conor Cruise O’Brien, Haughey’s 
long-term advisory and then writer for The Irish Times, took four of Haughey’s own 
adjectives from that press conferences and coined the infamous acronym, GUBU.147 ‘You’ve 
got to hand it to the man. He is grotesque, unbelievable, bizarre and unprecedented.’148 More 
criticism was to come Haughey’s way in his GUBU year. 
 
 The Dowra affair came in September. Garda Thomas Nangle had been charged with 
assaulting a civilian, James McGowan, during an argument in a bar. McGowan was called as 
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a chief witness but on the morning of the trial, he was arrested by RUC Special Branch. 
McGowan was told he was under arrest due to information passed to the RUC by the Garda. 
The charge against Nangle, who was the brother-in-law of Haughey’s Minister for Justice 
Seán Doherty, not only led to a breakdown in RUC-Garda co-operation, but also led to 
accusations of collusion instigated by Ministers in Haughey’s government.149 In October, 
Doherty was again embroiled in controversy when a state security car accompanying him on 
a night out crashed. Doherty’s recollection of the evening’s events was confused. He claimed 
to have returned to his hotel at 2am, but was sighted at 4:30am. The time difference was not 
important in itself but the fact that Doherty could not get his story straight was suspicious, 
especially in the aftermath of the Dowra affair.150 
 
On 1 October Charles McCreevy, TD for Kildare, lodged a no confidence vote against 
Haughey.151 During the cabinet meeting that followed Desmond O’Malley, Minister for 
Industry and Commerce, and Martin O’Donoghue, Minister for Education, resigned in 
protest against Haughey as leader.152 Haughey survived this as the Gang of 22 were the only 
party members to vote against him in the open roll-call vote, but his days as Taoiseach were 
numbered. Fianna Fáil’s October budget plan, ‘The Way Forward,’ called for ‘severe cuts’ 
and tax increases.153 In light of this, the Worker’s Party withdrew their support for Haughey’s 
Government and voted against him in another no confidence motion. FitzGerald wrote later 
that Fianna Fáil had ‘discredited themselves with the public, and it was time for them to 
go.’154 An election was called on 2 November 1982, the third in only eighteen months, the 
result of which was inconclusive. A coalition was created between Fine Gael and the Irish 
Labour Party with FitzGerald appointed as Taoiseach and Dick Spring as Tánaiste.155 
Haughey was out of the Taoiseach’s Office again.156 
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On 18 December, Liffeygate broke.157 The telephones of Bruce Arnold, a journalist 
for the Irish Independent, Geraldine Kennedy and Vincent Browne, founder of the political 
magazine Magill, had been tapped under Doherty’s orders throughout the summer of 1982.158 
The taps were sanctioned by a Garda warrant for various reasons including a new category 
of ‘national security,’ but taps were usually only sanctioned when serious crimes were being 
investigated. Due to Kennedy’s articles in The Irish Times in particular, there were suspicions 
that a mole was present in Haughey’s cabinet. The only tap that was proven to exist on a 
Fianna Fáil member was on O’Donoghue. On 20 January, FitzGerald’s Minister for Justice, 
Michael Noonan, released three statements.159 
 
The first announced the resignation of Patrick McLaughlin and Joseph Ainsworth, 
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Garda respectively. The second accused 
Doherty and Ray MacSharry, former Tánaiste, of recording a conversation with O’Donoghue 
using a tape recorder.160 Noonan had a transcript of that phone call, and had also found out 
that the tape recorder had been brought to MacSharry by T.J. Ainsworth, then Deputy 
Commissioner in charge of the Security Section in the Garda. Ainsworth had recovered the 
tape and agreed to have it transcribed before delivering the despatch back to Doherty. 
Noonan’s third statement accused Doherty of gross incompetence and abuse of resources 
while confirming that none of those who had been tapped were involved in criminal 
activity.161 Noonan’s statements were explosive.  
 
Haughey announced the resignations of MacSharry and Doherty the following day 
and promised to set up an official inquiry.162 Haughey categorically denied any knowledge 
of what Doherty and MacSharry had done but was tainted by association.163 Haughey was 
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accused of trying to silence Geraldine Kennedy and of preventing freedom of the press.164 
The scandal also revealed the split in Fianna Fáil. Although no taps were found on their 
phones, rumours surrounded a ‘Gang of 22’ Haughey dissenters who had had their 
conversations taped. This included O’Malley, McCreevy, George Colley, Seamus Brennan, 
TD for Dublin South, and O’Donoghue.165 Once again Haughey was at the epicentre of an 
Irish scandal.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how relations between Haughey and Thatcher further deteriorated 
due to the Falklands War. As we will see throughout this thesis, the actions of Haughey would 
change how Thatcher viewed the Republic of Ireland and affected her relationship with the 
FitzGerald administration. Haughey’s refusal to support the UK at a time of crisis proved to 
Thatcher that the Republic of Ireland was not a friend to the UK, and she punished him 
accordingly by refusing to meet with him. This proves that Thatcher did take politics 
personally, especially when it came to her New Right inspired patriotism. Further to this, the 
successive scandals that affected the Haughey administration from July to December 1982 
would have proved to Thatcher that her initial judgement of Haughey was ill informed. 
Haughey himself had been treated with suspicion due to the Arms Crisis. Now, there was 
evidence of corruption from within his party that had affected the Garda and the justice 
system. In light of this, Thatcher’s decision to refuse to meet Haughey could be seen as an 
act of self preservation.  
 
Haughey entered 1982 on rocky terms with Thatcher. His indecisiveness during the 
Falklands war reeked of Brit-bashing republicanism. The sinking of the Belgrano was a 
mirror of the Sharelga. British secrecy over the incident and their delayed apology intensified 
Anglophobia in Ireland. After Haughey re-instated neutrality in May, Hibernophobia in 
                                                
164 The Irish Examiner, 24 Jan. 1983. 
165 The Evening Herald, 20 Jan. 1983. The rest of the gang were David Andrews, TD for Dún Laoghaire, Sylvester Barrett, 
TD for Clare, Thomas Bellew, TD for Louth, Hugh Byrne, TD for Wexford, Sean Byrne, TD for Tipperary South, Hugh 
Conaghan, TD for Donegal North-East, Pádraig Faulkner, TD for Louth, Tom Fitzpatrick, TD for Dublin South-Central, 
Séan French, TD for Cork North-Central, Jim Gibbons, TD for Carlow-Kilkenny, Mary Harney, TD for Dublin South-West, 
Tom Meaney, TD for Cork North-West, Bobby Molloy, who had been Minister for Defence under Lynch, Ciarán Murphy, 
TD for Wicklow, Willie O’Dea, TD for Limerick-East, Joe Walsh, TD for Cork South-West, and Pearse Wyse, TD for Cork 
South-Central. Wyse, Harney, O’Malley and Molloy later set up/joined the Progressive Democrats. 
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Britain sharpened. Boycotting of Irish products was evident, as was anti-Haughey sentiment. 
Thatcher herself was intensely angry over the decision. Her once rosy friendship with 
Haughey soured and, with a stroke of her pen, ended for the time being. Haughey’s 
motivations for the decision remain murky, historians and contemporaries can point to 
various conclusions to explain the episode. Haughey was either appealing to his grass-roots, 
green base with the upcoming Galway-East by-election in mind, or disagreed with the advice 
of Iveagh House following the attack on Belgrano. There is little evidence to form a decisive 
final point on this matter. Perhaps when Haughey’s private papers are released in 2022, 
concrete evidence will be available. The results of his actions, however, are certain. Haughey 
side-stepped the relationship he had once deemed ‘historic,’ overruled his country’s 
traditional stance of neutrality then u-turned that decision when he realised the invasion 
necessitated British military intervention. Haughey was in trouble with Thatcher and at home.  
 
The latter half of 1982 produced a Fianna Fáil scandal per month. In June there was 
the over-ride scandal. Had Haughey installed a telephone system that allowed him to listen 
in to calls by his Ministers and the opposition? In August, the fact that Haughey’s Attorney 
General had a murderer as a guest in his home was further scandalised by the fact that he left 
the country for a holiday. Connolly believed he was innocent but his decision to go ahead 
with his trip made it seem as though he was above the law, and had Haughey’s blessing. 
September saw the first incident linked with Doherty. The Dowra affair exposed collusion 
and nepotism within Haughey’s Government that was sanctioned by the Minister of Justice. 
Then in October, Doherty’s hazy recollection of the night his state car crashed painted a 
picture of a party-hard Minister, more interested in having a good time than telling the truth. 
The final outrage came in December when it was revealed that Doherty had tapped the phones 
of prominent journalists and, possibly, some of Haughey’s enemies within Fianna Fáil. 
Haughey pleaded innocence but Liffeygate hung over him. Haughey was ‘bad’ and 

















The Return of FitzGerald, 1983-1984 
If you had the good fortune to sit next to Garret FitzGerald at dinner- wrapped round by his 
natural warmth and curiosity, as well as numbed by the sheer volume of Dublin-tinctured 
words that tumbled out of him- you might learn many dozens of mind-bogglingly bizarre 
facts.1 
 
When Garret FitzGerald returned to the Taoiseach’s office in December 1982, he faced the 
task of repairing an Anglo-Irish relationship at its most fragile since Bloody Sunday in 1972. 
Thatcher was furious with Haughey over his volte-face during the Falklands War. She felt he 
had betrayed her and, in-turn, believed that Dublin could not be trusted. British civil servants 
knew that she found FitzGerald difficult to work with - his notorious verbosity clashing with 
her notorious impatience.2 On one occasion she fell asleep during an Anglo-Irish summit 
meeting.3 Robert Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary and a very important figure in Anglo-
Irish relations reported that FitzGerald, 
 
thought that he might have wrecked Anglo-Irish relations: you and he were on a boat, 
not under cover, the conditions were not particularly good and you were minded to 
go into the cabin, but Dr. FitzGerald persuaded you not to do so and you were almost 
immediately drenched by a passing wave.4 
 
Yet Thatcher’s advisors appreciated that he was ‘a formidable, if rather unorthodox, political 
leader.’5 Moreover, according to the then Deputy to the Cabinet Office, David Goodall, 
Thatcher had been deeply distressed by British casualties in the Falklands War.6 When he 
                                                
1 The Economist, 26 May 2011. 
2 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, briefing on FitzGerald, undated. 
3 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two, p. 300 and Robin Renwick, A Journey with Margaret Thatcher: Foreign Policy Under the 
Iron Lady (London: Biteback, 2013), p. 115. Renwick revealed that after MT had fallen asleep, FitzGerald asked if she 
thought he was Welsh because she called him ‘Gareth.’ 
4 TNA UK, PREM 19/508, minute from Armstrong to MT, 16 Oct. 1981. 
5 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, briefing on FitzGerald, undated. 
6 Sir David Goodall, British diplomat. Deputy Secretary (Overseas and Defence), Cabinet Office 1982-1984, Deputy Under-
Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Defence and Intelligence) 1984-1987, High Commissioner to India, 
1987-1991. 
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observed at a meeting with her at the end of 1982 that it was a ‘scandalous fact’ that the only 
place that British soldiers were being killed was in Northern Ireland, she replied that she 
wanted ‘to do something about Ireland’ once the 1983 election was safely negotiated. Robert 
Armstrong heard much the same from her.7 FitzGerald wanted meetings between ministers 
and the two leaders to restart. In his letter responding to Thatcher’s congratulation on his re-
election, he suggested that they should meet after a review of the current situation in Northern 
Ireland had been completed.8 
 
This chapter will focus on 1983 and 1984, years of remarkable wax and wane in 
Anglo-Irish relations. They began with Anglo-Irish relations in the deep freeze. It proved 
difficult for FitzGerald to meet Thatcher. Her anger with Haughey had a knock on effect on 
the new Taoiseach. FitzGerald’s most visible initiative was the establishment of the New 
Ireland Forum (NIF). Originally intended to include all shades of non-paramilitary Irish and 
northern Irish opinion, unionists boycotted it and the forum instead became a talking shop 
for moderate Irish nationalism. Its first report in 1984 provided three options for settlement 
of the Northern question, a unitary state, joint sovereignty and a federal solution. It 
demonstrated moderate nationalism was willing to make compromises on Irish unity, though 
it had no effect on political unionism which viewed the report with disdain. The report’s 
release coincided with the first PIRA attempt on Thatcher’s life, the Brighton bomb, which 
deeply affected her and almost certainly influenced her ‘out … out … out …’ speech. She 
rejected all of the forum’s findings out of hand. Ironically, the speech that upset everybody 
benefited Anglo-Irish relations in the long run. Thatcher was deeply embarrassed by what 
was undiplomatic behaviour and, without ever apologising, agreed to meet with FitzGerald. 
 
This chapter is key to understanding how Thatcher operated as a leader. At this point, 
she is still actively engaged with the Northern Ireland problem as reflected in her meetings 
with FitzGerald. When she makes a mistake (the out out out speech) she does not apologise 
as such. Her speech comes from her fear of a take over from Dublin, reflecting a deep seeded 
mistrust in her Irish counterparts. This chapter will also mark’s the end of the first phase of 
                                                
7 Renwick, A Journey with Margaret Thatcher, p. 111 and Armstrong interviewed for ‘Margaret Thatcher: Ireland and the 
Iron Lady,’ RTÉ, 2013.  
8 CAC, THCR 3/1/27, letter from FitzGerald to MT, 17 Dec. 1982. 
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FitzGerald had watched the deterioration of Haughey’s relationship with Thatcher with 
alarm. He was not impressed with the British white paper on Northern Ireland, published on 
5 April 1982, but felt it was not the role of the Irish government to sabotage an effort that 
still had power-sharing at its heart.9 Haughey, as we have seen, had outright rejected the 
proposals. FitzGerald and his Foreign Minister, Peter Barry, were also critical of Haughey’s 
overselling of the Anglo-Irish summits in 1980 and 1981 which had so riled Thatcher.10 
Indeed, when they met in November 1984, Thatcher hand-bagged in her inimitable style 
Dermot Nally, 
 
I remember that at a previous meeting certain people (at this point she directed her 
gaze at Mr. Dermot Nally and pointed her finger accusingly at him) slipped in words 
in a communiqué which subsequently got me into great difficulties. I am thinking of 
the communiqué issued after my meeting with Mr. Haughey. That will not happen 
again. I will never let anything into a communiqué without going over it word by 
word.11 
 
Dublin learnt their lesson and Anglo-Irish discussions in the FitzGerald era were marked by 
a great deal of secrecy. In 1984 Barry criticised Haughey and his administration for ruining 
Anglo-Irish meetings with his post-conference statements, 
 
Irish leaders have in the recent past made ludicrously inflated claims for the 
significance of their meetings with the British with results which have set back the 
prospects of peace, reconciliation and stability, through damaging the credibility of 
our Government. The Taoiseach, the Tánaiste (Dick Spring) and I have, conscious of 
the childish and damaging irresponsibility of this approach and concerned to achieve 
real progress rather than mere political advantage in this state, refrained very carefully 
                                                
9 ‘Northern Ireland, A Framework for Devolution’ is available on CAIN http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cmd8541.htm.  
10 Peter Barry, Fine Gael TD 1969-1997. Deputy Leader of Fine Gael 1977-1987, 1991-1993, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
1982-1987, Tánaiste 1987. 
11 NAI, DFA 2014/32/2059, draft attached to summary of meeting between FitzGerald and MT, in Chequers on 19 Nov. 
1984. The London’s record of the meeting notes MT’s comments as ‘The Prime Minister concluded that in that event we 
could only aim for a very general communiqué.’ See TNA UK, PREM 19/1408/2. 
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- in hindsight, perhaps a little too carefully - from presenting our meeting at Chequers 
as involving an “historic breakthrough”.12 
 
FitzGerald also believed that Haughey’s second administration had been reckless in its 
handling of the Falklands War. He had been relieved when Haughey had backed the EEC 
sanctions on Argentina. He was dismayed when, after the sinking of the Belgrano, Paddy 
Power had denounced Britain as ‘aggressors’ and the government announced that it was 
abandoning sanctions.13 It was all a misjudgement. FitzGerald concluded that, 
 
The damage to Anglo-Irish relations through this ill-conceived and, in the form in 
which it was announced, illegal decision would clearly be immense. It was difficult 
to see in the light of acte gratuit it would ever be possible to make progress towards 
a peaceful settlement in Northern Ireland in conjunction with a British government 
led by Margaret Thatcher.14 
 
Fine Gael policy had supported devolution and power sharing but, in the light of the 
experience of Sunningdale, downplayed the Irish dimension. However, by 1982 it was clear 
to FitzGerald that this was not sustainable. The polarisation brought about by the Hunger 
strikes, the rise of Provisional Sinn Féin as a political force and the demands of Hume and 
the SDLP for an Irish dimension meant that his instinct, which was to try to create dialogue 
and agreement with the unionists, had to be given up in the light of unionist intransigence 
over power sharing. His ‘constitutional crusade’ was designed to appeal to a certain kind of 
unionist liberal but they were a rare breed in the 1980s. He concluded that going above their 
heads with the British would have to be attempted even if it meant ruining his reputation 
amongst them. He feared the alternative was an escalation in violence resulting in outright 
civil war. Much of FitzGerald’s ruminations on a new approach to Northern Ireland had taken 
place in the spring of 1982 while he was preparing the prestigious Dimbleby lecture.15 
                                                
12 NAI, TAOIS 2014/105/776, remarks by Barry at the launch of Clonmel Chamber of Commerce “Start-Your-Own-
Business” competition, 23 Nov. 1984. 
13 FitzGerald asked Haughey to restate the governments position and asked specifically if Power’s statement was reflective 
of official policy. See ‘Private Notice Question- Falkland Islands Crisis,’ Dáil Éireann debate, 4 May 1982, vol. 334 no. 1. 
14 FitzGerald, All in a Life, p. 409. 
15 An annual lecture delivered in memory of Richard Dimbleby, a BBC broadcaster. The lecture is given by a prominent 
public figure. Previous lectures were delivered by Lord Halisham, MT’s Lord Chancellor, and Roy Jenkins, President of 
the EEC. FitzGerald’s speech was published in 1982. FitzGerald, Irish Identities: Dimbleby Lecture (London: BBC Books, 
1982).  
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FitzGerald rejected simple solutions such as repartition, integration with Britain, an 
independent Northern Ireland or enforced reunification, and instead called for ‘a political 
structure in Ireland and between Britain and Ireland that would adequately express and at the 
same time safeguard the senses of identity of the two traditions in Ireland.’16 He went on to 
propose a joint security and justice system for Ireland. He acknowledged that the political 
structures for a settlement would be complex, and reiterated his commitment to building a 
pluralist Ireland of common citizenship with Britain.17 Nonetheless, the Electoral 
Amendment Bill of 1983, and successful referendum in 1984, can be interpreted as a gesture 
of goodwill to Thatcher, and unionism, more generally.18 
 
The speech, broadcast on 20 May, was well received and may well have helped Fine 
Gael hold their seat in the Dublin West by-election.19 However, the proposals for an All-
Ireland police force and court eventually turned up as an election issue when the Haughey 
government fell in November 1982. Fianna Fáil claimed that it would mean County Kerry 
would be ‘policed by the RUC’ during the subsequent election campaign. When Jim Prior 
referred to the proposal, Haughey issued a histrionic statement levelling the gravest of 
allegations against FitzGerald, 
 
The fact that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland knew in advice what Dr. 
FitzGerald would say in a speech on Northern Ireland reveals now the degree of 
collusion that exists between the leader of the Fine Gael party and the British 
government. We have known for some time that Dr. FitzGerald had secretly 
collaborated with the British government in supporting and promoting the disastrous 
Northern Ireland Assembly proposal but have been unable to secure either a 
confirmation or denial from Dr. FitzGerald. A feature of this election has been support 
emanating from British government circles, radio and television networks and leading 
newspapers for Dr. FitzGerald and the Fine Gael Party. It is abundantly clear that this 
                                                
16 FitzGerald, All in a Life, p. 410-411. 
17 In one of the anomalies that bedevil Anglo-Irish relations, Irish citizens were allowed to vote in British general elections. 
Conversely, British citizens in the Irish republic could not do so. FitzGerald championed the move though MT did not 
consider it very important. TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, FCO to Dublin 87 of 26 July 1982. 
18 Gerry Whyte, Social Inclusion and the Legal System: Public Interest Law in Ireland (Dublin: Institute of Public 
Administration, 2015), p. 37. The Irish Electoral (Amendment) Act was passed into law on 21 Dec. 1983. It can be found 
at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1983/act/36/enacted/en/html. The June 1984 referendum changed the Irish constitution 
by extending voting rights to certain non-Irish citizens. The Ninth Amendment was passed by 75.4%. The Evening Herald 
and The Irish Times, 16 June 1984.  
19 FitzGerald, All in a Life, p. 410-11. 
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support has been coming from Britain in return for Dr. FitzGerald’s support for 
British policy in Northern Ireland. I believe the situation which has now been revealed 
represents one of the threats for our political independence since the last war.20 
 
During the election, FitzGerald’s one speech on Northern Ireland called for a ‘complete and 
radical rethinking of British policy’ on Northern Ireland. The Republic of Ireland had to take 
effective measures against violence.21 The second major playing of the ‘green card’ by 
Haughey in 1982 failed to arrest the rise in FitzGerald and Fine Gael’s popularity. Fine Gael 
finished five seats behind Fianna Fáil in the election. A coalition government was swiftly 
negotiated with Labour. However, it was to be a fractious four years in office with passionate 
disagreements between both parties on public expenditure and taxation policies. The 
government also had little economic luck with persistently low growth making every tax and 
spend decision difficult. Such were the difficulties between Labour and Fine Gael on the 
economy that FitzGerald would almost certainly have dissolved the Dáil if the Northern Irish 
issue was not there. Only the conviction in both parties that Haughey was a danger on the 
economic and Northern Irish fronts held the coalition together.22 
 
FitzGerald was certainly right that if Haughey had been returned as Taoiseach in the 
1982 election, he would have had an extremely difficult problem in having any kind of a 
relationship with Thatcher. He continued making unrealistic assertions that had no chance of 
success, notably in his Ard Fheis speech in February 1983.23 In January 1983, Robert 
Armstrong took the view that the deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations under Haughey was 
due to the Irish and it ‘was for the Irish Government to take the initiative in restoring them 
… the British Government has no interest in seeking to force the pace, still less in appearing 
to woo or pursue the Irish.’24 Armstrong warned that it would be in Britain’s interest to rebuff 
efforts by FitzGerald to restore normal relations.25  
 
                                                
20 Mansergh, Spirit of the Nation, p. 713. Haughey’s statement was also recorded in TNA UK, PREM 19/1068. 
21 FitzGerald, All in a Life, p. 419. 
22 See especially FitzGerald, All in a Life, pp. 424-5. 
23 Mansergh, Spirit of the Nation, pp. 733-742.  
24 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, Armstrong minute to MT, 13 Jan. 1983. 
25 CAC, THCR 2/6/2/130, Armstrong letter to Enoch Powell, 21 Dec. 1982. 
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A proposed visit by FitzGerald to Belfast in January was discouraged presumably for 
fear of protests.26 But FitzGerald went ahead and made a speech at Queen’s University on 27 
January.27 He called for support from Europe in dealing with northern Ireland and ridiculed 
the men of violence.28 FitzGerald reiterated his determination to ‘develop a new and dynamic 
relationship with both communities in Northern Ireland (and) with the British Government.’29 
His message to Thatcher was clear; you need to forgive and forget, sooner rather than later, 
the mistakes of the previous administration.  
 
Throughout 1983, FitzGerald wanted the NIF to develop a number of alternative 
proposals. In 1984, negotiations with the British government, resulting in an agreement in 
the autumn of 1984, would take place. Before FitzGerald could instigate his plan, he needed 
to establish a relationship with London. To this end FitzGerald strengthened his foreign 
affairs team. The Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Seán Donlon, the Assistant 
Secretary for the Anglo-Irish Division, Michael Lillis, and the Secretary to the Government, 
Dermot Nally were the key figures on the civil service side. Peter Barry, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Dick Spring, Tánaiste and leader of the Labour Party, were the key 
figures on the political side. In June 1983, Noel Dorr was made Ambassador to London. 
Anthony Parsons, who had become Thatcher’s chief foreign policy advisor, but had been 
Dorr’s opposite number at the UN during the Falklands war was aghast at Dorr’s 
appointment. He considered his behaviour ‘intolerable’ during the crisis. However, he also 
felt that Dorr was ‘extremely sound’ on Anglo-Irish relations and the North.30 While the 
political relationship between Thatcher and FitzGerald was subject to frequent strain, the 
relationship between Nally and his British counterpart, Armstrong was to prove remarkably 
stable and productive.31 Meanwhile, the violence continued. 
 
                                                
26 TNA UK, PREM 19/1068, FCO to Dublin 7 of 20 Jan. 1983. 
27 The Evening Herald, 27 Jan. 1983.  
28 TNA UK, PREM 19/1068, Dublin 39 to FCO of 28 Jan. 1983. FitzGerald’s speech is not recorded in the TAOIS or DFA 
files. The Thatcher Government accorded it attention as it signified FitzGerald’s plan and the policies he was presenting to 
Europe. 
29 iBid., and Dublin 83 to FCO of 12 Mar. 1983. 
30 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, Parsons to Coles (PM’s Office), 15 June 1983. 
31 See especially FitzGerald, All in a Life, pp. 468-9. 
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In December 1982, the INLA carried out a devastating attack on the Dropping Well 
Inn in Ballykelly. The bomb killed 11 soldiers and 5 civilians. In November and December 
1982, there were also five shooting incidents where the RUC and the army opened fire and 
killed seven Catholics in disputed circumstances. This led to claims that a ‘shoot-to-kill’ 
policy was in operation in Northern Ireland.32 More encouraging for London was the first 
sign that extradition, which the Irish government had refused to countenance for political 
offences, was back on the agenda. The Irish Supreme Court ordered the extradition of 
Dominic McGlinchey, a senior INLA member, to Northern Ireland. The court ruled that he 
had murdered a civilian, therefore, his crime was not politically motivated.33 Subsequently, 
the Irish Attorney-General, Peter Sutherland, indicated that the British government might 
want to look at other cases that could have fallen under the Supreme Court judgement.34 The 
question of extradition would remain a poison in Anglo-Irish relations over the rest of the 
decade. Indeed when Sutherland met British law officers he was not convinced that attacks 
on military targets would qualify for extradition.35 Another spectre was the electoral rise of 
Provisional Sinn Féin.  
 
A report suggested they would do well in the forthcoming UK general election. Gerry 
Adams was likely to win in West Belfast. Terrorism would continue but the ‘Provisionals are 
likely to apply their own constraints in an attempt to balance terrorism with increasing 
political activity.’36 
 
FitzGerald faced immediate difficulties when it came to the NIF. Firstly, his liberal 
credentials were tarnished when he allowed Haughey to out maneuverer him on an anti-
abortion amendment to the Irish constitution. The first significant constitutional change was 
                                                
32 TNA UK, PREM 19/1068, Dublin 355 of 8 Dec. 1982. On 11 Nov. 1982, 3 unarmed IRA members were shot and killed 
at an RUC checkpoint in Lurgan. On 24 November Michael Tighe was killed by an undercover RUC unit at a farm near 
Lurgan. The farm had previously been used by the IRA to store arsenal. In December 1982, two INLA members, Roddie 
Carroll and Seamus Grew, were shot by special support unit Officer James McBride of the RUC. His witness statement can 
be found at NAI, DFA 2014/32/1930. See McKittrick, Lost Lives for more on the victims and the circumstances surrounding 
their deaths. For more on security operations during The Troubles see Taylor, Brits. Shoot-to-kill will be further discussed 
in chpt. 6.  
33 NAI, TAOIS 2012/90/976, memo from Mansergh to FitzGerald, 9 Dec. 1982, and letter from unnamed legal advisor to 
Neligan, 10 Dec. 1982. 
34 TNA UK, PREM 19/1068, FCO 240 of 31 Dec. 1982. 
35 TNA UK, PREM 19/1068, H. Steel (Attorney General’s office) to GL Angel (NIO), 17 Mar. 1983. 
36 TNA UK, PREM 19/1068, Robert Armstrong to MT, ‘Northern Ireland: The Provisionals and the General Election,’ 12 
Apr. 1983. 
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a disastrous and unworkable addition, passed after the most bitter referendum in the history 
of the state.37 Moreover, many of his colleagues saw the Northern Irish question as secondary 
to the economic crisis of unsustainable government deficits and unemployment. On 22 
February 1983, they rejected his proposal for a NIF, which he wanted to move ahead with 
before the SDLP’s proposal for a Council for a New Ireland gained traction.38 FitzGerald had 
to engage in a series of manoeuvres to get the proposal past his government colleagues.  
 
At a dinner in January, Seán Donlon told Leonard Figg that ‘contact between Foreign 
Ministers should be close’ and spoke of a new initiative that would ‘do something to 
strengthen the position of the SDLP.’39 Haughey reluctantly came on board but made clear 
that the NIF’s purpose was to outline a plan before an all-round constitutional conference 
that would produce a final constitutional settlement. This language put even the Alliance 
party off attending let alone the UUP and the DUP.40 On 11 March, Peter Barry made a 
speech that outlined Irish government policy. He wanted Britain to apply pressure to the 
Ulster unionists, 
 
Is it unreasonable to ask that British policy should reflect the view of the majority of 
the people of the United Kingdom? How long more will one million people be 
allowed to impede not only the reconciliation of five million people on this island but 




The EEC summit in Brussels in March 1983 provided the first opportunity for an Anglo-Irish 
meeting. Both sides would be at the same location without either having to face government 
and public criticism by travelling to the other’s preferred meeting place. Logistical 
                                                
37 The referendum came about following the ruling in the US in 1981 that anti-abortion laws were unconstitutional. Anti-
abortion groups and the Church then pressurized the Irish Government to reaffirm its position so that the Irish Supreme 
Court would be unable to come to a similar conclusion. FitzGerald held traditional views on abortion but a whispering 
campaign within the Dáil suggested that he had gone ‘soft.’ See FitzGerald, All in a Life, pp. 416-417.  
38 The SDLP’s Council would be exclusive to constitutional nationalist parties. See FitzGerald, All in a Life, pp. 462-463 
and comments by FitzGerald, ‘Ceisteanna-Questions. Oral Answers. British Policy on Northern Ireland,’ Dáil Éireann 
debate, 11 May 1983. 
39 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, Brussels 329 to FCO of 24 Jan. 1983. 
40 See especially FitzGerald, All in a Life, pp. 464-6. 
41 TNA UK, PREM 19/1068, Dublin 82 of 12 Mar. 1983. 
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convenience aside, the meeting was a cause of concern for both parties. London wanted to 
keep the meeting as short as possible, and initially suggested a tête-à-tête lasting thirty 
minutes. For FitzGerald this was not long enough. He was keen to ‘pick up the threads after 
his absence from power.’42 Thatcher’s team felt they could limit what ‘he does and says … 
in connection with Northern Ireland for as long as possible’ by meeting with him.43 London 
also recognised the long term impact the informal discussion could have. FitzGerald was 
expected to remain as Taoiseach for a long time in comparison to the short tenures of the past 
few years. To agree to his request could yield positive results.44 Consequently, the meeting 
on 22 March was extended to ninety minutes.45  
 
During the conversation FitzGerald shared that ‘he was glad that he was in contact 
with the Prime Minister and … hoped it would be possible to strengthen contact in the future.’ 
London and Dublin’s summaries of the meeting follow the same basic topics, starting with 
FitzGerald raising security and ending with a discussion on Ministerial contacts. Yet 
London’s record omits some of the conversation. Whereas London’s record skims over a 
discussion on the upcoming General Election, Dublin’s summary records a detailed 
conversation. Thatcher told FitzGerald that she had not yet penned her manifesto and, during 
a discussion of Irish support in cities like Liverpool and Glasgow, she asked if Armstrong 
thought that the Scottish Nationalists were responsible for “one of those letter-bombs sent to 
me”. Dublin was keeping a close eye on the inner workings of Thatcher’s Government and 
how the British public viewed her.46  
 
London’s record shows that Thatcher was reluctant to overshare. She told FitzGerald 
that, so far as Anglo-Irish meetings went, ‘it was necessary to proceed slowly’ and that she 
could only agree to one or two private contacts. she also told him that she regarded their 
relationship as ‘more as a matter of keeping in touch.’47 Yet the Dublin summary records that 
                                                
42 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, FCO 88 to Coles of 18 Mar. 1983. 
43 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, Coles to FCO, 14 Mar. 1983. 
44 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, Coles 71 to FCO of 14 Mar. 1983. The Irish side prepared a 13-page brief for FitzGerald that 
outlined the impact Haughey’s relations with MT could have on his relationship with her and how best to handle her. See 
NAI, TAOIS 2013/100/1101, brief for meeting with MT, 21-22 Mar. 1983. 
45 CAC, THCR 6/1/2/5, MT Engagement Diary, 22 Mar. 1983. 
46 NAI, TAOIS 2013/100/1050, meeting between FitzGerald and MT, 22 Mar. 1983.  
47 TNA UK, PREM 19/1070, record of conversation, 22 Mar. 1983. 
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Thatcher said that ‘it was obviously to the advantage of both parties to keep in touch.’48 Why 
are the two records different? Thatcher’s team would circulate the summary to inform the 
ministers who were not there what had been discussed. Therefore, it was important to show 
that Thatcher had adopted a stand-off approach to FitzGerald, in keeping with the instructions 
she had received through the pre-summit briefings.49 Thatcher was also dismissive of the NIF 
initiative, which FitzGerald had sold as a means of helping the SDLP. The establishment of 
the NIF would be “very damaging” for relations with unionists. It would revive Unionist 
fears of the Council of Ireland arrangement which had destabilised Sunningdale.50 The SDLP 
were FitzGerald’s “problem”. She did not want to see Sinn Féin become more popular, but 
the SDLP were anti-Unionist, and ‘that was her problem’ with them.51 She was disappointed 
that they had boycotted the new Stormont assembly. Thatcher left FitzGerald in no doubt of 
her wariness towards him and the Irish. FitzGerald later described the meeting as ‘cool 
enough,’ but the meeting was significant because Anglo-Irish dialogue had been re-
established.52 
 
Jim Prior wrote to Thatcher in April 1983 that he saw little sign of movement in 
Northern Ireland. He remained committed to the Northern Ireland Assembly and did not want 
to ‘promise any new and dramatic initiatives. To do so would raise false expectations which 
are bound to be disappointed to our discredit. We have a good foundation in the Assembly 
and the 1982 Act.’ He suggested a way forward might be rolling devolution with the four 
spending departments devolved to each of the parties. This ‘would avoid the difficulties of 
collective power sharing, and if accepted, would meet the criteria of widespread acceptance.’ 
Thatcher queried whether this was acceptable as it would not have cross party support.53 
Prior, in a reply, conceded that ‘widespread community support’ remained the fundamental 
requirement without which devolution cannot be carried out.’ Prior singled out Haughey’s 
activities as one key roadblock.54 After the election, Prior suggested pressurising the Irish 
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government to get the SDLP to take up seats in the Assembly might be a good strategy. To 
him, something had to be done, 
 
The Prime Minister asked whether it was Mr. Prior’s basic concern that because the 
supporters of violence were going to win, we should organise a tactical withdrawal. 
Mr Prior said that this was not his view … This would be utterly wrong. He was 
absolutely convinced that withdrawal would mean civil war. His main point was that 
he believed it would be a mistake to do nothing for five years. 
 
Thatcher ‘expressed doubt as to whether we could solve the Northern Ireland problem’ but 
could only act as a catalyst for the people there to come to a resolution. Prior agreed but 
warned that the ‘key was to achieve relations with Dublin which were sufficiently good for 
Dublin to be persuaded to put pressure on the SDLP.’55 One striking development arose from 
the meeting. Prior agreed to send Thatcher a reading list concerning Northern Ireland, 
including books by F.S.L. Lyons and Dervla Murphy.56 
 
FitzGerald and Thatcher met again at the EEC in Stuttgart on 16 June 1983. 
FitzGerald had a problem - the ‘Dowra’ affair (see chapter 3). From Dublin’s record, it 
appears Thatcher had not been briefed on this development, as she asked her team to take 
note of FitzGerald’s concern so that the matter could be examined.57 London’s summary 
paints a different picture. It notes that FitzGerald felt there ‘had recently been very effective 
cooperation between the respective police authorities on a matter of serious concern.’58 But 
cooperation would be stalled by the Dowra affair. Although a Police Consultative Council 
had been founded a few years ago, it had fallen into disuse under Haughey. FitzGerald 
wondered if Thatcher could help with re-establishing the Council, as ‘the authorities in the 
Republic had clear evidence of collusion.’ Thatcher felt that it was the wrong time to revive 
the Council, and this is what she asked Armstrong to note down for further investigation.59 
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FitzGerald’s focus remained on the NIF, but he had to get past Thatcher’s ‘Fortress Falklands 
nationalism.’60 
 
Tentative Irish Initiatives 
After Thatcher’s landslide election victory in June 1983, a formal summit meeting with the 
Taoiseach was on the agenda. Thatcher was sceptical about its value. She noted on a memo 
that ‘we haven’t anything to talk about save security and EEC’ and that ‘no amount of talks 
about new committees can conceal that fact.’61  
 
 Noonan made an important speech in September 1983 where he declared that the 
challenge for the British and Irish governments was to find ‘a workable arrangement’ that 
would ‘give to the people of Northern Ireland what they want and what they need.’ It was a 
requirement that ‘Irish nationalists must accommodate the unionist identity and vice versa.’ 
The Times commented that the speech’s refreshing directness showed that there was hope for 
the NIF.62 Also in September, David Goodall met with Michael Lillis. Lillis floated some 
tentative ideas. The ‘overriding objective from the Republic’s point of view (and that of the 
SDLP) … was not unification, but the restoration of stability in Northern Ireland before the 
SDLP were eclipsed by Sinn Féin and the consequent unrest in the North infected the whole 
of Ireland.’ In return for recognising Northern Ireland, and accepting the return of Stormont, 
the Irish security forces would participate in security operations in Northern Ireland. Goodall 
acknowledged that the recognition of Northern Ireland ‘would constitute an important shift 
in the position of the Irish government and the SDLP.’ Armstrong remained ‘profoundly 
sceptical’ about the proposition, which he suggested was politically. That being said, he saw 
the package suggested by Lillis as potentially leading to something that could produce 
‘significant political advantage.’63 Thatcher replied that Goodall should seek further 
clarification.64  
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Goodall, in his follow up meeting with Lillis, made clear that London had no interest 
in any Irish proposals for joint sovereignty, which much press coverage seemed to be pointing 
towards. Lillis said joint sovereignty had received much attention in the Forum because there 
were intimations that this was acceptable to London as a possible long term solution. Goodall 
said that such a concept would not be entertained by the British government. There was then 
a discussion of Irish involvement in law and order in the Northern Ireland. Goodall warned 
that the ideas did not seem fully formed and might make things worse. Lillis responded that 
Dublin was aware of the risks and wished to proceed ‘cautiously and slowly.’ He also said 
that the Forum was going to produce a series of alternative proposals but its ‘most important 
function would be to lower the level of public expectation in the Republic about unification’ 
and allow the creation of a climate in which something along the lines of the previous 
proposals could be launched. Goodall agreed this was ‘sensible and realistic.’65  
 
Armstrong, in his note to Thatcher, felt that the amendment of the Irish constitution, 
in return for Irish participation in law and order in Northern Ireland, was a high price. He 
believed that dialogue should be maintained. He proposed a team of senior officials to look 
at the Irish proposals when they were fleshed out.66 Thatcher was not convinced. She warned 
that the Irish initiative could lead to more violence.67 Even worse, while John Hume endorsed 
the idea of an Irish police presence and an acceptance of Stormont, he was dismissive of 
constitutional change. He suggested that Lillis had misrepresented his party’s position when 
he held discussions with Jim Prior.68 Meanwhile, Armstrong prepped Thatcher for her up-
coming meeting with FitzGerald.  
 
Armstrong advised Thatcher to ‘listen sympathetically to what FitzGerald has to say; 
probe him on the realism of his approach; and, while striking a strongly sceptical note, make 
it clear that you would be prepared to look at any practical and realistic ideas which might 
help to reduce the level of violence in Northern Ireland.’69 London was also concerned by 
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FitzGerald’s request ‘for a period of time en tête-à-tête with the Prime Minister without 
colleagues, advisors or note- takers’ as he was known for being ‘a very rapid and indistinct 
talker, and not always an attentive listener.’ Armstrong admitted that he was concerned that 
FitzGerald would leave the meeting ‘with some misconception of what the Prime Minister 
had said.’70  
 
Privately, Dublin was unsure of how to present their ideas to Thatcher. ‘Do we or do 
we not insist on maintaining all our nationalist cards face up on the table during that time?’71 
They were also concerned by Thatcher’s attitude, ‘we are told that she has a conviction, 
reinforced in recent years, that every effort of Government to resolve the crisis, only made it 
worse.’ FitzGerald would have to convince Thatcher that they both had a pivotal role to play. 
Irish Cabinet Advisors, aware of FitzGerald’s habit of making prolonged speeches, warned 
him that ‘in dealing with Thatcher it is advisable to be concrete rather than theoretical.’72 
FitzGerald could channel his fast-paced dialogue into his new initiative. In a press interview 
before the summit, FitzGerald stated that the two governments had ‘different view points, 
but we both have responsibilities to try to resolve this problem and restore peace and stability 
to Ireland.’73  
 
According to FitzGerald’s account, the meeting did not go particularly well. Thatcher 
refused to discuss joint sovereignty as she feared having to answer questions on the matter 
in parliament. (Brian Walden, television presenter and admirer of Thatcher, had just 
presented a programme on that very question, though ‘FitzGerald made clear that he had 
received no briefings from Irish officials’). The plenary session which involved Dick Spring, 
Peter Barry, Geoffrey Howe and Jim Prior saw a more expansive discussion which covered 
proposals for joint security coordination, constitutional change in the republic and a political 
layer. However, it was to be many months before that London was willing to take risks and 
launch a new political initiative.74  
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Alan Goodison, who had been appointed Ambassador to Ireland in July 1983, sent an 
impressionistic, somewhat condescending, account of Irish attitudes to Northern Ireland. It 
was all rather bleak. (Though he enjoyed the confidence of FitzGerald). Thatcher, as was her 
style, underlined considerable portions that interested her. He concluded that many in the 
‘south wanted nothing to with the North’ but believed in nationalist myths. The unionist 
position was ‘not generally understood.’ Northern Catholics were seen as victims and there 
was a level of tolerance for Sinn Féin that alarmed Dublin. Dublin believed that the key to 
combating alienation of the minority was to give legitimacy to the security forces.75 Goodwin 
concluded, 
 
So, as the people in the Republic contemplate the problems of Northern Ireland, Dr. 
FitzGerald and his friends are feeling desperate. They see no obvious answer to 
Ireland’s problems. But precisely because the Unionists are so intransigent, the logic 
of the nationalist myth is that only Britain can produce the basis for a solution, by 
withdrawing the guarantee and obliging the Unionists to reach an agreement with the 
South. If only - the reasoning goes - HMG were more interested. If only the British 
knew more about Ireland. Then perhaps the British could find the solution itself. They 
think that if they press us hard enough - and they don’t even know how to do that - 
we shall tell them what the answer is. I do not believe we know what the answer is 
either.76  
 
A March 1984 report of the British Joint Intelligence Committee warned that the strategy of 
the Provisionals remained that ‘of forcing the withdrawal of the British from Northern Ireland 
by means of a dual strategy involving both political action and terrorism, and thereafter 
bringing about a new “socialist republic” of all Ireland.’ Until the breakout from the Maze in 
November, the campaign in 1983 had, due to repeated security force successes, reduced 
popular PIRA support. The major concern now was the significant electoral advance of Sinn 
Féin. They wanted to take more than half of the nationalist vote at the 1985 local elections. 
The growth of Sinn Féin in the Republic of Ireland, most likely at the expense of Fianna Fáil, 
could lead them to intimidate the government. 77 Lillis also advised London that Sinn Féin’s 
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move to contest the 1985 elections was purely tactical. Haughey and Fianna Fáil could not 
reject the right of Sinn Féin to be the political party of the minority in the North. Goodall 
made clear that until Sinn Féin renounced violence there would be no talks. 78 
 
The New Ireland Forum  
The sessions of the NIF began in September 1983. The NIF was based on a concept Hume 
had presented to FitzGerald for a nationalist Council for a New Ireland. FitzGerald expanded 
on this idea and organised an all Ireland Forum that was open to all parties.79 ‘The origins of 
the (NIF) date back to the autumn of 1982 and the rise of Sinn Féin as a political force in 
Northern Ireland.’80 The Forum, then, sought to counter the emergence of Sinn Féin as a 
viable political party by shoring up the SDLP, the moderate Nationalist party, in Northern 
Ireland. The Forum also served as a platform to present the SDLP as a viable Nationalist 
party to the Thatcher Government, ‘The SDLP’s problem was that its moderation appeared 
to win no favour from the British government, which refused steadfastly to upset the unionist 
majority.’81 The unionist parties and Alliance abstained, while Sinn Féin were not permitted 
to join. The Forum was made up of four leaders from the main nationalist parties; Haughey, 
Fianna Fáil, FitzGerald, Fine Gael, Dick Spring, Labour, and Hume, SDLP.  
 
FitzGerald was anxious that the Forum report would set out a number of models for 
future solutions to the Northern Ireland problem. He was particularly interested in ensuring 
his model - joint sovereignty - was not rejected by Fianna Fáil, who might wish to deflect the 
Forum down more nationalist lines.82 Throughout the whole period of the NIF, keeping 
Fianna Fáil on board meant that FitzGerald had to be cautious. He told Thatcher in January 
1984 that the NIF report would have to take account of the views of Haughey. Michael Lillis 
explained that the report would contain three sections: the first would assess the attitudes of 
all parties to the problem; the second would ‘identify a number of principles or criteria which 
any settlement of the problem must satisfy’; the final part would examine possible models 
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for a solution. These models, Lillis emphasised, were ‘strictly illustrative’ but would 
probably be ‘a unitary state; a federal or confederal state; and some form of cooperation or 
joint administration in Northern Ireland.’ Lillis asked if a report presented in this form would 
present difficulties in London. Goodall replied that the outline seemed sensible but he was 
worried that Haughey would emphasise the unitary state solution. Lillis agreed that there was 
a risk but said the SDLP would be against it. Overall, Goodall was sceptical. Lillis promised 
that London would get an advance copy of the report.  
 
On 4 February, FitzGerald told Nicholas Scott, Minister of State for Northern Ireland, 
that the Forum was proceeding well and a list of principles had been agreed.83 The list would 
be ‘acceptable to HMG’ and took account of unionist positions.84 A draft of the Forum report 
was passed to Goodall by Lillis with instructions that the document should only be seen by 
the Prime Minister. Lillis added that FitzGerald was looking forward to starting serious 
dialogue with London when they were ready. Goodall asked for the advance copy of the 
report to be shown to Thatcher.85 Hume, in a meeting with Thatcher, explained that the SDLP 
had to boycott the Northern Ireland assembly as the Protestant community had ‘resolutely 
and unmovably’ set their views against power sharing. This was why the work of the Forum 
was so important.86 
 
A meeting of senior ministers and officials from London on 6 January 1984 agreed 
that ‘a political initiative on Northern Ireland was desirable which, by helping to isolate and 
neutralise the terrorists and their supporters, would promote law and order in the province’ 
and allow the government to respond effectively to any new proposals. The problem was that 
this was likely to ‘evoke strong unionist opposition.’ As far as London was concerned a 
‘crucial precondition’ was Dublin’s ‘willingness and ability to waive the territorial claim to 
the North.’ In return, London would consider joint policing and joint law enforcement in 
Northern Ireland. Thatcher agreed that, in advance of the Forum report, exploratory talks 
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with Dublin should begin.87 Dublin was somewhat surprised by this. Lillis told Armstrong 
that Irish ideas were not much advanced beyond what had been floated tentatively the 
previous autumn. Nonetheless, he was glad that Thatcher was taking political progress 
seriously. Lillis also said that Dublin was pursuing the idea of joint authority, which was not 
as dangerous a word for unionism as joint sovereignty. However, he also said that joint 
policing was unlikely to work unless there was joint authority. They were also unhappy with 
London’s proposal for a border security zone on the Republic’s side.88 Meanwhile, Haughey 
had lost none of his vitriol against Thatcher or what he called the appeasement of the British 
government.  
 
In an outburst in the Dáil in March 1984, he lambasted FitzGerald, 
 
Will you never learn? Will you understand that no matter what soft words or 
protestations are used, the age-old reality prevails? Britain relentlessly and 
remorselessly pursues Britain’s self interest, no mater whom it hurts or affects … 
Ireland’s interests are best defended by Irish men and women and all the appeasement 
and platitudes and honeyed words mean nothing when the chips are down.89  
 
J.J. O’Molloy, a political commentator, concluded that any ‘lingering hopes’ that FitzGerald 
had for the New Ireland Forum ‘surely died then.’ The NIF report would ‘eventually reflect 
this collapse of a bipartisan Irish approach to the Northern problem.’90  
 
The report was scheduled for publication on 2 May 1984. Goodison received an 
advance copy of a late draft. Prior was disappointed with the report. He told Thatcher that it 
was ‘rhetorical and thin on practicalities.’ Moreover, he felt the ‘green’ passages had not 
balanced by a clear recognition of ‘obstacles to Irish unity.’ The report was substantively in 
the ‘Fianna Fáil tradition.’ While there were elements that showed some movement in 
nationalist opinion, there was ‘no unequivocal statement’ about majority consent. He 
acknowledged that a balance had to be found between rejecting the report and increasing 
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difficulties for the Irish.91 Writing to Thatcher to inform her of the Forum’s work, FitzGerald 
told her, 
 
The Report is an important event in the political development of this State and for our 
relations with you and indeed with Northern Ireland. I believe that it marks a 
consolidation by the four main voices of constitutional nationalists in Ireland, 
speaking together, of important principles which we hold in common with you, and 
moreover, that it marks a seminal advance in the acceptance by Irish Nationalists of 
the rights and the ethos of the Unionists of Northern Ireland.92  
 
FitzGerald secretly sent Thatcher an advance copy of the report, taking a great risk as he had 
not consulted with the other Forum members. Understandably he was ‘very anxious that we 
should on no account disclose that he has passed an advance copy to you.’ The move appears 
to be a grand show of trust in Thatcher, to flatter her even. The feeling at the time was that 
the ‘Irish wish to keep the British side in play while they did their own homework.’93 The 
report aimed to dispel the nationalist myth that responsibility for Northern Ireland lay with 
Britain alone because ‘many in the South want to have nothing to do with the North.’94 The 
paper stated that ‘a united Ireland in the form of a sovereign independent Irish state (could 
only be achieved) peacefully and by consent,’ this being ‘the best and most durable basis for 
peace and stability.’95 It was hoped that the NIF would ‘herald a new beginning for all who 
have been cruelly disappointed by past failures.’96 The report set out three options for the 
future of Northern Ireland; unity with Ireland; a federal arrangement; joint authority shared 
between Ireland and Britain.97 Prior had already presaged London’s disappointment with the 
report. Thatcher assembled the small group of officials to look at it.98 Fundamentally, one 
British analysis considered the reports reading of the history of Northern Ireland as 
‘unsatisfactory’ because ‘although it acknowledges that Irish unity can only be achieved by 
consent, it fails to tackle the fact that such consent will not be forthcoming for the foreseeable 
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future.’99 London accepted that this was because ‘it (represented) the highest common factor 
of agreement among the four political parties involved in the Forum.’100 London concluded 
that the proposals were ‘fraught with difficulties, and cannot as they stand be regarded as 
providing an acceptable way forward.’101 Although Dublin wanted Thatcher to ‘say very little 
and leave (them) to make the running,’ a formal response would have to be made.102  
 
The Forum report appears to have provided little in the way of substance for the secret 
discussions between senior officials. Dublin’s proposals to recognise Northern Ireland and 
London’s proposals for enhanced security cooperation were the main subject at talks between 
Armstrong and Nally. FitzGerald’s team pointed out the difficulties of amending the 
constitution to remove Articles two and three but suggested that they could register the 
proposed agreement with the UN. Dublin felt that London’s approach was ‘too narrowly 
focussed on security.’ The Irish proposals for joint authority were outlined by Nally. 
Sovereignty, defence, foreign affairs and finance would remain with the UK but on all other 
matters, ‘public authority in the province would be vested in a joint authority comprising a 
Minister appointed by each government for the purpose.’ Armstrong raised numerous 
objections - most notably who would have the casting vote on contentious issues. They also 
suggested that the powers for joint authority would impinge on sovereignty particularly over 
security. Armstrong felt that London would have to decide whether they wanted to continue 
the discussions with them, or seek an internal settlement.103 Prior was supportive of 
continuing to probe for a political solution as the other alternatives were not good.104 
 
Following the summit with Dublin, Armstrong briefed Thatcher on three possible 
responses to the NIF report; ‘to decide that no form of Irish political presence … in Northern 
Ireland would be tolerable, and to disengage from conversations with the Irish Government’ 
or ‘to decide that an Irish political presence, however diluted or “consultative” … would be 
tolerable; and to explore further in the Armstrong-Nally forum the possibility of reaching 
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agreement on that basis.’105 Another idea was for London to launch an independent initiative 
to overshadow the NIF.106 Prior warned Peter Barry in early June that Thatcher’s first 
impressions of the talks and the forum were not encouraging. A wide range of measures 
might be possible in Northern Ireland if the Irish side would amend Articles two and three of 
their constitution. Dublin responded that they would be willing to do so in return for a 
‘substantial quid pro quo’ from London.107 In response to the suggestions, and amid 
mounting pressure for a response from Thatcher, Sir Philip Woodfield was commissioned to 
conduct research into ways in which the Irish Government could be given association with 
the political administration of Northern Ireland, without compromising British 
sovereignty.108  
 
Included in these papers are sketches by Dr. Paul Compton of Queen’s University, 
who attempted to re-draw the border in a way that ‘would produce a more homogeneous 
population in Northern Ireland.’ Compton suggested reducing the size of Northern Ireland 
by almost half in order to allow around 500,000 Catholic residents to join the Irish 
Republic.109 The Compton report also discussed the possibility of dividing Belfast ‘in the 
style of Berlin with perhaps a corridor and a wall.’110 Jim Prior advised against repartition. 
He felt it should only be used as a ‘draconian’ measure in the event of civil war.’ Prior did 
not think, however, that the NIF proposals for joint authority were acceptable either. The best 
option was a consultative role for the Republic of Ireland, offering influence rather than 
shared authority.111 On 21 June, Thatcher held another meeting to discuss Northern Ireland 
with her senior ministers and advisers.  
 
 Thatcher agreed that Ministerial level meetings should continue. She would avoid 
constitutional matters when she met FitzGerald. Thatcher even pointed out to him that a failed 
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referendum could make things worse.112 Prior took a moderate course in the Common’s 
debate which drew brickbats and praise in the Irish media. The Irish Press and Haughey were 
notably hostile. The British embassy in Dublin assessed that Haughey was frightened that 
FitzGerald would achieve a deal with Thatcher and this would split Fianna Fáil.113 However, 
London was adamant that Dublin’s proposals for joint authority, as presented by Nally, were 
unworkable.  
 
Armstrong, in meetings in Dublin, made clear that the responsibility for decisions on 
Northern Ireland would rest with the British government even if the Irish government was 
granted a significant role (‘formalised or institutionalised cooperation’). It was not what 
Dublin wanted but they indicated that they might be willing to accept it provided it was 
institutionalised and there was a resident Irish government representative in Northern Ireland. 
Armstrong considered the talks had moved ‘the dialogue on to a more realistic basis.’114 Dorr 
was concerned that Prior had a different agenda than Armstrong and Thatcher. He seemed 
more interested in getting devolution going again.115 Dorr’s references to Joint authority, in 
turn, concerned Thatcher who asked that further efforts be made to disabuse him of this being 
an option.116 The Dublin side returned to the issue in further consultation between Nally and 
Armstrong.  
 
Nally said London’s proposals were inadequate. They would not be enough to end 
Catholic alienation. Moreover, it would not be significant enough to allow a referendum on 
Articles two and three to take place with any chance of success. They also warned that the 
RUC was not likely, in its present form, to be acceptable and suggested a tripartite policing 
solution to Northern Ireland with nationalist areas patrolled by a mainly unarmed Catholic 
force, and vice versa for the unionist areas. London pointed to the grave difficulties in setting 
up such a force. Armstrong felt that Dublin could be talked round.117 Peter Barry told 
journalists that Dublin hoped that the next Anglo-Irish summit would be a major step forward 
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and that Thatcher and her team now had a sense that the Northern Ireland question was a 
priority.118  
 
Prior, who was about to move on from Northern Ireland, sent a lengthy paper at the 
end of September to Douglas Hurd, his successor, and Thatcher. He painted a fairly bleak 
picture of the Northern Ireland situation. He urged the continuation of talks with Dublin as 
‘there are clearly considerable advantages to be had from a bold departure in Anglo-Irish 
relations as long as it is not seen by the Unionists to be designed to lead ineluctably to a 
united Ireland.’ He concluded that, 
 
… if any substantial progress is to be made it will require your personal involvement. 
You, more than any other British politician, are trusted by the Unionists as being rock 
solid on the question of Northern Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom. If 
unpalatable things are to be imposed upon the majority it can only be done using your 
personal authority.119 
 
A draft response was written during a meeting of the AIIGC between the 18 and 19 of 
October at Chequers. Thatcher and FitzGerald agreed that political violence must be 
unanimously condemned; both community identities should be ‘recognised and respected’ 
and the government of Northern Ireland should reflect both traditions, instilling ‘both 
communities with the confidence that their rights will be safeguarded.’120 Although the 
statement repeated what had been said before, it was now formally agreed that the key to 
solving the Northern Ireland issue lay in stable Anglo-Irish co-operation. Conversations 
between them would lead to better understanding of each other’s position. Following a 
further meeting in September, Geoffrey Howe commented ‘there has been a marked increase 
of realism and lowering of expectations on the Irish side since your conversation with the 
Taoiseach.’121 Armstrong advised Thatcher that she faced a paradox, ‘the political case for 
continuing the process remains the same as the case for embarking upon it … we cannot 
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afford to do nothing, and that the risks of doing nothing are as great as or greater than the 
risks that would be attendant upon an agreed package.’122 Thatcher told reporters that she 
looked ‘forward to continued contact with Dr. FitzGerald and his Government on matters of 
mutual concern’ and that the ‘Irish Government has a legitimate interest in the situation in 
Northern Ireland (so) we try to keep them in touch with our thinking.’123 FitzGerald’s gentle 
perseverance appeared to be paying off. Only two years previously Thatcher had noted that 
she had wanted no more meetings between herself and Haughey to occur.124 Anglo-Irish 
relations appeared to be thawing.  
 
Public and political opinion on the situation in Northern Ireland were beginning to 
dovetail. The Times asked if a committee of MEPs from Northern Ireland, the Republic of 
Ireland and the UK could be established to ‘put forward major schemes for economical and 
social development’ so that future agreements would not collapse in the way Sunningdale 
had.125 The Irish Times reported that almost every paper agreed that the situation in Northern 
Ireland required concentrated attention as it was in danger of deteriorating further.126 
‘(FitzGerald) strongly endorsed the Prime Minister’s view that it would be dangerous to do 
nothing; and he shared her wish that the two governments should join in the process of 
finding a way to bring peace to Northern Ireland and should act together in the matter.’127 
However, things were to take a dramatic and unexpected turn.  
 
Brighton and ‘out out out’ 
The progress made by the teams from Dublin and London since FitzGerald’s return to office 
was challenged by events in Brighton in October 1984. During the Conservative Party 
Conference at the Grand Hotel, the PIRA detonated a bomb. It failed to kill Thatcher, its 
primary target, but caused five fatalities and left others with life changing injuries. Historians 
debate whether the bomb had any marked affect on Anglo-Irish relations and the peace 
process. McKivvit and McVea argue that although the bomb sent ‘shockwaves’ through 
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Britain and Ireland, ‘the long, careful Anglo-Irish negotiations kept inching painstakingly 
forward.’128 Kennedy-Pipe ventured that when Thatcher stated that she ‘was not going to be 
bombed to the negotiating table,’ the tone for the next two years of negotiations was 
negatively set.129 
 
 Later recollections of the event by Thatcher prove that the experience did personally 
affect her. During an interview, she recollected a touching moment during a Church service, 
 
The sun was just coming through the stained glass window and falling on some 
flowers right across the church and it occurred to me that this was the day I was not 
meant to see, and then all of a sudden, I thought: “There are some of my dearest 
friends who are not seeing this day”.130  
 
Armstrong told Thatcher that FitzGerald was ‘wildly over-optimistic’ about the speed of their 
impending negotiations and that cabinet was ‘in a different world following the Brighton 
Bomb and must proceed more slowly.’131 FitzGerald did not fully comprehend how seriously 
the bomb had affected Thatcher. It was the first direct action taken by the PIRA to end her 
life and, in the hours after, the group released a chilling statement; ‘today we were unlucky, 
but remember we only have to be lucky once - you will have to be always lucky.’132 Thatcher 
noted on a memo that ‘“The bomb” has slowed things down and may in the end kill any new 
initiative because I suspect it will be the first of a series.’133  
 
There was a notable hardening of British attitudes. In exchanges with Nally, 
Armstrong suggested that devolution with safeguards was the best possible basis for an 
agreement. An Irish speaking note, which also indicated a hardening of the position in 
Dublin, raised British ire. Goodison warned that the November summit occupied ‘a vital 
place in [FitzGerald’s] priorities. Whilst failure would not bring down his Government, it 
could seriously damage his credibility … Dr. FitzGerald cannot afford to come away from 
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the summit empty handed.’ FitzGerald’s precarious position was lost on Thatcher who noted 
in the margin ‘that is not my problem.’134 John Cole, BBC political editor, wrote ‘if one 
believes the voices in Whitehall, the Irish Forum report is flatulent and irrelevant, but London 
needs to behave diplomatically to maintain at least present levels of security cooperation 
from the republic.’135 The Fianna Fáil supporting The Irish Press, which began its editorial 
called ‘Outlook Gloomy,’ was scathing. It believed that the NIF had been a waste of time. 
Dublin was seen by London as providing security ‘to help maintain Britain’s holding.’ They 
had no intention of meeting any Irish requests regarding sovereignty or involvement in 
Northern Ireland. Consequently, ‘Constitutional Irish nationalism is at present waiting in the 
ante-chamber of the Summit to be shafted yet again.’ It concluded that the Irish government 
should use extradition and cross-border security as bargaining chips.136 
 
The next day, 14 November, Thatcher met with Hurd, Howe, Armstrong, Goodall 
and Goodison. Thatcher told them that Dublin was making unacceptable demands about joint 
authority. She had concluded that the risks of the PIRA regarding the breakdown of the inter-
governmental talks as a victory would jeopardise security cooperation. Therefore, more 
modest objectives needed to be presented. Thatcher concluded the meeting by saying that she 
would respond vigorously to the Irish brief.137 Thatcher was about to inflict a profound 
humiliation on FitzGerald. 
 
FitzGerald travelled to Chequers to meet her on 18 November, and from the outset it 
was apparent that he faced intense pressure from home. Previous talks were significant to 
their personal relationship, but the question emerged; did these meetings yield any tangible 
results? Dublin stated that they didn’t ‘want simply to have talks for the sake of talks’ while 
Howe commented that ‘if the talks were to continue they could only do so on the basis of the 
continued shared belief that the efforts would be worthwhile.’ London intended to work on 
the so termed ‘climate of increased realism’ to pressurise FitzGerald into accepting ‘limited 
joint arrangements of the kind we have been prepared to offer them in the exploratory talks 
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between our officials.’ London knew this would be difficult, but Thatcher was determined 
that Dublin should not over-step the mark and ask for more than she could give.138 After a 
‘heavy night,’ FitzGerald’s team were presented with a speaking note from London over 
breakfast.139 London would not accept any form of joint authority.140 FitzGerald’s idea was 
rejected outright, a heavy blow just before his tête-à-tête with Thatcher. 
 
The record of conversation shows that FitzGerald and Thatcher had a tense meeting. 
The tone of their conversation was particularly robust and wholly different to previous 
encounters. Thatcher commanded the discussion; she quick-fired questions and statements at 
FitzGerald who retorted concisely.141 When FitzGerald stated that power-sharing in Northern 
Ireland was the only way that the republican minority would have confidence in their own 
future. The Northern Ireland problem was about more than basic security. Sinn Féin had the 
potential to destabilise the political system in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. Furthermore, denying Nationalist’s right to identify as Irish would only further 
inflame the situation. Thatcher became ‘worried by the trend of the conversation. The 
Taoiseach seemed to be saying that he wanted a Republican enclave in Northern Ireland.’ 
Thatcher ‘was obsessed with the idea of creating a purely British enclave in Northern 
Ireland.’142 FitzGerald told her that ‘eighty-five thousand Catholics had been driven out of 
their homes … All he was seeking was effective policing with which the minority community 
could identify in the areas where it predominated.’143 Contrary to her notation on the pre-
summit briefing, Thatcher told FitzGerald ‘We don’t want to cause problems for you back 
home. We like you. We want to deal with you and not with that other man.’144 As Mulholland 
noted, Thatcher was impressed by FitzGerald’s ‘intellectual skill and clearly superior 
knowledge of the issues at stake.’145 The meeting was initially reported positively, Armstrong 
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later commented that ‘business appeared to have gone reasonably well.’146 But Hurd recalled 
that at one stage, Thatcher ‘… began to compare the Nationalists in the border counties with 
the Sudeten Germans in 1938; the Taoiseach looked grey and sad. The summit petered out 
with an empty communiqué.’147 This was the first warning that Thatcher had lost patience 
with the Irish question. 
 
 Thatcher’s infamous ‘out … out … out …’ burst caused palpable damage to the 
Anglo-Irish relationship. This is the first instance when Thatcher made the blunder. Previous 
Anglo-Irish diplomatic quarrels occurred due to some inappropriate action (real or perceived) 
by Dublin. These could be a minor issue, such as the FitzGerald-Thatcher personality clash, 
or a major issue like Haughey’s volte face decision during the Falklands. In this respect, it is 
the greatest of the Anglo-Irish fall outs because as Roy Jenkins, then President of the EEC 
remarked, ‘she does have the advantage of being almost totally impervious to how much she 
offends other people.’148 But reports had focused on the ‘lowering of expectations’ in Dublin, 
so were her remarks to be wholly unexpected? Albeit a public press conference was the worst 
setting to share her comments, but Thatcher was repeating the behind-the-scenes reactions to 
the report.149 Thatcher saw the report as a threat to the Unionist majority and to British 
sovereignty in Northern Ireland. While the Ulster Unionists reacted with ‘glee,’ Thatcher’s 
speech was reproached in Dublin.150  
 
It was reported that FitzGerald had ‘agreed to a suggestion that the prime minister’s 
behaviour at her press conference was “gratuitously offensive” and Mr. Barry is understood 
to have volunteered that her behaviour was “disgraceful”.’ The remarks leaked to the Irish 
press and saturated the headlines the following day.151 FitzGerald sent Thatcher a scathing 
letter in which he pointed out that in his press conference he ‘was extremely careful to avoid 
creating any difficulties for your position’ and that ‘it would be a tragedy if, through a 
misunderstanding, an impression were maintained that you totally rejected the essence of the 
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Forum Report.’152 As the Irish Independent observed what is surprising about the letter is 
FitzGerald’s separation from his natural courtesy, ‘the fact that after a long close session of 
personal talks with Thatcher which he hopes will lead somewhere he sees fit to tell the British 
Prime Minister what he thinks of her public performance speaks volumes.’153  
 
Her offence was three fold. First, her rejection of the NIF, second, her refusal to 
accept the term ‘alienation’ in relation to the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland, and 
third, the tone she used to rebuff the proposal.154 It was quite unusual that a major Anglo-
Irish fall out occurred due ‘not so much about what the prime minister said but more about 
the manner in which she said it,’ but this was the case.155 FitzGerald had not been able to 
listen to Thatcher’s conference due to a bad radio signal, and when one reporter quoted 
Thatcher’s ‘out out out’ to him, he was visibly shocked. Nally recalled, ‘I was standing at the 
back of the room and I saw his face drop. It was as if somebody had hit him a blow in the 
solar plexus.’156 The blunder really called for a public apology and a retraction of her 
statement, would the notorious Iron Lady stoop to such public grovelling? No. As Aitken 
commented ‘she pretended not to understand what the fuss was about.’157 She also gave this 
response in a later interview about the damage to Anglo-Irish relations, ‘I am very very sorry 
that somehow the thing got blown up. I do not know quite why, but these things happen now 
and then, but they must not affect the real issues.’158 Cabinet memos from this period bare 
little evidence of her usual notations and under-linings, and in her autobiography Thatcher 
concluded that ‘there seemed no point in pretending that these were acceptable approaches 
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when they were not.’159 In the Republic of Ireland, her speech left a feeling of ‘gloom and 
depression’ in its wake.160  
 
Dublin warned that relations had been profoundly ‘altered for the worse, in a manner 
that may be very difficult to recover.’161 There was no doubt that a crisis was beginning, one 
that FitzGerald feared ‘might not be easily appreciated in London.’162 His career was under 
threat. Thatcher’s comments had made a fool of him and he was now in trouble with the Dáil, 
his party and the Irish public. Public and political opinion agreed that FitzGerald had been 
‘subservient to the Prime Minister and (had) failed to achieve anything.’ FitzGerald had been 
told at a Fine Gael meeting that ‘he was finished as a convincing leader of the party.’ Anglo-
Irish relations were at a new low, as was Irish public opinion on Thatcher and FitzGerald, 
but he was not prepared to give up on the initiative.163 He considered that his career was in 
Thatcher’s hands and was anxious to make amends.164 He had already expressed his concerns 
over his leaked comments. As recorded in an official minute, ‘He does not deny that he spoke 
as reported but is anxious that the Prime Minister should understand that it was at a private 
meeting and that he had come under very heavy fire indeed from his own party.165 Another 
face-to-face conversation needed to be organised. 
 
 The two leaders met again at the EEC summit in Dublin in December. Thatcher was, 
at first, keen to press on with EEC matters and ignore the Anglo-Irish situation. She noted on 
a memo to Powell that she would meet FitzGerald ‘if he wishes - but I really think that the 
less said the better and that such a meeting will raise expectations with the press that cannot 
be fulfilled. I would rather say that we shall be meeting in the early months of next year …’166 
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She questioned the necessity of sending a pre-summit letter to him, deeming the draft ‘too 
contrived and too apologetic.’167 Her defensiveness continued in their discussion. She told 
FitzGerald that ‘In the Anglo-Irish arena, I am doing everything I can. I have been smiling 
all day!’ She also attempted to pass some of the blame onto Hume, who she called 
FitzGerald’s ‘chum.’ ‘(Hume) is not making things easy. He has reacted in such a hostile 
way in the Commons that I am almost driven to wonder whether there is any point in trying 
to get a solution to the problem.’168 When FitzGerald outlined the issues Thatcher’s speech 
had raised, focusing in particular on her tone, Thatcher rebuffed, 
 
… nothing which she had said at the press conference should have surprised anyone. 
The Government had made plain many times in recent months that it could not accept 
the models in the New Ireland Forum report. “Alienation” was a word which she was 
loth [sic] to use for reasons which she had explained at the Summit.169 
 
In her autobiography, Thatcher reflected on their discussion. She wrote ‘he pleaded that extra 
sensitivity was needed in what was said after eight hundred years of misunderstanding. I felt 
at the end I had gained insight into every one of those eight hundred years.’170 Thatcher was 
‘nervous of making any further comment on Irish affairs,’ but FitzGerald convinced her to 
hold a press conference following their meeting. She told him that ‘she would not want to 
give the impression of backing down or changing her mind. Depending on the nature of the 
questions at her press conference and the tone in which they were asked, she would attempt 
to speak in terms helpful to the Taoiseach.’ She was quizzed on the atmosphere by the press, 
but remained adamant that there was no problem, ‘as far as I am concerned, there is no rift 
between myself and Dr. Garret FitzGerald.’ Thatcher also guiltily told a reporter, ‘I am afraid 
I have a weakness of when people ask me direct questions in press conferences, of giving 
direct answers. I hope that will not cause you any trouble.’171  
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Following that press conference, the pressure on FitzGerald was lifted. Moreover. 
Thatcher continued to improve his political standing by agreeing to more talks in place of an 
actual apology.172 Concerns over the level of Irish expectations continued to be discussed, 
with Thatcher commenting that ‘the Irish want more than we can give and always will. I 
doubt whether we shall find a way forward.’173  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has followed several key themes. First, the Thatcher-FitzGerald dynamic. The 
beginning of FitzGerald’s second term saw him struggle to repair the damage caused by 
Haughey. He carefully negotiated with Thatcher, who had surmised that no matter who was 
Taoiseach, meeting with them was practically pointless. Second, this chapter shows how 
Thatcher’s own thinking on Northern Ireland was challenged by FitzGerald. He rejected her 
long-held idea on redrawing the border to move nationalists out of Northern Ireland, and 
explained to her that nationalists were entitled to identify as Irish. Although Thatcher was 
‘unwilling to engage with the unattractive reality that Irish nationalists were inassimilable to 
British sovereignty,’ FitzGerald persuaded her that Dublin and London needed to work 
together to bring stability to Northern Ireland. Then, the Brighton bomb happened.  
 
The bomb did not stop Anglo-Irish negotiations, but it did shorten Thatcher’s temper. 
The third research theme shows how the bomb hardened Thatcher’s attitude. Previously, any 
major Anglo-Irish fall-out could be blamed on Dublin. Thatcher was left oblivious to what 
she had done following her notorious ‘out … out … out …’ speech. FitzGerald later surmised 
that ‘if there were anyone else present she tended to speak for the record and even to some 
degree to act a role,’ but her outburst caused him serious problems at home.174 Rather than 
apologise for her error, Thatcher extended an olive branch to FitzGerald allowing for more 
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Negotiating the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
It was a very difficult thing for ( Thatcher) because she was both a very publicly declared 
and emotional unionist herself, and when she had said earlier that Northern Ireland was as 
British as Finchley, she meant it.1 
 
On 15 November 1985, journalists gathered inside Hillsborough Castle, County Down. In 
front of a large painting of Windsor Castle was a desk, two chairs, and two leather bound 
folders; one green, one red. Margaret Thatcher, accompanied by Bernard Ingham, Press 
Secretary, Humphrey Atkins, former Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Geoffrey Howe, 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Tom King, the newly 
appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, entered the room first.2 Garret FitzGerald 
was close behind her along with Dick Spring, Tánaiste, Peter Barry, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Dermot Nally, Civil Servant and Peter Prendergast, Press Secretary.3 In stark contrast 
to the team from Dublin and her colleagues behind her, Thatcher cut a gloomy figure as the 
AIA was distributed around the room. Outside the gates of the castle, people from the Ulster 
Unionist parties gathered to protest against the agreement. 15 November 1985 was the 
culmination of nearly two years of negotiations between London and Dublin. A truly historic 
Agreement was about to be signed. 
 
In 1984, Dublin and London had started to negotiate via the Armstrong-Nally forum. 
London was still preoccupied with security while Dublin pushed for an agreement that would 
appeal to the minority community in Northern Ireland. Thatcher’s ‘out … out … out …’ 
speech of October 1984 served as a catalyst to the Armstrong-Nally forum. Talks between 
the two teams increased from January 1985 as the idea of a formal agreement between Dublin 
and London was formed. This plan was problematic. Unionists in Northern Ireland would 
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inevitably reject Dublin having any formal role in ‘their’ province. Nationalists may not 
accept the re-clarification of Northern Ireland’s status as part of the UK. In January Robert 
Armstrong, head of Thatcher’s negotiating team, told FitzGerald, ‘the Prime Minister does 
not want to stand pat. She had told John Hume this and she had told President Reagan.’4  
 
This chapter will focus on the months leading up to the AIA of November 1985. The 
chapter will examine the work of the Armstrong-Nally forum in particular.5 The importance 
of the Armstrong-Nally forums has been recognised before.6 Thatcher and FitzGerald only 
met a handful of times during 1985 at the EEC with the bulk of the negotiations carried out 
by their appointed teams. With access to the PREM and Taosieach files, we can understand 
how relations between these teams developed to the extent that they were on friendly terms 
by the time the AIA was signed. Understanding Thatcher’s leadership style, and her influence 
over Armstrong’s team, is also central to following the Dublin-London talks. Thatcher is 
often labelled as an autocratic leader with a ‘black and white’ cognitive style.7 Yet the AIA 
proves that she was comfortable, to a certain extent, to rely on her Ministers to form key 
policy.8 This is important because it proves that Thatcher began to disengage from Northern 
                                                
4 NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/88, meeting with Armstrong, 22 Jan. 1985. Armstrong’s report of the meeting is in TNA UK, PREM 
19/1548. 
5 The Armstrong/Nally meetings occurred on the following dates, 21 Jan., 8 Feb., in London, 19 Feb., in Kildare, 22 Mar., 
in Dublin, 29-30 Apr., in Kent, 15 May, 14 June, 9 July in Dublin, 15-16 July, 21-22 July, 30-31 July in Kent, 3 Sept., 12-
13 Sept., in London, 19 Sept., 24 Sept., in Dublin, 1 Oct., 8 Oct., 13-14 Oct., in London, 31 Oct., 13 Nov., in Dublin and 7 
Dec., in Dublin. 
6 See Paul Arthur, ‘Anglo-Irish Relations and the Northern Ireland Problem,’ Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 2, 
no. 1 (1985), pp. 37-50, Feargal Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
(Cork: Cork University Press, 2001), Harris, ‘Anglo-Irish Elite Cooperation,’ pp. 203-214, and Thomas Hennessey, The 
Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending The Troubles? (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2000) for more on the role British-
Irish officials played in the negotiations. See also Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994), Hurd, 
Memoirs, Brian Lenihan, For the Record, Dublin: Blackwater Press, 1991, Jim Prior, A Balance of Power (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1986), and ‘The view from the castle,’ BBC, 1988, for personal reflections on meetings between officials.  
7 Dyson, ‘Cognitive Style and Foreign Policy,’ pp. 33-48. MT’s leadership style has been discussed by her party colleagues 
in Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Benn, The Benn Diaries (London: Random House, 2017), John Biffen, Semi-Detached 
(London: Biteback Publishing, 2013), Carrington, Reflect on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carrington (London: 
Fontana, 1989), Alan Clark, Diaries: Into Politics (London: Orion, 2000) and Diaries: In Power, 1983-1992 (London: 
Phoenix, 2003), Kenneth Clarke, Kind of Blue: A Political Memoir (London: Macmillan, 2016), Norman Fowler, Ministers 
Decide: A Personal Memoir of the Thatcher Years (London: Chapman’s Publishers, 1991), Heseltine, Life in the Jungle, 
Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, Hurd, Memoirs, Bernard Ingham, Kill the Messenger (London: HarperCollins, 1992), Norman 
Lamont, In Office (London: Little Brown, 1999), Nigel Lawson, Memoirs of a Tory Radical (London: Biteback, 2010), John 
Major, The Autobiography (London: HarperCollins, 1999), Cecil Parkinson, Right at the Centre: An Autobiography 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), John Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Memoirs of an Errant Politician 
(London: Politico’s Publishing, 2002), Prior, Balance of Power, Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 2004), Nicholas Ridley, My Style of Government: The Thatcher Years (London: Hutchinson, 1991), Malcolm 
Rifkind, Politics and Pragmatism: The Memoirs of Malcolm Rifkind (London: Biteback Publishing, 2016), Norman Tebbit, 
Upwardly Mobile: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988) and Whitelaw, Memoirs. 
8 See Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two, p. 318 as well as Derek Birrell, Direct Rule and the Governance of Northern Ireland 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 36, Mulholland, ‘Just Another Country,’ p. 191. Emma Kilheeney also 
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Ireland policy after the out out out burst of 1984. After 1984 Thatcher’s Northern Ireland 
policy entered stage two, disengagement. The Armstrong-Nally negotiations were not 
without their problems.  
 
Both Dublin and London were wary as media leaks increased in the lead up to the 
agreement. Dublin accused one junior Minister of showing a draft agreement to the media, 
while King blamed Dublin of tactically leaking information to the press to quell unionist 
fears of the agreement.9 London was further antagonised by the ‘Real Lives’ affair.10 The 
BBC planned to air a programme featuring Martin McGuiness, Sinn Féin MP for 
Londonderry, at home with his family and out in the community.11 The programme was 
eventually edited at the government’s request. Dublin and London also had to bear in mind 
American influence over the AIA. The State department supported the idea of an agreement 
and was considering contributing to a fund to support Northern Ireland. A misstep could spell 
disaster not only for Anglo-Irish relations, but for the people of Northern Ireland. 
 
A Meeting of Minds? Anglo-Irish Forums, January-March 1985 
The Armstrong-Nally talks were the backbone of the AIA.12 Dialogue between ministers 
from Dublin and London had actually begun in the summer 1984, but ramped up following 
the Brighton Bomb.13 These meetings were carefully prepared for. Officials acted under the 
                                                
reached this conclusion in her PhD thesis, ‘Ministers Advise, Prime Minister’s Decide? Secretaries of State for Northern 
Ireland and Policy Making During the Thatcher Years,’ PhD thesis, 2016, University of Manchester, Manchester. 
9 Email correspondence with Lord King of Bridgewater, 9 Apr. 2017. NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/52, meeting between FitzGerald 
and MT on the morning of the signing, 15 Nov. 1985. According to this record, FitzGerald had told MT about the opening 
paragraph in Irish. 
10 Greg McLaughlin and Stephen Baker, The Propaganda of Peace: The Role of Media and Culture in the Northern Ireland 
Peace Process (Bristol and Chicago: Intellect, 2010), pp. 90-91. See also Sarah Baxter, ‘Thatcher and the Media,’ Woman: 
A Cultural Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (1991), pp. 71-73, Jean Seaton, Pinkoes and Traitors: The BBC and the Nation, 1974-1987 
(London: Profile Books, 2015) for more on the ‘Real Lives’ controversy. Works on MT and her relationship with the media 
include, Jeremy Tunstall, ‘The media: lapdogs for Thatcher?’ Contemporary Record, vol. 4, no. 2 (1990), pp. 6-8, Jeremy 
Tunstall, ‘The Media Portfolio: Revolution Under Thatcher,’ Contemporary Record, vol. 2, no. 5 (1989), pp. 5-7, David 
Walker, ‘The Media and the Fall of Thatcher,’ Contemporary Record, vol. 5, no. 1 (1991), pp. 183-186 and Hugo Young, 
‘The Media Under Thatcher,’ Contemporary Record, vol. 3, no. 4 (1990), pp. 6-8.  
11 Martin McGuiness, former PIRA leader. Chief negotiator for Sinn Féin, leader of Sinn Féin 2007-2017, deputy First 
Minister of Northern Ireland 2007-2017. McGuiness followed Sinn Féin’s policy of abstention and, therefore, did not take 
his seat at Westminster. 
12 Arthur Aughey, ‘Conservative Party Policy in Northern Ireland’ in The Northern Ireland Question, ed., by Barton and 
Roche, p. 138. 
13 See Kelly, Failed Political Entity, pp. 303-315 for a comprehensive discussion of the 1984 Armstrong-Nally talks. 
Meetings in 1984 occurred on the following dates; 1 Mar., 10 May, 30 July, 3 Aug., 20 Sept., 17 Oct., 2-3 Nov., and 17 
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instructions of Thatcher and FitzGerald. The Taoiseach and Prime Minister would receive 
detailed reports on the discussion, and would then advise their delegation how to proceed. 
This ensured the talks remained confidential and avoided the media circus that surrounded 
meetings between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach. The talks had both Thatcher and 
FitzGerald’s full approval, but Thatcher did have to defend the initiative to party members, 
‘It is, of course, essential that we build a sound working relationship with the Irish 
Government. We now have a good base from which to start, but there will be difficult and 
sensitive issues.’14 The Armstrong-Nally Forums allowed Thatcher and FitzGerald to 
negotiate through an approved team in secret. The key figures from London were Armstrong, 
Hurd, until he was replaced as Secretary of State by King in September, Howe and David 
Goodall. Present on the Irish side were Nally, Barry, Spring, Michael Lillis and Seán Donlon.  
 
 Thatcher put Armstrong in charge of her team because he was Cabinet Secretary and 
head of the Civil Service.15 She could, therefore, keep a close eye on the negotiations.16 
Armstrong was sympathetic to nationalism and was ‘always thinking about Ireland.’17 He 
had previously worked with Nally at the G7 summit and they personally got on well 
together.18 Goodall also had a particular interest in Ireland. His ancestor had been in the Irish 
Parliament, and he often made personal reflections on the Northern Ireland problem during 
the Armstrong-Nally forums. He told Noel Dorr that he believed Irish involvement in 
Northern Ireland would ‘lead to a more equalised relationship between the two countries.’ 
Dorr reflected that this was his “Irish side”.19 Goodall got along well with the Dublin team 
and felt that both sides could talk with ease. He reflected that ‘it could be compared only with 
the way in which the British can talk to some East Coast Americans.’20 Howe and Hurd 
entered the negotiations officially in March. Howe had been ignorant on Irish matters, and 
confessed in his autobiography that initially ‘… there was no need for either Margaret or I to 
cast our eyes across the Irish sea.’21 Howe and Hurd had successfully persuaded Thatcher to 
                                                
14 PRONI, CENT 3/39A, letter from MT to Biggs-Davison, 5 Feb. 1985 and TNA UK, PREM 19/1549, minute from Hurd 
to MT, 19 June 1985. 
15 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 394 and Hurd, Memoirs, p. 335. 
16 ‘Anglo-Irish Agreement: 30 Years On,’ The Irish Times supplement, 14 Nov. 2015. 
17 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two, p. 302.  
18 Lord Armstrong interview in The Irish Times, 14 Nov. 2015. 
19 NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/88, Armstrong/Nally discussions, Barretstown Castle Kildare, 19 Feb. 1985. 
20 iBid.,		
21 Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 411. 
 173 
allow them to join as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had an interest in maintaining 
good relations with Dublin.22 The Forum also gave them the opportunity to ‘“re-trace the 
furrow” at political level’ and to understand recent developments. They therefore had ‘a more 
direct feel for the pressures and constraints which operate on the Irish side … and they in 
turn will be able to explain more directly to (the Irish) ministers the constraints and 
limitations on what the British side can do.’23 King entered the negotiations following his 
appointment as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in September, and was shocked to 
discover that unionists had been excluded from the negotiations. King’s move to Northern 
Ireland was seen as a demotion from his previous post in Employment.24 As Richard 
Needham wrote, ‘… those ministers that go to Ulster go for either of two reasons; as a step 
on the way up or as a step in the way out. In either case, they do not stay long.’25 Norman 
Tebbit, then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, had advised Thatcher to drop King in 
the September Cabinet shuffle as he was ‘not using his opportunities at (the Department of 
Employment).’26 Thatcher placed a tick beside this note, but underlined Tebbit’s further 
comment that she may wish to ‘hold that last option in reserve for next year.’27 It appears 
Thatcher decided to send King to Northern Ireland ‘… to make room for the Prime Minister 
to appoint someone at the Department of Education more faithful to her dogma.’28 
 
At the head of the Dublin team was Nally. Nally was characterised by a London 
personality report as ‘an excellent civil servant, discreet, loyal and sensible. He is pleasant 
socially but is capable of taking a very robust line on instructions. He has a remarkable 
capacity for alcohol.’29 Barry first became interested in Northern Ireland when he was elected 
to the Dáil in 1969. Barry’s nationalism had made him a pariah in Fine Gael, ‘… I was left 
paddling my own canoe in the middle of a raging storm.’30 Spring was placed in the team as 
                                                
22 TNA UK, PREM 19/1549, minute from Hurd to MT, 19 June 1985. 
23 NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/88, letter from Dorr to Lillis, 12 Mar. 1985. 
24 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two, p. 330. Being moved to Northern Ireland was  
25 Richard Needham, Battling for Peace (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1998), p. 122. 
26 Norman Tebbit, Baron Tebbit, Conservative MP 1970-1992. Tebbit was badly injured in the Brighton Bomb and his wife 
was paralysed. 
27 CAC, THCR 1/14/14, Tebbit letter to MT, 27 Aug. 1985.  
28 David Bloomfield and Maeve Lankford, ‘From Whitewash to Mayhem: The State of the Secretary in Northern Ireland,’ 
in The Northern Ireland Question in British Politics, p. 151. 
29 TNA UK, PREM 19/1809, personality report, undated. Also in TNA UK, FCO 87/2176. 
30 Interview with Peter Barry, The Irish Times, 14 Nov. 2015 and TNA UK, PREM 19/1809, personality report, undated. 
Also in FCO 87/2176.	
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he was Tánaiste. Spring felt that Northern Ireland was low on Thatcher’s list of priorities. He 
suspected that ‘… she wasn’t going to lose too much sleep over the catholics and protestants 
in Northern Ireland fighting with one another.’31 Lillis was described as someone who ‘makes 
sure to get his point of view across; and on occasions, he can be sharply combative … his 
colleagues consider him a “workaholic” and he can be found often at his desk at weekends.’32 
Lillis was a nationalist but claimed to have an understanding of British attitudes through his 
English wife.33 Donlon had been Irish Ambassador to the US. He had helped to establish the 
Friends of Ireland group. His relationship with the Americans was strong, so much so that 
when Haughey asked him to return to Ireland in 1980, two of the Four Horsemen intervened. 
Donlon stayed in the US until 1981. His rapport with the Americans gave him a unique 
insight into how the AIA would be received overseas, and the financial support Reagan would 
give.34 By the end of the Armstrong-Nally talks, the two sides had grown so close that they 
had personalised ties designed which they wore to reunions.35 According to Goodall, ‘… the 
detailed negotiations carried on within this very small group of officials, and we got to know 
one another very well.’36 
 
The first meeting of 1985 marked the beginning of serious negotiations between 
Dublin and London. The January meeting began with Armstrong handing over a paper on 
the AIIGC. London proposed a new body that would meet regularly to discuss North/South 
relations. The body would help to form policy and law, but would not represent a ‘derogation 
of sovereignty on the part of either the United kingdom or the Republic.’37 Nally removed 
from the meeting for 10 minutes to read the proposal in private. When he returned he 
delivered a personal assessment.38 He felt that London was still focused on a ‘shallower’ set 
of proposals and was preoccupied with security.39 According to Dublin’s record of the 
                                                
31 Dick Spring interviewed for ‘Thatcher and the IRA, Dealing with Terror,’ BBC, 2014. 
32 TNA UK, CAB 164/1674, report on Michael Lillis, undated. 
33 TNA UK, PREM 19/1809, personality report, undated. Also in FCO 87/2176. 
34 Joseph E. Thompson, American Policy and Northern Ireland: A Saga of Peacebuilding (London: Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 2001), p. 91.  
35 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two, p. 302. 
36 Goodall, ‘The Anglo-Irish Agreement,’ ed., by Spencer, p. 44. 
37 TNA UK, PREM 19/1548, AIIGC standing committee, 17 Jan. 1985. MT underlined this sentence to signify that she 
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38 NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/88, Armstrong/Nally meeting, Dublin, 21 Jan. 1985. London’s record of the meeting is in TNA 
UK, PREM 19/1548. 
39 TNA UK, PREM 19/1548, Armstrong/Nally meeting, Dublin, 21 Jan. 1985 and NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/88, 
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meeting, Armstrong argued that there was ‘no hard and clear line between “security” and 
“political” issues,’ but admitted the paper’s emphasis on security was ‘potentially 
problematic.’40 Nally then asked how the minority would relate to the AIIGC. Armstrong 
replied that this was not the aim of the new body, a point Thatcher later underlined and 
ticked.41 The point of the AIIGC was to regulate contact between Dublin and London. Nally 
then outlined the difficulties surrounding power sharing and devolution.  
 
Dublin and London agreed that no political party in Northern Ireland would be fully 
satisfied with their suggestions. At a meeting in January with Dublin, the OUP and DUP had 
said that they understood ‘Dublin’s right to be “interested” or to “show concern”’ in Northern 
Ireland.42 This contradicted their public position and some of the unionist delegates stressed 
that this was their personal view, but it was a promising step forward. Nally recalled how 
Irish and Northern Irish civil servants used to meet for an annual golf competition. Following 
the collapse of Sunningdale, the trip had been stopped by unionists. His point was that the 
two governments should aim to introduce a permanent settlement that could provide a long-
term solution and improve relations on a personal level between Dublin and Belfast. Failure 
could further alienate Dublin from Belfast, as well as catholic from protestant, exaggerating 
the problem further. The conversation then moved on to Joint Courts. 
 
After reading the proposal Nally asked London to reconsider the Courts issue. Dublin 
wanted terrorist cases to be heard by courts made up of judges from Northern Ireland and 
Ireland.43 FitzGerald felt that the mixed system would work well, ‘the multiplicity of judges 
helping to avoid some of the danger that could arise if a single judge were to seek to carry 
out all the functions of a jury as well as his normal judicial duties.’44 But the proposition 
raised difficulties, in particular the oath of allegiance that judges would take.45 London 
promised to re-examine courts in more detail, but Nally was concerned by London’s initial 
                                                
40 NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/88, Armstrong/Nally meeting, Dublin, 21 Jan. 1985. 
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44 FitzGerald, All in a Life, p. 573. 
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laissez faire attitude towards the issue. London needed time to research the problem before 
presenting it to Dublin again. Next, Donlon asked about the unionist reaction to devolution. 
 
An unnamed official from the NIO answered that question. In his opinion there had 
not been a large-scale ‘shift’ in unionist attitudes to Dublin. Lillis mentioned that a 
parliamentary tier could help garner unionist support for an agreement.46 Overall, Dublin felt 
it was important to make a move as soon as possible and suggested ‘getting something in 
place before May.’ Although Nally was disappointed with the proposal, the meeting had gone 
well. Charles Powell noted that the meeting showed that Dublin had shown ‘signs of greater 
realism.’47 The next meeting was set for February. 
 
The 8 February meeting was used as an opportunity for Dublin to make a formal 
response to London’s proposal. Nally concluded that the proposal ‘would not be a sufficient 
basis on which to carry a constitutional referendum.’48 Unless London would allow Dublin 
to put forward ideas and proposals on Northern Ireland in the AIIGC, they would not consider 
changing articles two and three of the Irish constitution, which laid claim to Northern Ireland 
as lost territory.49 Nally’s team used articles two and three as their bargaining chip. Dorr said 
he had been told by an unnamed Conservative MP that London viewed the amendments as 
an integral part of the overall package.50 But London wanted to proceed slowly. Powell told 
Thatcher that Armstrong did not want to ‘… rush back to the Irish in a matter of days with a 
reply.’ Thatcher wrote in response, ‘I am not able to give sufficient time to consider this until 
I return from the US. Delay any further meetings.’51 
 
Although she had approved the January proposal, Thatcher had not looked at what 
had been done since. She was focused on the miner’s strike and was distracted by the Ponting 
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Affair.52 The later issue had revealed weakness within her government. Armstrong and 
Goodall felt that Thatcher’s premiership was at a crossroads. They both expected ‘that her 
power will go downhill from here on.’53 Goodall added that London expected that any 
agreement would result in a ‘great deal’ of sacrifice ‘in return for nothing.’54 Nally surmised 
that London wanted to be “travelling hopefully” rather than ‘arriving or having arrived’ at 
any final decision.55 At the second February meeting, Goodall suggested that London should 
draft another paper. This would turn Thatcher’s attention back to Ireland as this paper would 
require her approval. The Armstrong-Nally forum was carefully building on ideas from the 
ground up, the foundations being the January 1985 proposal. Thatcher could not “bristle” and 
reject something new, as she had with the NIF report in 1984. Thatcher should not be rushed 
into anything. Her team needed ‘to try to bring her along carefully.’56  
 
‘The Americans made me do it’: the USA and the AIA 
American approval of the AIA was key to gaining monetary investment for Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland. In February, Thatcher visited Washington to speak to the House 
of Congress. She had been advised that Northern Ireland would be a pivotal topic during her 
trip, so a powerful speech was prepared.57 Thatcher reaffirmed British Sovereignity over 
Northern Ireland but went on to say, 
 
If ever there were to be a majority in favour of change, then I believe that our 
Parliament would respond accordingly, for that is the principle of consent enshrined 
in your constitution and in an essential part of ours. There is no disagreement on this 
principle between the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the 
Republic of Ireland.58 
 
                                                
52 The Ponting Affair refers to leaked documents by Clive Ponting, then a senior Civil Servant, regarding the sinking of the 
Belgrano. Ponting sent two memos to a Labour MP claiming that the information was in the public interest. Ponting was 
charged with a criminal offence, but was later acquitted by a jury. He resigned from his post on 16 Feb. 1985.  
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54 iBid., 
55 NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/88, briefing for the Taoiseach, 20 Feb. 1985. 
56 NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/88, Armstrong/Nally meeting, Barretstown Castle Kildare, 19 Feb, 1985. 
57 TNA UK, PREM 19/1658, No. 10 briefing for MT, 3 Feb. 1985. 
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Her speech was well received. The audience applauded her at regular intervals. At the March 
Anglo-Irish meeting, Armstrong reported to Dublin that she had found a ‘general 
benevolence in the White House.’59  
 
Following Thatcher’s visit to the USA, Nally asked Armstrong if Thatcher had any 
confirmation of US interest in the fund. London had not had formal confirmation at that stage 
but hoped Hurd would be able to discuss it with Reagan when he went to the US. Nally asked 
how the fund would be administered, which he hoped was ‘not a stupid question.’ Armstrong 
jovially replied, ‘the first thing would be an argument about additionality [sic] with the 
Treasury. We would need to think by whom, and how such a fund would be administered. 
Should it be a foundation outside the Government?’60 London did ‘not want to look a gift 
horse in the mouth,’ but Howe urged that America should not be allowed to influence their 
talks. Howe later wrote, 
 
The scale and nature of US involvement in all this needs to be seen in the right 
perspective. Only rarely were we under direct pressure from the other side of the 
Atlantic specifically to change our policies … We did all this, as much as anything, 
in the overall British interest: to undermine American fund-raising for terrorism, to 
strengthen American willingness to extradite those wanted for trial.61  
 
Dublin and London had struggled to minimise support for NORAID since the early 1970s. 
The PIRA fundraiser had captured the imagination of Irish-Americans who ‘… saw militant 
Irish republicanism as a more authentic expression of Irish culture.’62 From 1983 Irish-
American attitudes had started to change as Dublin and London began to talk to each other, 
 
 … people of the US are taking a much more informed attitude to Northern Ireland 
affairs: they recognise the need to stop help going to terrorists and are sympathetic to 
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the talks we are having with the Irish Government. Only a conspicuous failure in these 
talks is likely to set back the progress which has been made.63 
 
Reagan had also made ‘helpful St. Patrick’s Day statements this year and last (1984 and 
1985).’ The Friends of Ireland group, founded by three of the so-called four horsemen, Tip 
O’Neill, Ted Kennedy and Daniel Moynihan, had also worked to inform Irish-Americans on 
Northern Ireland. The Friends of Ireland ‘helped to ensure a generally responsible attitude 
from the Irish lobby in Congress … the Americans now undoubtedly have a better 
understanding of the international threat posed by terrorism.64 To reap the benefits of this 
Goodall visited the US in June to meet with Admiral Poindexter.65  
 
The visit was risky. Information about the agreement could leak to the American 
press. Thatcher agreed that it was essential to get the Americans on side. She sanctioned the 
visit, but warned ‘… we can’t bring the matter to a conclusion without speculation, we must 
require the strictest confidentiality.’66 Goodall met with Poindexter and Martin Wenick, 
director of the Office of North European Affairs. Poindexter only spoke to say that he felt 
Reagan would be ‘much reassured’ by Goodall’s account of Anglo-Irish relations, and while 
Wenick was ‘equally supportive’ he did question how unionists would react to it. Armstrong, 
rather ominously, told the Americans, ‘unionist opposition to the proposed agreement was 
inevitable, but we hoped and believed that it would be containable.’67 Poindexter then told 
Goodall that the State Department had considered giving between $500 million and $0.25 
billion, ‘of which the North would get the lion’s share’ to the fund after an agreement was 
signed. This was confirmation of Reagan’s ‘willingness to be generous to Northern Ireland 
after an agreement is signed.’68 Dublin and London needed to continue to negotiate.  
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Armstrong-Nally Forums, March-June 1985 
Before the March Armstrong-Nally meeting, Armstrong presented Thatcher with a new idea. 
Armstrong wanted to establish a sub-committee to inform Thatcher’s Cabinet on Anglo-Irish 
dialogue. The sub-committee would then be able to pass policy to support any initiative. The 
sub-committee would include Thatcher, the Lord President of the Council, Whitelaw, the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Howe, the Secretary of State for 
Defence, Michael Heseltine, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Tebbit, the Chief 
Secretary of the Treasury, Peter Rees, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Grey 
Gowrie, and the Attorney General, Michael Havers. Thatcher agreed to the new committee 
and suggested that the Lord Privy Seal, John Biffen, should be added to the list.69 Included 
in the sub-committee were some of her friends, Gowrie, Tebbit and Whitelaw, and some of 
her old sparring partners, Heseltine and Howe. Behind the scenes, Armstrong steered 
Thatcher’s attention back to Northern Ireland. Thatcher had become ‘testy.’ Howe and Hurd 
felt that going forward, she needed more encouragement.  
 
 Thatcher had started to ask ‘what’s really in it for us? and will it really work?’70 At 
the March Armstrong-Nally meeting, Goodall told Lillis that FitzGerald ‘had greater 
standing with Thatcher on (Northern Ireland) issues than even Howe and Hurd.’ If FitzGerald 
could ‘“capture her imagination” … without frightening her,’ the process would be a lot 
smoother for everyone.71 Meetings with her own advisors were becoming difficult. Goodall 
reported that at the latest briefing, Thatcher had become ‘very sharp and critical’ and was 
‘going cold’ on Ireland.72 The Armstrong-Nally forum had to coax Thatcher into making a 
move when in reality ‘… she did not pay continuous attention to the subject, at the opening 
of each meeting on Northern Ireland she tended to begin from square one and to repeat 
ancient themes which had been discussed and dealt with long before.’73 Goodall aired his 
frustration with Thatcher’s habit of separating security from politics. He had continually tried 
to tell Thatcher that the two problems were ‘intrinsically linked,’ ‘He spoke with the rather 
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weary air of someone who had tried to do just that many times.’74 Security remained as a key 
issue. 
 
Dorr raised the shoot-to-kill issue in March. He argued that there had been 35 
incidents that were difficult to explain. He suggested that when accusations came to light, a 
procedure should be put in place whereby those responsible in the security forces would be 
transferred or suspended to reduce the risk of tit-for-tat attacks.75 Dorr also said that he 
understood that fatal force could be justified in some instances. There was a line to be drawn. 
The question was, where was it?76 The issue was only touched on at this stage, it would 
become a greater problem later.77 Armstrong told the Dublin team that London would need 
more time to deal with these issues. An official paper or agreement was still a long way off, 
 
Armstrong: The Prime Minister’s view is that the time to do something is when it is 
ready. 
Donlon: It reminds me of what my mother used to say when we asked her as children 
when dinner would be ready. She would reply “when it’s ready”. 
Armstrong: Clearly the pace will determine things. The Prime Minister will not want 
to commit herself to a date until she is sure ...78 
 
To try to get things moving, FitzGerald suggested that Dublin and London should try to agree 
on a set of guidelines for future joint press conferences, 
 
This would not be easy to achieve but it was vital that it should be achieved. One of 
the problems could be differences in personality - it might be difficult for the Prime 
Minister and myself to sound the same note, but we had a very strong common 
interest in doing so. We could not forget the lessons of the experience of December 
1980 and the damage done by the exaggerated presentation of what had happened 
after that meeting. While the present situation was very different and that particular 
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kind of danger did not exist, there still remained a real problem: to ensure that no 
wedge could be driven between us after an agreement had been announced.79 
 
An agreement on post-summit press conferences was especially important as the first 
Thatcher-FitzGerald meeting of the year was scheduled in just over a week’s time. Ahead of 
this meeting, Goodall gave FitzGerald some advice on how to handle Thatcher. 
 
Goodall advised FitzGerald to focus on the American fund. Thatcher favoured this 
idea as she believed that she had “thought of it”. She would therefore feel confident talking 
about it.80 At their meeting in March, it was evident that Thatcher was not as comfortable 
talking about Northern Ireland to FitzGerald as she used to be. ‘ Thatcher spoke from a brief, 
the Taoiseach from a page of notes.’81 FitzGerald used Goodall’s advice. He told Thatcher 
that their teams had made considerable progress. ‘He felt that this created an historic window 
of opportunity for Thatcher and himself to go forward on the basis of the Chequer’s 
communiqué.’82 FitzGerald then turned to Thatcher’s overarching concern; security. 
 
FitzGerald asked for help with a case involving the PIRA laundering money to a bank 
account in Switzerland. According to Goodall, ‘the Taoiseach’s mind was more than usually 
difficult to fathom’ but Thatcher promised to help investigate the matter further.83 FitzGerald 
also talked about the post office in Creggan, a large housing estate in Londonderry, which 
had closed because the RUC could no longer protect it. Pensioners had to travel by bus to lift 
their pensions in another town. Some travelled by a taxi paid for by the PIRA. FitzGerald 
asked if an unarmed, community police could be created and deployed to such areas to 
support the RUC. Thatcher did not comprehend the suggestion. She asked if FitzGerald 
meant something like the ‘B’ specials.84 FitzGerald tartly responded, ‘No; that would be 
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entirely the wrong name to call this unarmed force.’ He mentioned a similar police service 
that had been set up during the Irish civil war of 1922-23. Although they had initially faced 
difficulties they eventually succeeded. Thatcher was not receptive to this idea. She asked if 
FitzGerald wanted a group of ‘vigilantes’ to be installed in problem areas. In the end, 
Armstrong intervened to say that he understood what FitzGerald meant.85 It seems Thatcher 
was deliberately obtuse due to her misgivings over the Anglo-Irish talks. Even so, the idea 
was further researched with the help of the Chief Constable of the RUC.86 FitzGerald had 
made a study of the 1969 Scarman Report prior to the June EEC meeting, and attempted to 
explain to Thatcher why the police needed to be restructured, 
 
Taoiseach: We have looked recently at the Scarman Report. An incident there 
involved a machinegun attack on Divis Flats in which a child was killed. There was 
a second incident in which whole streets of Catholics were burnt out and a third of a 
similar nature in all of which a particular police officer was involved. These incidents 
are mentioned in the Scarman Report. The officer is not named but he had recently 
been promoted to one of the highest offices in the Northern Ireland Police. What kind 
of sensitivity is that? Do you think that a minority community can support a police 
force where that sort of thing happens?  
Prime Minister (visibly moved): I am sure that Douglas Hurd would never …  
Taoiseach: That is the very point. Someone is not telling him …  
Prime Minister: Are there any similar incidents of which you can tell me … 
Taoiseach: I am using this instance as an illustration. I do not want to get into details. 
We are not engaging in a witch hunt.87 
 
FitzGerald was concerned that, despite the new RUC code of conduct, London would not 
change the RUC’s oath of allegiance. The oath, as it stood, put members of the nationalist 
community off joining the RUC as they had to swear to protect the Queen. Dublin thought it 
would be better to swear an oath to the two communities in Northern Ireland instead.88 
FitzGerald understood the reasons for the British decision; a change to the oath would dent 
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the confidence of the unionists, ‘but it was difficult to see how it could be presented as 
anything other than a slap in the face. He did not see how he could explain it.’89 The gap had 
to be bridged. The nationalist community needed to see evidence of change in regards 
security, certainly ‘more than cosmetic and gradualist changes.’90 The RUC and Ulster 
Defence Regiment (UDR) were viewed as emblems of brutality and discrimination by the 
minority community. RUC Officers were mainly protestant and since the start of The 
Troubles, relations between the minority community and the police was increasingly 
problematic.91 Changing the oath could increase the number of catholic recruits and, 
therefore, strengthen relations between the RUC and the minority. But ‘Thatcher and her 
advisors were always conscious of the reaction such changes could provoke. They took 
account ‘not just of Unionist reaction (in parliament or on the hillsides) but also of the 
opinions of cabinet ministers and the mass of Conservative back benchers in the 
Commons.’92  
 
FitzGerald told Thatcher that although the paper was ‘more or less alright,’ there were 
still some outstanding issues. Thatcher was still wary of making a formal agreement with 
Dublin. She had told members of her Cabinet that she wanted to do something about Ireland, 
but she did not know what that something was.93 ‘… she did not have enough knowledge and 
backing to frame an alternative. She felt she had to do something and she allowed herself to 
be persuaded of the likely benefits of most of it.’94 Thatcher relied on Enoch Powell’s 
opinion. Whitelaw commented that Powell had ‘a strange (influence) on Thatcher from 
across the aisle of the House of Commons.’ Whitelaw also repeated Thatcher’s desire to do 
something about Ireland, but in a tone that ‘conveyed a worried hope-rather than a certainty-
that her good intentions would ultimately prevail over her doubts.’95 Privately, Thatcher felt 
that ‘it would not be tolerable to be locked into an agreement which was functioning badly, 
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but would be difficult to denounce. We must leave ourselves a retreat.’96 Thatcher surmised 
that Dublin and London, 
 
… both had the same problem in mirror image. He was worried that he had gone too 
far in the negotiations and would lose support. She was fearful of the reactions of the 
Unionists to the proposed agreement. They would say that the Government had 
conceded a permanent foot in the door to the Irish Government in Northern Ireland 
without receiving anything worthwhile in return. Equally it would be very damaging 
now not to go ahead with the proposed agreement.97 
 
FitzGerald suggested that the Commissioner of the Garda, Lawrence Wren, and Chief 
Constable of the RUC, John Hermon, should be included in the new Intergovernmental 
Committee. This was a surprising idea, given the ‘well-known antipathy’ between the two 
heads of police.98 Earlier in June, Alan Goodison reported that FitzGerald was ‘disturbed’ 
and ‘very upset’ by rumours that London was going to appoint a new police authority for 
Northern Ireland. Goodison told Nally that London could not ‘be expected to act as if an 
agreement were already in place.’ London still had ultimate authority over Northern Ireland 
and could do what it thought best without consulting Dublin. Armstrong noted on the memo 
that he had warned Dublin of this, ‘Will they ever learn?’99 The day after this blip, Hurd met 
with FitzGerald and Barry to discuss their concerns. 
 
FitzGerald had been told that Hurd was going to brief the unionist parties on the 
content of the Armstrong-Nally talks. FitzGerald had agreed to postpone any agreement until 
after the July fortnight ‘to avoid the kind of explosion which talking to (unionists) must 
cause.’ FitzGerald told Hurd that he had kept Hume and Mallon informed because Dublin 
needed ‘to know that what they did would have the support of the SDLP.’ This excuse did 
not convince Hurd. He replied that ‘if the Irish Government needed the support of the SDLP 
we both needed the acquiescence of the unionists.’100 That same day, The Irish Times had 
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published an exposé on the Anglo-Irish talks. The article was accurate and covered each of 
the main topics from the parliamentary tier to devolution.101 How had this leak occurred? 
 
Dublin and London had previously relied on ‘megaphone diplomacy’ to talk to each 
other.102 But since 1980, efforts had been made by both sides to talk directly and secretly to 
each other. James Sharkey, a Counsellor in Dublin’s DFA, pleaded with the British Embassy 
in Dublin to be wary of leaks. He stressed that ‘the undesirability of partial presentations or 
speculations about the content of the talkds [sic] at the present stage of negotiation.’103 
However King suspected that Dublin was tactically leaking details of the talks to allay 
unionist fears. He surmised that he was ‘not surprised that it backfired!’104 The articles only 
fanned the flames of unionist discontent. The Armstrong-Nally forum, as well as talks 
between Thatcher and FitzGerald, were conducted in secret. Information was getting to the 
newspapers. The Irish Times was ‘uncomfortably close to the truth’ on the content of the 
Anglo-Irish meetings, with articles detailing the argument for mixed courts.105 Both articles 
were written by a London based editor, leading Dublin to point the finger firmly at London 
and the NIO. It was suggested that Thatcher should step in by asking the Northern Ireland 
sub-committee (OD(I)) if confidentiality measures were being adhered to.106 The AIA sought 
to strengthen the professional ties between Dublin and London to create ‘clearer and greater 
trust between the two governments. If difficulties arose the first response was not to turn to 
the media but to talk, and on the whole I think we succeeded in doing that.’107 FitzGerald 
closed the meeting with a heartfelt plea to Thatcher and her team, 
 
Speaking with considerable emotion the Taoiseach said that he wanted the Prime 
Minister to understand that the Irish Government and people did not want a role in 
Northern Ireland. He was regarded as eccentric because of the time and effort which 
he was devoting to reach an agreement. He was the only person willing to take risks 
and force the Irish people to face up to the need for an agreement … For 800 years 
Britain had occupied Ireland to protect its flank. There was now a serious risk of 
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ending up with what we had always tried to avoid, an Ireland under hostile and sinister 
influence.108 
 
July began with a brief discussion on joint courts. Again, Nally said that Dublin could not 
sign an agreement without a formal commitment from London on a new judicial system in 
Northern Ireland. Nally also offered to send the Irish Attorney General, John Rogers, to 
Thatcher to discuss the subject.109 Armstrong stuck to policy. He told Nally that there could 
be no commitment as joint courts would cause a plethora of issues, political and legal. 
Thatcher wrote on the memo ‘we cannot agree to this.’110 Nally again tried to get a formal 
commitment from London on 15 July, and once again failed. At the next Armstrong-Nally 
summit on 21 and 22 July, London offered to increase contacts between the British and Irish 
Attorney Generals. Havers, was “jacked up” and had expected contact from Rogers. This was 
the furthest London could go, but the offer was ‘insufficient’ for Dublin.111  
 
 Leaks to the press continued over the summer. On 30 July, Conor Cruise O’Brien 
wrote that there was a final offer on the table. O’Brien did not know the details of the deal, 
but he did know that it involved executive control over Northern Ireland staying in London. 
O’Brien wrote that FitzGerald should not accept any deal from London. The article was 
deemed important enough for Thatcher’s attention.112 There were calls for FitzGerald to 
focus on what he wanted to gain from the AIA, rather than what John Hume and Thatcher 
wanted. ‘There are times when Garret FitzGerald gives the impression of operating on all 
their behalfs [sic] … at the expense of his own. He should be more selfish politically, more-
shrewd, and more relaxed. The crick in his neck from looking over his shoulder will then 
disappear.’113 If Dublin was leaking details of the talks to the press to keep unionists on side, 
it was not working. Over the summer marching season, unionists took to the streets to vent 
their anger, 
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The Northern Ireland Secretary reported that the situation in Northern Ireland had 
taken a turn for the worse since their last meeting. The Official Unionists had chosen 
to devote their Opposition day to a debate on the negotiations with the Republic. Dr. 
Paisley was stoking discontent. For the first time mention was being made of strike 
action. … Minor disturbances were becoming a regular feature in the Shankill 
Road.114 
 
The ‘Real Lives’ Affair 
While Dublin and London continued to negotiate, the BBC filmed a documentary for the 
‘Real Lives’ series called ‘At the edge of the union.’ The programme depicted Martin 
McGuiness, a self-confessed member of the PIRA, as a dedicated family man. This gave him 
a ‘human face’ and softened his reputation. ‘Here was a man regarded as an IRA commander 
shown at home with his wife and family, carrying out his role as a councillor and going to 
church. It sat very uneasily with the anti-terrorist propaganda of the armalite-toting, masked 
IRA man.’115 Only a month previously, Thatcher had given an emphatic speech at the 
American Bar Association in which she said that ‘terrorists’ should be starved ‘of the oxygen 
of publicity on which they depend.’ Thatcher said she did not mean outright censorship but 
had called on the media to adopt a code of conduct ‘… under which they would not say or 
show anything which could assist the terrorists’ morale or their cause …’116 
 
Leon Brittan, Thatcher’s Home Secretary, wrote to Stuart Young, Chairman of the 
BBC, to ask him to reconsider broadcasting the documentary.117 Brittan wrote that the 
programme ‘would be giving an immensely valuable platform to those who have evinced an 
ability, readiness and intention to murder indiscriminately its own viewers.’ It would also 
cause distress to the family members of PIRA victims. He quoted Thatcher’s US Bar 
Association speech and referred to the Trans World Airlines hijack in June.118 Brittan argued 
that ‘Even if the programme and any surrounding material were, as a whole, to present 
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terrorist organisations in a wholly unfavourable light, I would still ask you not to permit it to 
be broadcast.’119 The BBC Board of Governors suspected that the programme panicked the 
Thatcher Government mainly because it clashed with Thatcher’s ‘oxygen of publicity’ 
speech. Brittan’s letter was an attempt to save the Prime Minister’s face. The Board of 
Governors wrestled between the importance of broadcasting a programme that had already 
been advertised, and going against the wishes of Downing Street.120 
 
 Alan Protheroe, the Assistant Director General, argued that the programme was a 
political documentary. ‘… it underlined the irreconcilability of these two positions (unionism 
and republicanism); he did not believe it could be seen as an incitement to terrorism or as a 
justification of the use of violence.’ But other programmes that mirrored tense political 
situations had postponed to a later date. For example, ‘Ms. Rhymney Valley,’ about a mining 
community in South Wales at the time of the miners’ strike while the strike was on.’ The 
play was screened later, perhaps the same could be done with ‘Real Lives’?121 No. Alasdair 
Milne, the Director General, felt that a fair compromise was to screen an edited documentary. 
‘Real Lives’ had to ‘“hit the air if this place is to run properly” and the BBC were to maintain 
its credibility.’122 In fact, the ‘Real Lives’ episode ‘… dented the reputation’ of the BBC, and 
the Thatcher Government was accused of censorship.123 In July Gerald Kauffman, Labour 
MP, delivered a damning summation of the incident. ‘Thatcher gives a lot of impressions. 
One of the impressions that she gives is that since she doesn’t even allow free speech in her 
own cabinet, she doesn’t want anyone else to exercise it.’124 
 
The Last Push: Anglo-Irish Negotiations, July-November 1985 
London still did not know how an Anglo-Irish agreement would impact Northern Ireland. 
Cabinet had concluded that although the Agreement could ‘be of substantial benefit … it was 
not a solution to the problem of Northern Ireland: it would be only a step forward.’125 The 
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Armstrong-Nally talks had continued behind the scenes, but now Thatcher needed to make a 
commitment to the process. Armstrong told her ‘our preferred timetable seems likely to be 
an Anglo-Irish Summit in late October followed quickly by debates in the House of 
Commons and the Dáil and then by the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission.’ 
But Thatcher wanted to stick to protocol. She noted, ‘We have to debate these here before 
they are communicated.’ Thatcher was also unimpressed with the current draft agreement 
and put her squiggles underneath Armstrong’s assertion that the draft had been ‘agreed with 
the FCO and the NIO. We believe that it fairly reflects British interests.’ The Irish side wanted 
to reach agreement on the status of prisoners and asked Armstrong if Thatcher would agree 
to announce that terrorist prisoners in Northern Ireland ‘who have been convicted of terrorist 
crimes.’ This was too much for Thatcher. She scribbled that this point may have been 
approved by the NIO, but ‘Not with (her).’ Thatcher wrote at the bottom of the page, ‘I am 
utterly astounded by this minute. I am not prepared to go ahead with either of these things. 
NO. MT.’126 Thatcher may not have been directly involved in the negotiations, but on certain 
points her directions were clear. 
 
 Armstrong presented Thatcher with the option of restricting Army activity. In effect, 
the Army could only be active in the presence of the RUC. However, the presented paragraph 
was rejected not only for its content, but its presentation. Thatcher scribbled beside it, 
‘Shouldn’t dream of putting my name to such terrible English.’127 An advisor asked if her 
comment extended ‘to disliking the principles? Thatcher replied, ‘What is the paragraph 
trying to say? That we shall discuss how to return to a situation of normal policing? Or that 
the Army acts now rather than in support of the civil power? If we work out the meaning we 
can find the words.’128 The Armstrong-Nally forum then finished until September for summer 
recess. When it returned, there were major changes to the London team. 
 
 Thatcher had made light-hearted threats to shuffle key British diplomats. Goodall 
reported to Dorr that Thatcher had joked, ‘“It is time we found you a good Embassy, Mr. 
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Goodall”. He had asked where and she had replied “Indonesia”!’ Although Dorr resigned 
this as ‘ Thatcher’s rather heavy effort at banter,’ the remarks were unsettling and ‘cruel.’129 
In September, there was a Cabinet reshuffle. Goodall stayed in the Foreign Office, but 
Thatcher moved Hurd to the Home Secretary’s Office. His replacement as Secretary of State 
was Tom King. Disbelief resounded in Dublin. The Armstrong-Nally negotiations were in 
the final stages, ‘changing the relevant minister implied that Thatcher did not really give 
much thought to Ireland.’130 Thatcher had given ‘the Irish Government and the Irish people, 
north and south, a good resounding slap in the teeth.’131 In his autobiography, Hurd wrote 
that the job was ‘a marked promotion’ that he could not reject.132 King was a virtual unknown. 
He had held various, short-lived cabinet posts under Thatcher since 1976. His move from 
Employment to Northern Ireland was considered a demotion, and King admitted he ‘was in 
no sense an expert on Ulster matters.’133 But Thatcher felt he was the right man for the job. 
‘… Tom went with good grace and to good effect.’134  
 
King met with FitzGerald and Barry soon after his appointment as Secretary of State. 
FitzGerald recalled that King wanted a new Anglo-Irish process to have a ‘soft launch.’135 
London had promised that joint courts would be examined but King warned FitzGerald that 
it would be done with little ‘enthusiasm.’ ‘(King) was very dubious about the whole concept 
and if any agreement was to be entered into in good faith, the Irish side should understand 
that from the outset.’ Joint courts could be the ‘straw to break the camel’s back so far as the 
unionists were concerned.’136 King wanted to remove the article on joint courts as he felt it 
tipped the balance in Dublin’s favour. He was particularly concerned with the unionist 
reaction to the agreement.137 Thatcher agreed with King. She felt the agreement was in 
Dublin’s favour but did not know what to do about it. King was effectively powerless to 
change the terms of the agreement, having been appointed only two months before it was due 
                                                
129 NAI, TAOIS 2015/89/88, letter from Dorr to Lillis, 12 Mar. 1985. 
130 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two, p. 308. 
131 The Leinster Express, 4 Sept. 1985. 
132 Hurd, Memoirs, p. 346. 
133 Email correspondence with Lord King of Bridgewater, 9 Apr. 2017. 
134 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 421. 
135 FitzGerald, All in a Life, p. 557. 
136 TNA UK, PREM 19/1550, King meeting with FitzGerald, 17 Sept. 1985. 
137 TNA UK, PREM 19/1550, letter from King to MT, 25 Sept. 1985. 
 192 
to be signed. Thatcher instead looked at his objections as an opportunity to ‘look at the text 
afresh.’138 She requested to meet with King, Armstrong and Howe.139 
 
At that meeting on 2 October, King’s objections were over ruled. Thatcher was “too 
far down the road” to go back on the Armstrong-Nally negotiations.140 The risks of signing 
an agreement and having Dublin involved in Northern Ireland outweighed the risk of 
abandoning an agreement, especially given the rise in support for Sinn Féin. It was decided 
to press on with negotiations. Thatcher advised Armstrong to ‘make crystal clear that the 
Irish Government would have no executive role in the North … Decisions in Northern Ireland 
would remain for us.’141 Thatcher pooh-poohed King’s concerns and sided with Armstrong 
and Howe, who were more experienced.142 All this contradicts the popular image of Thatcher 
as an autocratic leader. In this instance, 
 
… her heart was … compelled to yield, albeit grudgingly, to her highly intelligent 
head; and this not under pressure from others because she, a woman of integrity, could 
weigh evidence, perceive what course would turn out best and, against natural 
impulse, decide to follow it.143 
 
At the end of September, the Armstrong-Nally forum focused on security.  
 
 Armstrong quizzed Nally on Dublin’s promise to sign the European Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST). Accession to the ECST would show a formal 
commitment by Dublin to defeating the PIRA and working alongside London.144 The ECST 
would also close a loophole on extradition whereby people who committed politically 
motivated crimes could not be extradited.145 The ECST was introduced in Autumn because 
Dublin had ruled out amending articles two and three of the constitution. London ‘… had 
created a disturbingly unilateral bargaining situation, one in which they were in a position to 
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make and withhold concessions at will because we had virtually nothing on the table to offer 
in turn.’146 Nally argued that Dublin wanted to accede to the ECST, but that it would be 
difficult unless London made a concession for them on three judge courts. Nally felt if 
FitzGerald signed the agreement as it stood, it would be illogical. ‘… we were arguing that 
the Northern court system was flawed …’ yet London wanted Dublin to ‘… facilitate 
extradition to those same courts.’ Armstrong wondered if recruiting catholic judges to the 
Northern Ireland judicial system would be enough to increase nationalist confidence, but 
Nally said that that ‘… would not be sufficient.’147 The discussion then moved on to the 
UDR. 
 
 The UDR was a regiment of the British Army, deployed exclusively in Northern 
Ireland from 1970 to defend the province from paramilitary attack. The UDR recruited from 
the population in Northern Ireland and had a high number of former ‘B’ specials in their 
battalion. There were also rumours that loyalist paramilitaries had infiltrated the regiment to 
steal weapons and gain experience.148 FitzGerald felt that the existence of the UDR was 
detrimental to nationalists and wanted to disband it completely.149 Armstrong had told Nally 
at an earlier September meeting that the UDR would be ‘kept under review.’ Dublin 
wondered ‘… whether they could go ahead with an Anglo-Irish agreement at all.’ London 
was holding its cards close to its chest. Dublin needed to know what they were really thinking 
and asked them to produce a brief that they could take back to FitzGerald.150 By the end of 
September, London agreed to have the RUC accompany all UDR patrols.151 Meanwhile, it 
looked as though Thatcher was in trouble. 
 
The Cabinet shuffle in September had caused ‘genuine and widespread worry’ in 
Thatcher as leader. Some Conservatives had started a search for ‘realistic possibilities for the 
next leadership.’ Peter Bruinvels, Conservative MP for Leicester East, reported that ‘... 
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Thatcher would have to go (and Bruinvels says this as someone who has given her vociferous 
support in the past); the right (including himself) will propose Norman Tebbit; the left will 
propose Peter Walker; they will then jointly agree on the compromise candidate: Douglas 
Hurd.’152 Thatcher needed a definitive move on Northern Ireland. There would be no 
Falklands factor to save her this time. This is partly why we see Thatcher become acutely 
involved in the negotiations from October onwards. Armstrong had told her that ‘the Irish 
Government are trembling on the brink of an agreement but need a concession on either joint 
courts or the role and development of the UDR to tip them over the edge.’153 
 
 Thatcher carefully checked over the draft agreements. When the word ‘committee’ 
was used, she noted, 
 
Having read the agreement again I fear it does not accurately convey our meaning. 
The fact is that this committee is no more than consultative. We have made it sound 
as if we have given the Republic more authority in our affairs. We haven’t and don’t 
intend to.154 
 
 Thatcher also rejected the term ‘conference.’ She wrote on a memo ‘It isn’t a conference. It 
is a committee.’155 Thatcher felt that the draft agreement was still in Dublin’s favour. She 
worried that ‘… those who argued that the Agreement held out the prospect of closer co-
operation against terrorism, the riposte would be that it should not be necessary for the UK 
to pay a price for Irish co-operation in this field.’156 With an agreement imminent, Thatcher 
wrote to FitzGerald to clarify a few outstanding points. 
 
  Thatcher told FitzGerald that she would be unable to sign an agreement in October 
as she was travelling to the US to meet with Reagan. She suggested a date in mid-November 
so that the agreement could be debated by the Commons in good time.157 In reply, Nally 
proposed signing the agreement in New York as FitzGerald would be there the same week 
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as Thatcher. Powell wrote on the letter, ‘This won’t do at all. It would put us under time-
pressure before the substance is finalized; we leave no time for Cabinet consideration.’ 
Thatcher agreed and rejected the suggestion.158 Thatcher also asked FitzGerald to reconsider 
the location of the Anglo-Irish Secretariat. The Secretariat was to be based at Maryfield in 
Belfast, but London was concerned that having a permanent base would make personnel 
sitting ducks for paramilitaries. The Maryfield team would have important work to do in 
helping the agreement.159 Thatcher asked FitzGerald to keep his appointments to the body 
‘small’ so that the team could be moved around different sites until ‘the new arrangements 
have settled down.’160 October saw the draft of the AIA passed back and forth between 
Dublin and London.  
 
 On 9 October, it was agreed that the AIA would be signed on 15 November. London 
wanted to ensure the agreement conveyed the correct meaning and would not inflame the 
unionists. At this time, King asked Thatcher for permission to bring his Parliamentary Private 
Secretary, Brian Mawhinney, with him to the rest of the meetings with Dublin.161 Mawhinney 
could then field questions from Conservative backbenchers on the agreement following its 
signature.162 This was a risky strategy. The agreement was a month away and extending the 
inner circle would increase the risk of leaks to the media. Indeed, there were already 
accusations from Dublin that a junior Minister had shown a draft copy of the AIA to the press 
in Blackpool. Powell mentioned that Mawhinney had close contacts with some ‘fairly 
extreme’ unionists. He had recently met with Paisley and was suspected of being the Minister 
with the draft.163 Powell wrote on a memo to Thatcher, ‘I don’t like the way these allegations 
are flying about,’ and Thatcher replied, ‘Nor do I.’164 Thatcher had just denied a request from 
King for Mawhinney to be shown a draft. Armstrong had also opposed showing Mawhinney 
a draft as he would no longer be able to tell Nally that the talks were wholly confidential. 
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Thatcher denied King’s request for Mawhinney to come with him to the Armstrong-Nally 
meetings. ‘No,’ she noted, ‘as indicated on a previous note, it is for Dr. Mawhinney’s position 
that he should not be there.’165 A draft copy of the agreement did not appear in the press 
before November because London was vigilant. Thatcher wrote at the top of a memo, ‘We 
must keep the information to a very limited circle.’166 King was still concerned that the 
unionist parties had not been officially told about the talks. 
 
During a meeting with Hume, King argued that there was little in the upcoming 
agreement for unionists. Hume believed that King was ‘in danger of bowing to Unionist 
pressure, that he is caving in.’167 After meeting King, Dorr reflected that he was disappointed 
‘at the extent to which he seems to want to play down various points to reduce the extent to 
which he will be subject to attack from Unionist flank.’168 As the agreement came closer, 
Paisley and Molyneaux dug their heels in. They told King they were ‘resolutely opposed to 
any Anglo-Irish Agreement and will see any Agreement as undermining Northern Ireland’s 
position as part of the UK.’ King surmised that the two leaders were only trying to get their 
point across, he doubted there would ‘be any histrionics,’ but concern over the unionist 
response was mounting.  
 
Paisley and Molyneaux met with Thatcher on 30 October. King warned Thatcher that 
although Paisley and Molyneaux were not privy to the Armstrong-Nally negotiations, they 
had ‘gleaned much from leaks in the newspapers.’169 King advised her to keep the exact 
details of the talks secret, as Paisley and Molyneaux would take whatever snippet of 
information they got straight to the press.170 Whilst London worked on keeping the agreement 
under wraps, Richard Ryan, a counsellor in the Irish Embassy and Dorr, then Irish 
Ambassador in London, researched support for the agreement in the Commons.171  
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 Ryan and Dorr asked around quietly to gleam as much information as they could for 
Lillis. They found that Bruinvels was ‘being courted by Enoch Powell (who is a personal 
friend), Jim Molyneaux (who presented him last week with a Unionist Party tie: he agreed to 
become a member of the UUP), Ian Paisley (whom he intensely dislikes), and John Taylor 
(UUP) (whom he also dislikes).’ Enoch Powell continually tried to rally support for unionists 
at Westminster. To start to work against an agreement, Bruinvels had been given a list of 
MP’s who had consented to it. This ‘blacklist’ was based on a Sunday Express article from 
July 1984 and was circulated around conservative benches. Although he recognised that the 
list was ‘a shabby piece of work,’ Bruinvels told Ryan that it had worried some people.172 
Tim Yeo, MP for South Suffolk, suggested that if Thatcher added Powell to the New Year 
honours list, he would leave the Commons. ‘Yeo recalled that Powell had told him that his 
ultimate goal was to gain ‘a seat “in another place”.’ Yeo himself was ‘fully on side’ with 
the negotiations and was willing to help the other organisers, Bill Cash and Bill Benyon.173 
Not everyone was receptive to the Dorr-Ryan lobby effort.  
 
Ryan briefly met Norman Tebbit in the Commons. He reacted strongly to Ryan, 
 
Tebbit, who had returned to work in January following Brighton, said there are no 
normal people in Northern Ireland or in Ireland as a whole. He became quite warm 
and asked how many casualties we are prepared to take to make this thing work, 
because that is what it boils down to, and if we have any illusions to the contrary we 
are bigger fools than he takes us for.174 
 
Ireland was a sensitive topic that had touched the lives of many in the Commons. Bernard 
Weatherill, Speaker of the House, was aware that a number of soldiers from his constituency 
had been killed in Ireland. As a consequence, the majority of his electorate wanted a ‘clean 
break’ from Ireland or at least ‘some quid pro quo for their sacrifice, their contribution.’175 
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By early November, Ryan and Dorr surmised that they could ‘do nothing to warn M.P.s 
whom we have not yet worked on in depth, or don’t know very well personally, about the 
possibility of well-poisoning.’ They were a two-man band against a ‘ruthless, narrow and 
actually rather stupid and blundering’ opposition. They were outnumbered. They felt that the 
opposition was ‘grim, humourless and pretty well without scruple’ and would do anything to 
discredit their work. They feared that the Conservative opposition would fling mud ‘in such 
a way as to make some stick.’ The two wrote to Lillis to tell him that they would continue 
their lobby and that they were ‘not susceptible to the tactics of folk who are, it seems, only 
prepared to play as long as they can win.’176  
 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement, November 1985 
On the day of the signing, Thatcher had a major setback. Ian Gow, who had been one of her 
Northern Ireland advisors and a close personal friend, resigned in protest against the AIA.177 
Gow was a staunch unionist advocate and felt that the AIA was a betrayl by the conservatives. 
It was a great personal blow to her, so much so that as soon as she landed in Hillsborough, 
she telephoned Gow to try to persuade him to stay. The call proved unsuccessful.178 Havers 
thought this was ‘a crazy thing to do.’ Gow’s resignation was more symbolic as he had started 
to distance himself from unionism. Havers ‘would have made this clear to the bloody fool if 
he had only flown a kite, but he didn’t.’179 Gow’s resignation rattled Thatcher. She became 
more unsettled as the actual signing approached. She moved furniture around and checked 
that the painting behind the desk had no political connotations.180 She also tried to fill time 
by holding a rehearsal question and answer session with FitzGerald.181 At 2pm, FitzGerald 
and Thatcher signed the AIA. The ceremony had a few hiccups. Unionist protestors had 
gathered outside the gates of the Castle and could be heard clearly throughout the 
afternoon.182 Also, FitzGerald opened his statement by speaking Irish. King later recalled 
that he had given no prior warning of this. At a time when Thatcher was already agitated, it 
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was ‘a pretty insensitive thing to have done without any warning to us, when neither Margaret 
nor Geoffrey nor I had the slightest idea what he was saying.’183 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how, in spite of being close to the AIA, Thatcher began to disengage 
from Northern Ireland. She left much of the negotiations with Dublin to her team, headed by 
Armstrong, and checked in to ensure security remained the top priority. Indeed, Thatcher’s 
near fixation with security measures becomes obvious during her meetings with FitzGerald. 
FitzGerald begins to act almost like a teacher when he instructs her that likening an unarmed 
volunteer police force to the ‘B’ specials is entirely wrong. It becomes obvious that Thatcher 
did not fully comprehend the history of Northern Ireland, and in response to this she becomes 
obtuse when discussing it with FitzGerald and her own team. This chapter also further 
highlights the ongoing problems with the media. As the AIA negotiations continued, the 
Thatcher government began to clamp down on giving those she deemed terrorists ‘the oxygen 
of publicity.’184 The ‘Real Lives’ affair led to accusations of media censorship. This coupled 
with leaks to the media regarding the AIA ignited tensions within the unionist community, 
who as we will see in chapter six, responded with outrage to the agreement. 
 
1985 was a remarkable year for Anglo-Irish relations. In spite of FitzGerald’s habit 
of over-talking, and her personal preference for Haughey, Thatcher learnt to trust FitzGerald. 
She reportedly ‘… liked the way he did not “tell” everything that had been discussed in 
private and began to see in him as the first realistic Irish leader with whom she could do 
business. Thatcher and FitzGerald were polar personalities. She, sharp-witted; he, an absent-
minded academic. Earlier in 1985 FitzGerald had become a national laughing stock when he 
poured salt into his tea. This incident came immediately after he had lost two pairs of glasses 
whilst out picking holly at Christmas.185 The relationship between Dublin and London had 
suffered its ups and downs, but now they were approaching what would be a pivotal event in 
the Northern Ireland peace process.  
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The AIA ensured that Dublin and London would work together. Gone were the days 
of headline diplomacy, where newspapers knew more about one government’s line of policy. 
‘Hillsborough seemed to promise an end to Anglo-Irish misunderstanding and held out the 
possibility of a constructive partnership with Dublin which might prevent Britain getting 
saddled with international criticism for dealing firmly with the Ulster crisis.’186 Thatcher 
committed herself and her government ‘to a new departure in Anglo-Irish relations the 
destination of which she would not be able to determine.’187 London did not want to fail, ‘… 
we must try to avoid finding ourselves in a few years time in a situation in which the 
agreement had not achieved our objectives.’188 Even before the AIA was signed, it had 
achieved its goal of bringing Dublin and London closer together. ‘In a sense, the most 
important achievement of the Agreement was that it removed distrust.’189 Thatcher and 
FitzGerald both made sacrifices to come to an agreement. Thatcher had ‘dumped’ the 
unionists and ‘cut through the labyrinth of Irish politics’ while FitzGerald had ‘the vision to 
abandon myth and go for reality.’190 Britain formally agreed to allow the Irish government to 
‘assist it henceforth in running the North as part of the United Kingdom.’191 As Goodall 
surmised, ‘Looking back on it, it’s not what the Agreement actually achieved at the time that 
proved significant, but what it led to.’192  
 
 Thatcher overruled internal and external opposition, from her party and the unionists 
respectively, in favour of the bigger picture. She permitted her selected team to work on the 
negotiations instead of going back and forth to FitzGerald herself. This is a marked departure 
from the image of Thatcher as an autocratic leader. She was prepared to take risks in order 
to secure a long-term arrangement with Dublin and better security for Northern Ireland. On 
the later point she was to be bitterly disappointed. 
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Chapter 6 
‘The Jezebel who sought to destroy Israel in a day’: 
Implementing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, November 1985-
December 1986 
 This is a treaty which has no clothes. It cannot do what it claims to do. It cannot carry out 
what it promises.1  
 
On New Year’s Eve 1985, RUC Constables James McCandless and Michael Williams 
patrolled the streets of Armagh town. County Armagh was ‘bandit’ country, a PIRA 
stronghold. Few families had been untouched by the Northern Ireland Troubles, which was 
about to enter its seventeenth year. As McCandless and Williams passed a litter bin on 
Thomas Street, the bells of the Cathedral rang in the New Year, 1986. Seconds later two 
PIRA men, hiding inside a nearby house, detonated a bomb. The two Constables were 
instantly killed. The PIRA claimed responsibility for the attack later on New Year’s Day, 
signalling the continuation of its violent campaign. It added that it would continue to kill 
members of the security forces with “increased efficiency”.2 
 
The 1985 AIA had 15 clauses that aimed to promote ‘lasting peace and stability,’ to 
recognise and respect the two traditions in Northern Ireland and to encourage dialogue 
between the unionist and nationalist political parties.3 But Dublin and London were 
unprepared for the backlash the AIA caused.4 The unionist parties, the DUP and OUP, were 
deeply angered that they had not been consulted about the agreement.5 On 17 December 
1985, all unionist MPs resigned their Westminster seats.6 Throughout 1986, unionist protests 
against the AIA escalated. There was a day-long strike and a small town in the Republic of 
                                                
1 The Mirror, 5 Dec. 1985. 
2 The Irish Times, 1 Jan. 1986, The Belfast Telegraph, 3 Jan. 1986. 
3 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland, November 1985 (with joint communiqué), 1985/86 Cmnd. 9657, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online.  
4 PRONI, CENT 3/10, Prime Minister: Northern Ireland, 11 Jan. 1986. 
5 In this chapter, the term ‘unionist’ will denote members of the DUP, UUP, OUP and their supporters. 
6 Arwell Ellis Owen, The AIA, The First Three Years (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1994), p. 45. 
 202 
Ireland was ‘invaded.’ This coupled with the continuation of the PIRA’s violent campaign 
highlighted the failures of the AIA.  
 
In Dublin, FitzGerald was in trouble. His divorce referendum, a key component of 
his constitutional crusade, was defeated. He managed to survive a vote of no confidence in 
February and again in October, but it was clear that he was on his way out. Thatcher 
continued to push for more security while FitzGerald tried to negotiate for three judge courts 
in Northern Ireland. Far from beckoning a new beginning for Northern Ireland, the AIA had 
brought about a stalemate. Problems with security cooperation were compounded by 
collapsed extradition cases throughout 1986 and suspicion surrounding the Stalker Inquiry. 
The Armstrong-Nally forum had convinced Thatcher to sign the AIA. She now needed to see 
results. 
 
This chapter will follow the Ulster Unionist protests against the AIA throughout 
1986. This is important because, thanks to the release of the PREM and Taoiseach files, for 
the first time we will be able to understand how these protests were followed in Dublin and 
London. This chapter also outlines Thatcher’s obvious disappointment in the AIA, which 
lead to her taking a rather defeatist attitude during her meetings with FitzGerald. This chapter 
goes beyond any previous analysis of the Thatcher Government’s Northern Ireland policy. 
Before, historians have written off the years after the AIA due to Thatcher’s disengagement 
from Northern Ireland policy. Now, we will be able to understand how Anglo-Irish relations 
in the later 1980s did continue, albeit at a distance when compared to the Armstrong-Nally 
talks.  
 
Belfast Says No! Unionist Resistance to the AIA 
On 23 November 1985, Ian Paisley took to the platform outside Belfast City Hall to address 
a large crowd of anti-agreement unionists. The AIA had been signed the previous Friday. 
Thousands of unionists had gathered in city centre to protest against the Agreement. London 
had hoped that unionists would accept the AIA, as article one guaranteed British sovereignty 
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over Northern Ireland.7 Yet unionists believed that they had been ‘… delivered, bound and 
trussed like a turkey ready for the oven, from one nation to another nation.’8 Paisley 
addressed the crowd in front of an ‘Ulster says NO!’ banner that was strewn across the front 
of City Hall. ‘… Thatcher tells us that that Republic must have some say in our province. We 
say never! Never! Never!’9 On 17 December, all unionist MPs resigned their seats in an act 
of further protest against the AIA. A by-election was called for 23 January 1986. The election 
was promoted as a referendum on the AIA. Unionists were asked to come out and vote against 
Dublin’s role in their province. One unionist candidate stood in each electoral area. If an area 
had no candidates, a dummy, ‘Peter Barry,’ then Irish Foreign Minister, was put forward.10 
Initially, the election results pointed to a unionist victory. All but one of the unionist 
candidates won their seat. The unionist parties celebrated what they saw as an outright 
victory. The Newsletter led with ‘418,230 loyalists say NO. What now Maggie?’11 However, 
the result was interpreted differently by Westminster.  
 
Turnout had actually fallen from 73% to 61% as many non-unionists had abstained.12 
The by-election, therefore, did not paint a complete picture of the electorate in Northern 
Ireland. The UUP also lost the Newry and Armagh seat to the SDLP.13 To London the by-
election was not an outright failure, nor was it a resounding success. This difference in 
assessment effectively ‘tarnished any gains that were made in terms of votes cast against the 
Agreement.’14 When it was clear that the by-election had failed to impress London, the DUP, 
led by Ian Paisley, began to organise militant protests. 
 
 Thatcher’s government had predicted ‘a range of Unionist responses, ranging from 
civil disobedience to paramilitary violence.’15 Ian Gow, who had resigned in protest against 
the AIA, told the unionist Belfast Newsletter that ‘Ulster’s position would be strengthened 
                                                
7 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland, November 1985 (with joint communiqué), 1985/86 Cmnd. 9657. 
8 Cochrane, Unionist Politics, p. 28. 
9 Footage of Paisley’s speech can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N_XuQTWZBH0. 
10 Owen, The AIA, p. 45. 
11 The News Letter, 25 Jan. 1986. 
12 TNA UK, PREM 19/1810, Northern Ireland political bulletin, 29 Jan. 1986. 
13 The results of the Westminster by-elections on 23 Jan. 1986 are available on CAIN, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/rw1986.htm. 
14 Cochrane, Unionist Politics, p. 144. 
15 PRONI, CENT 3/10, Prime Minister: Northern Ireland, 11 Jan. 1986. 
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by the “restrained and self-disciplined protest through the ballot box”.’ But there was no sign 
of tempers cooling.16 Paisley seemed determined to cause as much disruption as possible. 
Following suit, unionists refused to carry out their duties in local councils, therefore breaking 
the terms of their government contracts.17 Tom King sent Thatcher a ‘sombre’ minute that 
outlined how the AIA had been received in Northern Ireland.18 
 
Across the board, unionists were outraged by the AIA. Many saw it as ‘a sell-out to 
Dublin,’ the rest felt it was ‘… a well-meaning but ill-judged attempt which will collapse and 
lead to less rather than more stability.’ There was no hope of convincing the unionists to 
accept the AIA, ‘… the best we are likely to obtain is a grudging acquiescence.’ Coupled 
with this was a difference in approach between Dublin and London. Dublin lacked a sense 
of urgency in security cooperation. There was also a ‘… wide gulf in perception of the 
underlying realities of the Northern Ireland situation …’ But King also felt that Thatcher 
should stand firm.19 Kenneth Bloomfield, head of Northern Ireland’s Civil Service, and 
George Quigley, Permanent Secretary in Dublin’s Department of Finance and Personnel, 
surmised that unionists had trapped themselves in ‘logical cul-de-sacs,’ a cycle of negativity 
that saw them refuse to take part in negotiations.20 They followed a ‘we will eat grass’ policy. 
In the end, their obstinacy could ‘bring the whole place down about their ears.’21 King shared 
the bad news with Dublin. 
 
During a meeting with Michael Lillis, King warned that action ‘à la 1974’ was about 
to happen in Northern Ireland. People had purchased tinned food in anticipation of disruption. 
The NIO believed that Northern Ireland ‘could be “in flames”.’ King warned that the situation 
was ‘getting quite dangerous.’22 During an Armstrong/Nally meeting, London warned that 
violence in Northern Ireland was likely to worsen. The security forces had intercepted 
carloads of explosives and ammunition. London needed to see a commitment from Dublin 
                                                
16 The Belfast Telegraph, 7 Jan. 1986. 
17 PRONI, CENT 3/10, Prime Minister: Northern Ireland, 11 Jan. 1986. 
18 TNA UK, PREM 19/1810, King minute to MT, 10 Jan. 1986. 
19 iBid., 
20 Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, British civil servant. Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service 1984-1991. Sir George Quigley, 
businessman and British civil servant. Permanent Secretary, Department of Finance and Personnel 1979-1988. 
21 NAI, TAOIS 2016/52/16, Bloomfield meeting with Quigley, 28 Jan. 1986. 
22 NAI, TAOIS 2016/52/65, Lillis 980 to O Tuathail, 18 Feb. 1986.	
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on security co-operation but Dublin argued that security co-operation had improved since the 
AIA had been signed.23 Thatcher held a series of meetings towards the end of February to 
get a sense of how the AIA was received in Dublin and Northern Ireland. 
 
First, she met with FitzGerald. Thatcher still believed that getting greater security co-
operation and a move on the ECST would prove to the unionists that the AIA was worthwhile. 
Thatcher was dejected. She told FitzGerald ‘We might as well not have had the Agreement.’ 
Criminal activity around border areas continued to be a problem as suspects could easily 
evade arrest. FitzGerald thought this was ‘absolute nonsense’ and claimed that the Irish army 
had doubled in size. He believed the RUC Code of Conduct was pivotal to helping the police. 
Gaining the trust of the minority community would reduce attacks on police officers. He felt 
the Code and border patrols were key elements of the AIA that were not yet working. To this 
Thatcher interjected that cross-border security was not working. Could FitzGerald move 
more Gardaí to patrol the border? FitzGerald again pointed to different techniques and added 
that if there were issues ‘it should start at the level of the problem, not at Prime Ministerial 
level.’24  
 
 Thatcher was also unhappy with some of the comments from Dublin about the AIA. 
She asked FitzGerald why his ministers had claimed that the agreement gave Ireland more 
power than it actually did. This, she said, only further aggravated the unionists. FitzGerald 
was not aware of any such comments and asked for a list to be produced and sent to him. He 
added that it was not in their interests to antagonise the unionists further.25 A list produced 
by London highlighted comments made by FitzGerald, Barry and Dick Spring.26 FitzGerald 
pointed out that not all blame could be laid on Dublin. King had claimed that the AIA was a 
guarantee against a united Ireland. Whilst this was partially true, FitzGerald was concerned 
that there would be ‘considerable furore in the Republic.’ He went on to say that such remarks 
would cause problems for him in the Dáil, but he would ‘show restraint and decline to make 
                                                
23 NAI, TAOIS 2016/52/65, cross-border security co-operation, 17 Feb. 1986. 
24 NAI, TAOIS 2016/52/65, FitzGerald meeting with MT, 19 Feb. 1986. London’s record of the meeting is kept in TNA 
UK, PREM 19/1811.  
25 iBid., and TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, letter from Powell to Daniell, 19 Feb. 1986. 
26 Seven quotes were selected. The list was compiled after the ‘Day of Action’ in March. TNA UK, PREM 19/1812, letter 
from Ward to Powell, 3 Mar. 1986. 
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any comment.’27 FitzGerald showed that he knew how to deflate Thatcher. Instead of publicly 
condemning King, he wanted to move on. However, news soon reached him of a gaffe from 
London. 
 
FitzGerald was due to take the annual St. Patrick’s Day trip to the United States. This 
year was a particularly anticipated visit as it coincided with the retirement of Tip O’Neill.28 
Before FitzGerald left, he discovered that Thatcher had sent a message to Reagan requesting 
that the visit be kept low key with little media coverage. Thatcher denied any knowledge of 
the message. She told FitzGerald that she had not made the request but someone else may 
have. She promised to conduct an investigation into the matter as she wanted to know more 
about it.29 It was discovered that FitzGerald had misinterpreted, or been incorrectly informed 
of, a request from London to not hand over control of US aid for Northern Ireland at the 
White House dinner.30 It was explained that to make such a gesture at an exclusively 
American-Irish dinner would be inappropriate. As it transpired, March 1986 was a difficult 
month for Anglo-Irish relations.31   
 
‘This is the little school girl they want to send to England’: Dublin and the ECST 
Issues with extradition from Ireland to the UK gained prominence due to a number of high 
profile cases in 1986. The problem for Dublin lay in widespread mistrust of the Northern 
Ireland justice system. The use of Diplock Courts, with no jury, and supergrasses as witnesses 
meant that people in Ireland perceived the Northern Ireland system as unfair. Irish law also 
stated that a person could not be extradited if the crime was politically motivated, something 
paramilitary prisoners could argue. Although 87 extradition cases had been successfully 
completed, London believed that Dublin was reluctant to send Irish citizens to trial in the 
UK.32 This theory seemed to be proven when Evelyn Glenholmes, who had been arrested in 
Dublin in 1984 on charges relating to the 1981 London bombing, the Harrods bomb and the 
1984 Brighton Bomb, was released by a Dublin Court in March 1986. Glenholmes was 
                                                
27 TNA UK, PREM 19/1812, letter from Powell to Budd, 7 Mar. 1986. 
28 FitzGerald, All in a Life, p. 579 and The Irish Times, 18 Mar. 1986.  
29 NAI, TAOIS 2016/52/65, telephone conversation between FitzGerald and MT, 7 Mar. 1986 London’s record of the 
telephone conversation is kept in TNA UK, PREM 19/1812. 
30 TNA UK, PREM 19/1812, letter from Appleyard to Powell, 7 Mar. and letter from Powell to Appleyard, 10 Mar. 1986. 
31 TNA UK, PREM 19/1812, minute from Armstrong to MT, 12 Mar. 1986. 
32 O’Kane, Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland Since 1980, p. 54.  
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reported to be Britain’s most wanted woman, but her warrant was declared invalid. The 
Dublin Court could not hold Glenholmes as they did not have a new warrant.33 The result 
was a much televised chase through the streets of Dublin. Glenholmes, surrounded by friends 
and supporters, made a dash for a car as plain clothes Special Branch closed in. Television 
cameras filmed as a bare foot Glenholmes ran into a British Home Stores and was rearrested 
by Gardaí. Glenholmes was released without charge twice in one day. The ‘cock-up’ by 
London meant that a technicality had released a ‘dangerous terrorist’ back into Ireland. The 
televised chase and bungled arrest gave the PIRA ‘one of their biggest-ever propaganda 
victories …’34 Following the Glenholmes incident, Dublin and London agreed to follow a 
warrant checklist to ensure errors, including spelling mistakes, would be detected.35 Although 
it was the court that had refused the extradition application, Glenholmes’ re-release 
embarrassed Dublin and irritated Thatcher.  
 
 Thatcher later claimed that the Irish judicial system was non-co-operative. 
Glenholmes’ warrant had been rejected ‘because … they claimed that a full stop was 
missing.’36 Douglas Hurd announced to the Commons that the mistakes in the Glenholmes 
case had actually been London’s fault.37 A third warrant was issued, but Glenholmes had 
gone into hiding in the Republican safe house network.38 Of all the cases of 1986, that of 
Glenholmes was exceptional. In future London wanted to ensure that warrants were ‘exactly 
right’ and also queried whether the AIIGC could be used to streamline the process. 39 But the 
checklist failed again in August when John O’Reilly, who was wanted for conspiring to 
murder Civil Servant Kenneth Shimald, was released five minutes after entering a Dublin 
court. The warrants for O’Reilly were declared invalid because they had been signed by the 
wrong person.40 To prevent further embarrassment, changes needed to be made. 
 
                                                
33 TNA UK, CAB 128/83/13, conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet on 25 Mar. 1986. 
34 Munster Express, 4 Apr. 1986. Footage of Glenholmes release and re-arrest are on YouTube, Vernon Mann ITN News - 
Britain’s ‘most wanted woman’ for Harrods and Grand Hotel Bombings, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lJRXxnIhA8. 
35 The Evening Herald, 14 Apr. 1986. The checklist was completed in 1987. PRONI, NIO 20/27, extradition: checklist for 
future cases, 3 Aug. 1987. 
36 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 405. See also The Evening Herald, 23 Mar. 1986, The Evening Herald, 24 Mar. 1986. 
37 The Evening Herald, 25 Mar. 1986. 
38 The Irish Examiner, 25 Mar. 1986. 
39 TNA UK, PREM 19/1814, minute from Armstrong to MT, 24 Mar. 1986. 
40 The Evening Herald, The Irish Press and The Cork Examiner, 14 Aug. 1986. 
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Dublin had agreed to sign the ECST Bill in order to close the existing extradition 
loophole, but it was a slow process throughout 1986. Accession to the ECST would show a 
formal commitment by Dublin to defeating the PIRA.41 FitzGerald told Thatcher that he 
would sign the ECST to enable a streamlined extradition of suspects from Ireland to Britain.42 
In the Dáil, it was put to him that his reason for signing the Convention was due to pressure 
from London. The move would certainly make working with the unionists easier for 
Thatcher. Their long held grievance that republican terrorists were able to flee to sanctuary 
over the border after carrying out an attack would cease.43 FitzGerald maintained that his 
reason for signing was that every other member of the Council of Europe had already. It was 
Ireland’s turn.44  
	
The Unionist Protests Continue 
London was aware that unionists had planned a general strike for March.45 It was hoped that 
Thatcher could persuade the unionist leaders to call this off and to opt for dialogue instead. 
Another aim of the meeting was to get the unionists back to work at district council level.46 
Budgets were due to be set, if Westminster had to do it they would also have to consider 
dissolving the current administration. This was to be avoided at such a delicate time. Thatcher 
was briefed to make it clear that the AIA was set in stone.47 There was no possibility of it 
being abandoned because the unionists disagreed with it.  
 
At her meeting with Paisley and Molyneaux on 25 February, Thatcher maintained 
that the AIA ‘could not be torn up while at the same time demanding that matters revert to 
                                                
41 Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, p. 62. 
42 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, MT meeting with FitzGerald, 19 Feb. 1986 and The Evening Herald, 20 Feb. 1986.  
43 The Cork Examiner, 24 Feb. 1986. 
44 The Evening Herald, 21 Feb. 1986, The Irish Press, 21 Feb. 1986. 
45 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, MT meeting with King, 20 Feb. 1986. 
46 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, MT meeting with Molyneaux and Paisley, 25 Feb. 1986. 
47 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, MT speaking cards for meeting with unionists, 25 Feb. 1986. It is interesting to note that in 
1986 MT started to bring small note cards into meetings. These are kept within the PREM files. For the Paisley-Molyneaux 
meeting, MT’s cards emphasised the UK’s current position. The AIA was non-negotiable. MT noted that she ‘Couldn’t 
side-track it even (she) I wanted to.’ Her reason for carrying these cards is open to debate. MT perhaps realised that her 
limited understanding of the Irish problem was obvious when meeting with politicians from Belfast or Dublin. Having a 
line to stick to probably gave her some confidence when going into meetings, although it meant she was as incorrigible as 
ever. Another reason may be that she was busy with other matters and was slightly out of touch with Northern Ireland. We 
know that she felt like the AIA was like ‘waving a magic wand,’ and 1986 had already thrown up a major difficulty in the 
Westland Affair. MT was distracted, having these cards focused her attention and gave her something to refer to when the 
discussion became difficult. From the official synopsis we now that MT stuck to the position on her cards.  
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the situation which existed beforehand.’ She explained that things were not as bad as they 
believed. Yes, Dublin now had a limited say in Northern Ireland affairs, but London was still 
in charge. The Agreement could improve security as London and Dublin could work together 
to put a stop to cross-border incidents. Thatcher also offered to meet regularly with the 
unionists to ‘find a way forward.’ Paisley and Molyneaux remained adamant that they would 
not partake in talks unless the AIIGC was suspended. Thatcher asked Paisley if he had any 
new ideas, but he did not. He merely repeated that ‘Nobody else had to put up with an (inter-
state conference) with an enemy state.’48 He felt that the AIA had done more damage than 
Sunningdale. Thatcher tried to reassure him that the AIIGC was merely an idea-sharing 
platform, but Paisley was not prepared to listen.49 The meeting ended with some hope as 
Paisley and Molyneaux agreed that they could meet with Thatcher before Easter.50 Thatcher 
later told FitzGerald that there had been a ‘good deal of plain talking’ at the meeting.51 
However, Paisley and Molyneaux changed their position when they got back to Belfast. 
 
 Paisley and Molyneaux met with other unionist leaders to discuss their next steps. 
The leaders were unable to persuade their colleagues to engage with further talks. In fact, 
they agreed that they would not talk to Thatcher until the AIA had been abandoned. Thatcher 
was briefed on the speeches Paisley and Molyneaux made in Stormont to the unionist 
gathering. Molyneaux said he had been ‘very tough’ with Thatcher, when in fact he had taken 
a back seat during the meeting. He also told the gathering that he had changed his mind about 
the upcoming ‘Day of Action.’ He now endorsed it as it would prove their opposition to the 
AIA.52 Paisley adopted a similar line. He attacked Brian Mawhinney and King before asking 
for ‘Schools, shops, transport’ to strike. He warned that ‘Monday was only the beginning.’53 
Thatcher was advised that she should use the information cautiously, and if asked she should 
say that ‘there seems to be evidence of a change of heart since yesterday.’54 The unionists 
were determined to change Thatcher’s mind. They would go ahead with their protests.  
                                                
48 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, MT meeting with Molyneaux and Paisley, 25 Feb. 1986. A record of this meeting is also kept 
in PRONI, CENT 3/78A. 
49 PRONI, CENT 3/78A, MT meeting with Molyneaux and Paisley, 25 Feb. 1986.  
50 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, MT meeting with Molyneaux, Paisley, 25 Feb. 1986. 
51 NAI, TAOIS 2016/52/65, letter from MT to FitzGerald, 7 Mar. 1986. A copy of this letter is also kept in PREM 19/1812. 
52 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, report from Jim Daniell, NIO, undated. 
53 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, note on Paisley’s speech after meeting MT, circa. 25 Feb. 1986. 
54 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, report from Jim Daniell, NIO, undated. 
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First, they refused to set a rate in Belfast City Council.55 Next, Paisley and Molyneaux 
placed a full-page advertisement in the Newsletter entitled ‘A call to action.’ This was a pre-
warning that unionists should be prepared to fight. The advert reasoned that Thatcher had 
rejected the results of the by-election along with the ‘mandated and reasoned case’ Paisley 
and Molyneaux had presented to her at the February meeting.56 In an effort to re-inform the 
public of the facts of the AIA, the NIO also placed advertisements in Northern Ireland 
newspapers.57 The fiction versus fact format of the advert did little to cool unionist tempers. 
Thatcher’s Government had to prepare for the upcoming protests. 
 
 A ‘Day of Action’ was announced in late February.58 All unionist people were asked 
to forego work and/or to come out in protest. The methods of protest ranged from setting up 
road blocks to joining a march in Belfast. It was difficult for London to predict what the 
outcome would be. Contingency plans had been put in place before the Paisley-Molyneaux 
meeting. George Younger, Secretary of State for Defence, agreed for an extra battalion to be 
sent to Northern Ireland on a temporary basis.59 The soldiers would be sent on 13 March, too 
late to assist with the Day of Action but available if more trouble arose. How many people 
would take part? Where were the hot-spots likely to be? King warned that most would take 
part but it was difficult to judge how much support unionists could expect.60  
 
Unionists got to work early on 3 March. Between 3am and 6am, it was reported that 
the M1, the main road into Belfast, had been closed due to an obstruction. A mixture of oil 
and nails had been spilt over the motorway. The road was cleared by the Army. From 9am 
to 10am, there was trouble reported in Belfast City centre. An estimated 200 youths attacked 
the Police in North Belfast. At Gallagher’s cigarette factory in Ballymena, female employees 
were spat at and attacked as they arrived for work. People had shown up for work in 
                                                
55 The News Letter, 26 Feb. 1986. 
56 iBid., 28 Feb. 1986. 
57 TNA UK, CAB 128/83/13, conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet on 25 Mar. 1986 and TNA UK, PREM 19/1814, 
advert placed in unionist newspapers, circa. Mar. 1986. 
58 The News Letter, 26 and 27 Feb. 1986. 
59 TNA UK, PREM 19/1814, letter from King to Younger, 13 Feb. 1986, memo from Younger to King, 24 Feb. 1986 and 
minute from Mallaby to Powell, 24 Feb. 1986. George Younger, 4th Viscount Younger of Leckie, Conservative MP 1964-
1991. Secretary of State for Defence 1986-1989. 
60 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, letter from Powell to Daniell, 27 Feb. 1986. 
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nationalist communities but absenteeism was high in unionist areas. At Harland and Wolff 
only senior management had shown up for work. At lunchtime, Thatcher was passed a highly 
classified piece of information. She was told that security personnel at Aldergrove airport 
had been advised to go home. Indeed, many businesses were concerned for staff safety and 
their journey home as roads were blocked. It was particularly bad in counties Tyrone, 
Armagh and Down. Kilkeel was reported to be impassable. People had prepared for the strike 
by purchasing supplies, including milk and bread, the previous day. This meant that 
supermarkets and bakeries were closed. The big businesses in Belfast City Centre, including 
Marks and Spencer, were quiet. The strike appeared to lose momentum after lunchtime. 
Although road blocks were still in operation, the overall turn out to the strike was described 
as ‘patchy.’ There were rallies in country towns but towards the evening the strike quietened 
down.61  
 
The strike reflected badly on the unionists. Images of burnt-out cars were 
accompanied by reports of gunfire and an attack against the RUC in Belfast.62 The violence 
and damage caused by the protest led the other Northern Ireland parties to turn against the 
unionist alliance. They were accused of releasing a “monster” onto the streets.63 Thatcher 
told FitzGerald that she ‘deplored’ the ‘disgraceful tactics’ adopted by unionists.64 J.E. 
McConnell of the NIO’s Political Affairs Division reported to London that the strike had 
inspired a sense of ‘revulsion’ amongst the protestant community.65 One of his contacts told 
him he was ashamed of the strike. It was clearly sectarian. McConnell also reported that many 
of his contacts were afraid that the ‘hardmen’ had backed themselves into a corner. They 
refused to talk so they had to use violence.66 It seemed the strike had gotten out of control 
and the unionists were unsure of what to do next. 
 
 Paisley and Molyneaux denounced the Day of Action post hoc. They backtracked 
when they realised it had caused more harm than good. They had little control over the 
                                                
61 TNA UK, PREM 19/1812, hourly reports from Day of Action, 3 Mar. 1986. 
62 The News Letter, 4 Mar. 1986. 
63 iBid., 5 Mar. 1986. 
64 NAI, TAOIS 2016/52/65, letter from MT to FitzGerald, 7 Mar. 1986. 
65 John McConnell, British civil servant. Head of the Political Division of the NIO. A catholic who had King’s confidence, 
he talked to Dublin and gave them briefings on the situation in Northern Ireland from King’s view. 
66 PRONI, CENT 1/15/47A, Day of Action - Aftermath, 5 Mar. 1986. 
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protestors who had resorted to destruction of property and intimidation. The protest did little 
to commend the unionist position to Westminster or Dublin. Thatcher later wrote in her 
autobiography that around this time she concluded that ‘… one of the problems of Northern 
Ireland politics was that it no longer attracted enough people of high calibre.’67 It was 
apparent that there was little room for manoeuvre within unionist political circles. They fell 
back on their tried and tested methods of mass protest to try to guilt the Conservatives into 
changing their position. Shortly after the plan was sent to Thatcher, the UUP voted to end 
their relationship with the Conservative party. The vote was carried with a two-thirds 
majority. John Taylor, UUP MP for Strangford, said ‘It was a logical move because the 
unionists were now sitting in opposition to the Conservatives in the Commons and had not 
taken the Tory Whip since 1972.’ This was a symbolic rupture at a time when the atmosphere 
between unionism and conservatism was already strained.68  
 
 Following the unsuccessful Day of Action, there was no clear plan on what to do 
next.69 Sporadic riots began to break out throughout the Province from the beginning of April. 
These outbursts further proved that Ulster Unionists had no control over their support base. 
In reaction to this, Paisley and Molyneaux announced a 12-point civil protest plan.70 But the 
plan failed to prevent violence on the streets.  
 
 Attacks on RUC officers continued to escalate. By April, Sir Eldon Griffiths, who 
was a ‘friend’ to Thatcher and had previously written to outline his suggestions for the RUC, 
asked to meet Thatcher to discuss the problem. He believed, 
 
- that the attacks on the RUC should have been foreseen and preventative action taken, 
                                                
67 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 404.  
68 The News Letter, 26 Apr. 1986. 
69 TNA UK, PREM 19/1814, minute from Armstrong to MT, 24 Mar. 1986. 
70 The 12 points of the plan were 1. Letters would be sent to Area Boards asking for support by adjourning meetings. 2. An 
invitation to all District Councils to adjourn and to hinder the work of the Commissioner and his colleagues. 3. The 
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the RUC to come out against the AIA. 12. A day of prayer would occur on 3 May. 12-point package of opposition to the 
AIA by the Unionist Party leaders, 23 Apr. 1986. See PRONI, CENT 3/78A. 
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- that more needs to be done now to protect them; 
- that you should see the Police Federation; 
- that the Chief Constable is subject to political direction; 
- that the RUC should be taken off border security duties.71 
 
This was to be a tense, ‘unhappy’ meeting.72  
 
Griffiths wanted Thatcher to focus on two objectives, ‘to keep the RUC together and 
to keep them out of politics.’ Griffiths proposed that Thatcher make a visit to Northern 
Ireland to unveil a memorial plaque, meet with bereaved families and make a speech on 
terrorism. Griffiths also felt that the RUC had too much ground to cover. Removing them 
from border security operations would allow more focus on other areas. Parades posed 
another problem. Loyalist revellers often clashed with RUC officers whom they knew 
personally or were related to. They could not ‘give them a tanning on the streets and then 
meet to drink with them in the evening.’ This sparked revenge attacks as trouble makers knew 
where officers lived. It was a vicious circle.73   
 
The Police Federation told King that they felt the RUC were the ‘Achilles heel of the 
(AIA).’ There were instances of officers fleeing their homes. Families had become targets 
for paramilitaries. More worryingly, people who attacked policemen were protected by their 
community. Attacks came from both sides of the community as the RUC was seen as a 
prejudiced force by both sides.74 There had been 248 attacks on the families of 226 serving 
officers. Whilst on duty, ten officers had been shot and 71 had been threatened. The RUC 
had been drawn into politics by the preferences of the majority of its workforce. A balance 
needed to be found to ensure the safety of serving officers and their families. The Police 
Federation also suggested that the government should cover the losses of any officer who 
had to quickly sell their home after an attack. This was key to improving morale.75 As the 
six-month anniversary of the AIA approached, the security forces anticipated more trouble. 
 
                                                
71 TNA UK, PREM 19/1812, memo from Powell to MT, 21 Apr. 1986. 
72 TNA UK, PREM 19/1812, memo from Powell to MT, 11 Apr. 1986. 
73 TNA UK, PREM 19/1812, letter from Powell to Daniell, 24 Apr. 1986. 
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On the day of the anniversary on 15 May, the DUP took over the switchboard at 
Stormont for two-and-a-half hours. They redirected calls and claimed that they had cancelled 
one call from the Cabinet Office.76 After the police realised that some of the MPA’s office 
workers were passing them food and water, they broke the door down with a sledge hammer 
to clear them out. Between 30,000 and 50,000 Orangemen marched through Hillsborough. 
The protest passed off peacefully but the small town was blocked off until the crowd 
dispersed.77 Other anti-AIA civilians, who preferred a more symbolic way of showing their 
displeasure, could purchase a dog chew toy of Thatcher. This sold out within days.78 How 
did Westminster view the second unionist protest?  
 
The day after the six-month protest King told the press that the Northern Ireland 
assembly could be dissolved in a matter of weeks.79 Back in March King had suggested 
continuing with devolution. Molyneaux had told King he would consider entering into 
discussions but, as has been aforementioned, relations between the UUP and Conservatives 
were severed in April.80 London refused to give in to the strikes. King sent Thatcher a lengthy 
memo arguing for devolution.81 This was a risky decision. Not only could it further alienate 
the unionists, it could also signal that Thatcher’s ‘Northern Ireland policies have run into a 
cul de sac.’82 Another General Election was due in June, such an admittance of failure could 
weaken Thatcher. The Assembly was due to expire on 20 October 1986.83 To dissolve 
Stormont would avoid another anti-agreement campaign as seen in the by-elections and 
would protect the government from further embarrassment. King had to convince Thatcher. 
 
Cabinet agreed that dissolution was the next logical step. But Thatcher was concerned 
by the consequences of such a move.84 The possibility of dissolution had already been leaked 
to the media. Attached to a minute from King is a clipping from The Times which discussed 
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the idea.85 King worked to persuade her it was the best chance at progress. His assessment of 
Stormont, penned in June, was damning. King concluded that Stormont operated as a weekly 
anti-AIA meeting. Other parties had stopped attending.86 John Cushanan, leader of the 
Alliance Party, told King that even though it would leave him without a salary, he supported 
the dissolution of the Assembly. London was funding a weekly anti-AIA forum at a cost of 
£2.8 million per annum. Members were taking a salary without doing any work. The 
Assembly had damaged public confidence in local politics and King doubted it would cause 
much fuss if it ended. The marching season was fast approaching, to continue to allow the 
unionists to use Stormont as a think-tank for anti-agreement protests was inadvisable.87 
During Cabinet on 12 June, King sought support for dissolution from his colleagues. By 
funding Stormont, London could be seen as encouraging the anti-agreement campaign. 
Cabinet therefore agreed that Stormont would be dissolved and an announcement made to 
the Commons.88 The next day, King told a press conference that dissolution had been 
‘inevitable.’ ‘We … had a situation in which an assembly, set up and approved by parliament 
with funds by parliament to discharge two functions, was actually discharging neither.’89 
Unionists were further outraged. 
 
As James Kilfedder, Speaker of the Assembly at Stormont, read out the dissolution 
order on 23 June, he was met with shouts of ‘Ulster Says No!’ The Newsletter wrote that 
Stormont ‘died’ that afternoon.90 The next day, Paisley warned that Northern Ireland was on 
the verge of Civil War. He urged all protestants to, 
 
… get in touch with his neighbour; every street needs to be organised; every area 
needs to be organised; every town and hamlet and townland needs to be organised. 
And that’s exactly what’s going to happen in this province … And this is a war. And 
let no one mince words about it. This is no garden party or picnic, and people will be 
hurt.91  
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Talks between Dublin and London continued throughout 1986. These contacts proved pivotal 
as the shortcomings of the AIA became obvious. FitzGerald complained that King was ‘too 
adversarial.’ The personal relationship between King and Barry was said to be poor due to 
their ‘hard-hitting’ negotiation techniques and Barry’s green tinge. Both men agreed to work 
out their differences, but temperament still played a pivotal part in Anglo-Irish relations after 
the agreement was signed. Thatcher was advised to keep away from personalities and stick 
to the issues, as were her ministers.92 
 
Barry and King continued to meet but their conversations were contentious. Barry 
said that the AIA was viewed as ‘worthless’ as there was little evidence of results. FitzGerald 
had signed the ECST in February, but the Glenholmes incident had occurred a month later. 
London wanted more security co-operation but Dublin needed something in return. The 
suspension of John Stalker, Assistant chief Constable to the Greater Manchester Police, at 
the beginning of June had caused a media storm.93 Stalker had been tasked with investigating 
a supposed shoot-to-kill policy in Northern Ireland in 1984. Stalker had investigated three 
incidents; the deaths of three PIRA men, Gervaise McKerr, Sean Burns and Eugene Toman, 
at a checkpoint in Lurgan on 11 November 1982; the death of Michael Tighe on 24 November 
1982; and the deaths of Seamus Grew and Roddy Carroll on 12 December 1982.94 Each 
incident involved the RUC using lethal force. Security personnel in Northern Ireland were 
issued with a yellow card that clearly instructed them to use their firearms as a last resort.95 
All three incidents in the Stalker enquiry had raised concerns over the RUC’s interpretation 
of minimum force. McKerr, Burns and Toman were unarmed but had been shot at 109 times; 
Tighe, Grew and Carroll were armed but had not discharged their weapons. Stalker was due 
to give his final report but was suddenly removed from the inquiry on 5 June and suspended 
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from the police.96 Dublin had known that an investigation into the RUC was underway and 
had quietly asked for updates on its progression.97  
 
Michael Lillis told an official from the NIO that Dublin wanted to see London act 
decisively in the Stalker case. Dublin saw it ‘as an opportunity to demonstrate to the minority 
community that the British police system was “objective and fair”.’ Lillis then implied that 
‘… prosecuting those responsible for collusion would mean that the Irish would feel 
confident enough to back off from their demands for the Police complaints procedure, 
something that had proven to be a thorny issue in the recent past.’ The NIO official reflected 
that Lillis ‘clearly felt very strongly’ about the Stalker case.98 Barry asked King for more 
information on what had happened. Dublin suspected that Stalker had been suspended 
because he was too close to the truth. Senior RUC officers had been implicated. ‘There was 
something of a stink about the whole affair’ and Dublin felt that decisive action needed to be 
taken before the PIRA used it as a propaganda tool.99  
 
King complimented Barry on his handling of Northern Ireland in the Dáil. He admired 
his combination of ‘patience plus a latent impatience.’ Barry ‘smiled’ but reflected that he 
could not rely on trickery when discussing Northern Ireland anymore. Both governments 
needed results that went beyond the existence of the AIIGC. Barry told King that unless 
three-man courts were introduced, ‘It would be extremely difficult’ to implement the ECST 
until late 1986.100 Until then, FitzGerald worked on another change for Ireland.  
 
 A major part of FitzGerald’s constitutional crusade was to implement a divorce 
referendum. A win on this would put Ireland in line with its modern European neighbours. 
More importantly, it would announce to protestants in Northern Ireland that Ireland was not 
strictly catholic. Early opinion polls showed that the majority were in favour of divorce, but 
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an unexpected shift occurred at the voting stations.101 The proposal won 36.5% of the public 
vote, a humiliating defeat for FitzGerald.102 In Northern Ireland there was little surprise at 
the outcome. Some unionists said ‘it showed that Éire was still in the 19th century.’103 The 
question shifted from if FitzGerald was to exit from the Taoiseach’s office, to when.104  
 
The Marching Season, Summer 1986 
London was aware of plans to parade through a catholic area in Portadown.105 Paisley asked 
that every unionist go to Portadown to ‘insist on their right to march through catholic areas 
…’106 The Portadown parade was reported as being the only one that had not been 
peaceful.107 Paisley’s increasingly provocative speeches riled the PIRA. The PIRA escalated 
their campaign by attacking contractors who worked for the security forces. They also 
extended their threat to any civilian who had links with the security forces. They sought to 
provoke the protestant community. The death of a UDR Sergeant on the Shankill Road in 
Belfast triggered a series of tit-for-tat murders between loyalists and republicans. Although 
a number of people thought to be responsible were caught, the situation was not easy to 
control.108 The Libyans had announced their support for the PIRA in July. They had sent 
money and would be caught sending arms in 1987 (see chapter seven).109 Cabinet believed 
Paisley was the root-cause of the attacks on nationalist areas.110 King was furious over the 
Portadown parade. He blamed ‘hooligans’ who had been called out to cause trouble and 
interrupt the Orange Order’s annual parade.111 But actions by the DUP proved that faceless 
hooligans were not wholly to blame for disturbing the peace.  
 
 On 7 August Peter Robinson, Deputy Leader of the DUP, led 200 supporters to the 
small town of Clontibret, County Monaghan.112 The event was meant to highlight the lack of 
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security at the border but ultimately ended in failure. The RUC had tipped off the Garda that 
a large crowd was moving across the border. When two Gardaí arrived at Clontibret, they 
were attacked by the group. The crowd also vandalised the local Garda station. They smashed 
windows and painted “Ulster has awakened” on the front of the building. Robinson was 
arrested and charged with a variety of crimes including actual bodily harm. The Clontibret 
invasion caused London serious embarrassment. An official apology was sent from London 
to Dublin.113 Barry strongly condemned the ‘charade.’ He said it ‘would have been laughable 
if it had not resulted in a vicious assault on two members of the Garda Siochana and damage 
to Garda property.’114 Dublin learnt through a secret source that the Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA), a Loyalist paramilitary group, had decided not to support Robinson’s 
invasion. They wanted to see if he could “fend for himself entirely”.115 Paisley’s Deputy had 
attempted to upstage him while he was out of the country, and now had a criminal record. 
King was growing impatient with the unionist pact.  
 
King realised by September 1986 that persuading the unionists of the benefit of the 
AIA was a ‘waste of time.’116 The Stalker affair had eroded confidence in the security forces, 
particularly the RUC, in both communities. In September the affair was ‘still festering away, 
leaving a bad taste.’117 Cracks had appeared in the unionist pact that could be exploited by 
London.118 Dublin was also trying to piece a plan together. 
 
Bishop William McCappin, who was ‘unhappy’ with the AIA, tried to describe the 
reality of life in Northern Ireland during a meeting with Richard Ryan.119 McCappin felt that 
relations between catholics and protestants were ‘excellent.’ The trouble was caused by 
strangers. He specifically blamed ‘DUP hooligans from Belfast.’ McCappin explained his 
point with an anecdote, 
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… an Orangeman … wished to take part in the Twelfth parade in Newtownards but 
was worried that he would not be (able) to bring in the silage on his farm. He went to 
Newtownards regardless - and, on his return, found that two Catholic neighbours had 
done the job for him!120 
 
McCappin’s information was important. Although large numbers had attended the anti-
agreement parades and riots, the vast majority of protestants and/or unionists did not respond 
to Paisley’s cries for war.121 Ryan later met with John Houston, Political Advisor to Geoffrey 
Howe, who felt that there was ‘… little or no evidence of intelligent leadership emerging 
anywhere in the Unionist ranks …’ Houston also felt that the strain between Howe and 
Thatcher, caused by her South African policies, could cause problems for Anglo-Irish 
relations. Howe was still her main advisor on Northern Ireland. Without him Thatcher could 
stall.122 McConnell felt that tensions in Northern Ireland might subside after the marching 
season but there could be a new push in the Autumn.123   
 
Fred Catherwood, a Northern Ireland born MEP, suggested setting up a short-term 
round-table conference to open up dialogue between Dublin, London and Belfast.124 
Catherwood recommended the conference to run until the next AIIGC in November.125 This 
would hopefully dispel tensions in the lead up to the first anniversary of the AIA. Andrews 
felt that Catherwood’s plan was a good idea but knew it would need to be coupled with a 
concession to the unionists to tempt them to the table. He suggested a review of the AIA if 
‘stringent conditions were satisfied.’ By this he probably meant if unionists agreed to stop 
protesting. Such an idea was not without its issues. Andrew’s recognised that nationalists 
would see a review of the AIA as a setback, a ‘surrender to the Orange card,’ but all would 
benefit if unionists would stop stirring the pot.126 Catherwood felt that what was needed was 
to tilt the playing field back in the direction of the unionists. It was now tilted away from 
them. The question of balance was all important. At the same time, he admitted that 
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nationalist gains from the Agreement could not be compromised.127 Catherwood’s idea was 
met with some criticism. 
 
 Speaking on a personal level, Archbishop Robin Eames, Church of Ireland Primate 
of all Ireland, warned that Catherwood was “in this only for his own ends”.128 To his mind, 
Catherwood put forward proposals for “Personal glorification” and because of this, Paisley 
and Molyneaux had lost confidence in him. Eames was also critical of Catherwood’s 
premature announcement as the round-table was not ready. His proposal was therefore 
‘dead,’ destroyed by its own creator.129 Professor Con O’Leary, an Irish born academic, also 
sent a proposal.130 O’Leary had taken an interest in unionism and had even served as an 
advisor to the UDA. He was also often called upon by the media to explain the ins and outs 
of Northern Ireland politics.131 O’Leary made five suggestions, 
 
1. Suspend all AIIGC meetings for three months, or until talks between Dublin, Belfast 
and London had concluded. 
2. Close the Secretariat office at Maryfield until the talks conclude. 
3. Review rights of nationalist and unionist communities in Northern Ireland. 
4. Look again at Articles two and three of the Irish Constitution. 
5. If an revised Agreement is produced, submit it to a referendum.132 
 
David Goodall commended O’Leary’s ideas but said that he could not put his name to them. 
They amounted to a suspension of the AIA which Thatcher would not entertain. She could 
not be seen to bend to unionist demands. Goodall wished O’Leary ‘good luck’ but said the 
proposals could not be implemented in their current form.133  
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October-December 1986 
Although FitzGerald wanted to uphold the AIA, in October he told The Belfast Telegraph, 
‘One of the curious misconceptions in Northern Ireland is that we want to be involved to the 
extent that we are.’134 Fine Gael’s interest in Northern Ireland was the elimination of the 
PIRA.135 FitzGerald wanted to reassure unionists that a united Ireland was not on Fine Gael’s 
agenda. What did Dublin want? FitzGerald told Gow, ‘We want to destroy the IRA which 
threatens both our countries.’ FitzGerald warned that Sinn Féin would continue to make 
political gains which would leave the SDLP at the wayside. His fear was that civil war could 
erupt if Sinn Féin produced a mandate. It was time to ‘get through to the unionists’ the truth 
behind the agreement. Irish nationalism had made changes to implement the agreement, 
which guaranteed the wishes of the majority in Northern Ireland.136 Unionists needed to 
accept the AIA for what it really was.137 Before the first anniversary, and the anticipated 
unionist protests, Thatcher and FitzGerald had another meeting. 
 
FitzGerald was concerned that the UDR were still deployed in Northern Ireland. They 
were a divisive presence (see chapter 5). Thatcher was adamant that the UDR was essential 
while the violence continued. Withdrawing them would endanger more lives whilst the 
‘blasts, the deaths and the bombings’ continued. Thatcher was ‘depressed’ that security along 
the border had not improved. She had expected violence to be defeated by the AIA, but it had 
escalated instead. Thatcher’s next comment reflects her overall sense of frustration with 
Northern Ireland. FitzGerald remarked that border areas were difficult because they were 
almost impossible to patrol. He said, ‘It is not the border that we would prefer!’ She retorted, 
‘Yes, we got it wrong in 1921.’ This was a startling admission from Thatcher. Did she mean 
that a united Ireland would have been better? Or was she referring to redrawing the border. 
The clue lies in further comments during the discussion.  
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FitzGerald told an anecdote of a man whose house straddled the border. The RUC 
tried to arrest him ‘by using an entrance which was in the South, even though it was the most 
northerly part of the house!’ As so often happened, Thatcher did not pick up on the joke. She 
curtly replied that towns close to the border, like Dundalk, were common places for suspects 
to hide from the RUC. FitzGerald said that law abiding people had also moved to the 
Republic of Ireland to live and work, but added, ‘We have 200 people from the North in our 
jails. You can have them back any time you want.’ Thatcher replied, ‘I don’t want them. You 
can have all the Nationalists in the North if you like.’ The conversation concluded with a 
reflection from Thatcher on the pressures she faced in the upcoming 1987 election. She also 
added, ‘rather with a wistful reference … whether she could continue, in all seriousness, to 
send young men to their death in Northern Ireland.’138 Houston reported to Richard Ryan that 
Thatcher was ‘“a bit fed up about the whole thing … She doesn’t see where it’s going … She 
doesn’t see what’s coming out of it”.’ 139  
 
Where once she referred to Finchley and Northern Ireland as one, now there was a 
definite separation reflected not only in her attitude but in her choice of words. ‘I don’t want 
them’ was her response to transferring British citizens from Irish jails. ‘They’ were more 
trouble than they were worth. Moore recalls a private conversation with Thatcher along 
similar lines, 
 
She went on about Ulster and how the Unionists had persecuted the minority and how 
she couldn’t send ‘wave after wave’ of young men to look after the place … She was 
sparky. She referred to matters of Ulster as ‘foreign affairs.’ I asked her how her 
devotion to the British nation could justify her sort of behaviour. She said human 
rights mattered more than anything else.140 
 
FitzGerald later recalled another example of this shift following the AIA. Whilst discussing 
grants from Europe and the USA for Northern Ireland, Thatcher rebuffed,  
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“More money for these people?” She said waving her hand in the general direction 
of Northern Ireland. “Look at their schools; look at their roads. Why should they have 
more money? I need that money for my people in England, who don’t have anything 
like this”.141 
 
Her reflection on whether she could continue to send the Army to Northern Ireland is perhaps 
a reflection of the guilt she felt over the increasing attacks and deaths. It had all started during 
her first few months as Prime Minister with the Warrenpoint ambush and the assassination 
of Mountbatten. In public she had maintained that she would stop these attacks and protect 
‘her boys.’ She knew she had failed. Thatcher’s unionism, from this point on, is best 
described as an English unionism.142  
 
She saw Northern Ireland in terms of them and us. Her English unionism is illustrated 
by her concern for the plight of ‘our boys’ in the British army. She also saw Northern Ireland 
as an economic drain on the rest of the UK.143 Thatcher’s own weariness with the Ulster 
Unionists, particularly during the 1986 anti-AIA protests, is another important factor in this 
English Unionism. ‘Thatcherism did not seek to conserve the fragile web of understood 
relationships … that make up the Conservative nation.’144 So when the Ulster Unionists 
reacted to the AIA with protests, vandalism and mass riots, Thatcher likened them to a threat 
to a threat to ‘the body politic.’ Just as the PIRA paramilitary prisoner was ‘invisible,’ so too 
were the Ulster Unionists.145 Indeed the protests ‘exposed the Unionist mainstream not 
merely as politically ineffectual but as intellectually feeble also.’146 With the first anniversary 
of the AIA approaching, things were not about to improve in Northern Ireland. 
  
Instability and extremism had led to an overwhelming atmosphere of frustration in 
Northern Ireland. ‘… people saw no hope and … were allowing the stagnation and instability 
to continue, if not grow worse.’147 A source told Dublin that inside UUP headquarters 
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members felt they were being ‘lost’ to the DUP. The UUP were ‘…in turmoil with no 
direction and a nauseating belief that their decisions are being forced on them by Paisley, 
Robinson and the DUP.’148 The only thing uniting the Unionist parties was their antipathy 
towards the AIA. Ivor Oswald, Managing Director of Alliance and Leicester Building 
Society and Chairman of the Northern Ireland Building Societies, described their pact as a 
‘tatty policy’ that was ‘held together by the forlorn hope of a future hung parliament where 
they might possibly negotiate an end to their nightmare.’149 Dublin concluded that the best 
thing to do was to ride out the storm. The unionists would eventually run out of puff. This 
would have to be done sensitively. They did not want to ‘take or agree to steps that would be 
seen by nationalists and by unionists alike as a victory for unionist intransigence or as a 
setback to the efforts to put Northern nationalists on a footing of equality.’150   
 
 In anticipation of the first anniversary of the AIA, people had bought supplies, 
including camping gas cylinders, in case there was serious disruption. It was thought that the 
village of Ballylumford would be completely closed.151 In The News Letter, Molyneaux and 
Paisley had placed an advertisement calling for the unionist people to come and ‘show it’s 
still NO! At the City Hall, Belfast …’ With a large unionist readership, it was anyone’s guess 
how many would show up. The News Letter also reported that a loyalist fighting force had 
been sworn in, its members vowing to “take whatever steps are necessary” to oppose the 
AIA.152 The new force was called Ulster Resistance. The problem with the unionist campaign 
in 1986 was that it was the same old story. They may have felt they were being radical in 
setting up a new citizens army and inviting the loyal and the faithful to Belfast City Hall for 
a protest, but it had all been done before.153 Paisley and Molyneaux relied on long memory 
and hoped to stir up the same level of outrage that was present during the home rule crises. 
People were weary. The Troubles were approaching their twentieth anniversary and the tired 
tactics of the unionists were doing little to inspire ordinary people. The News Letter did its 
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best to drum up support immediately before the City Hall rally, leading with stories on the 
‘Accord that gave birth to murder and mayhem’ and claiming that ‘Thousands … still (say) 
no!’154 But would ‘thousands’ show up on the day? 
 
 The anniversary of the AIA arrived and, once again, the protest descended into chaos. 
During a riot in North Belfast one protestor was killed after being knocked down by a Police 
Land Rover.155 An elderly pensioner dropped dead after a bottle was thrown through her 
living room window.156 Towards the end of Paisley’s speech at City Hall he called for calm 
as the outer crowd began to throw stones.157 His plea failed and some of the crowd then 
damaged and looted the City Centre stores.158 48 RUC men were injured, two in Portadown 
had acid thrown in their eyes.159 Robinson claimed that unionists were not ‘revolutionists, or 
anarchists, or murderers’ but stories in the media proved otherwise.160 ‘Mass demonstrations 
produced a sense of solidarity, but they were unpredictable and often degenerated into 
mindless delinquency.’161 Once again, the protest served to irritate Thatcher.  
 
She did not take kindly to Paisley calling her a traitor, indeed Jim Prior felt that doing 
so was a ‘great tactical mistake.’ Instead of changing her mind, labelling her as treacherous 
entrenched her. Even Dublin felt that if the unionists had rephrased and told her she was ill 
informed her natural inquisitiveness would have induced her to talk.162 Paisley’s comments 
instead reinforced the image of Northern Ireland as a place apart, a volatile province that 
required a firm hand.163 She was dismissive of the day’s events. She was at Camp David in 
Maryland having talks with Ronald Reagan and was more concerned with discussing NATO 
and nuclear weapons than the fracas in Northern Ireland. She was asked if the AIA had been 
discussed, she said it had not. ‘My thoughts on the Agreement are the same as they were 
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when I made the Agreement.’164 Keith Raffan, MP for Delyn, reported that there were 
‘ripples of disenchantment’ through the back-benches at Westminster.  
 
Raffan told Ryan that the AIA had failed and there was clearly no quick solution. He 
said that if only the unionists were ‘smart enough’ they would realise that back-benchers 
were open to a ‘reasonable’ campaign from them if they returned to the Commons.165 Tim 
Edgar, MP for Enfield North, felt there was a definite sense of ‘hopelessness’ in Westminster. 
The AIA had not solved the Irish problem. It had exacerbated it.166 Viscount Long, a Senior 
Whip for the Conservatives, told Dorr that he was “very turned off” by the unionist’s bitter 
language.167 To have a senior Conservative MP ridicule the anti-AIA campaign was 
incredibly damaging, especially given that it was spoken to a key member of FitzGerald’s 
Government. Tom Sackville, MP for Bolton West, who had just been made Private Secretary 
to the Minister for Northern Ireland, said that he and his fellow MP’s were alarmed by the 
behaviour of the unionists. He said they “bellowed and howled” and when he asked them to 
stop, they grew louder. The MP’s were ‘appalled’ and ended up saying ‘that if they and their 
associates never came back to Westminster, they would not be missed.’168 Brian Mawhinney 
reported that on a flight to Belfast, Paisley and Robinson had stonewalled him, hardly the 
behaviour one would expect of a political leader and his deputy.169 The unionist campaign 
had also impacted public opinion in Britain. 
 
 The Daily Mirror launched a ‘Britain out of Ireland’ campaign that focused on 
British Army losses and depicted Northern Ireland as a war-torn wasteland beyond help. One 
in four houses were ‘unfit for human habitation’ and an entire generation was in prison.170 
Even The Belfast Telegraph recognised the divide between Northern Ireland and life in 
mainland Britain. British people did not understand the problems there, nor did they care.171 
Unionists had tried to appeal to British people by launching a new campaign, but the “No” 
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movement had ‘annoyed and confused supporters in Great Britain.’172 London and Dublin 
needed to continue to communicate if a solution was to be found. 
 
A few days after the first anniversary protest, Paisley and Molyneaux met with Neil 
Kinnock and Peter Archer from the Labour Party.173 Paisley and Molyneaux claimed to be 
‘depressed.’ It seems they had realised that their protests were futile. Their reason for 
travelling to London was to show that they had ‘one line at least open to the outside world.’ 
They realised meeting with Labour was essentially pointless as they too supported the AIA, 
but they felt that Labour were at least straight shooters. The Conservatives had pretended ‘to 
be their friend and to be for the Union, but (they were) in fact their enemy ...’ Kinnock and 
Archer felt that the unionists were now open to discussing power sharing with the SDLP, but 
that they were unsure how to proceed.174 The meeting was low key. Indeed there was little 
media comment on it, but it gave Dublin and London a glimmer of hope.175 
 
While in London for the opening of a Kilkenny Designs store, FitzGerald briefly met 
with King.176 King told FitzGerald that unionists were still complaining about the border. He 
had continually been told ‘“just look at all those IRA terrorists strutting around in the 
Republic and nothing is done to lock them up”.’ FitzGerald had signed the ECST in February, 
but he needed to pass it into law. FitzGerald said he was confident that the Bill would pass 
through the Dáil before Christmas 1986, as long as he could get the support of the Progressive 
Democrats. King, perhaps in the interest of flattery, told FitzGerald that he was ‘lost in 
admiration’ at how quickly Dáil business was handled.177 The Extradition Bill was passed, 
by a narrow majority, in the Dáil on 18 December 1986. The loophole, that political crimes 
were exempt from extradition, was closed.178 The ECST Bill, however, was not convened 
until 1988 (see Epilogue). Alongside extradition was the old issue of security cooperation.  
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 King said another problem stemmed from the exchange of information between the 
RUC and the Garda. Although the RUC could request information about suspects after 
questioning, they were not permitted to be present during interviews. FitzGerald indicated 
that this was a matter for the Garda but was curious about why King wanted to change the 
procedure. King said that it did not work as the PIRA were trained to resist interrogation. 
After they were released most would disappear into the crowd. If trained interrogators could 
be used, evidence that could be used in court could be obtained. Basically, King wanted more 
cooperation between the Garda and Irish Army, and the RUC and British Army.179 King also 
said that he had heard ‘through the gossip chain’ that the Irish Army and Garda were wary 
of talking to their British counterparts. When the Garda and Army ‘hear an English accent 
on the other end of the phone (they) get up-tight because they might be talking to an army 
officer.’180 This could not continue. London was willing to provide extra support and training 
to improve border security.  
 
 Thatcher was due to give a speech at the European Council in December. Shortly 
after beginning, Paisley approached her and presented her with an ‘Ulster Says NO!’ poster. 
He went on to add, ‘I would like to indict you, Thatcher, as a traitor to the loyalist people of 
Northern Ireland in denying them the right to vote on the Anglo-Irish Agreement.’181 
Thatcher did not react to Paisley’s outburst, indeed she sat ‘chatting and laughing’ until 
Paisley was ejected from the meeting.182 King released a statement chastising Paisley for his 
lack of self-control when it came to publicity stunts. King said Paisley’s actions had served 
to disgrace the image of Northern Ireland in the influential European arena.183 It was an 
embarrassing interruption for Thatcher in front of her European peers, and she needed to 
reassert her authority. 
 
 Thatcher made a Christmas visit to Northern Ireland for the first time since 1983. 
She visited the army and police ‘to show her solidarity’ and to chat about the current security 
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situation.184 Unionists had organised a protest against Thatcher’s visit at Belfast City Hall, 
but the turnout was minimal. Fewer than forty people rallied around Paisley, and people 
seemed more concerned with finishing their Christmas shopping.185 Paisley proudly claimed 
he had called her a ‘traitor’ and that she had ‘scurried as quickly as she could into her 
helicopter.’186 It was a hollow victory.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed Anglo-Irish relations in 1986 in greater detail than any previous 
works of historiography. Now, we understand better how the AIA affected Anglo-Irish 
relations during its first year. Todd argues that the AIA had a three-fold impact. First, it 
altered existing policies, second, it formalised Irish influence and third, it changed the aims 
of nationalists by introducing them to new policies.187 The AIA also had a social impact. It 
united the supporters of unionism who were favourable to a more physical campaign, and 
gave them a cause to oppose in a way that had not been seen since Sunningdale. Although 
not all jumped onto the anti-AIA bandwagon, a significant number did. The reaction came 
about due to a sudden disturbance in the status quo. ‘The AIA did not change the fact of 
British sovereignty but it did change its meaning in a way that did not suit either unionists’ 
interests or unionists’ assumptions about the place of Northern Ireland in the United 
Kingdom.’188 Unionists protested against the AIA because they saw it as a threat to the 
Union.189 Thatcher’s turn around, from denouncing the New Ireland Forum report of 1984 to 
signing an agreement with Dublin within a few months, astounded the unionists. They turned 
their shock into action, but their mistake lay in their tactics.  
 
They held uninspiring rallies and protests that had been done before and attracted the 
extreme elements of their support base.190 Peaceful protests disintegrated into violence 
against the police, army and businesses. The loyalist mob did more to tarnish Paisley and 
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Molyneaux’s campaign, and Paisley’s actions did little to repair the damage in Westminster. 
At the end of 1986 Stormont was dissolved, the AIA was still in place and Thatcher was 
weary of Northern Ireland. Seán Donlon noted that Thatcher expected the AIA to be like ‘a 
magic wand.’191 Unionists would understand that their position in the union had been 
strengthened. She thought Dublin would step-up to her demands for security co-operation. 
Therefore, the paramilitaries would finally be defeated. She was disappointed in all three 
aspects. Unionists were infuriated and set out on a series of strikes and protests. Attacks by 
republican and loyalist paramilitaries continued. In fact, violence escalated in 1986 as 
civilians became involved. Although she was frustrated, Thatcher continued to meet with 
FitzGerald yet each meeting marked a deterioration in Thatcher’s interest in Northern Ireland.  
 
Thatcher’s relayed her disappointment in the AIA to FitzGerald. Her pessimism was 
compounded by the fact that some Ulster Unionists were embarking on criminal behaviours 
to try to fight the agreement. This coupled with Paisley’s continual denunciation of her as a 
traitor led to Thatcher telling FitzGerald that ‘We might as well not have had the 
Agreement.’192 The AIA did not bring harmony to Northern Ireland, or too Anglo-Irish 
relations. 1986 also saw extradition between the UK and the Republic of Ireland and shoot 
to kill emerge as key points of contention that would continue for the rest of Thatcher’s term.  
 
Kenneth Bloomfield’s anecdote of the AIA being like a house on a precipice is an 
accurate reflection of the situation between Dublin, Belfast and London at the end of 1986. 
The Unionists failed to see that London and Dublin would not discard the Agreement. Neither 
would start to throw the building materials over the edge because ‘there would be no 
house.’193 Unionist protests merely irritated the builders in Dublin and London. Until 
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‘The Bogey-Man’: Haughey and Thatcher, 1987 
… she was horrified by what had happened, by the way it disregarded everything that was 
most precious in British life. And I think … the iron really entered her soul.1 
 
Lord Justice Gibson had been on the PIRA’s hit list since 1984. He had acquitted RUC 
officers of killing three PIRA men, Eugene Toman, Gervaise McKerr and Sean Burns, at a 
checkpoint in Lurgan in 1982. Gibson’s commendation of the officers for their ‘courage and 
determination in bringing the three deceased to justice, in this case to the final court of 
justice,’ had incensed nationalists who suspected the security forces were operating under a 
shoot-to-kill policy. The PIRA carefully planned their revenge attack. Gibson and his wife 
Cecily were driving back from holiday via Dublin. They had been escorted to the Northern 
Ireland border by the Garda and had to travel a short distance, through ‘no man’s land,’ alone 
to meet the RUC. The PIRA had planted a roadside bomb, supplied by Libya, which 
detonated as the Gibson’s passed. They were instantly killed.2 
 
 Since the AIA had been signed, violence had increased in Northern Ireland.3 Dublin 
and London continued to work to find a solution. Unionists continued their protest against 
the Agreement, starting in January with a petition of concern.4 But Unionist outrage at the 
AIA waned. Ian Paisley and James Molyneaux agreed to meet with Tom King to find a way 
forward, but focus in London shifted to Dublin as Garret FitzGerald was replaced as 
Taoiseach by Charles Haughey.5 
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 Margaret Thatcher and Haughey had not met since the Falklands fall-out of 1982, and 
Haughey’s anti-AIA speeches had set London on edge.6 But when Haughey became 
Taoiseach, he changed his tune. He agreed to support the AIA but said he would have to 
prioritise the Republic of Ireland’s weak economy. London wanted to maintain a good 
relationship with Dublin, and investigated how to ‘thicken’ relations, but events in Northern 
Ireland overtook them. The Stalker/Sampson report was finished in March, but no arrests 
were made and its findings remain secret.7 The Loughgall ambush in May raised more 
questions about collusion and shoot-to-kill. Haughey himself had been contacted by the UVF 
who told him they had been asked by British security forces to assassinate him. International 
support for the PIRA increased. It was discovered that Colonel Gaddafi had not only said he 
supported the PIRA, he had supplied them with arms and ammunition. The discovery of the 
cargo in The Eksund alerted Dublin and London to the threat of paramilitary groups. Just 
over a week later, the Enniskillen Bomb pushed Thatcher over the edge. She was dismayed 
by the PIRA attack, and was reinforced in her conviction that security needed to be improved. 
Haughey had side-lined the ECST but, in the aftermath of Enniskillen, passed it through the 
Dáil with the caveat that all extradition requests had to go through the Irish Attorney General. 
Thatcher was incensed. 
 
 At their final meeting of 1987, Thatcher left Haughey in no doubt about how she felt. 
To her mind the whole process was in tatters and she was deeply angered that Haughey had 
not consulted London about the amendment. Haughey tried to reassure her that things had 
moved in the right direction, but Thatcher had had enough. In her memoirs she concluded 
that Dublin was more concerned with ‘gesture politics’ than maintaining good relations with 
London.8 
 
 The final chapter of this thesis will continue to highlight how Thatcher disengaged 
from Northern Ireland. The return of Haughey as Taoiseach meant that Thatcher was no 
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longer challenged over her understanding of Northern Ireland. Both parties were advised to 
focus on their personal relationship rather than their policies due to their troubled past. This 
coupled with Haughey’s new rules around extradition and his flip-flop speeches on the AIA 
led Thatcher and her team to believe that they could not trust Haughey or his party. This 
chapter is able to detail meetings between Haughey and Thatcher in 1987 for the first time. 
Meanwhile, the violence in Northern Ireland continued to escalate. The Enniskillen bomb 
proved two things to Thatcher; the PIRA were depraved and the Republic of Ireland 
continued to be a PIRA haven. By the end of the year, Thatcher admitted to Haughey that 
while London would continue to try to work with Dublin, but she felt ‘deeply angered.’ This 
chapter highlights Thatcher’s sense of frustration which was only further jarred by the 
violence in Northern Ireland and the return of Haughey. 
 
The Unionist Protest Continues, January 1987 
Paisley and Molyneaux picked up where they left off before the Christmas break. On 2 
January 1987, the DUP and UUP launched a petition against the AIA. The aim was to recreate 
the Ulster Covenant of 1912. The petition was taken door-to-door, to Church Halls and public 
buildings for members of the public to sign. But after a few days it became obvious to the 
FCO that the petition had failed to capture the imagination of the anti-AIA unionists, 
 
… the reality was that most of the prominent Unionists present signed a copy of the 
petition twice, once for the benefit of the cameras and once for the record, and one 
report suggests that copies available for signature were actually in short supply. 
Despite an attempt at solemnity, the local press commented that the occasion was 
scarcely enhanced by Lord Mayor Sammy Wilson and his mock Italian suit, which 
contrasted significantly with the more sombre dress of his colleagues.9 
 
On 17 January high-profile unionist MPs, including Ian Paisley, took part in a drive for 
signatures. Stations were set up for one day in Orange Halls, Leisure Centres, and even a 
horse box in Belfast. But the public were not interested. January 1987 was particularly cold 
and potential signatories decided to stay inside rather than venture out. The NIO also found 
that people avoided stations. ‘…shoppers in Bangor “passed by on the other side” to avoid a 
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stand manned by Jim Kilfedder (MP for North Down) and Hazel Bradford (a prominent 
member of the UUP whose husband had been Minister for Development in the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland until 1972) in the main street …’10 The petition was not a complete disaster, 
it was delivered to Buckingham Palace with 400,000 signatures. But it did highlight the split 
between the UUP and DUP. 
 
 The UUP had been uncomfortable with some of the DUP’s more extreme tactics. The 
12-point civil protest plan of 1986 had aimed to officiate the anti-AIA protest but the DUP 
had already deviated from it. In the middle of January 1987, Peter Robinson was fined 
£15,000 for his part in the Clontibret invasion, a reminder of the incitement to violence the 
DUP, and Paisley’s own deputy, were capable of. Paisley and Molyneaux met on 12 January 
and agreed a new set of measures. What these measures were remains elusive. They 
announced that they would ‘increase the pressure on local government’ but did not outline 
how that would happen.11 On 19 January the DUP and UUP held separate meetings and 
announced conflicting strategies. The DUP wanted to continue to interrupt the work of local 
Councils and carry out mass resignations. The UUP wanted to carry out two council 
meetings; one in February to set rates; the second in June to elect new Chairmen and Mayors. 
This fundamental difference in approach ‘confounded’ the FCO.12 It was clear that ‘Those 
who predicted … that 1987 was likely to follow the pattern of 1986 seem to have got it about 
right.’13 Although the UUP/DUP split was apparent, the FCO doubted that either party would 
try to conduct talks with anyone but each other.14  
 
 In spite of the FCO’s report, Tom King invited Paisley and Molyneaux to meet him 
to discuss progress in Northern Ireland. King wanted to try to get things moving so that 1987 
was not as ‘sterile politically’ as 1986, but Paisley and Molyneaux refused.15 Brian 
Mawhinney advised King to work on an offer for Paisley and Molyneaux. Then if they ever 
approached Belfast and/or King, they would have something to present to them. Mawhinney 
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also felt that King should continue to encourage the unionists to the table. He hoped they 
would eventually acknowledge that the AIA ‘… is not going to go away…’16 But the mood 
in London was also bleak. 
 
 Richard Ryan met with Ian Gow to talk about the unionists. Ryan reported that Gow 
was ‘… very depressed.’ Paisley and Molyneaux refused to budge, and there was little 
evidence that any new blood was moving up through the ranks. Gow added “They are all 
awful”. He had little hope for a change in Northern Ireland after the general elections in the 
UK and the Republic of Ireland. He felt the situation was stagnant.17 There was about to be 
a change in Dublin. 
 
‘We have worked together before and we can work together again’: The Return of 
Haughey 
FitzGerald was in trouble. He had survived two no confidence votes in 1986 but the state of 
the economy coupled with the failure of the divorce referendum meant that FitzGerald’s days 
in the Taoiseach’s Office were numbered.18 FitzGerald reshuffled his Cabinet in 1986, but 
the change lacked ‘motive and purpose.’19 When key Ministers, most notably Barry Desmond 
who was then Minister for Health, refused to move in the reshuffle, FitzGerald’s authority 
over his party was called into question.20 Haughey started to circle Fine Gael. He told 
Nicholas Fenn, the British Ambassador, that he would be back in power soon.21 Haughey 
was confident he would win an election due to FitzGerald’s ‘bad record.’ Fenn reported that 
Haughey had ‘some harsh things to say about the (AIA),’ but that the potential new Taoiseach 
did not want to spark a crisis with London. He recognised the improvements the AIA had 
made to Anglo-Irish relations, but he also felt that good relations with the UK were ‘not 
everything.’ Haughey warned that London ‘should not expect an authentic Irish Nationalist 
to accept a copper-bottomed partition.’22 Haughey also told the FCO that he would probably 
                                                
16 PRONI, CENT 3/68/A, note from Mawhinney to King, 15 Jan. 1987. 
17 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/61, lunch with Gow, 13 Jan. 1987. 
18 TNA UK, PREM 19/1811, Goodison 102 to FCO, 17 Feb. 1986, ‘Confidence in Government: Motion,’ Dáil Éireann 
Debate vol. 363, no. 15, 20 Feb. 1986 and FitzGerald, All in a Life, pp. 619-639. 
19 Arnold, Haughey, p. 228. 
20 FitzGerald, All in a Life, pp. 619-620.  
21 Sir Nicholas Fenn, British diplomat. Ambassador to Ireland 1986-1991. 
22 TNA UK, CJ 4/6891, Fenn 14 to FCO, 14 Jan. 1987. 
 238 
continue to operate the AIA but he would oversee Anglo-Irish relations with a ‘harder’ 
nationalist stance. Haughey wanted Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland and would not 
be shy about telling them this in future.23 FitzGerald’s government ended on 20 January after 
the Labour Party withdrew its support over Fine Gael’s budget proposals.24 An election was 
announced for February.  
 
The NIO passed Fianna Fáil’s election manifesto to the FCO along with an 
evaluation. As Taoiseach, Haughey would press for a constitutional conference as he had in 
December 1980. Haughey would also fight for ‘… substantial reforms in the administration 
of justice etc.’25 The NIO prepared a brief on a potential Fianna Fáil government. It was 
expected that Haughey would personally take charge of Anglo-Irish relations as he had in 
previous terms. That way, he could shape his Northern Ireland policy according to the ‘… 
political dividends it pays at home.’ The NIO warned that there would be ‘rough water’ if 
Haughey became Taoiseach again. He had ‘unusually strong nationalist convictions’ and 
would ‘… try to exploit all the available diplomatic weapons available to him in the UK, 
Europe or the USA to induce faster progress than he wishes in Northern Ireland.’ It would be 
pivotal for London to publicly commit to the AIA again. Haughey had lambasted the AIA at 
a Wolfe Tone commemoration in Bodenstown in October 1986.26 He had told the crowd that 
Northern Ireland remained a ‘failed political entity’ and that Fianna Fáil would continue to 
push for Irish unity in spite of Article one.27 Haughey felt that the trouble with the AIA was 
that it secured the unionist position, and they had proved to be a problem themselves. 
Haughey was worried that the AIA created ‘… a situation where the Irish Government will 
be backed into a position where they will have to accept responsibility for an undesirable, an 
unsatisfactory and an unpalatable security apparatus and its operations without having any 
real control over them.’28 If relations broke down, London planned to either ask the US to 
pressurise Haughey into continuing Anglo-Irish relations or use the AIIGC as a bargaining 
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chip by offering to give it a wider role.29 Haughey won the 1987 election and returned to the 
Taoiseach’s office on 10 March. 
 
Having suffered yet another defeat at the polls, FitzGerald resigned as leader of Fine 
Gael and announced his retirement from politics. It was the end of an era for Anglo-Irish 
relations. FitzGerald wrote that he said goodbye to Thatcher at the February EEC London 
summit and that she ‘… was not receptive to my attempts to convince her that (Haughey) 
would not perform a u-turn on the (AIA).’30 Thatcher expected Haughey to play to 
Republican sympathies when he took over from FitzGerald.31 FitzGerald was replaced as 
leader of Fine Gael by Alan Dukes, who the NIO felt was ‘… tough, unflappable, clear-
headed, self-confident, decisive and an excellent debater …’32 They sensed he would be a 
‘… very effective antagonist for Mr. Haughey.’33 Along with a change in leader came other 
changes.  
 
Noel Dorr moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was replaced as Ambassador 
to the UK by Andrew O’Rourke.34 One London personality report characterised O’Rourke 
as ‘quiet … intelligent, thoughtful and objective …’ an improvement on the unpopular 
Dorr.35 Peter Barry was replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs by the tactless Brian 
Lenihan, who had caused problems after the Throne Room Summit by telling the media there 
would be a united Ireland within ten years (see chapter one). David Goodall, whom Thatcher 
had threatened to move in 1984 (see chapter four) was replaced as Deputy Under Secretary 
of State for Defence by John Boyd.36 Ryan felt that Boyd was ‘very direct and personable, 
and has a clear enthusiasm for his Irish responsibilities.’37 Robert Armstrong, Séan Donlon, 
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30 FitzGerald, All in a Life, p. 602. 
31 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 405. 
32 Alan Dukes, Fine Gael TD 1981-2002. Minister for Justice 1986-1987, Leader of Fine Gael 1987-1990. 
33 TNA UK, CJ 4/6891, Stimson 126 to FCO, 23 Mar. 1987. 
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 240 
Michael Lillis, Dermot Nally and Dick Spring remained on the Anglo-Irish scene. London 
sent Fenn to greet the new Taoiseach. 
 
 Haughey said that he looked forward to ‘resuming a constructive relationship’ with 
Thatcher. On that note, Fenn said that London had noted his change of stance since last 
October. Haughey had since said ‘… “no problem”: “wherever we may go in the future we 
start with the (AIA) as it was signed”.’38 Haughey told The Irish Times that Anglo-Irish 
meetings were well established and he did ‘… not see any reason to depart from that 
practice.’39 It seemed that both Dublin and London were ready for business as usual.40 
 
During his first speech to the Dáil as Taoiseach on 10 March, Haughey briefly 
attacked the ‘constitutional aspects’ of the AIA. Fianna Fáil would continue to support the 
agreement but Haughey said that they had serious reservations about Article one.41 King and 
Thatcher met to discuss the speech on 12 March. They agreed that Haughey’s comments 
were ‘unhelpful’ and felt it was important to discourage ‘any further utterances on these lines 
and persuading the new Irish Government to endorse the (AIA) in its entirety.’ Cabinet 
suspected that Haughey’s administration would not last.42 There was little London could do.  
 
 In Dublin, Haughey was briefed on the mood in London. He had not met Thatcher 
since March 1982 after their Falklands fall out (see chapter 3). Would his charm work on the 
Prime Minister? Officials from the DFA and Department of the Taoiseach doubted it. 
Thatcher continued to focus on security and had told Dorr that she felt that Dublin was 
‘unable or perhaps unwilling to commit sufficient resources’ to patrolling the border. 
Thatcher’s disappointment had increased, as had violence in Northern Ireland, after the AIA. 
London needed ‘… results of a concrete nature …’43 Boyd outlined to Ryan London’s 
attitude towards the AIA, 
 
                                                
38 TNA UK, CJ 4/6891, Fenn 90 to FCO, 4 Mar. 1987. 
39 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/55, The Irish Times, 7 Mar. 1987. 
40 TNA UK, CJ 4/6891, Fenn 90 to FCO, 4 Mar. 1987. 
41 ‘Appointment of Taoiseach and Nomination of Members of Government,’ Dáil Éireann debate, 10 Mar. 1987.  
42 TNA UK, CAB 128/85/9, conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held at No. 10, 12 Mar. 1987. 
43 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/34, security statistics; cross border security co-operation, 13 Mar. 1987 and NAI, DFA 2017/4/178, 
cross border security cooperation, 13 Mar. 1987. 
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- they genuinely expect full (and pretty vigorous) implementation from the Irish 
Government; 
- they are ready for business as usual; 
- they hope that Tom King’s invitation to Minister Lenihan to have a meal in London 
will enable an early meeting; 
- they expect officials to get on with the business of the Conference with a view to a 
meeting of it perhaps in April; 
- they envisage a meeting between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister in the first 
instance en marge of the (EEC) toward the end of the Belgian presidency in June.44 
 
Boyd concluded that Dublin’s work with back-bench MPs was important. It kept them up-
to-date with Dublin and the scale of the Northern Ireland problem. ‘(Boyd) said he personally 
felt this to be a necessary and important part of the whole process although he personally 
would rather sup with the devil than some of the “Roy Bean-type” figures on the right wing 
of the Conservative Party!’45 After becoming Taoiseach, Haughey needed to consider how 
he would approach Anglo-Irish relations. 
 
 By the end of March, Haughey had changed his tune again. Haughey told the Dáil 
that his government would ‘… honour and operate …’ the AIA.46 King reflected that this 
change of heart was probably due to pressure excised on Haughey during the annual St. 
Patrick’s Day trip to Washington.47 Peter Barry later told the FCO that Haughey had been 
“rapped over the knuckles” in the US over his attitude towards the AIA.48 Nevertheless, the 
apparent change was welcome. Haughey also indicated that he would consider hosting an 
informal meeting about a new committee on constitutional reform. If the parties of the Dáil 
agreed that the Irish constitution needed to be revised, Haughey would support the idea. 
Although Fianna Fáil had no proposals to change the constitution, the fact that Haughey was 
open to suggestions from outside the party looked promising. ‘… his own openness to the 
idea of inter-party talks opens the way for the subject of Constitutional reform becoming a 
                                                
44 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/55, lunch with John Boyd, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 16 Mar. 1987. 
45 iBid., 
46 ‘Ceisteanna- Questions. Oral answers - AIA,’ Dáil Éireann debate, 24 Mar. 1987. 
47 TNA UK, CAB 128/85/12, conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held at No. 10, 26 Mar. 1987. 
48 TNA UK, FCO 87/2514, political development in Northern Ireland, 5 Apr. 1987. 
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major feature of the twenty-fifth Dáil.’49 But how sincere was Haughey about the AIA? 
Officials from the NIO were sent to discuss Haughey’s plans. 
 
 Lillis had bad news for the NIO. Haughey was still ‘… strongly antipathetic …’ to 
the AIA, but felt obliged by internal and external pressures to accept it.50 The FCO hoped 
that ‘bogey-man’ Haughey would continue to operate according to that pressure but there 
was no guarantee.51 Lillis hoped that London would agree to a ‘real and inter-linked progress 
on the main areas defined by the Agreement. The objective in doing so would be to “clear 
the pitch” for a really serious bid for devolution.’52 Dorr warned London that they should 
expect Haughey to push for progress on the justice system and discrimination in the 
workplace in Northern Ireland. Indeed, Declan O’Donovan, an Assistant Secretary in the 
DFA, was sent to meet with John Steel, then Director of the Northern Ireland Court Service, 
to discuss the legal system in Northern Ireland. In the summer of 1986, Steel had told the 
DFA that three-judge-courts would not happen. He had hinted that a ‘… second senior 
judicial office …’ was a better proposal and now, in April 1987, he was ‘… convinced that 
such an office has become a distinct probability.’ Steel’s idea was deemed important because 
he had talked them over with Robert Lowry, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.53 
 
Eamon O Tuathail, Assistant Secretary at Dublin’s DFA, stressed the importance of 
London staying focused. They could be distracted by the marching season and the General 
Election. Nationalists had seen some improvements since the AIA was signed and support 
for Sinn Féin was in decline. But there had also been an increase in PIRA activity.54 The 
Independent reported back in March that the PIRA had regrouped in some areas and was 
working on increasing its arsenal.55 Robert Andrew, Permanent Under-Secretary at the NIO, 
said that the security forces had defused a lot of bombs. They had also noticed a revival of 
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51 TNA UK, FCO 87/2514, political development in Northern Ireland, 5 Apr. 1987. 
52 PRONI, CENT 3/83A, future of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 6 Apr. 1987. 
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car bombs and shootings. Andrew warned that a ‘bad explosion … could create a very 
difficult atmosphere.’56  
 
On 2 April, Lawrence Marley, a PIRA volunteer, was shot dead at his home in Belfast. 
His funeral, held four days later, proved to be a propaganda coup for the PIRA. Marley’s 
funeral had to be stopped, and was eventually abandoned, after the RUC stormed the 
procession in full riot gear. The behaviour of the RUC was criticised in Dublin. Bishop Cathal 
Daly called on the security forces to ‘… formulate and publicly announce the conditions 
which they expected mourners to observe …’ so funerals could be respectfully carried out.57 
A report by the Department of the Taoiseach in May reflected on the impact of the RUC’s 
‘insensitive behaviour.’ Although some PIRA funerals had been orchestrated to trap the 
security forces, Dublin felt that the RUC should have known they were walking into a trap, 
particularly as television cameras were present.58 The report concluded, ‘We have pressed 
for a more discreet presence which does not offend mourners and disarms Provo 
propagandists.’59 At the April AIIGC meeting, Gerry Collins asked John Hermon if the RUC 
had ‘… won at the Marley funeral.’ Hermon replied, ‘We won one-third and we lost two-
thirds.’60 
 
Danny Morrison, a PIRA volunteer who had acted as a spokesman during the 1981 
Hunger Strike, told an unnamed Dublin contact that the PIRA were ‘very pleased with the 
controversy which had developed over the police handling of paramilitary funerals and 
intended to “keep the pot boiling”.’ Morrison also said that although the PIRA had taken “a 
lot of flak” for the deaths of two RUC Constables on 11 April, for the most part the nationalist 
community felt that the RUC “had it coming to them”. Funerals would be used as a 
propaganda tool by Sinn Féin to increase support. Back in February, the DFA in Dublin had 
received promising information on the PIRA.  
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Patrick J. McGrory, a Belfast criminal Lawyer, told David Donoghue, an official from 
the DFA, that Gerry Adams had indicated that it was time for Sinn Féin to distance itself 
from the “armed struggle”. McGrory felt that Adams had become disenchanted with violence 
and wanted to present himself as a “politician more than a gunman”. Adams was also 
‘furious’ with the INLA. They had ‘damaged the “good name” of Republicanism’ and the 
PIRA would step in to ‘put an end to it’ if they did not end their campaign. McGrory also 
passed on that republicans were waiting for unionists to “go berserk” over the AIA. They 
expected a civil war to break out, but recruitment to the PIRA had declined.61 McGrory’s 
information was important. He indicated that republicans were more likely to accept an 
invitation to talk. Adams wanted to carve a career as a politician.62 Another unnamed contact 
for the Department of the Taoiseach said that funerals had proved to be a ‘godsend’ for 
Adams and Sinn Féin. The ‘emotive issue’ would swing undecided nationalist voters to Sinn 
Féin in the same way as the 1981 hunger strike had.63 Support for the PIRA was also 
increasing overseas. 
 
Back in March, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, leader of Libya, had caused an uproar 
after he congratulated Haughey on his re-election and called him a ‘friend.’ Gaddafi had 
made similar comments back in 1985 while Haughey was leader of the opposition.64 A 
newspaper cut out, kept for reference by the DFA in Dublin, reported on the criticism from 
Belfast and London. Frank Millar, UUP General Secretary, called for Thatcher to reconsider 
the ‘… whole shape and scale, structure and purpose of Anglo-Irish relations.’65 At the April 
AIIGC meeting, Hermon was asked where weapons for the PIRA were coming from. Hermon 
listed Canada, America, Amsterdam and the Hague, and mentioned an arms cache found in 
Sligo that was from Libya.66 Support was clearly widespread. The deaths of Lord and Lady 
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Gibson at the end of April served as proof of a surge in paramilitary activity.67 Events in May 
further proved this theory. 
 
‘Hidden eyes were watching everywhere,’ Summer 1987 
At the May 1987 meeting of the AIIGC, Dublin said that they hoped the PIRA would ‘opt 
for a relatively low profile over the coming months.’68 Obviously news of the Loughgall 
ambush had not yet reached the meeting. On the evening of 8 May, an eight-man PIRA unit 
had stolen a digger, planted a bomb in its front bucket, and drove into the village of Loughgall 
to blow up the RUC station. The men were also armed with automatic rifles and some were 
wearing bullet proof vests. After driving the digger through the perimeter fence of the station, 
the bomb was detonated. The station was badly damaged but before the PIRA men could 
continue with their attack, the SAS ambushed the group. All eight PIRA men, and a civilian, 
died at the scene. It was the biggest loss of life in one incident the PIRA would suffer 
throughout The Troubles. It was obvious that the SAS had prior knowledge of the attack.69  
 
 Dublin and London were wary of saying much about the Loughgall ambush. In a 
letter to Haughey, Lenihan wrote that people were suspicious, ‘Many people, including the 
Leader of our Opposition, were asking why could not some or all of the gunmen have been 
arrested or even shot in the legs?’ The ambush was an operational success but it had ‘touched 
a nerve.’ Lenihan asked King why the SAS had decided to shoot the men instead of trying to 
arrest them. King said he had been told that the SAS deemed arrest too dangerous, and shot 
the men to prevent further casualties.70 The PIRA had lost support in the months following 
the AIA, but the actions of the security forces and RUC was playing into their hands.71 The 
FCO feared there could be ‘a wave of emotional reaction’ which would benefit Sinn Féin.72 
Further to this, the PIRA had started to target high profile British civil servants in a letter 
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bomb campaign. Bernard Ingham and Robert Andrew were amongst those targeted.73 But, in 
spite of the evidence of international support for the PIRA, the Department of the Taoiseach 
felt that the current upsurge of violence came from a desire to prove that the organisation had 
not ‘gone “stale”.74 There remained the question of how these attacks affect relations between 
Haughey and Thatcher? 
 
  Thatcher and Haughey planned to meet while they were both in Brussels for the June 
EEC. Haughey had been Taoiseach for under three months, and the DFA in Dublin had found 
out, from Fenn, that Thatcher wanted to get off on the right foot with him. Fenn added that 
Thatcher had been briefed on security co-operation, the possibility of dialogue between the 
parties in Northern Ireland and devolution. Fenn advised Haughey to focus on his relationship 
with Thatcher, and to avoid mentioning anything too heavy i.e. his all-party conference idea. 
The DFA also warned Haughey that Thatcher was not impressed with the SDLP’s reaction 
to the AIA, and that he would probably have to reassure her that the party was willing to 
support the talks process.75 Lillis suggested that Haughey’s critique of the AIA could be 
useful. Haughey could raise London’s “non delivery” to Thatcher should she become 
defensive about security.76 Dorr advised Haughey that Thatcher was still prone to ‘seize on 
and pursue some issue where she feels she is in the right, in a single minded - not to say self-
righteous way.’ She felt that she had gotten little from the AIA and tended to lecture Dublin, 
in an “exasperating” way, on her grievances. Haughey would have to choose between arguing 
with Thatcher or ‘showing a measure of patience which could perhaps be of longer term 
benefit.’77 Overall, Thatcher wanted her first meeting with Haughey to ‘…go well and be the 
basis for continued friendly relations.’78 
 
                                                
73 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/33, security and legal issues, May 1987, The Evening Herald and The Irish Examiner, 16 Apr. 1987 
and The Irish Press, 21 Apr. 1987. 
74 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/33, security and legal issues, May 1987. It emerged in June that a small group in the Italian Secret 
Service had sent arms to the PIRA, The Irish Press and The Evening Herald, 3 June 1987. Israel’s Ambassador to the UK, 
Yehuda Avner, told Dorr that Paisley had asked him for weapons, NAI, DFA 2017/4/78, letter from Dorr to Lillis, 14 June 
1987. 
75 NAI, DFA 2017/4/149, Haughey meeting with MT, general steering note, undated (circa. June 1987). 
76 NAI, DFA 2017/4/149, letter from Lillis to O Tuathail, 16 June 1987. 
77 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/56, memo from Dorr, 23 June 1987 and NAI, DFA 2017/4/149, developments ahead on Northern 
Ireland - Haughey meeting with MT, 23 June 1987. 
78 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/56, Haughey meeting with MT, 26 June 1987. 
 247 
 In turn, Thatcher was sent a brief on Haughey. The FCO warned that Haughey was 
‘Republican by conviction’ but that he had committed verbally to the AIA.79 The NIO knew 
there was no ‘…disguising Mr. Haughey’s past bad record’ but there needed to be a meeting 
between the two leaders. Haughey was a ‘one-man band’ and rebuilding relations between 
him and Thatcher was crucial. Haughey expected a meeting with the Prime Minister, and the 
NIO knew he would be offended if this did not happen.80 Haughey wanted ‘to mend fences.’ 
Robert Andrew advised that ‘harping on past disagreements’ would be pointless.81 Haughey 
would approach a meeting with Thatcher with ‘relative cordiality, and common interest.’ 
Without Haughey, London could lose any hope of the SDLP backing the AIA. ‘Equally, 
unhelpfulness in Dublin will harden, rather than help unfreeze Unionist attitudes.’82 There 
was a window of opportunity for the SDLP. In the June general election, the SDLP had done 
better than Sinn Féin. But this could result in a surge in violence from the PIRA as they saw 
a decline in support at the ballot box.83 Overall, Haughey would be ‘on his best behaviour … 
He genuinely wants to re-establish a cordial working relationship with … His “Dear 
Margaret” if she won the upcoming UK General Election.84  
 
The 1987 British General Election resulted in another victory for Thatcher and the 
Conservatives, and gave the Prime Minister the opportunity to undertake a reshuffle. In mid-
June, there were a few key changes to the Anglo team. Nicholas Scott, who had proved to be 
a useful contact for Lillis, returned to London and became Minister of State for Social 
Security. Lillis felt Scott’s departure was ‘… bad news …’ as he was ‘… sympathetic to 
constitutional nationalism … He was also vital in King’s first year in office in calming (King) 
down and in keeping him committed to implementing “our side” of the Agreement.’ Lillis 
said that King barely knew the new Minister of State, John Stanley, and had to fly to London 
to meet him.85 Lillis also tipped O Tuathail off on the other characters of the NIO.  
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 Lillis felt that Scott’s departure could lighten up Richard Needham, the newly 
appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.86 The two men had 
become rivals, resulting in Needham taking up the unionist cause. Needham could be got on 
side if his current interest, the redevelopment of Belfast, was taken seriously. Lillis said that 
Brian Mawhinney had held on to some informal unionist contacts. Mawhinney had also come 
round to the AIA, so he could be a useful contact for Dublin. Lillis welcomed King’s 
reappointment as Secretary of State, noting that he had come a long way and had become ‘… 
his own man vis-à-vis the Stormont machine, the police and the Army.’87 Now that the UK 
Election was over, and Thatcher was to remain Prime Minister, attention in Dublin turned 
back to the EEC summit. 
 
 The Department of the Taoiseach and DFA prepared briefs on security co-operation 
for Haughey throughout June. The RUC had described the information they got from the 
Garda as “low grade” due to their inexperience of covert surveillance. The Stalker/Sampson 
report, which had been completed in March, had further damaged nationalist confidence in 
the RUC. No criminal proceedings were brought against the RUC and the contents of the 
report remained secret. The public were given no answers about shoot-to-kill. The Garda 
were therefore wary of adopting any RUC structures until the affair was ‘cleared up.’88 The 
Stalker/Sampson affair had the potential to reduce ‘Anglo-Irish relations to their lowest point 
since the signing of the (AIA).’89 Contrary to this, one NIO brief reported that relations 
between the Garda and the RUC had actually improved. ‘Better communications, and a 
system of regular and formalised as well as personal contact has established a framework for 
progress.’ But there were improvements to be made on resources and training.90 The 
Taoiseach’s Office also highlighted problems with Haughey’s public statements. 
 
 Haughey’s flip-flop speeches on the AIA had caused concern in London, and Lillis 
had picked up on some ‘worrying vibes’ in Maryfield. His contacts had reported that 
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disparities between public statements and actual performance made the situation ‘quite 
difficult to handle.’ If he discussed actual policy it clashed with some of Haughey’s 
statements and Lillis was then open to accusations of ‘either insufficient awareness of the 
position on our own side, or even of a degree of “going native”.’ Lillis and his team were 
then subjected to ‘resentment’ from their counterparts. Lillis had also been fighting Dublin’s 
corner. He had told London ‘literally every day’ that security could not be treated as an 
isolated problem. If the AIA was to succeed, London needed to recognise issues the minority 
community faced.91 The DFA expanded on this with a brief prepared the day after Lillis’s 
letter. 
 
 There had been ‘no delivery insofar as the Nationalist population of Northern Ireland 
was concerned.’ London had only paid ‘lip service’ to the confidence building measures in 
public administration and justice. The Stalker/Sampson affair had resulted in a lack of trust 
in the Northern Ireland justice system. Further to this, the Code of Conduct for the RUC had 
not yet been implemented. Dorr said he had raised these issues with Mark Elliott, an official 
from the NIO, so that work could start behind the scenes and Haughey would not need to 
issue a list of demands to Thatcher at their meeting.92 
 
 On 30 June, Haughey and Thatcher had a ‘friendly’ twenty-minute meeting.93 The 
discussion started with a brief chat about the state of the Irish economy, which Haughey 
indicated would be his main concern for the time being.94 He said the Republic of Ireland 
was ‘right up against the wall.’95 Haughey went on to congratulate Thatcher on the AIA, ‘She 
was the first British Prime Minister to tell the Unionists that there must be change and 
progress and to stand firm on this … they would come round. This was an historic 
contribution to Anglo-Irish relations.’96 He continued, ‘You did not, like Prime Minister 
Wilson, for example, back down; it is very important that they understand the position.’97 
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Haughey remembered that a little flattery could get you far with Thatcher. Thatcher then 
turned to security. She continued to be concerned by the number of PIRA attacks and the use 
of the border as an escape route. Haughey assured her that, once the economy had stabilised, 
Dublin would focus on incidents from their side of the border. He jokingly asked her for the 
lend of ‘£2 billion or so …!’ In the meantime, Thatcher felt that Dublin and London could 
agree to ‘a fuller exchange of information and above all pre-emptive intelligence was vital.’98 
But Haughey counteracted that co-operation had improved. At the close of the meeting, 
Haughey suggested that they could meet again when the economy was under control, ‘we 
could perhaps talk through our respective aides as to whether there are ways in which we can 
make progress and also placate the unionists.’99 Although the meeting had gone well, Arnold 
argued that Dublin and London’s post-summit press conferences ‘produced a chilly 
definition of how things were between the two leaders.’ Thatcher ‘publicly revealed the state 
of the relationship in a rhetorical question to (Ingham): ‘What does it say in the 
communiqué?’ she asked. ‘I think we worked it up to cordial, didn’t we Bernard?’ Meanwhile 
Haughey ‘was quite clearly seen to be in the hands of his shrewd, able and by now quite 
experienced press secretary, P.J. Mara …’ Haughey’s performance pointed to ‘passive 
leadership.’ Haughey was going to play it safe with London.100 
 
 August is usually a quiet month for Belfast, Dublin and London, as officials and 
Ministers take their holidays. But August 1987 in Dublin proved to be quite dramatic. The 
Department of the Taoiseach received a letter from the UVF informing them that MI5, MI6 
and the SAS had passed on information about the PIRA, including suspects and planned 
attacks. The letter claimed that the aforementioned security forces had also supplied the UVF 
with weapons before asking them to assassinate Haughey. Addressing Haughey directly, the 
letter claimed that an MI5 Officer supplied information on, 
 
Your cars, aerial photographs of your home, your island home on the Kerry coast. 
Details of your trips into Farranford Private Airport, photographs of your plane. 
                                                
98 TNA UK, CJ 4/6776, MT meeting with Haughey, 30 June 1987. 
99 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/56, meeting between Haughey and MT, 30 June 1987. 
100 Arnold, Haughey, p. 239. 
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Photographs and the details of your private yatch [sic]. We refused to do it, we were 
asked would we accept responsibility if you were killed we refused.101 
 
Haughey was on holiday when the letter arrived, but was shown it later. He asked for the 
Department of Justice to let him know if they had any more information.102 What did the 
UVF hope to achieve by sending the letter?  
 
If the letter was genuine, it was a threat in itself. The UVF claimed to know Haughey’s 
whereabouts during his leisure time. They were armed and could assassinate him at any time. 
However, Ed Moloney, a seasoned Northern Ireland journalist and commentator, doubts that 
the letter is genuine.103 But the fact that the letter was kept and stored in a Department of the 
Taoiseach file means that the threat was taken seriously. With paramilitary violence on the 
rise in 1987, no doubt somebody wanted to capitalise on the threat and try to scare the 
Taoiseach. 
  
Autumn 1987  
Following the summer break, the NIO published a ‘game plan’ for Anglo-Irish relations over 
the next few months. Dublin was still preoccupied with the economy, and believed that 
London’s commitment to the AIA was ‘lukewarm.’ Meanwhile, London looked on Irish 
problems as ‘an irritant which risks deflecting attention from their wider economic and social 
policies.’ The report also warned that Anglo-Irish relations were susceptible to damage from 
unpredictable events. Therefore, the NIO decided it would continue with their idea to have 
‘talks about talks’ with the UUP and DUP to allow Dublin time to sort out its economy and, 
hopefully, to bring something positive to London.104 
 
 On 14 September, Molyneaux and Paisley met with King for ‘talks about talks.’ This 
was the first meeting between an official from Westminster and the unionist alliance since 
                                                
101 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/34, letter from Capt. W. Johnston to Haughey, 5 Aug. 1987. 
102 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/34, memo from Department of the Taoiseach to the Department of Justice, undated (circa late 
Aug. 1987). 
103 According to his blog he asked a UVF contact about the Haughey letter. The source labelled the letter ‘nonsense’ and 
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2018, https://thebrokenelbow.com/2018/01/04/that-uvf-letter-to-haughey-here-it-is/. 
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February 1986.105 By meeting with King, Paisley and Molyneaux signified the end of the 
unionist alliance’s boycott of ministers and officials from London. King told Thatcher that 
the first meeting had been ‘… reasonably cordial, though Paisley has more than once become 
a little heated and shown signs of wishing to break off the process.’ But Paisley and 
Molyneaux did agree to stop demanding the Maryfield Secretariat to close.106 They also 
agreed that a round table conference involving all the main Northern Ireland parties, bar Sinn 
Féin, should be established for three months. The aim of the conference would be to discuss 
proposals on devolution, but the two leaders would not elaborate any further on their position. 
Paisley and Molyneaux also agreed that Dublin should be informed about the conference, 
although they would not be invited to attend. Haughey had suggested that he and Thatcher 
could meet to discuss the unionists so this idea would look good to Dublin.107 King felt they 
should make these arrangements as soon as possible and Thatcher agreed. She noted on the 
brief ‘certainly we can’t wait long.’108 But she then changed her mind. 
 
 On further reflection, Thatcher had ‘… serious and substantial reservations …’ about 
King’s memo. She decided that Dublin should not be told about the new idea and listed her 
reservations as follows, 
 
- the proposal is tantamount to suspending the (AIA) for three months. This would look 
publicly as though we were giving the Unionists what they want. She believes that it 
would be disastrous to give in to the conditions sought by Paisley and Molyneaux and 
anyway the Government has no authority to do so … 
- she does not accept that Paisley and Molyneaux have failed to realise how much the 
role of the Intergovernmental Conference would be reduced in the event of 
devolution. It has been explained to them countless times, including by her.109 
 
And, quite drastically, she asked that any copies of King’s minute of the meeting be 
recalled.110 In a draft letter to King, Thatcher further explained her reservations with the plan. 
                                                
105 King had requested the meeting back in July. TNA UK, CAB 128/86/9, conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held at 
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108 TNA UK, FCO 87/2519, minute from King to MT, 18 Sept. 1987. 




  Thatcher did not want to appear to buckle under pressure from the unionists and 
suspend the AIA. The Agreement was a blueprint for good Anglo-Irish relations and also put 
‘… Northern Ireland politics in perspective …’ The AIA also worked as an expression of 
good faith between Dublin and London that other countries could recognise. Suspending 
Maryfield and the AIIGC would not go ahead.111 The fact that there was no announcement 
led The Sunday Independent to report that King-Paisley-Molyneaux meeting had resulted in 
a stalemate.112 But Thatcher did say that she wanted King to continue meeting with the 
unionists, ‘Despite this gloomy analysis, we are committed to looking for ways forward. 
Accordingly, I support Mr. King’s efforts. The thrust of what he now proposes seems right.’ 
Thatcher also wanted Dublin to eventually be told about the discussions, but not right away. 
Thatcher requested a meeting to further discuss political development in Northern Ireland.113 
King, meanwhile. continued to work with Dublin. 
  
 King met with Lenihan over breakfast at the EEC Foreign Minister’s weekend at the 
start of October. Lenihan wanted to discuss the ECST. At the end of September, FitzGerald 
had caused a stir at the British-Irish Association Conference. He had made an impassioned 
speech that explained ‘a very specific linkage between reform of the North’s single judge 
courts and his Government’s willingness to ratify the (ECST).’ FitzGerald’s speech was 
reported in the Irish media.114 Lenihan said that FitzGerald’s comments had ‘wrong-footed’ 
Haughey’s Government. He warned that the ECST would probably not pass through the Dáil. 
Therefore, Dublin would need at least six-months to work on the bill. King replied that a 
delay would look bad and would give ‘… entirely the wrong political signal,’ but Lenihan 
did not give ground.115 The ECST would become the dominant Anglo-Irish issue in the last 
months of 1987. 
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‘Innocent until proved Irish’: Anglo-Irish Relations and the ECST 
The Armstrong-Nally teams came together at the start of October for an informal chat about 
the impact of the AIA.116 Dublin also wanted to tackle London about the ECST, which they 
could not implement until there was a change in the Northern Ireland Courts. Armstrong felt 
that, despite the difficulties, the AIA was ‘robust’, 
 
I don’t think things will ever be the same again. Both sides in Northern Ireland have 
seen the willingness of the British government, led by as right wing a Prime Minister 
as they are ever likely to see, prepared nevertheless to enter into an Agreement with 
the Irish Government. In the long term that is very significant.117 
 
Armstrong also assured Nally and Dorr that Thatcher’s commitment to the AIA was ‘… as 
solid as ever.’118 Nally and Dorr then brought up the courts issue. 
 
 Nally said that Haughey was actually ‘… somewhat dubious about the desirability of 
mixed courts,’ but people like FitzGerald, Barry and Geraldine Kennedy, who had been 
elected Progressive Democrat TD in the 1987 election, were drawing attention to it. They 
each felt that there had not been enough change in the Northern Ireland Justice System. Such 
criticism from high-profile people had kept the Irish media interested in the Courts issue.119 
Andrew asked if jury trials were immediately reintroduced would it solve the problem? And 
if there were prosecutions in the Stalker/Sampson affair would it make a difference? Dorr 
replied that those measures would help, ‘But it was not possible for us to draw up an exact 
balance sheet.’ Nally and Dorr concluded the meeting by stating again that the ECST bill 
would be deferred until London made changes to Northern Ireland Courts.120 ‘The problems 
in ratifying the ECST were political rather than legal.’ Dublin had always thought that they 
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would only have to consent to the ECST when London changed the Northern Ireland Court 
System. When this misunderstanding came to light, Dublin decided they would rather delay 
the act and risk the Anglo-Irish process than be seen to bow to pressure from Thatcher.121 
Haughey and Armstrong met at the end of October to go over the ECST. 
 
 Armstrong opened the meeting with a confirmation that Thatcher appreciated ‘… as 
well as anybody the significance of parliamentary arithmetic and she knows the sort of 
difficulties you face.’ Later in the day he said that Thatcher was ‘not for turning’ on the 
AIA.122 But Armstrong warned that it would be a “considerable setback’ if the ECST was 
not ratified on 1 December. But Haughey did not budge. He said he needed 12 months to get 
the ECST through the Dáil. Haughey had had a difficult time in government, ‘I am asking 
our backbenchers to close hospitals and take extremely difficult decisions, often contrary to 
what they themselves have said in their constituencies.’ Haughey asked London to appreciate 
the difficulties he faced, ‘Let us as partners in this Agreement agree to defer action to give 
both of us time over the next 12 months.’123 London asked for a deadline of 6 months but 
Dublin did not want to agree to a short time limit. As they saw it the situation was 
‘evolving.’124 Nothing was agreed at this stage, and events in Northern Ireland overtook 
Anglo-Irish relations once again.  
 
‘There is no such thing as 100% security’: The End of 1987  
On 1 November, an Irish fishing vessel called The Eksund was intercepted by French 
authorities. It was found to have 150 tonnes of arms and ammunition from Libya. The Eksund 
was taking the cargo to the PIRA. This was not the first shipment, but its size and the fact 
that the French found it led to a lot of press coverage. Collins told the Dáil that the Garda 
were investigating reports of arms shipments from Libya back in 1985 and 1986.125 Collins 
later told RTÉ that he believed there was “reason to worry” about the amount of support the 
PIRA had received from Libya.126 The same day, Glasgow police confiscated a PIRA arms 
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cache in a canal that included ten submachine guns and revolvers.127 Violence had been on 
the rise throughout 1987 and The Eksund find confirmed that the PIRA were not going to 
back down. Wary that these incidents could affect Anglo-Irish relations, the FCO in London 
investigated how to “thicken” Anglo-Irish relations. 
 
The report, compiled by the Republic of Ireland Department, researched possible 
topics of conversation to have with Dublin apart from Northern Ireland.128 The report felt 
that it was important to take notice of Haughey, ‘What is needed however is some indication 
that we do not want to deal with him at arms length. Can we find nice things to say to him 
personally on the economy - i.e. anything except Northern Ireland?’ Unofficial (or personal) 
relations were pivotal to a good relationship with Dublin. When blips occurred, ‘atavistic 
feelings’ arose as had happened in December 1980. The report stated that it would ‘take 
another 600 years to breed those out of the system. But gradual thickening up of official 
relations of one sort or another will undoubtedly help.’129 Two days after the report was 
published, one of the worst incidents of The Troubles occurred. 
 
 8 November 1987 was Remembrance Sunday. The PIRA targeted two Remembrance 
ceremonies at Ennsikillen and Tullyhommon. The larger bomb at Tullyhommon did not 
explode, but 11 people were killed in the Enniskillen bomb. The attack sent shockwaves 
through Dublin and London. Haughey immediately wrote to Thatcher to send his sympathies 
and support, ‘All the security forces in this island must combine in an all out effort to have 
the perpetrators brought to justice.’ Thatcher noted that it was a ‘good message.’130 Thatcher 
was horrified by the attack. She told the BBC, 
 
It was so appalling, really I could scarcely believe it because every civilised country 
honours and respects their dead. And every civilised country expects others to honour 
their dead too. And to take advantage of those people, assembling in that way, was 
really a desecration. It was so cruel, so callous that the people who did it can have 
                                                
127 The Irish Press, 1 Nov. 1986.  
128 TNA UK, FCO 87/2435, memo from George to Boyd, 6 Nov. 1987. 
129 TNA UK, FCO 87/2435, minute from T.J.B. George to Boyd, 6 Nov. 1987. 
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nothing of human thoughtfulness or kindness or sensitivity at all. It was utterly 
barbaric.131 
 
 Thatcher continued that no country should have sympathy for those who carried out the 
attack, and there should be no hiding place for the people behind it. She also said that, no 
matter how much effort was put into it, there could never be 100% security.132 Enniskillen 
further highlighted the holes in Anglo-Irish security cooperation. The town was targeted 
because it was close to the border. The bombers could detonate or plant a bomb and evade 
capture by crossing the border into the Republic of Ireland in as little as twenty minutes. But 
Ennsikillen proved to be a propaganda disaster for the PIRA. 
 
 The evening after the bomb, Gordon Wilson publicly forgave the bombers for killing 
his daughter Marie, a student nurse.133 His television interview ‘made a deep impression on 
a worldwide audience.’134 Even Gaddafi condemned the attack, stating that the bomb did not 
‘belong to the legitimate revolutionary operation.’135 The PIRA said that the bomb had been 
aimed at security personnel and tried to blame interference from British Army equipment for 
setting the bomb off early, but the excuse did not wash.136 In fact it emerged that the 
Tullyhommon service was targeted because the Girls and Boy’s Brigade were parading there. 
The PIRA had targeted a Christian organisation made up of members as young as three years 
old.137 It later emerged that a 1200lb bomb was found and diffused in Belfast on 8 November. 
The PIRA had carried out a carefully planned attack on Remembrance Day with the aim of 
inflicting large-scale civilian casualties. It was speculated that the PIRA wanted to goad 
loyalists into violence, and drive a wedge between Dublin and London.138 
 
  Thatcher met with a Northern Ireland delegation the day after Ennsikillen. Mr. Foster 
wanted London to take greater measures against Sinn Féin, ‘The Government must protect 
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the Unionist people of Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin should be proscribed and selective 
internment brought back.’ Thatcher said that London would not be seen to panic and rush 
through new measures ‘in the heat of the moment.’ Mr. Cooper suggested that London could 
persuade Dublin to ‘divorce themselves completely from Sinn Féin and support the security 
forces. There should be no longer any ambivalence about this.’ He thought that London 
should act quickly, and this was actually discussed by Cabinet a few days later.139 Thatcher also 
insisted on attending the rescheduled memorial service.140 She wrote in her memoirs that 
after Enniskillen, ‘… requirements for practical improvements in security, reviewed after 
each new tragedy, increasingly dominated my policy towards both Northern Ireland and the 
Republic.’141 
 
 Enniskillen deeply impacted Thatcher. London wanted to continue working with 
Dublin and in the weeks after Ennsikillen, they tried to figure out the best course to keep the 
relationship between the two premiers healthy. ‘The crucial relationship is that between the 
two Prime Ministers - chequered in the past and uneasy now.’ Thatcher and Haughey were 
due to meet at the Copenhagen EEC on 4 December. Fenn thought it would be better to delay 
an Anglo-Irish summit instead of having a “tense” meeting too soon. Fenn also thought that 
figuring out a way to help the Irish economy would earn “golden options” from Haughey.142 
Indeed, Haughey was in trouble. 
 
When he met with King on 18 November, Haughey still could not guarantee that the 
ECST would be passed through the Dáil. Haughey asked Armstrong to appreciate that he had 
taken on a lot when he came into office in March. He had had to change his position on the 
AIA and had tried to work it. But he needed 12 months to pass the ECST. Haughey asked 
that London not ‘… look a gift horse in the mouth.’ It was unfortunate that there would be a 
delay but London would eventually get all that it had asked for, 
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You will have extradition: you will have the backing of warrants system: your courts 
will not be able to interfere any more than they would have been able to interfere 
under the informal arrangements. You are worried about them. Our courts are perhaps 
worse! And we are making this proposal to try and get ourselves out of these 
difficulties. 
 
King offered help in the way of three options, 
 
(1) made the offer, which I understand has not yet been formally accepted, under which 
there would be an exchange of letters accepting the declaratory statement idea; 
(2) we would also formally accept the speciality rule under which a person cannot be 
separately tried for a non-extraditable offence; 
(3) we would also pursue the question of the check list so as to make sure that warrants 
are properly prepared. 
 
But Haughey did not accept King’s offer, 
 
We are in deep trouble politically. Our Party headquarters say that things there are 
going berserk. I would like you to understand that this means for us an enormous 
political battle. We are offering everything you need and want. This is what I thought 
a few weeks ago I could not give you. What we are offering does not take from the 
efficacy of the backing of warrants system.143 
 
King continued to press for the ECST at a meeting with Lenihan at the Foreign Affairs 
Council on 23 November.  
 
 King emphasised that ratifying the ECST on time was pivotal to good relations with 
London. Lenihan ‘…warmly welcomed the close cross-border cooperation over follow-up to 
The Eksund.’ Lenihan actually approached King again later to say again that Dublin was 
‘…extremely grateful for the cooperation they had received from us over the search for arms 
from previous shipments.’ But Dublin still would not be able to pass the ECST in 6 months. 
They needed 12. King ‘regarded what Mr. Lenihan had to say as very bad news’ but on 
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returning to London, it was discovered that ‘… Lenihan’s line had been overtaken by 
events.’144 
 
 On 23 November, the evening before Lenihan and King met at the EEC, there had 
been a meeting in Dublin and the decision was made to ratify the ECST. An amendment bill 
was published the same day. The new amendment meant that extradition applications would 
be made to the Irish Attorney General. He or she would ensure there was a case to answer, 
based on prima facie evidence, before allowing the extradition to go ahead.145 Haughey 
announced to the Dáil that the revised ECST would come into law on 30 November.146 
Thatcher was incensed by the amendment. She told her Cabinet, 
 
The system was therefore likely to go wrong before long … The result of the changes 
would be that arrangements in the Irish Republic for extradition to the United 
Kingdom would be worse than before, and worse in some ways than the Republic’s 
arrangements for extradition to other European countries … The Prime Minister, 
summing up a short discussion, said that the position of the Irish Government was 
most unsatisfactory. The Government’s public line would have to be critical.147 
 
On 1 December, days before she was due to meet Haughey, she told the Commons, ‘… what 
the Republic is doing by taking this step is making us the least favoured nation in this 
matter.’148 The FCO tried to push their “thickening” relations message again. 
 
 ‘As the dust settles on ECST ratification and extradition, we need to think if there is 
anything we can do to thicken Anglo-Irish relations.’ The FCO advised that London should, 
 
a. (Widen) the angle of vision, and avoiding an obsessive concentration on Northern 
Ireland; 
b. personalities; 
c. Northern Ireland affairs.149 
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They also felt that the Thatcher-Haughey dynamic would be best served by having 
‘occasional contacts to gradually warm the relationship between the two.150 But Thatcher 
could not hide her irritation with Haughey when she met him at the EEC in Copenhagen. 
 
 She opened the meeting by telling Haughey off, 
 
I am extremely upset by your moves on extradition. They are a step backwards. We 
have been working a system for 20 years or more and here now I find that it is changed 
without consultation. My Attorney, Paddy Mayhew, tells me that there is no way his 
documentation can be kept out of the Irish courts. He says that previous cases have 
been thrown out by the Irish courts for all sorts of frivolous reasons. One case was 
thrown out because documents were not stapled together. I can see a time when our 
Attorney General would be called before an Irish court to answer it. I am very angry 
about all this. My feelings go deeper than anger. He tells me there may never be 
another extradition case again. I know now from what you told me that you have 
extreme difficulties with your people, but where are they living? They are going back 
to the black and tans - or is it 400 years ago? … I did not have to sign the (AIA). I 
could have got by without it. The only thing it has brought me is criticism and bad 
blood with the Unionists. I had thought that if we operated it for a time, we could 
calm their fears: that has not come about. The Nationalists are quite glad about it. I 
(thought) we could build on all that. Then we get this! I appreciate your problems. I 
know the level of crime you have in Dublin. I know your Gardaí have difficulties. 
There is a level of Provo support which can provide safe houses in many areas. What 
is going to happen now is that we will not get extradition and your courts can look 
through Paddy’s warrants.151 
 
Haughey waited until Thatcher drew breath and said, ‘I am sorry you feel so strongly. I can 
see you feel anger …’ Thatcher replied, ‘It is not anger. It is far deeper than that. The whole 
thing has suddenly collapsed …’ Haughey tried to defend the amendment. He argued that the 
new law would prevent mistakes and the release of suspects into the community. But 
Thatcher would not hear it. ‘There is no way you can court-proof what you are doing.’ She 
told him outright, ‘You are not backing our warrants.’ Haughey argued that the new 
amendment was ‘framed negatively … In the vast majority cases will have to be looked at in 
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more detail but they will be few.’ Thatcher replied, ‘Why do I even try!’ Haughey implored 
her, ‘Keep trying. You are one of the most able politicians. In the Council you want binding 
and effective budgetary discipline. Apply the same thing here.’ He asked her to give the new 
amendment time, ‘Don’t say we did this unilaterally or broke faith. Give the new system an 
opportunity and we will see that it does work properly.’ She replied, ‘We will try it: we have 
no option.’152 
 
 The NIO produced a report on the next steps for Anglo-Irish relations. They surmised 
that Enniskillen had had a positive impact on Dublin. They wanted to do more to improve 
security, but they would do it in their own way. Lawrence Wren retired and was replaced as 
Garda Commissioner by Eamonn Doherty. The personal animosity between Wren and John 
Hermon would no longer be an obstacle to co-operation between the Garda and the RUC.153 
A new security initiative would be implemented in 1988. A border zone, controlled by the 
RUC and the Army, would be introduced and the number of battalions to patrol the border 
would be increased. A Border Commander would be appointed and he would coordinate 
cross-border operations with the Garda.154 King advised the FCO that close cooperation with 
Dublin should try to be maintained. ‘… closer contacts of this kind could provide a cushion 
for the tumbles which periodically bedevil Anglo/Irish relations. But he considers that we 
will need to pace ourselves quite gently through all this …’155 
 
Conclusion 
The ‘cold wave’ of January 1987 is perhaps an apt representation of the general state of 
Anglo-Irish relations throughout that year. The year started off with yet more protests from 
the DUP and UUP. A petition of concern against the AIA was delivered to Buckingham 
Palace with 400,000 signatures. But unionists failed to realise that the AIA would not be 
undone. Dublin and London were committed to the mechanisms of the Agreement, foremost 
in communicating with each other. Paisley and Molyneaux must have realised this as they 
agreed to meet with King. Their idea for a party conference with London was hardly ground 
                                                
152 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/56, meeting between Haughey and MT, 4-5 December 1987. Underline in original document. 
153 TNA UK, CJ 4/6877, combatting terrorism in Northern Ireland, 18 Dec. 1987. 
154 TNA UK, CJ 4/6877, draft agreement, steps to improve the security situation in Northern Ireland, 18 Dec. 1987. 
155 TNA UK, FCO 87/2435, letter from Parker to George, 30 Dec. 1987. 
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breaking, but it was a start. Events in Northern Ireland and Ireland overshadowed the 
unionists. 
 
 It began with the return of Haughey as Taoiseach. Haughey had previously spelt out 
his opposition to the AIA, but on becoming Taoiseach decided to support the Agreement. 
Haughey did not want to ‘spark another crisis with London,’ memories of Thatcher’s last 
hand-bagging in 1980 must have still been vivid. Dublin set out to get along with London in 
spite of Haughey’s private doubts over the AIA and ever increasing paramilitary activity in 
Northern Ireland. The Stalker/Sampson report, completed in March, failed to allay nationalist 
mistrust in the Northern Ireland Justice system and the security services. The Loughgall 
ambush confirmed to many critics that there was a shoot-to-kill policy in force in Northern 
Ireland. Meanwhile, the PIRA received a propaganda boost from the funeral of Marley, 
which was handled disastrously by the RUC. The group also had the support of a variety of 
countries, but most notably Libya. Gaddafi had openly said he supported the armed struggle 
against Britain and the discovery of The Eksund confirmed that the mad dog of the Middle 
East had sent the PIRA an extensive cargo of arms and ammunition.  
 
 As violence increased, contact between Dublin and London continued steadily. 
Thatcher and Haughey had a friendly meeting at the EEC in June where Haughey said he 
was more concerned by the Irish economy than Northern Ireland. London was anxious to get 
the ECST passed but Dublin was slow on the up-take. London ramped the pressure up after 
the summer break but Dublin refused to budge. They were adamant that they needed twelve 
months to get the bill passed through the Dáil. If they tried any earlier, Haughey would risk 
leaving the Taoiseach’s office again. That all changed following the Enniskillen Bomb. The 
fact that Gaddafi condemned the attack is indicative of the level of shock and revulsion the 
PIRA’s plan warranted. Dublin continued to tell London that they could not rush through the 
ECST, but Haughey suddenly announced a new amendment to the act that confirmed to 
Thatcher that he would conduct gesture politics throughout his term.156 
 
                                                
156 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 407. 
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Haughey wanted to gain control over British extradition requests. He did not want to 
be accused of being Thatcher’s puppet. So his extradition act included the caveat that any 
requests had to go through the Irish Attorney General first. Thatcher was furious. When she 
met Haughey in December, Dublin’s record of the meeting shows she bombarded Haughey 
with a rant that left him with little room for manoeuvre. He tried to flatter her, telling her she 
was the only Prime Minister capable of dealing with the complicated Northern Ireland issue 
effectively. But Thatcher had reached her limit. Haughey asked her to give the amended 
ECST a try. Her reply, ‘We will try it: we have no option’ reflects her overall weariness with 
Dublin and Northern Ireland at the end of 1987.157 
 
This chapter has highlighted how a change of leader can affect Anglo-Irish relations. 
For the first time, we can fully understand how the return of Haughey in 1987 impacted 
Anglo-Irish relations. The two leaders had last fallen out back in 1982. Five years later, 
Thatcher still felt wary of Haughey. Haughey’s contradicting speeches on the AIA coupled 
with his decision to try to control British extradition requests proved to Thatcher that there 
was little point in engaging with Haughey. During their last meeting in 1987, she told him 
she had ‘no option.’ This is a far cry from the Iron Lady the media and general public believe 
Thatcher to be. She was truly disappointed that the AIA had not solved the Northern Ireland 
problem. Indeed, if anything, Enniskillen seemed to prove that it had made the situation 
worse. Thatcher admitted that she had little idea of what to do next and instead turned her 
attention to the wider world. This theme continues up and until she left the Prime Minister’s 









                                                
157 NAI, TAOIS 2017/10/56, meeting between Haughey and MT, 4-5 December 1987. 
 265 
Epilogue 
“No selfish strategic interest”: Anglo-Irish relations, 1988-1990 
 
Following Margaret Thatcher and Charles Haughey’s December 1987 meeting, Anglo-Irish 
relations became stagnant. According to her memoirs, Enniskillen confirmed two things to 
Thatcher; that ‘terrorism would have to be met with more and more effective counter-terrorist 
activity’; and that the best way forward was to ‘stand almost alone’ when it came to Northern 
Ireland.1 We can see from the available records that before she left No. 10 in November 1990 
Thatcher did not meet with Haughey in the margins of an Anglo-Irish summit again.2 The 
two premiers continued to meet during EEC summits, but in 1990 Haughey asked that he and 
Thatcher no longer treat Northern Ireland as a key issue.3 Haughey and Thatcher both turned 
their attention to the wider political stage.  
 
After her incredibly successful Moscow visit in 1987 Thatcher became an 
internationally recognised world leader.4 She had spoken about the need to help the people 
of Eastern Europe who lived under communism.5 Now, with the help of Ronald Reagan, she 
was in a position to make a move. Haughey meanwhile, wanted to remain as Taoiseach for 
as long as possible. The Irish economy proved to be a greater priority in the late 1980’s and 
Ireland’s presidency of the Council of the European Union (CEU) gave Haughey the 
opportunity to parade as President on the international stage.6 Then, just before Thatcher 
resigned as leader, Peter Brooke, who had replaced Tom King as Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland in 1989, made the Whitbread speech in which the British Government 
confirmed it had ‘no selfish strategic interest in Northern Ireland: our role is to help, enable 
                                                
1 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 407. 
2 CAIN, ‘A Chronology of the Conflict,’ 1988 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch88.htm, 1989 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch89.htm, 1990 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch90.htm. For an analysis of the 
Thatcher Government and Northern Ireland from 1988-1990 see Spencer (eds.), The British and Peace in Northern Ireland, 
chpts. 1 and 5 and Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 406-415. 
3 TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, minute from Butler to Powell, 19 Apr. 1990. 
4 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two, pp. 614-634 and 670-672, Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 478-485, 
5 Charles Moore interviewed for ‘Charles Moore: Margaret Thatcher and the Cold War,’ Institute of Economic Affairs, 
2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rMvJaXDQMsg. 
6 TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, Fenn 331 to Kerr, 17 Apr. 1990. See also Kelly, Failed Political Entity, pp. 334-340 and 
Whelan, Fianna Fáil, pp. 229-250 for an assessment of Haughey’s priorities between 1988 and 1990. 
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and encourage.’7 13 days later, Thatcher resigned as Prime Minister and withdrew from front-
line politics. 
 
As the majority of files from Belfast, Dublin and London for the years 1988-1990 are 
still withheld, this epilogue takes advantage of secondary and published primary sources to 
describe how Thatcher’s focus on Northern Ireland began to wane in the final years of her 
premiership.8 Her involvement with Northern Ireland affairs decreased as she turned her 
attention to world affairs, most notably the Cold War. Thatcher was no longer interested in 
maintaining a relationship with Dublin, and vice versa. Haughey wanted to elevate Ireland’s 
position onto the global stage and secure his position as Taoiseach. Thatcher’s Government 
had ‘no selfish strategic interest’ in Northern Ireland.9 
 
‘Appalling savagery’: 1988 
March 1988 saw two weeks of escalated paramilitary activity from both sides of the divide. 
It started with the deaths of three PIRA volunteers, Seán Savage, Daniel McCann and 
Mairéad Farrell, in Gibraltar. The three suspects were shot dead by plain-clothed SAS 
soldiers. It was suspected that the three had planned to attack the changing of the guard 
ceremony outside the residence of the Governor of Gibraltar with a bomb. It later emerged 
that Savage, McCann and Farrell were unarmed when they were shot, and no car bomb was 
found. This all sounded alarmingly similar to the incidents investigated by the 
Stalker/Sampson inquiry (see chapter seven). The television documentary, Death on the 
Rock, further scandalised the incident.10 The bodies of Savage, McCann and Farrell were 
flown home to Belfast.  
 
 A large crowd had gathered for the joint funeral service and burial at Milltown 
Cemetery. As the third coffin was lowered into the ground, Michael Stone, a member of the 
                                                
7 Dixon and O’Kane, Northern Ireland, pp. 142-143 for the entire speech.  
8 The majority of the PREM files covering 1988-1990 are withheld under the Freedom of Information Act for security 
reasons. They are due to be reconsidered in 2019. The only file that was available for consultation for this epilogue was 
PREM 19/3403. PREM 19/2274 was released 20 days before the submission deadline of this thesis. Therefore, articles from 
The Irish Times covering the release are referred to in place of the file itself. 
9 The ‘Whitbread speech’ is printed in full in Dixon and O’Kane, Northern Ireland Since 1969, pp. 142-143. 
10 ‘Death on the Rock’ is available to watch on YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7MBqTw2vl0. For more on 
the Gibraltar killings see especially, Nicholas Eckert, Fatal Encounter: The Story of the Gibraltar Killings (Dublin: Poolbeg, 
1999). 
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loyalist paramilitary UDA, threw a grenade towards the crowd. Stone hoped to kill Gerry 
Adams and Martin McGuiness but failed. He continued to throw grenades and fired as he ran 
towards the M1 motorway. He killed three people and injured at least sixty others before he 
was apprehended by members of the crowd, badly beaten and arrested by the RUC.11  
 
The funeral of Caoimhín Mac Brádaigh, one of Stone’s victims, took place three days 
later. As the funeral procession travelled towards Milltown Cemetery, a silver Volkswagen 
Passat drove towards the funeral. The car was trapped by the funeral procession who believed 
they were under attack by loyalists. Two plain-clothed soldiers, Corporals Derek Wood and 
David Howes, were in the car. As the crowd surged, Wood fired his handgun, briefly 
scattering the crowd. The corporals were eventually overpowered. All of this happened in 
full view of the media who recorded the Corporals being dragged from their car.12 They were 
beaten before being taken to a waste ground where they were further beaten, stripped, 
searched, stabbed and shot.13 Thatcher was outraged by the murder of the corporals. She told 
the BBC it was an act of ‘appalling savagery.’14 In her memoirs, Thatcher wrote, ‘No one 
who saw the film of the lynching of the two young soldiers trapped by that frenzied 
Republican mob … will believe that reason or goodwill can ever be a substitute for force 
when dealing with Irish Republican terrorism.’15 In light of these events, Haughey requested 
a meeting with Nicholas Fenn.  
 
Communications between Dublin and London had decreased to the extent that there 
was no contact from London after any of the incidents in March. Haughey asked Fenn if 
Thatcher was ‘trying to destabilise his administration. We’d come from the relative harmony 
of Enniskillen to full crisis in the space of a few weeks in Dublin; and London hadn’t 
noticed.’16 Fenn later recalled that he had tried to keep London updated, but that ‘if British 
Ambassadors in Dublin want to be heard, they need to shout, because the British government 
                                                
11 McKittrick, Lost Lives, pp. 1117-1124. Footage of Stone’s attack is on YouTube, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCfjifKmk2U. For more on the Milltown Cemetery Killings, see especially Martin 
Dillon, Stone Cold: The True Story of Michael Stone and the Milltown Massacre (London: Hutchinson, 1992). 
12 This footage is also on YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhfgQOLSrTQ.  
13 McKittrick, Lost Lives, pp. 1120-1124.  
14 MTF, Margaret Thatcher remarks on IRA lynching of Corporals Wood and Howes, 19 Mar. 1988,  
15 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 407.  
16 BDOHP, interview with Nicholas Fenn, 2010. 
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is always too busy fighting a war in the Balkans or wherever it may be.’ Fenn tried to grab 
Thatcher’s attention with a brief entitled “Litany of Horror”. In it he advised that contact 
should be maintained in accordance with the AIA. Fenn was then called to London by 
Thatcher who, by this time ‘regarded Haughey with utter contempt.’ She was furious with 
Fenn because she felt he had defended Haughey, 
 
She was icily civil. She acknowledged that I should go on telling the truth, but she 
said I should tell Mr. Haughey in the language that she had just used to me, what she 
thought of him. And then she got up and the interview was clearly at an end, and she 
hissed in my ear as I left the room: “Go back to Ireland where you belong”. 
 
Fenn then had to tell Haughey what Thatcher said, 
 
I carried out the Prime Minister’s instructions. Haughey was visibly shocked. I told 
him what she thought of him. I shan’t repeat it. And he said: “The Prime Minister has 
lost confidence in me”. I said: “Yes, Taoiseach”. “Confidence once lost cannot be 
restored”. “That’s a counsel of despair”. “The Irish have lived with despair for 800 
years”. That was the flavour of this difficult passage in our relations with the Irish in 
1988.17 
 
Through the interim period from March 1988 to April 1990, it remains unknown what, if any, 
structures were put in place to recover relations between Thatcher and Haughey. In October 
1988, the British Government introduced a broadcasting ban. The voices of members of Sinn 
Féin, the UDA and the PIRA, to name a few, were prohibited. This left the Thatcher 
Government open to more accusations of censorship, but Thatcher wrote that she believed 
the ban worked (even though journalists found a loophole and used actors voices for their 
reports).18 To her mind, the undesirables in Northern Ireland were silenced. From the 
available records we can see that both Haughey and Thatcher began to pay more attention to, 
and take more interest in, world affairs from 1989 onwards. 
 
                                                
17 BDOHP, interview with Fenn, 2010 and The Irish Times, 24 July 2018. 
18 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 412. For more on the broadcasting ban see Mary Corcoran and Mark O’Brien, Political 
Censorship and the Democratic State: The Irish Broadcasting Ban (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005) and The Media and 
Northern Ireland, ed., by Bill Rolston, (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1991). 
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‘Confidence once lost cannot be restored’: 1989-1990 
 Thatcher’s trip to Moscow in March 1987 saw her transform from a ‘suburban housewife’ 
to a ‘senior statesman of the Western World.’19 She also got along famously with Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the Secretary of the communist party.20 Back in 1984 she told the BBC, ‘I like 
Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together.’ She enjoyed the 1987 Moscow visit, and 
relations between the two only improved as they continued to visit each other.21 Her 
relationship with Reagan also continued to blossom as the pair worked on bringing the Cold 
War to a peaceful end.22 Meanwhile, Haughey also began to take an interest in global politics. 
 
From January to July 1990, the Republic of Ireland held the Presidency of the CEU. 
This position gave Haughey the chance to rub shoulders with the European Heads of State in 
a way he had not been able to before. As Fenn surmised, ‘Haughey is enjoying his presidency 
role. His tour of capitals has given him an entrée to Heads of State and government which he 
has not previously enjoyed.’23 Ireland’s presidency came at a time of enormous change for 
Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 had spelt the end of the Cold War and 
of Communism in Europe.24 Haughey relished his time at the helm of a changing world order. 
He underwent ‘a conversion to European political union’ and supported German 
unification.25 There were also changes in Northern Ireland 
 
Peter Brooke’s appointment as Secretary of State of Northern Ireland in July 1989 
marked another shift in Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy. King had failed to gain the 
affection or respect of either community in Northern Ireland.26 Unionists especially disliked 
him as he presided over the years after the AIA. Ian Paisley referred to him as ‘Tomcat’ 
                                                
19 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two, p. 670.  
20 Mikhail Gorbachov, Soviet politician. Second Secretary of the communist Party of the Soviet Union 1984-1985, General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985-1991, President of the Soviet Union 1990-1991. 
21 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 478-485, p. 792, p. 786 and pp. 805-806. See also Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two for 
more on how relations between MT and Gorbachev grew. Gorbachev came to see MT in April 1989. MT visited Gorbachev 
in Sept. 1989 and MT had a final visit to Moscow as Prime Minister in June 1990. 
22 See Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two and John O’Sullivan, The President, the Pope and the Prime Minister: Three Who 
Changed the World (Washington: Regnery, 2006). 
23 TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, Fenn 331 to Kerr, 17 Apr. 1990. 
24 For more on the end of the Cold War, see Saki Dockrill, The End of the Cold War Era: The Transformation of the Global 
Security Order (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005). 
25 TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, Fenn 331 to Kerr, 17 Apr. 1990. 
26 Cochrane, Unionist Politics, chpt. 7. 
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King.27 Three civilians from the Republic of Ireland were charged with attempting to 
assassinate King in October 1988.28 Brooke, ‘a Tory of the old school,’ was a different 
character. Thatcher reflected that his ‘unflappable good humour’ made him an ideal Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland.29 But on taking the job, Thatcher asked him not to embark on 
any new ventures in Northern Ireland before the next UK general election.30 Thatcher had 
won her last General Election in 1987. She wanted Brooke to stand pat until told otherwise. 
Relations between Dublin and London also slowed down. 
 
In the final year of her premiership, Thatcher and Haughey met twice. These meetings 
occurred because Haughey was visiting members of the European Council in his capacity as 
President. From the documents in PREM 19/3403, we can see that the content of these 
meetings was wholly different from the Teapot Summit of 1980. Ahead of the first meeting 
in April, Haughey requested that any discussion of Anglo-Irish affairs be limited to ‘two or 
three sentences.’ Haughey wanted to talk about the April European Council meeting 
instead.31 London’s record of the meeting shows that Northern Ireland received ‘a few 
minutes’ attention. ‘It was a gentle, almost torpid, encounter.’ Many contemporaries, 
including John Major who would replace Thatcher as Prime Minister in November 1990, 
recalled that in the later years of her premiership Thatcher became more argumentative. It 
was her way of reaching a decision.32 But her relations with Haughey had cooled to the extent 
that she did not challenge him over security like she used to. There were no decisions to make 
with Haughey. She told Haughey that efforts were being made on Northern Ireland in London 
but did not expand on what they were. Haughey replied that he was ‘happy to leave it to the 
Northern Ireland Secretary to try to sort it all out.’33 A similar approach was adopted at the 
final Haughey-Thatcher meeting in June. 
 
                                                
27 Jeremy Smith, Making the Peace in Ireland (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 171.  
28 The three accused, Finbarr Cullen, John McCann and Martina Shanahan, were reportedly supporters of the PIRA but were 
not members. The Irish Examiner, The Irish Press and The Irish Times, 13 Oct. 1988. 
29 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 414. See also Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, chpt. 7 for 
more on Brooke’s personality.  
30 Emma Kilheeney, ‘Ministers Advise, Prime Minister’s Decide? Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland and Policy 
Making During the Thatcher Years,’ PhD thesis, 2016, University of Manchester, Manchester, p. 199.  
31 TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, minute from Butler to Powell, 19 Apr. 1990. 
32 Major, The Autobiography, pp. 84-85. See also Shepherd, The Real Iron Lady for more on Thatcher’s love of argument.  
33 TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, letter from Powell to Gozney, 20 Apr. 1990. 
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 Before the meeting, Gerry Collins and Brooke agreed that there would be no 
‘substantive exchanges.’34 The meeting was held over lunch and was a casual affair. From 
London’s record of the meeting, it appears that Haughey took the lead of the discussion, 
 
Mr. Haughey whisked through the official business in record time, showing very little 
disposition to get into an argument. We had disposed of the European Council before 
the first course was served, and Anglo-Irish relations only a couple of mouthfuls into 
it. But we did have a very interesting time on the early Irish Saints, the state of 
Georgian houses in Ireland, the Prime Minister’s traveller’s tales from the Soviet 
Union, and the World Cup match between England and Ireland. I feel a bit of a sneak 
letting you know all this. But it would otherwise be difficult to explain the exiguous 
record …35 
 
Haughey added that he appreciated Brooke’s effort to start talks with the Northern Ireland 
parties and that ‘The Republic was being as helpful as it could behind the scenes and trying 
to avoid saying anything which might appear insensitive.’36 Although no record exists, 
Thatcher must have allowed Brooke to organise an all party (bar Sinn Féin) conference. 
Brooke wrote to Thatcher on 25 July to say that the talks would be delayed until Autumn 
1990.37 Four days later, the PIRA reminded Thatcher of the threat they posed. 
 
  Thatcher’s close friend and Northern Ireland advisor, Ian Gow, was assassinated by 
the PIRA outside his home in West Sussex. Northern Ireland was ‘Gow’s political passion’ 
and his resignation in protest of the AIA had distressed Thatcher in 1985.38 Thatcher likened 
her reaction to Gow’s death to that of Airey Neave’s, ‘I experienced again something of that 
deep personal grief I had felt when Airey was killed.’39 After Neave’s death in 1979 Thatcher 
started a dialogue with Dublin that she hoped would result in improved security cooperation. 
London’s next move on Northern Ireland was the opposite. 
 
                                                
34 TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, letter from Pope to Powell, 12 June 1990. 
35 TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, letter from Powell to Wall, 13 June 1990. 
36 iBid.,  
37 TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, minute from Brooke to MT, 25 July 1990. 
38 The Guardian, 31 July 1990.  
39 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 414. 
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 On 9 November, Brooke made a key speech on Northern Ireland. The content of the 
speech was as important as the timing. Brooke’s speech was meant to ‘focus the minds of 
nationalists and republicans, Irish politicians, Irish Americans and others on the real nature 
of that (British) presence.’40 The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland had ‘no selfish strategic’ in Northern Ireland. Should a majority vote for 
unity with the Republic of Ireland the UK would accept it.41 ‘The message was not what the 
role was, rather than what it was misrepresented as being. In essence, it was to stand behind 
the consent principle, ‘which left the ultimate destiny of Northern Ireland in the hands and 
votes of its own people.’42 As Patterson asserts, the end of the Cold War played a pivotal role 
in Brooke’s speech. There was a new world order and other national liberation groups had 
opted for dialogue over violence.43 John Chilcot, who served as Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland from 1990-1997, said of the Whitbread speech, ‘It was a useful 
message to convey to the Provisionals that we did not want to hang on to Northern Ireland 
for strategic reasons.’44 Brooke’s speech made a deep impact on the Republican movement 
and opened the way for talks between Sinn Féin and Downing Street.45 13 days after Brooke’s 
speech, there was more change in store for the Northern Ireland Peace Process. 
 
  Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister came to an end on 22 November 1990. Following 
Geoffrey Howe’s damaging ‘conflict of loyalty’ resignation speech to the Commons on 13 
November, Michael Heseltine launched a leadership challenge that Thatcher stood little 
chance of surviving.46 Her colleagues in government were weary of her confrontational style 
of leadership. Heseltine wrote that Major’s Government marked a change in atmosphere at 
No. 10, ‘In contrast to the Thatcher years, everyone was allowed their say. Arguments were 
countered by reason and not interrupted or shouted down. Personal abuse and raised voices 
were never part of the currency.’47 The Iron Lady’s tenure was over and the Northern Ireland 
Peace Process moved on.
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46 ‘Personal Statement,’ Commons sitting of 13 Nov. 1990, Hansard HC [431-556] cc. 461-465. 




Irish attention to Anglo-Irish relations was obsessive and constant. British attention was 
fitful and occasional: we tended only to notice them when they got up and hit us, which is 
maybe why they hit us so often.1 
 
The overarching question this thesis sought to answer was why did Thatcher’s Northern 
Ireland policy alter over her eleven-year tenure? She changed from referring to Northern 
Ireland as ‘as British as Finchley’ in 1981 to announcing through Peter Brooke that the UK 
had ‘no selfish strategic interest’ in the province in 1990.2 This thesis has followed Thatcher’s 
Northern Ireland policy by looking closely at newly released documents from the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Northern Ireland Office, the Department of the Taoiseach and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Through this, the research question expanded with several 
sub-questions.  
 
 First, how did Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy alter as the government of the 
Republic of Ireland was passed between Fianna Fáil, under Charles Haughey, and Fine Gael, 
under Garret FitzGerald. Anglo-Irish relations had gotten off to a rocky start when Thatcher 
met with Jack Lynch. Lynch was tired, disgruntled and had little interest in Northern Ireland. 
Thatcher ‘concluded there was nothing doing with (Lynch).’3 Lynch’s successor, Haughey, 
had a different approach. He ‘set out to charm’ Thatcher, and initially this tactic worked.4 
The Teapot Summit of June 1980 set the tone for the first few months of the Thatcher-
Haughey dynamic. Relations remained friendly until Brian Lenihan told the press that Anglo-
Irish relations had developed so well that there would be a united Ireland within ten years.5 
Thatcher was incensed. First-hand accounts tell us that she ‘tore into Haughey’ in a tirade 
that lasted half an hour.6 Haughey made more mistakes, most notably his u-turn over 
sanctions against Argentina during the Falklands War. Although Thatcher viewed Haughey 
                                                
1 BDOHP, interview with Nicholas Fenn, 2010. 
2 ‘Anglo-Irish Bilateral Talks,’ Commons sitting of 10 Nov. 1981, Hansard HC [403-516] cc. 421-428 and Dixon and 
O’Kane, Northern Ireland, pp. 142-143. 
3 Bernard Ingham interviewed for ‘Margaret Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady,’ RTÉ, 2013. 
4 Walter Kirwan interviewed for ‘Margaret Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady,’ RTÉ, 2013. 
5 TNA UK, PREM 19/508, Figg 76 to FCO, 23 Mar. 1981.  
6 Martin Mansergh interviewed for ‘Margaret Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady,’ RTÉ, 2013. 
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with suspicion, she continued to go along with the Anglo-Irish process in line with the advice 
of her Ministers.  
 
 In 1984, negotiations between Dublin and London became formalised through the 
Armstrong-Nally group. This allowed Thatcher to talk to Dublin indirectly without the press 
attention Anglo-Irish elite summits usually warranted. The end result of this process was the 
1985 AIA. Thatcher had been convinced by the Armstrong team that this Agreement was the 
next logical move for Northern Ireland, but her misgivings were confirmed when Ian Gow 
resigned in protest on the morning of the signing. She expected the AIA to be like ‘waving a 
magic wand,’ but the AIA failed to gain the security cooperation with the Republic of Ireland 
that Thatcher wanted.7 This led to the next research theme. How the AIA impacted Thatcher’s 
attitude to Northern Ireland.  
 
Her disappointment at the lack of security cooperation was compounded by the 
increase of paramilitary activity after 1985. Thatcher reluctantly signed the AIA because she 
believed security cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and the UK would improve. 
Thatcher had been convinced by her friend and shadow Northern Ireland advisor, Airey 
Neave, that the Northern Ireland problem was a military one. The AIA formalised diplomacy 
between Dublin and London but resulted in a series of protests by the unionist alliance in 
Northern Ireland. FitzGerald had said in 1986 that it was time for the Republic of Ireland to 
sign the ECST as most other European countries already had. He instead tried to use the 
treaty as a bargaining tool to get concessions on the Courts System in Northern Ireland. When 
FitzGerald left the Taoiseach’s office for the final time in March 1987, the ECST had not 
been ratified by the Dáil. Haughey’s decision to stall the process led Thatcher to conclude 
that the Republic of Ireland would conduct ‘gesture politics.’8 After the Enniskillen bomb, 
the Dáil ratified the ECST, but Haughey’s caveat that all extradition cases had to be made to 
and approved by the Irish Attorney General enraged Thatcher. Arthur described how Anglo-
Irish relations moved through two stages from 1979 to 1990; a military response due to 
                                                
7 Seán Donlon, interviewed for ‘Thatcher and the IRA: Dealing with terror,’ BBC, 2014. 
8 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 407.  
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violence followed by diplomacy.9 This thesis expands on Arthur’s theory by introducing a 
third stage to cover the final years of Thatcher’s premiership; disengagement.  
 
Although the documentation for the years 1988 to 1990 has not been fully released, 
we can see from the available documents that Anglo-Irish relations took a back seat as 
Haughey and Thatcher turned their attention to world affairs. From the available documents 
we now know that when Thatcher and Haughey met in 1990, Northern Ireland was side-lined 
from the main discussion as both parties focused more on remaining friendly. This goes some 
way to explaining why Brooke made the ‘no selfish strategic interest’ speech in the last few 
weeks of Thatcher’s time in office. Thatcher’s government had shifted from protecting 
Northern Ireland to feeling bewildered by it’s politics, people and paramilitaries. Thatcher 
had tried to engage with Dublin and Northern Ireland politicians to little avail. In order to 
fully understand the Whitbread speech, this thesis also explored the impact of personality on 
elite relationships. 
 
Although Thatcher signed the AIA with FitzGerald, in her autobiography she was 
rather unkind towards him. She labelled him a ‘cosmopolitan intellectual, more sensitive to 
imagined snubs and more inclined to exaggerate the importance of essentially trivial 
issues.’10 Remarkably Thatcher, according to her own account, was more comfortable with 
Haughey. This is in spite of the fact that she had fallen out with Haughey on three occasions; 
once in December 1980 after the Throne Room summit; then during the Falklands War; and 
after Dublin ratified the ECST in 1987. In 1984 Thatcher handed over the responsibility of 
talking to Dublin to a team headed by Robert Armstrong. This challenges the idea that 
Thatcher was an autocratic leader with a black and white cognitive style.11 In the Anglo-Irish 
arena, Thatcher could be pragmatic. She did not want to sign the AIA, as illustrated by her 
‘out out out’ burst and especially after Gow resigned in protest on the morning of the signing, 
but she was convinced that it was the next logical step. This gives credence to Moore’s 
summation that Thatcher was willing ‘to permit others to do things of which she in theory 
                                                
9 Arthur, Special Relationships.  
10 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 393. 
11 Dyson, ‘Cognitive Style and Foreign Policy,’ pp. 33-48. 
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disapproved.’12 Yet her handwriting over an offer for the 1981 Hunger Strikers suggests that 
Thatcher was a more nuanced leader than has hitherto been appreciated.13  
 
This thesis also suggests that Thatcher was engaged with the Northern Ireland issue 
up and until her ‘out … out … out …’ speech in November 1984. The fact that she had made 
a mistake caused Thatcher’s team deep embarrassment. She in turn ‘pretended not to 
understand what the fuss was about.’14 Following this, Thatcher offered to conduct more 
Anglo-Irish summits in place of an actual apology to FitzGerald. She sidestepped her own 
misgivings about the AIA but continued to regret it. In the years succeeding the AIA 
Thatcher’s uncertainty was confirmed to her as paramilitary activity from both sides of the 
divide escalated. This led her to take her anger out on Haughey and Nicholas Fenn in 1987 
and 1988. In 1987 Thatcher began to consider her position as a world leader and transformed 
into a ‘statesman’ during her 1987 visit to Moscow.15 Haughey, in turn, wanted to stay in the 
Taoiseach’s office for as long as possible. His position as President of the CEU gave him the 
chance to act as a world leader, a role he relished. Surprisingly, and in contradiction with 
Kelly’s hypothesis that ‘… Ulster … always remained close to (Haughey’s) heart,’ for their 
meeting in April 1990 Haughey requested that any discussion of Anglo-Irish affairs be 
limited to ‘two or three sentences.’16 By the time Thatcher left Downing Street both she and 
Haughey had turned their attention to global politics.  
 
This thesis has also attempted to follow Anglo-Irish relations using records from the 
archives in Dublin and London. Previous works have focused on records either from Dublin 
(Stephen Kelly) or London (Charles Moore). This thesis offers a dual view of relations 
between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach. It also introduces an interesting look into how 
records of meetings and verbatim accounts differed between London and Dublin. How one 
side interpreted conversation allows us to explore the priorities of each side in a more detailed 
way than has hitherto been possible.   
 
                                                
12 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. 2, p. 318. 
13 TNA UK, PREM 19/506, letter from Whitmore to Boys-Smith, 8 July 1981. 
14 Aitken, Thatcher, p. 418.  
15 Moore, Thatcher: Vol. Two, p. 670.  
16 Kelly, Failed Political Entity, p. 25 and TNA UK, PREM 19/3403, minute from Butler to Powell, 19 Apr. 1990. 
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This thesis has expanded on the current literature by using newly released 
documentation from the archives covering the years 1979 to 1990. However, due to concerns 
with international relations and security, the PREM files covering the years 1988 to 1990 are 
still withheld by the Cabinet Office. Records from the Department of the Taoiseach and 
Foreign Affairs in Dublin will continue to be released under the 30-year rule over the next 
three years. Individual documents contained in the released files from both Dublin and 
London are withheld, or certain pieces of information have been redacted. If these records 
and pieces of information are made available to the public, there will be further opportunity 
to expand on the period this work has covered.  
 
The overarching research question has been answered. The Thatcher government’s 
Northern Ireland policy changed due to a number of factors, namely Thatcher’s own 
disappointment with security cooperation and continued paramilitary activity. Thatcher 
concluded her chapter on Northern Ireland in her autobiography with a reflection that it was 
‘surely time to consider an alternative approach’ to the province.17 Her eleven years in the 
Prime Minister’s Office did not result in a solution to the Northern Ireland problem. But the 
work of Thatcher and her selected team laid the groundwork for the 1993 Downing Street 
Declaration and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. This is often disputed in the existing 
historiography. Thatcher herself reflected that the AIA failed to gain her the security 
cooperation she wanted, while Adams, in an article published after her death, lambasted 
Thatcher’s policies and accused her of making ‘the North of Ireland a more bitterly divided 
place.’18 Dixon and O’Kane, meanwhile, agree that although the long-term impact of the AIA 
was not what Thatcher wanted, the Agreement changed the political arena in Northern Ireland 
and was ‘important in creating the conditions under which the peace process was to emerge 
in the early 1990s.’19 Thatcher has also been treated as a hero (Robin Harris’s 2013 work Not 
for Turning is a celebration of Thatcherism) or a villain (in his two works on Thatcher, The 
Grocer’s Daughter and The Iron Lady, John Campbell is barely able to hide his contempt for 
Thatcher’s policies). The aim of this work has been to present a factual account of the 
Thatcher Government’s Northern Ireland policy.  
                                                
17 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 415. 
18 iBid., p. 415, The Guardian, 9 Apr. 2013.  
19 Dixon and O’Kane, Northern Ireland Since 1969, p. 64. 
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What this work discovers is that although Thatcher wanted to portray herself as the 
Iron Lady of Great Britain, when it came to Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations she 
discovered she was out of her depth. Her basic grasp of the Northern Ireland problem came 
from Neave. Northern Ireland was a security problem and therefore needed a military-based 
solution. The key to achieving this was closer cooperation with, and gaining security 
concessions from, the Republic of Ireland. Both her own Northern Ireland advisors their 
counterparts in Dublin, and her own counterpart the Taoiseach, especially Garret FitzGerald, 
were determined to educate her on other solutions to the Northern Ireland problem. Yet, as 
this thesis shows, even after the AIA Thatcher was unable to consider any other course of 
action. This is not to say she was ignorant, on the contrary she was incredibly sharp and she 
did attempt to read up on the history of Ireland. Her extensive annotations and notes 
contained within the PREM files proves this. But there were also other international issues 
which commanded her interest and attention. Things may have been different if FitzGerald 
had stayed on as Taoiseach into the late 1980s, but the return of Haughey sealed Thatcher’s 
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